linux/security
Mauricio Faria de Oliveira 039a79ef0b apparmor: check/put label on apparmor_sk_clone_security()
[ Upstream commit 3b646abc5b ]

Currently apparmor_sk_clone_security() does not check for existing
label/peer in the 'new' struct sock; it just overwrites it, if any
(with another reference to the label of the source sock.)

    static void apparmor_sk_clone_security(const struct sock *sk,
                                           struct sock *newsk)
    {
            struct aa_sk_ctx *ctx = SK_CTX(sk);
            struct aa_sk_ctx *new = SK_CTX(newsk);

            new->label = aa_get_label(ctx->label);
            new->peer = aa_get_label(ctx->peer);
    }

This might leak label references, which might overflow under load.
Thus, check for and put labels, to prevent such errors.

Note this is similarly done on:

    static int apparmor_socket_post_create(struct socket *sock, ...)
    ...
            if (sock->sk) {
                    struct aa_sk_ctx *ctx = SK_CTX(sock->sk);

                    aa_put_label(ctx->label);
                    ctx->label = aa_get_label(label);
            }
    ...

Context:
-------

The label reference count leak is observed if apparmor_sock_graft()
is called previously: this sets the 'ctx->label' field by getting
a reference to the current label (later overwritten, without put.)

    static void apparmor_sock_graft(struct sock *sk, ...)
    {
            struct aa_sk_ctx *ctx = SK_CTX(sk);

            if (!ctx->label)
                    ctx->label = aa_get_current_label();
    }

And that is the case on crypto/af_alg.c:af_alg_accept():

    int af_alg_accept(struct sock *sk, struct socket *newsock, ...)
    ...
            struct sock *sk2;
            ...
            sk2 = sk_alloc(...);
            ...
            security_sock_graft(sk2, newsock);
            security_sk_clone(sk, sk2);
    ...

Apparently both calls are done on their own right, especially for
other LSMs, being introduced in 2010/2014, before apparmor socket
mediation in 2017 (see commits [1,2,3,4]).

So, it looks OK there! Let's fix the reference leak in apparmor.

Test-case:
---------

Exercise that code path enough to overflow label reference count.

    $ cat aa-refcnt-af_alg.c
    #include <stdio.h>
    #include <string.h>
    #include <unistd.h>
    #include <sys/socket.h>
    #include <linux/if_alg.h>

    int main() {
            int sockfd;
            struct sockaddr_alg sa;

            /* Setup the crypto API socket */
            sockfd = socket(AF_ALG, SOCK_SEQPACKET, 0);
            if (sockfd < 0) {
                    perror("socket");
                    return 1;
            }

            memset(&sa, 0, sizeof(sa));
            sa.salg_family = AF_ALG;
            strcpy((char *) sa.salg_type, "rng");
            strcpy((char *) sa.salg_name, "stdrng");

            if (bind(sockfd, (struct sockaddr *) &sa, sizeof(sa)) < 0) {
                    perror("bind");
                    return 1;
            }

            /* Accept a "connection" and close it; repeat. */
            while (!close(accept(sockfd, NULL, 0)));

            return 0;
    }

    $ gcc -o aa-refcnt-af_alg aa-refcnt-af_alg.c

    $ ./aa-refcnt-af_alg
    <a few hours later>

    [ 9928.475953] refcount_t overflow at apparmor_sk_clone_security+0x37/0x70 in aa-refcnt-af_alg[1322], uid/euid: 1000/1000
    ...
    [ 9928.507443] RIP: 0010:apparmor_sk_clone_security+0x37/0x70
    ...
    [ 9928.514286]  security_sk_clone+0x33/0x50
    [ 9928.514807]  af_alg_accept+0x81/0x1c0 [af_alg]
    [ 9928.516091]  alg_accept+0x15/0x20 [af_alg]
    [ 9928.516682]  SYSC_accept4+0xff/0x210
    [ 9928.519609]  SyS_accept+0x10/0x20
    [ 9928.520190]  do_syscall_64+0x73/0x130
    [ 9928.520808]  entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x3d/0xa2

Note that other messages may be seen, not just overflow, depending on
the value being incremented by kref_get(); on another run:

    [ 7273.182666] refcount_t: saturated; leaking memory.
    ...
    [ 7273.185789] refcount_t: underflow; use-after-free.

Kprobes:
-------

Using kprobe events to monitor sk -> sk_security -> label -> count (kref):

Original v5.7 (one reference leak every iteration)

 ... (af_alg_accept+0x0/0x1c0) label=0xffff8a0f36c25eb0 label_refcnt=0x11fd2
 ... (af_alg_release_parent+0x0/0xd0) label=0xffff8a0f36c25eb0 label_refcnt=0x11fd4
 ... (af_alg_accept+0x0/0x1c0) label=0xffff8a0f36c25eb0 label_refcnt=0x11fd3
 ... (af_alg_release_parent+0x0/0xd0) label=0xffff8a0f36c25eb0 label_refcnt=0x11fd5
 ... (af_alg_accept+0x0/0x1c0) label=0xffff8a0f36c25eb0 label_refcnt=0x11fd4
 ... (af_alg_release_parent+0x0/0xd0) label=0xffff8a0f36c25eb0 label_refcnt=0x11fd6

Patched v5.7 (zero reference leak per iteration)

 ... (af_alg_accept+0x0/0x1c0) label=0xffff9ff376c25eb0 label_refcnt=0x593
 ... (af_alg_release_parent+0x0/0xd0) label=0xffff9ff376c25eb0 label_refcnt=0x594
 ... (af_alg_accept+0x0/0x1c0) label=0xffff9ff376c25eb0 label_refcnt=0x593
 ... (af_alg_release_parent+0x0/0xd0) label=0xffff9ff376c25eb0 label_refcnt=0x594
 ... (af_alg_accept+0x0/0x1c0) label=0xffff9ff376c25eb0 label_refcnt=0x593
 ... (af_alg_release_parent+0x0/0xd0) label=0xffff9ff376c25eb0 label_refcnt=0x594

Commits:
-------

[1] commit 507cad355f ("crypto: af_alg - Make sure sk_security is initialized on accept()ed sockets")
[2] commit 4c63f83c2c ("crypto: af_alg - properly label AF_ALG socket")
[3] commit 2acce6aa9f ("Networking") a.k.a ("crypto: af_alg - Avoid sock_graft call warning)
[4] commit 56974a6fcf ("apparmor: add base infastructure for socket mediation")

Fixes: 56974a6fcf ("apparmor: add base infastructure for socket mediation")
Reported-by: Brian Moyles <bmoyles@netflix.com>
Signed-off-by: Mauricio Faria de Oliveira <mfo@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2020-06-24 17:50:19 +02:00
..
apparmor apparmor: check/put label on apparmor_sk_clone_security() 2020-06-24 17:50:19 +02:00
integrity ima: Set again build_ima_appraise variable 2020-06-22 09:31:17 +02:00
keys mm: add kvfree_sensitive() for freeing sensitive data objects 2020-06-17 16:40:23 +02:00
loadpin proc/sysctl: add shared variables for range check 2019-07-18 17:08:07 -07:00
lockdown lockdown: Allow unprivileged users to see lockdown status 2020-06-22 09:30:53 +02:00
safesetid LSM: SafeSetID: Stop releasing uninitialized ruleset 2019-09-17 11:27:05 -07:00
selinux selinux: fix error return code in policydb_read() 2020-06-22 09:31:01 +02:00
smack Smack: slab-out-of-bounds in vsscanf 2020-06-17 16:40:36 +02:00
tomoyo tomoyo: Use atomic_t for statistics counter 2020-02-05 21:22:41 +00:00
yama proc/sysctl: add shared variables for range check 2019-07-18 17:08:07 -07:00
Kconfig Merge branch 'next-lockdown' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security 2019-09-28 08:14:15 -07:00
Kconfig.hardening meminit fix 2019-07-28 12:33:15 -07:00
Makefile security: Add a static lockdown policy LSM 2019-08-19 21:54:15 -07:00
commoncap.c exec: Always set cap_ambient in cap_bprm_set_creds 2020-06-03 08:21:23 +02:00
device_cgroup.c docs: cgroup-v1: add it to the admin-guide book 2019-07-15 11:03:02 -03:00
inode.c Merge branch 'work.mount0' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/viro/vfs 2019-07-19 10:42:02 -07:00
lsm_audit.c treewide: Replace GPLv2 boilerplate/reference with SPDX - rule 500 2019-06-19 17:09:55 +02:00
min_addr.c
security.c Merge branch 'next-lockdown' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security 2019-09-28 08:14:15 -07:00