qemu-e2k/qemu-doc.texi

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\input texinfo @c -*- texinfo -*-
@c %**start of header
@setfilename qemu-doc.info
@include version.texi
@documentlanguage en
@documentencoding UTF-8
@settitle QEMU version @value{VERSION} User Documentation
@exampleindent 0
@paragraphindent 0
@c %**end of header
@ifinfo
@direntry
* QEMU: (qemu-doc). The QEMU Emulator User Documentation.
@end direntry
@end ifinfo
@iftex
@titlepage
@sp 7
@center @titlefont{QEMU version @value{VERSION}}
@sp 1
@center @titlefont{User Documentation}
@sp 3
@end titlepage
@end iftex
@ifnottex
@node Top
@top
@menu
* Introduction::
* QEMU PC System emulator::
* QEMU System emulator for non PC targets::
* QEMU Guest Agent::
* QEMU User space emulator::
* Implementation notes::
* Deprecated features::
* License::
* Index::
@end menu
@end ifnottex
@contents
@node Introduction
@chapter Introduction
@menu
* intro_features:: Features
@end menu
@node intro_features
@section Features
QEMU is a FAST! processor emulator using dynamic translation to
achieve good emulation speed.
@cindex operating modes
QEMU has two operating modes:
@itemize
@cindex system emulation
@item Full system emulation. In this mode, QEMU emulates a full system (for
example a PC), including one or several processors and various
peripherals. It can be used to launch different Operating Systems
without rebooting the PC or to debug system code.
@cindex user mode emulation
@item User mode emulation. In this mode, QEMU can launch
processes compiled for one CPU on another CPU. It can be used to
launch the Wine Windows API emulator (@url{https://www.winehq.org}) or
to ease cross-compilation and cross-debugging.
@end itemize
QEMU has the following features:
@itemize
@item QEMU can run without a host kernel driver and yet gives acceptable
performance. It uses dynamic translation to native code for reasonable speed,
with support for self-modifying code and precise exceptions.
@item It is portable to several operating systems (GNU/Linux, *BSD, Mac OS X,
Windows) and architectures.
@item It performs accurate software emulation of the FPU.
@end itemize
QEMU user mode emulation has the following features:
@itemize
@item Generic Linux system call converter, including most ioctls.
@item clone() emulation using native CPU clone() to use Linux scheduler for threads.
@item Accurate signal handling by remapping host signals to target signals.
@end itemize
QEMU full system emulation has the following features:
@itemize
@item
QEMU uses a full software MMU for maximum portability.
@item
QEMU can optionally use an in-kernel accelerator, like kvm. The accelerators
execute most of the guest code natively, while
continuing to emulate the rest of the machine.
@item
Various hardware devices can be emulated and in some cases, host
devices (e.g. serial and parallel ports, USB, drives) can be used
transparently by the guest Operating System. Host device passthrough
can be used for talking to external physical peripherals (e.g. a
webcam, modem or tape drive).
@item
Symmetric multiprocessing (SMP) support. Currently, an in-kernel
accelerator is required to use more than one host CPU for emulation.
@end itemize
@node QEMU PC System emulator
@chapter QEMU PC System emulator
@cindex system emulation (PC)
@menu
* pcsys_introduction:: Introduction
* pcsys_quickstart:: Quick Start
* sec_invocation:: Invocation
* pcsys_keys:: Keys in the graphical frontends
* mux_keys:: Keys in the character backend multiplexer
* pcsys_monitor:: QEMU Monitor
* disk_images:: Disk Images
* pcsys_network:: Network emulation
* pcsys_other_devs:: Other Devices
* direct_linux_boot:: Direct Linux Boot
* pcsys_usb:: USB emulation
* vnc_security:: VNC security
* gdb_usage:: GDB usage
* pcsys_os_specific:: Target OS specific information
@end menu
@node pcsys_introduction
@section Introduction
@c man begin DESCRIPTION
The QEMU PC System emulator simulates the
following peripherals:
@itemize @minus
@item
i440FX host PCI bridge and PIIX3 PCI to ISA bridge
@item
Cirrus CLGD 5446 PCI VGA card or dummy VGA card with Bochs VESA
extensions (hardware level, including all non standard modes).
@item
PS/2 mouse and keyboard
@item
2 PCI IDE interfaces with hard disk and CD-ROM support
@item
Floppy disk
@item
PCI and ISA network adapters
@item
Serial ports
@item
IPMI BMC, either and internal or external one
@item
Creative SoundBlaster 16 sound card
@item
ENSONIQ AudioPCI ES1370 sound card
@item
Intel 82801AA AC97 Audio compatible sound card
@item
Intel HD Audio Controller and HDA codec
@item
Adlib (OPL2) - Yamaha YM3812 compatible chip
@item
Gravis Ultrasound GF1 sound card
@item
CS4231A compatible sound card
@item
PCI UHCI, OHCI, EHCI or XHCI USB controller and a virtual USB-1.1 hub.
@end itemize
SMP is supported with up to 255 CPUs.
QEMU uses the PC BIOS from the Seabios project and the Plex86/Bochs LGPL
VGA BIOS.
QEMU uses YM3812 emulation by Tatsuyuki Satoh.
QEMU uses GUS emulation (GUSEMU32 @url{http://www.deinmeister.de/gusemu/})
by Tibor "TS" Schütz.
Note that, by default, GUS shares IRQ(7) with parallel ports and so
QEMU must be told to not have parallel ports to have working GUS.
@example
qemu-system-i386 dos.img -soundhw gus -parallel none
@end example
Alternatively:
@example
qemu-system-i386 dos.img -device gus,irq=5
@end example
Or some other unclaimed IRQ.
CS4231A is the chip used in Windows Sound System and GUSMAX products
@c man end
@node pcsys_quickstart
@section Quick Start
@cindex quick start
Download and uncompress the linux image (@file{linux.img}) and type:
@example
qemu-system-i386 linux.img
@end example
Linux should boot and give you a prompt.
@node sec_invocation
@section Invocation
@example
@c man begin SYNOPSIS
@command{qemu-system-i386} [@var{options}] [@var{disk_image}]
@c man end
@end example
@c man begin OPTIONS
@var{disk_image} is a raw hard disk image for IDE hard disk 0. Some
targets do not need a disk image.
@include qemu-options.texi
@c man end
@subsection Device URL Syntax
@c TODO merge this with section Disk Images
@c man begin NOTES
In addition to using normal file images for the emulated storage devices,
QEMU can also use networked resources such as iSCSI devices. These are
specified using a special URL syntax.
@table @option
@item iSCSI
iSCSI support allows QEMU to access iSCSI resources directly and use as
images for the guest storage. Both disk and cdrom images are supported.
Syntax for specifying iSCSI LUNs is
``iscsi://<target-ip>[:<port>]/<target-iqn>/<lun>''
By default qemu will use the iSCSI initiator-name
'iqn.2008-11.org.linux-kvm[:<name>]' but this can also be set from the command
line or a configuration file.
Since version Qemu 2.4 it is possible to specify a iSCSI request timeout to detect
stalled requests and force a reestablishment of the session. The timeout
is specified in seconds. The default is 0 which means no timeout. Libiscsi
1.15.0 or greater is required for this feature.
Example (without authentication):
@example
qemu-system-i386 -iscsi initiator-name=iqn.2001-04.com.example:my-initiator \
-cdrom iscsi://192.0.2.1/iqn.2001-04.com.example/2 \
-drive file=iscsi://192.0.2.1/iqn.2001-04.com.example/1
@end example
Example (CHAP username/password via URL):
@example
qemu-system-i386 -drive file=iscsi://user%password@@192.0.2.1/iqn.2001-04.com.example/1
@end example
Example (CHAP username/password via environment variables):
@example
LIBISCSI_CHAP_USERNAME="user" \
LIBISCSI_CHAP_PASSWORD="password" \
qemu-system-i386 -drive file=iscsi://192.0.2.1/iqn.2001-04.com.example/1
@end example
@item NBD
QEMU supports NBD (Network Block Devices) both using TCP protocol as well
as Unix Domain Sockets.
Syntax for specifying a NBD device using TCP
``nbd:<server-ip>:<port>[:exportname=<export>]''
Syntax for specifying a NBD device using Unix Domain Sockets
``nbd:unix:<domain-socket>[:exportname=<export>]''
Example for TCP
@example
qemu-system-i386 --drive file=nbd:192.0.2.1:30000
@end example
Example for Unix Domain Sockets
@example
qemu-system-i386 --drive file=nbd:unix:/tmp/nbd-socket
@end example
@item SSH
QEMU supports SSH (Secure Shell) access to remote disks.
Examples:
@example
qemu-system-i386 -drive file=ssh://user@@host/path/to/disk.img
qemu-system-i386 -drive file.driver=ssh,file.user=user,file.host=host,file.port=22,file.path=/path/to/disk.img
@end example
Currently authentication must be done using ssh-agent. Other
authentication methods may be supported in future.
@item Sheepdog
Sheepdog is a distributed storage system for QEMU.
QEMU supports using either local sheepdog devices or remote networked
devices.
Syntax for specifying a sheepdog device
@example
sheepdog[+tcp|+unix]://[host:port]/vdiname[?socket=path][#snapid|#tag]
@end example
Example
@example
qemu-system-i386 --drive file=sheepdog://192.0.2.1:30000/MyVirtualMachine
@end example
See also @url{https://sheepdog.github.io/sheepdog/}.
@item GlusterFS
GlusterFS is a user space distributed file system.
QEMU supports the use of GlusterFS volumes for hosting VM disk images using
TCP, Unix Domain Sockets and RDMA transport protocols.
Syntax for specifying a VM disk image on GlusterFS volume is
@example
URI:
gluster[+type]://[host[:port]]/volume/path[?socket=...][,debug=N][,logfile=...]
JSON:
'json:@{"driver":"qcow2","file":@{"driver":"gluster","volume":"testvol","path":"a.img","debug":N,"logfile":"...",
@ "server":[@{"type":"tcp","host":"...","port":"..."@},
@ @{"type":"unix","socket":"..."@}]@}@}'
@end example
Example
@example
URI:
qemu-system-x86_64 --drive file=gluster://192.0.2.1/testvol/a.img,
@ file.debug=9,file.logfile=/var/log/qemu-gluster.log
JSON:
qemu-system-x86_64 'json:@{"driver":"qcow2",
@ "file":@{"driver":"gluster",
@ "volume":"testvol","path":"a.img",
@ "debug":9,"logfile":"/var/log/qemu-gluster.log",
@ "server":[@{"type":"tcp","host":"1.2.3.4","port":24007@},
@ @{"type":"unix","socket":"/var/run/glusterd.socket"@}]@}@}'
qemu-system-x86_64 -drive driver=qcow2,file.driver=gluster,file.volume=testvol,file.path=/path/a.img,
@ file.debug=9,file.logfile=/var/log/qemu-gluster.log,
@ file.server.0.type=tcp,file.server.0.host=1.2.3.4,file.server.0.port=24007,
@ file.server.1.type=unix,file.server.1.socket=/var/run/glusterd.socket
@end example
See also @url{http://www.gluster.org}.
@item HTTP/HTTPS/FTP/FTPS
QEMU supports read-only access to files accessed over http(s) and ftp(s).
Syntax using a single filename:
@example
<protocol>://[<username>[:<password>]@@]<host>/<path>
@end example
where:
@table @option
@item protocol
'http', 'https', 'ftp', or 'ftps'.
@item username
Optional username for authentication to the remote server.
@item password
Optional password for authentication to the remote server.
@item host
Address of the remote server.
@item path
Path on the remote server, including any query string.
@end table
The following options are also supported:
@table @option
@item url
The full URL when passing options to the driver explicitly.
@item readahead
The amount of data to read ahead with each range request to the remote server.
This value may optionally have the suffix 'T', 'G', 'M', 'K', 'k' or 'b'. If it
does not have a suffix, it will be assumed to be in bytes. The value must be a
multiple of 512 bytes. It defaults to 256k.
@item sslverify
Whether to verify the remote server's certificate when connecting over SSL. It
can have the value 'on' or 'off'. It defaults to 'on'.
@item cookie
Send this cookie (it can also be a list of cookies separated by ';') with
each outgoing request. Only supported when using protocols such as HTTP
which support cookies, otherwise ignored.
@item timeout
Set the timeout in seconds of the CURL connection. This timeout is the time
that CURL waits for a response from the remote server to get the size of the
image to be downloaded. If not set, the default timeout of 5 seconds is used.
@end table
Note that when passing options to qemu explicitly, @option{driver} is the value
of <protocol>.
Example: boot from a remote Fedora 20 live ISO image
@example
qemu-system-x86_64 --drive media=cdrom,file=http://dl.fedoraproject.org/pub/fedora/linux/releases/20/Live/x86_64/Fedora-Live-Desktop-x86_64-20-1.iso,readonly
qemu-system-x86_64 --drive media=cdrom,file.driver=http,file.url=http://dl.fedoraproject.org/pub/fedora/linux/releases/20/Live/x86_64/Fedora-Live-Desktop-x86_64-20-1.iso,readonly
@end example
Example: boot from a remote Fedora 20 cloud image using a local overlay for
writes, copy-on-read, and a readahead of 64k
@example
qemu-img create -f qcow2 -o backing_file='json:@{"file.driver":"http",, "file.url":"https://dl.fedoraproject.org/pub/fedora/linux/releases/20/Images/x86_64/Fedora-x86_64-20-20131211.1-sda.qcow2",, "file.readahead":"64k"@}' /tmp/Fedora-x86_64-20-20131211.1-sda.qcow2
qemu-system-x86_64 -drive file=/tmp/Fedora-x86_64-20-20131211.1-sda.qcow2,copy-on-read=on
@end example
Example: boot from an image stored on a VMware vSphere server with a self-signed
certificate using a local overlay for writes, a readahead of 64k and a timeout
of 10 seconds.
@example
qemu-img create -f qcow2 -o backing_file='json:@{"file.driver":"https",, "file.url":"https://user:password@@vsphere.example.com/folder/test/test-flat.vmdk?dcPath=Datacenter&dsName=datastore1",, "file.sslverify":"off",, "file.readahead":"64k",, "file.timeout":10@}' /tmp/test.qcow2
qemu-system-x86_64 -drive file=/tmp/test.qcow2
@end example
@end table
@c man end
@node pcsys_keys
@section Keys in the graphical frontends
@c man begin OPTIONS
During the graphical emulation, you can use special key combinations to change
modes. The default key mappings are shown below, but if you use @code{-alt-grab}
then the modifier is Ctrl-Alt-Shift (instead of Ctrl-Alt) and if you use
@code{-ctrl-grab} then the modifier is the right Ctrl key (instead of Ctrl-Alt):
@table @key
@item Ctrl-Alt-f
@kindex Ctrl-Alt-f
Toggle full screen
@item Ctrl-Alt-+
@kindex Ctrl-Alt-+
Enlarge the screen
@item Ctrl-Alt--
@kindex Ctrl-Alt--
Shrink the screen
@item Ctrl-Alt-u
@kindex Ctrl-Alt-u
Restore the screen's un-scaled dimensions
@item Ctrl-Alt-n
@kindex Ctrl-Alt-n
Switch to virtual console 'n'. Standard console mappings are:
@table @emph
@item 1
Target system display
@item 2
Monitor
@item 3
Serial port
@end table
@item Ctrl-Alt
@kindex Ctrl-Alt
Toggle mouse and keyboard grab.
@end table
@kindex Ctrl-Up
@kindex Ctrl-Down
@kindex Ctrl-PageUp
@kindex Ctrl-PageDown
In the virtual consoles, you can use @key{Ctrl-Up}, @key{Ctrl-Down},
@key{Ctrl-PageUp} and @key{Ctrl-PageDown} to move in the back log.
@c man end
@node mux_keys
@section Keys in the character backend multiplexer
@c man begin OPTIONS
During emulation, if you are using a character backend multiplexer
(which is the default if you are using @option{-nographic}) then
several commands are available via an escape sequence. These
key sequences all start with an escape character, which is @key{Ctrl-a}
by default, but can be changed with @option{-echr}. The list below assumes
you're using the default.
@table @key
@item Ctrl-a h
@kindex Ctrl-a h
Print this help
@item Ctrl-a x
@kindex Ctrl-a x
Exit emulator
@item Ctrl-a s
@kindex Ctrl-a s
Save disk data back to file (if -snapshot)
@item Ctrl-a t
@kindex Ctrl-a t
Toggle console timestamps
@item Ctrl-a b
@kindex Ctrl-a b
Send break (magic sysrq in Linux)
@item Ctrl-a c
@kindex Ctrl-a c
Rotate between the frontends connected to the multiplexer (usually
this switches between the monitor and the console)
@item Ctrl-a Ctrl-a
@kindex Ctrl-a Ctrl-a
Send the escape character to the frontend
@end table
@c man end
@ignore
@c man begin SEEALSO
The HTML documentation of QEMU for more precise information and Linux
user mode emulator invocation.
@c man end
@c man begin AUTHOR
Fabrice Bellard
@c man end
@end ignore
@node pcsys_monitor
@section QEMU Monitor
@cindex QEMU monitor
The QEMU monitor is used to give complex commands to the QEMU
emulator. You can use it to:
@itemize @minus
@item
Remove or insert removable media images
(such as CD-ROM or floppies).
@item
Freeze/unfreeze the Virtual Machine (VM) and save or restore its state
from a disk file.
@item Inspect the VM state without an external debugger.
@end itemize
@subsection Commands
The following commands are available:
@include qemu-monitor.texi
@include qemu-monitor-info.texi
@subsection Integer expressions
The monitor understands integers expressions for every integer
argument. You can use register names to get the value of specifics
CPU registers by prefixing them with @emph{$}.
@node disk_images
@section Disk Images
QEMU supports many disk image formats, including growable disk images
(their size increase as non empty sectors are written), compressed and
encrypted disk images.
@menu
* disk_images_quickstart:: Quick start for disk image creation
* disk_images_snapshot_mode:: Snapshot mode
* vm_snapshots:: VM snapshots
* qemu_img_invocation:: qemu-img Invocation
* qemu_nbd_invocation:: qemu-nbd Invocation
* disk_images_formats:: Disk image file formats
* host_drives:: Using host drives
* disk_images_fat_images:: Virtual FAT disk images
* disk_images_nbd:: NBD access
* disk_images_sheepdog:: Sheepdog disk images
* disk_images_iscsi:: iSCSI LUNs
* disk_images_gluster:: GlusterFS disk images
* disk_images_ssh:: Secure Shell (ssh) disk images
* disk_images_nvme:: NVMe userspace driver
* disk_image_locking:: Disk image file locking
@end menu
@node disk_images_quickstart
@subsection Quick start for disk image creation
You can create a disk image with the command:
@example
qemu-img create myimage.img mysize
@end example
where @var{myimage.img} is the disk image filename and @var{mysize} is its
size in kilobytes. You can add an @code{M} suffix to give the size in
megabytes and a @code{G} suffix for gigabytes.
See @ref{qemu_img_invocation} for more information.
@node disk_images_snapshot_mode
@subsection Snapshot mode
If you use the option @option{-snapshot}, all disk images are
considered as read only. When sectors in written, they are written in
a temporary file created in @file{/tmp}. You can however force the
write back to the raw disk images by using the @code{commit} monitor
command (or @key{C-a s} in the serial console).
@node vm_snapshots
@subsection VM snapshots
VM snapshots are snapshots of the complete virtual machine including
CPU state, RAM, device state and the content of all the writable
disks. In order to use VM snapshots, you must have at least one non
removable and writable block device using the @code{qcow2} disk image
format. Normally this device is the first virtual hard drive.
Use the monitor command @code{savevm} to create a new VM snapshot or
replace an existing one. A human readable name can be assigned to each
snapshot in addition to its numerical ID.
Use @code{loadvm} to restore a VM snapshot and @code{delvm} to remove
a VM snapshot. @code{info snapshots} lists the available snapshots
with their associated information:
@example
(qemu) info snapshots
Snapshot devices: hda
Snapshot list (from hda):
ID TAG VM SIZE DATE VM CLOCK
1 start 41M 2006-08-06 12:38:02 00:00:14.954
2 40M 2006-08-06 12:43:29 00:00:18.633
3 msys 40M 2006-08-06 12:44:04 00:00:23.514
@end example
A VM snapshot is made of a VM state info (its size is shown in
@code{info snapshots}) and a snapshot of every writable disk image.
The VM state info is stored in the first @code{qcow2} non removable
and writable block device. The disk image snapshots are stored in
every disk image. The size of a snapshot in a disk image is difficult
to evaluate and is not shown by @code{info snapshots} because the
associated disk sectors are shared among all the snapshots to save
disk space (otherwise each snapshot would need a full copy of all the
disk images).
When using the (unrelated) @code{-snapshot} option
(@ref{disk_images_snapshot_mode}), you can always make VM snapshots,
but they are deleted as soon as you exit QEMU.
VM snapshots currently have the following known limitations:
@itemize
@item
They cannot cope with removable devices if they are removed or
inserted after a snapshot is done.
@item
A few device drivers still have incomplete snapshot support so their
state is not saved or restored properly (in particular USB).
@end itemize
@node qemu_img_invocation
@subsection @code{qemu-img} Invocation
@include qemu-img.texi
@node qemu_nbd_invocation
@subsection @code{qemu-nbd} Invocation
@include qemu-nbd.texi
@include docs/qemu-block-drivers.texi
@node pcsys_network
@section Network emulation
QEMU can simulate several network cards (PCI or ISA cards on the PC
target) and can connect them to an arbitrary number of Virtual Local
Area Networks (VLANs). Host TAP devices can be connected to any QEMU
VLAN. VLAN can be connected between separate instances of QEMU to
simulate large networks. For simpler usage, a non privileged user mode
network stack can replace the TAP device to have a basic network
connection.
@subsection VLANs
QEMU simulates several VLANs. A VLAN can be symbolised as a virtual
connection between several network devices. These devices can be for
example QEMU virtual Ethernet cards or virtual Host ethernet devices
(TAP devices).
@subsection Using TAP network interfaces
This is the standard way to connect QEMU to a real network. QEMU adds
a virtual network device on your host (called @code{tapN}), and you
can then configure it as if it was a real ethernet card.
@subsubsection Linux host
As an example, you can download the @file{linux-test-xxx.tar.gz}
archive and copy the script @file{qemu-ifup} in @file{/etc} and
configure properly @code{sudo} so that the command @code{ifconfig}
contained in @file{qemu-ifup} can be executed as root. You must verify
that your host kernel supports the TAP network interfaces: the
device @file{/dev/net/tun} must be present.
See @ref{sec_invocation} to have examples of command lines using the
TAP network interfaces.
@subsubsection Windows host
There is a virtual ethernet driver for Windows 2000/XP systems, called
TAP-Win32. But it is not included in standard QEMU for Windows,
so you will need to get it separately. It is part of OpenVPN package,
so download OpenVPN from : @url{https://openvpn.net/}.
@subsection Using the user mode network stack
By using the option @option{-net user} (default configuration if no
@option{-net} option is specified), QEMU uses a completely user mode
network stack (you don't need root privilege to use the virtual
network). The virtual network configuration is the following:
@example
QEMU VLAN <------> Firewall/DHCP server <-----> Internet
| (10.0.2.2)
|
----> DNS server (10.0.2.3)
|
----> SMB server (10.0.2.4)
@end example
The QEMU VM behaves as if it was behind a firewall which blocks all
incoming connections. You can use a DHCP client to automatically
configure the network in the QEMU VM. The DHCP server assign addresses
to the hosts starting from 10.0.2.15.
In order to check that the user mode network is working, you can ping
the address 10.0.2.2 and verify that you got an address in the range
10.0.2.x from the QEMU virtual DHCP server.
Note that ICMP traffic in general does not work with user mode networking.
@code{ping}, aka. ICMP echo, to the local router (10.0.2.2) shall work,
however. If you're using QEMU on Linux >= 3.0, it can use unprivileged ICMP
ping sockets to allow @code{ping} to the Internet. The host admin has to set
the ping_group_range in order to grant access to those sockets. To allow ping
for GID 100 (usually users group):
@example
echo 100 100 > /proc/sys/net/ipv4/ping_group_range
@end example
When using the built-in TFTP server, the router is also the TFTP
server.
When using the @option{'-netdev user,hostfwd=...'} option, TCP or UDP
connections can be redirected from the host to the guest. It allows for
example to redirect X11, telnet or SSH connections.
@subsection Connecting VLANs between QEMU instances
Using the @option{-net socket} option, it is possible to make VLANs
that span several QEMU instances. See @ref{sec_invocation} to have a
basic example.
@node pcsys_other_devs
@section Other Devices
@subsection Inter-VM Shared Memory device
ivshmem: Split ivshmem-plain, ivshmem-doorbell off ivshmem ivshmem can be configured with and without interrupt capability (a.k.a. "doorbell"). The two configurations have largely disjoint options, which makes for a confusing (and badly checked) user interface. Moreover, the device can't tell the guest whether its doorbell is enabled. Create two new device models ivshmem-plain and ivshmem-doorbell, and deprecate the old one. Changes from ivshmem: * PCI revision is 1 instead of 0. The new revision is fully backwards compatible for guests. Guests may elect to require at least revision 1 to make sure they're not exposed to the funny "no shared memory, yet" state. * Property "role" replaced by "master". role=master becomes master=on, role=peer becomes master=off. Default is off instead of auto. * Property "use64" is gone. The new devices always have 64 bit BARs. Changes from ivshmem to ivshmem-plain: * The Interrupt Pin register in PCI config space is zero (does not use an interrupt pin) instead of one (uses INTA). * Property "x-memdev" is renamed to "memdev". * Properties "shm" and "size" are gone. Use property "memdev" instead. * Property "msi" is gone. The new device can't have MSI-X capability. It can't interrupt anyway. * Properties "ioeventfd" and "vectors" are gone. They're meaningless without interrupts anyway. Changes from ivshmem to ivshmem-doorbell: * Property "msi" is gone. The new device always has MSI-X capability. * Property "ioeventfd" defaults to on instead of off. * Property "size" is gone. The new device can only map all the shared memory received from the server. Guests can easily find out whether the device is configured for interrupts by checking for MSI-X capability. Note: some code added in sub-optimal places to make the diff easier to review. The next commit will move it to more sensible places. Signed-off-by: Markus Armbruster <armbru@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Marc-André Lureau <marcandre.lureau@redhat.com> Message-Id: <1458066895-20632-37-git-send-email-armbru@redhat.com>
2016-03-15 19:34:51 +01:00
On Linux hosts, a shared memory device is available. The basic syntax
is:
@example
ivshmem: Split ivshmem-plain, ivshmem-doorbell off ivshmem ivshmem can be configured with and without interrupt capability (a.k.a. "doorbell"). The two configurations have largely disjoint options, which makes for a confusing (and badly checked) user interface. Moreover, the device can't tell the guest whether its doorbell is enabled. Create two new device models ivshmem-plain and ivshmem-doorbell, and deprecate the old one. Changes from ivshmem: * PCI revision is 1 instead of 0. The new revision is fully backwards compatible for guests. Guests may elect to require at least revision 1 to make sure they're not exposed to the funny "no shared memory, yet" state. * Property "role" replaced by "master". role=master becomes master=on, role=peer becomes master=off. Default is off instead of auto. * Property "use64" is gone. The new devices always have 64 bit BARs. Changes from ivshmem to ivshmem-plain: * The Interrupt Pin register in PCI config space is zero (does not use an interrupt pin) instead of one (uses INTA). * Property "x-memdev" is renamed to "memdev". * Properties "shm" and "size" are gone. Use property "memdev" instead. * Property "msi" is gone. The new device can't have MSI-X capability. It can't interrupt anyway. * Properties "ioeventfd" and "vectors" are gone. They're meaningless without interrupts anyway. Changes from ivshmem to ivshmem-doorbell: * Property "msi" is gone. The new device always has MSI-X capability. * Property "ioeventfd" defaults to on instead of off. * Property "size" is gone. The new device can only map all the shared memory received from the server. Guests can easily find out whether the device is configured for interrupts by checking for MSI-X capability. Note: some code added in sub-optimal places to make the diff easier to review. The next commit will move it to more sensible places. Signed-off-by: Markus Armbruster <armbru@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Marc-André Lureau <marcandre.lureau@redhat.com> Message-Id: <1458066895-20632-37-git-send-email-armbru@redhat.com>
2016-03-15 19:34:51 +01:00
qemu-system-x86_64 -device ivshmem-plain,memdev=@var{hostmem}
@end example
where @var{hostmem} names a host memory backend. For a POSIX shared
memory backend, use something like
@example
-object memory-backend-file,size=1M,share,mem-path=/dev/shm/ivshmem,id=@var{hostmem}
@end example
If desired, interrupts can be sent between guest VMs accessing the same shared
memory region. Interrupt support requires using a shared memory server and
using a chardev socket to connect to it. The code for the shared memory server
is qemu.git/contrib/ivshmem-server. An example syntax when using the shared
memory server is:
@example
# First start the ivshmem server once and for all
ivshmem-server -p @var{pidfile} -S @var{path} -m @var{shm-name} -l @var{shm-size} -n @var{vectors}
# Then start your qemu instances with matching arguments
ivshmem: Split ivshmem-plain, ivshmem-doorbell off ivshmem ivshmem can be configured with and without interrupt capability (a.k.a. "doorbell"). The two configurations have largely disjoint options, which makes for a confusing (and badly checked) user interface. Moreover, the device can't tell the guest whether its doorbell is enabled. Create two new device models ivshmem-plain and ivshmem-doorbell, and deprecate the old one. Changes from ivshmem: * PCI revision is 1 instead of 0. The new revision is fully backwards compatible for guests. Guests may elect to require at least revision 1 to make sure they're not exposed to the funny "no shared memory, yet" state. * Property "role" replaced by "master". role=master becomes master=on, role=peer becomes master=off. Default is off instead of auto. * Property "use64" is gone. The new devices always have 64 bit BARs. Changes from ivshmem to ivshmem-plain: * The Interrupt Pin register in PCI config space is zero (does not use an interrupt pin) instead of one (uses INTA). * Property "x-memdev" is renamed to "memdev". * Properties "shm" and "size" are gone. Use property "memdev" instead. * Property "msi" is gone. The new device can't have MSI-X capability. It can't interrupt anyway. * Properties "ioeventfd" and "vectors" are gone. They're meaningless without interrupts anyway. Changes from ivshmem to ivshmem-doorbell: * Property "msi" is gone. The new device always has MSI-X capability. * Property "ioeventfd" defaults to on instead of off. * Property "size" is gone. The new device can only map all the shared memory received from the server. Guests can easily find out whether the device is configured for interrupts by checking for MSI-X capability. Note: some code added in sub-optimal places to make the diff easier to review. The next commit will move it to more sensible places. Signed-off-by: Markus Armbruster <armbru@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Marc-André Lureau <marcandre.lureau@redhat.com> Message-Id: <1458066895-20632-37-git-send-email-armbru@redhat.com>
2016-03-15 19:34:51 +01:00
qemu-system-x86_64 -device ivshmem-doorbell,vectors=@var{vectors},chardev=@var{id}
-chardev socket,path=@var{path},id=@var{id}
@end example
When using the server, the guest will be assigned a VM ID (>=0) that allows guests
using the same server to communicate via interrupts. Guests can read their
VM ID from a device register (see ivshmem-spec.txt).
@subsubsection Migration with ivshmem
ivshmem: Split ivshmem-plain, ivshmem-doorbell off ivshmem ivshmem can be configured with and without interrupt capability (a.k.a. "doorbell"). The two configurations have largely disjoint options, which makes for a confusing (and badly checked) user interface. Moreover, the device can't tell the guest whether its doorbell is enabled. Create two new device models ivshmem-plain and ivshmem-doorbell, and deprecate the old one. Changes from ivshmem: * PCI revision is 1 instead of 0. The new revision is fully backwards compatible for guests. Guests may elect to require at least revision 1 to make sure they're not exposed to the funny "no shared memory, yet" state. * Property "role" replaced by "master". role=master becomes master=on, role=peer becomes master=off. Default is off instead of auto. * Property "use64" is gone. The new devices always have 64 bit BARs. Changes from ivshmem to ivshmem-plain: * The Interrupt Pin register in PCI config space is zero (does not use an interrupt pin) instead of one (uses INTA). * Property "x-memdev" is renamed to "memdev". * Properties "shm" and "size" are gone. Use property "memdev" instead. * Property "msi" is gone. The new device can't have MSI-X capability. It can't interrupt anyway. * Properties "ioeventfd" and "vectors" are gone. They're meaningless without interrupts anyway. Changes from ivshmem to ivshmem-doorbell: * Property "msi" is gone. The new device always has MSI-X capability. * Property "ioeventfd" defaults to on instead of off. * Property "size" is gone. The new device can only map all the shared memory received from the server. Guests can easily find out whether the device is configured for interrupts by checking for MSI-X capability. Note: some code added in sub-optimal places to make the diff easier to review. The next commit will move it to more sensible places. Signed-off-by: Markus Armbruster <armbru@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Marc-André Lureau <marcandre.lureau@redhat.com> Message-Id: <1458066895-20632-37-git-send-email-armbru@redhat.com>
2016-03-15 19:34:51 +01:00
With device property @option{master=on}, the guest will copy the shared
memory on migration to the destination host. With @option{master=off},
the guest will not be able to migrate with the device attached. In the
latter case, the device should be detached and then reattached after
migration using the PCI hotplug support.
At most one of the devices sharing the same memory can be master. The
master must complete migration before you plug back the other devices.
@subsubsection ivshmem and hugepages
Instead of specifying the <shm size> using POSIX shm, you may specify
a memory backend that has hugepage support:
@example
ivshmem: Split ivshmem-plain, ivshmem-doorbell off ivshmem ivshmem can be configured with and without interrupt capability (a.k.a. "doorbell"). The two configurations have largely disjoint options, which makes for a confusing (and badly checked) user interface. Moreover, the device can't tell the guest whether its doorbell is enabled. Create two new device models ivshmem-plain and ivshmem-doorbell, and deprecate the old one. Changes from ivshmem: * PCI revision is 1 instead of 0. The new revision is fully backwards compatible for guests. Guests may elect to require at least revision 1 to make sure they're not exposed to the funny "no shared memory, yet" state. * Property "role" replaced by "master". role=master becomes master=on, role=peer becomes master=off. Default is off instead of auto. * Property "use64" is gone. The new devices always have 64 bit BARs. Changes from ivshmem to ivshmem-plain: * The Interrupt Pin register in PCI config space is zero (does not use an interrupt pin) instead of one (uses INTA). * Property "x-memdev" is renamed to "memdev". * Properties "shm" and "size" are gone. Use property "memdev" instead. * Property "msi" is gone. The new device can't have MSI-X capability. It can't interrupt anyway. * Properties "ioeventfd" and "vectors" are gone. They're meaningless without interrupts anyway. Changes from ivshmem to ivshmem-doorbell: * Property "msi" is gone. The new device always has MSI-X capability. * Property "ioeventfd" defaults to on instead of off. * Property "size" is gone. The new device can only map all the shared memory received from the server. Guests can easily find out whether the device is configured for interrupts by checking for MSI-X capability. Note: some code added in sub-optimal places to make the diff easier to review. The next commit will move it to more sensible places. Signed-off-by: Markus Armbruster <armbru@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Marc-André Lureau <marcandre.lureau@redhat.com> Message-Id: <1458066895-20632-37-git-send-email-armbru@redhat.com>
2016-03-15 19:34:51 +01:00
qemu-system-x86_64 -object memory-backend-file,size=1G,mem-path=/dev/hugepages/my-shmem-file,share,id=mb1
-device ivshmem-plain,memdev=mb1
@end example
ivshmem-server also supports hugepages mount points with the
@option{-m} memory path argument.
@node direct_linux_boot
@section Direct Linux Boot
This section explains how to launch a Linux kernel inside QEMU without
having to make a full bootable image. It is very useful for fast Linux
kernel testing.
The syntax is:
@example
qemu-system-i386 -kernel arch/i386/boot/bzImage -hda root-2.4.20.img -append "root=/dev/hda"
@end example
Use @option{-kernel} to provide the Linux kernel image and
@option{-append} to give the kernel command line arguments. The
@option{-initrd} option can be used to provide an INITRD image.
When using the direct Linux boot, a disk image for the first hard disk
@file{hda} is required because its boot sector is used to launch the
Linux kernel.
If you do not need graphical output, you can disable it and redirect
the virtual serial port and the QEMU monitor to the console with the
@option{-nographic} option. The typical command line is:
@example
qemu-system-i386 -kernel arch/i386/boot/bzImage -hda root-2.4.20.img \
-append "root=/dev/hda console=ttyS0" -nographic
@end example
Use @key{Ctrl-a c} to switch between the serial console and the
monitor (@pxref{pcsys_keys}).
@node pcsys_usb
@section USB emulation
QEMU can emulate a PCI UHCI, OHCI, EHCI or XHCI USB controller. You can
plug virtual USB devices or real host USB devices (only works with certain
host operating systems). QEMU will automatically create and connect virtual
USB hubs as necessary to connect multiple USB devices.
@menu
* usb_devices::
* host_usb_devices::
@end menu
@node usb_devices
@subsection Connecting USB devices
USB devices can be connected with the @option{-device usb-...} command line
option or the @code{device_add} monitor command. Available devices are:
@table @code
@item usb-mouse
Virtual Mouse. This will override the PS/2 mouse emulation when activated.
@item usb-tablet
Pointer device that uses absolute coordinates (like a touchscreen).
This means QEMU is able to report the mouse position without having
to grab the mouse. Also overrides the PS/2 mouse emulation when activated.
@item usb-storage,drive=@var{drive_id}
Mass storage device backed by @var{drive_id} (@pxref{disk_images})
@item usb-uas
USB attached SCSI device, see
@url{https://git.qemu.org/?p=qemu.git;a=blob_plain;f=docs/usb-storage.txt,usb-storage.txt}
for details
@item usb-bot
Bulk-only transport storage device, see
@url{https://git.qemu.org/?p=qemu.git;a=blob_plain;f=docs/usb-storage.txt,usb-storage.txt}
for details here, too
@item usb-mtp,x-root=@var{dir}
Media transfer protocol device, using @var{dir} as root of the file tree
that is presented to the guest.
@item usb-host,hostbus=@var{bus},hostaddr=@var{addr}
Pass through the host device identified by @var{bus} and @var{addr}
@item usb-host,vendorid=@var{vendor},productid=@var{product}
Pass through the host device identified by @var{vendor} and @var{product} ID
@item usb-wacom-tablet
Virtual Wacom PenPartner tablet. This device is similar to the @code{tablet}
above but it can be used with the tslib library because in addition to touch
coordinates it reports touch pressure.
@item usb-kbd
Standard USB keyboard. Will override the PS/2 keyboard (if present).
@item usb-serial,chardev=@var{id}
Serial converter. This emulates an FTDI FT232BM chip connected to host character
device @var{id}.
@item usb-braille,chardev=@var{id}
Braille device. This will use BrlAPI to display the braille output on a real
or fake device referenced by @var{id}.
@item usb-net[,netdev=@var{id}]
Network adapter that supports CDC ethernet and RNDIS protocols. @var{id}
specifies a netdev defined with @code{-netdev @dots{},id=@var{id}}.
For instance, user-mode networking can be used with
@example
qemu-system-i386 [...] -netdev user,id=net0 -device usb-net,netdev=net0
@end example
@item usb-ccid
Smartcard reader device
@item usb-audio
USB audio device
@item usb-bt-dongle
Bluetooth dongle for the transport layer of HCI. It is connected to HCI
scatternet 0 by default (corresponds to @code{-bt hci,vlan=0}).
Note that the syntax for the @code{-device usb-bt-dongle} option is not as
useful yet as it was with the legacy @code{-usbdevice} option. So to
configure an USB bluetooth device, you might need to use
"@code{-usbdevice bt}[:@var{hci-type}]" instead. This configures a
bluetooth dongle whose type is specified in the same format as with
the @option{-bt hci} option, @pxref{bt-hcis,,allowed HCI types}. If
no type is given, the HCI logic corresponds to @code{-bt hci,vlan=0}.
This USB device implements the USB Transport Layer of HCI. Example
usage:
@example
@command{qemu-system-i386} [...@var{OPTIONS}...] @option{-usbdevice} bt:hci,vlan=3 @option{-bt} device:keyboard,vlan=3
@end example
@end table
@node host_usb_devices
@subsection Using host USB devices on a Linux host
WARNING: this is an experimental feature. QEMU will slow down when
using it. USB devices requiring real time streaming (i.e. USB Video
Cameras) are not supported yet.
@enumerate
@item If you use an early Linux 2.4 kernel, verify that no Linux driver
is actually using the USB device. A simple way to do that is simply to
disable the corresponding kernel module by renaming it from @file{mydriver.o}
to @file{mydriver.o.disabled}.
@item Verify that @file{/proc/bus/usb} is working (most Linux distributions should enable it by default). You should see something like that:
@example
ls /proc/bus/usb
001 devices drivers
@end example
@item Since only root can access to the USB devices directly, you can either launch QEMU as root or change the permissions of the USB devices you want to use. For testing, the following suffices:
@example
chown -R myuid /proc/bus/usb
@end example
@item Launch QEMU and do in the monitor:
@example
info usbhost
Device 1.2, speed 480 Mb/s
Class 00: USB device 1234:5678, USB DISK
@end example
You should see the list of the devices you can use (Never try to use
hubs, it won't work).
@item Add the device in QEMU by using:
@example
device_add usb-host,vendorid=0x1234,productid=0x5678
@end example
Normally the guest OS should report that a new USB device is plugged.
You can use the option @option{-device usb-host,...} to do the same.
@item Now you can try to use the host USB device in QEMU.
@end enumerate
When relaunching QEMU, you may have to unplug and plug again the USB
device to make it work again (this is a bug).
@node vnc_security
@section VNC security
The VNC server capability provides access to the graphical console
of the guest VM across the network. This has a number of security
considerations depending on the deployment scenarios.
@menu
* vnc_sec_none::
* vnc_sec_password::
* vnc_sec_certificate::
* vnc_sec_certificate_verify::
* vnc_sec_certificate_pw::
Add SASL authentication support ("Daniel P. Berrange") This patch adds the new SASL authentication protocol to the VNC server. It is enabled by setting the 'sasl' flag when launching VNC. SASL can optionally provide encryption via its SSF layer, if a suitable mechanism is configured (eg, GSSAPI/Kerberos, or Digest-MD5). If an SSF layer is not available, then it should be combined with the x509 VNC authentication protocol which provides encryption. eg, if using GSSAPI qemu -vnc localhost:1,sasl eg if using TLS/x509 for encryption qemu -vnc localhost:1,sasl,tls,x509 By default the Cyrus SASL library will look for its configuration in the file /etc/sasl2/qemu.conf. For non-root users, this can be overridden by setting the SASL_CONF_PATH environment variable, eg to make it look in $HOME/.sasl2. NB unprivileged users may not have access to the full range of SASL mechanisms, since some of them require some administrative privileges to configure. The patch includes an example SASL configuration file which illustrates config for GSSAPI and Digest-MD5, though it should be noted that the latter is not really considered secure any more. Most of the SASL authentication code is located in a separate source file, vnc-auth-sasl.c. The main vnc.c file only contains minimal integration glue, specifically parsing of command line flags / setup, and calls to start the SASL auth process, to do encoding/decoding for data. There are several possible stacks for reading & writing of data, depending on the combo of VNC authentication methods in use - Clear. read/write straight to socket - TLS. read/write via GNUTLS helpers - SASL. encode/decode via SASL SSF layer, then read/write to socket - SASL+TLS. encode/decode via SASL SSF layer, then read/write via GNUTLS Hence, the vnc_client_read & vnc_client_write methods have been refactored a little. vnc_client_read: main entry point for reading, calls either - vnc_client_read_plain reading, with no intermediate decoding - vnc_client_read_sasl reading, with SASL SSF decoding These two methods, then call vnc_client_read_buf(). This decides whether to write to the socket directly or write via GNUTLS. The situation is the same for writing data. More extensive comments have been added in the code / patch. The vnc_client_read_sasl and vnc_client_write_sasl method implementations live in the separate vnc-auth-sasl.c file. The state required for the SASL auth mechanism is kept in a separate VncStateSASL struct, defined in vnc-auth-sasl.h and included in the main VncState. The configure script probes for SASL and automatically enables it if found, unless --disable-vnc-sasl was given to override it. Makefile | 7 Makefile.target | 5 b/qemu.sasl | 34 ++ b/vnc-auth-sasl.c | 626 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ b/vnc-auth-sasl.h | 67 +++++ configure | 34 ++ qemu-doc.texi | 97 ++++++++ vnc-auth-vencrypt.c | 12 vnc.c | 249 ++++++++++++++++++-- vnc.h | 31 ++ 10 files changed, 1129 insertions(+), 33 deletions(-) Signed-off-by: Daniel P. Berrange <berrange@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Anthony Liguori <aliguori@us.ibm.com> git-svn-id: svn://svn.savannah.nongnu.org/qemu/trunk@6724 c046a42c-6fe2-441c-8c8c-71466251a162
2009-03-06 21:27:28 +01:00
* vnc_sec_sasl::
* vnc_sec_certificate_sasl::
* vnc_generate_cert::
Add SASL authentication support ("Daniel P. Berrange") This patch adds the new SASL authentication protocol to the VNC server. It is enabled by setting the 'sasl' flag when launching VNC. SASL can optionally provide encryption via its SSF layer, if a suitable mechanism is configured (eg, GSSAPI/Kerberos, or Digest-MD5). If an SSF layer is not available, then it should be combined with the x509 VNC authentication protocol which provides encryption. eg, if using GSSAPI qemu -vnc localhost:1,sasl eg if using TLS/x509 for encryption qemu -vnc localhost:1,sasl,tls,x509 By default the Cyrus SASL library will look for its configuration in the file /etc/sasl2/qemu.conf. For non-root users, this can be overridden by setting the SASL_CONF_PATH environment variable, eg to make it look in $HOME/.sasl2. NB unprivileged users may not have access to the full range of SASL mechanisms, since some of them require some administrative privileges to configure. The patch includes an example SASL configuration file which illustrates config for GSSAPI and Digest-MD5, though it should be noted that the latter is not really considered secure any more. Most of the SASL authentication code is located in a separate source file, vnc-auth-sasl.c. The main vnc.c file only contains minimal integration glue, specifically parsing of command line flags / setup, and calls to start the SASL auth process, to do encoding/decoding for data. There are several possible stacks for reading & writing of data, depending on the combo of VNC authentication methods in use - Clear. read/write straight to socket - TLS. read/write via GNUTLS helpers - SASL. encode/decode via SASL SSF layer, then read/write to socket - SASL+TLS. encode/decode via SASL SSF layer, then read/write via GNUTLS Hence, the vnc_client_read & vnc_client_write methods have been refactored a little. vnc_client_read: main entry point for reading, calls either - vnc_client_read_plain reading, with no intermediate decoding - vnc_client_read_sasl reading, with SASL SSF decoding These two methods, then call vnc_client_read_buf(). This decides whether to write to the socket directly or write via GNUTLS. The situation is the same for writing data. More extensive comments have been added in the code / patch. The vnc_client_read_sasl and vnc_client_write_sasl method implementations live in the separate vnc-auth-sasl.c file. The state required for the SASL auth mechanism is kept in a separate VncStateSASL struct, defined in vnc-auth-sasl.h and included in the main VncState. The configure script probes for SASL and automatically enables it if found, unless --disable-vnc-sasl was given to override it. Makefile | 7 Makefile.target | 5 b/qemu.sasl | 34 ++ b/vnc-auth-sasl.c | 626 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ b/vnc-auth-sasl.h | 67 +++++ configure | 34 ++ qemu-doc.texi | 97 ++++++++ vnc-auth-vencrypt.c | 12 vnc.c | 249 ++++++++++++++++++-- vnc.h | 31 ++ 10 files changed, 1129 insertions(+), 33 deletions(-) Signed-off-by: Daniel P. Berrange <berrange@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Anthony Liguori <aliguori@us.ibm.com> git-svn-id: svn://svn.savannah.nongnu.org/qemu/trunk@6724 c046a42c-6fe2-441c-8c8c-71466251a162
2009-03-06 21:27:28 +01:00
* vnc_setup_sasl::
@end menu
@node vnc_sec_none
@subsection Without passwords
The simplest VNC server setup does not include any form of authentication.
For this setup it is recommended to restrict it to listen on a UNIX domain
socket only. For example
@example
qemu-system-i386 [...OPTIONS...] -vnc unix:/home/joebloggs/.qemu-myvm-vnc
@end example
This ensures that only users on local box with read/write access to that
path can access the VNC server. To securely access the VNC server from a
remote machine, a combination of netcat+ssh can be used to provide a secure
tunnel.
@node vnc_sec_password
@subsection With passwords
The VNC protocol has limited support for password based authentication. Since
the protocol limits passwords to 8 characters it should not be considered
to provide high security. The password can be fairly easily brute-forced by
a client making repeat connections. For this reason, a VNC server using password
authentication should be restricted to only listen on the loopback interface
or UNIX domain sockets. Password authentication is not supported when operating
in FIPS 140-2 compliance mode as it requires the use of the DES cipher. Password
authentication is requested with the @code{password} option, and then once QEMU
is running the password is set with the monitor. Until the monitor is used to
set the password all clients will be rejected.
@example
qemu-system-i386 [...OPTIONS...] -vnc :1,password -monitor stdio
(qemu) change vnc password
Password: ********
(qemu)
@end example
@node vnc_sec_certificate
@subsection With x509 certificates
The QEMU VNC server also implements the VeNCrypt extension allowing use of
TLS for encryption of the session, and x509 certificates for authentication.
The use of x509 certificates is strongly recommended, because TLS on its
own is susceptible to man-in-the-middle attacks. Basic x509 certificate
support provides a secure session, but no authentication. This allows any
client to connect, and provides an encrypted session.
@example
qemu-system-i386 [...OPTIONS...] -vnc :1,tls,x509=/etc/pki/qemu -monitor stdio
@end example
In the above example @code{/etc/pki/qemu} should contain at least three files,
@code{ca-cert.pem}, @code{server-cert.pem} and @code{server-key.pem}. Unprivileged
users will want to use a private directory, for example @code{$HOME/.pki/qemu}.
NB the @code{server-key.pem} file should be protected with file mode 0600 to
only be readable by the user owning it.
@node vnc_sec_certificate_verify
@subsection With x509 certificates and client verification
Certificates can also provide a means to authenticate the client connecting.
The server will request that the client provide a certificate, which it will
then validate against the CA certificate. This is a good choice if deploying
in an environment with a private internal certificate authority.
@example
qemu-system-i386 [...OPTIONS...] -vnc :1,tls,x509verify=/etc/pki/qemu -monitor stdio
@end example
@node vnc_sec_certificate_pw
@subsection With x509 certificates, client verification and passwords
Finally, the previous method can be combined with VNC password authentication
to provide two layers of authentication for clients.
@example
qemu-system-i386 [...OPTIONS...] -vnc :1,password,tls,x509verify=/etc/pki/qemu -monitor stdio
(qemu) change vnc password
Password: ********
(qemu)
@end example
Add SASL authentication support ("Daniel P. Berrange") This patch adds the new SASL authentication protocol to the VNC server. It is enabled by setting the 'sasl' flag when launching VNC. SASL can optionally provide encryption via its SSF layer, if a suitable mechanism is configured (eg, GSSAPI/Kerberos, or Digest-MD5). If an SSF layer is not available, then it should be combined with the x509 VNC authentication protocol which provides encryption. eg, if using GSSAPI qemu -vnc localhost:1,sasl eg if using TLS/x509 for encryption qemu -vnc localhost:1,sasl,tls,x509 By default the Cyrus SASL library will look for its configuration in the file /etc/sasl2/qemu.conf. For non-root users, this can be overridden by setting the SASL_CONF_PATH environment variable, eg to make it look in $HOME/.sasl2. NB unprivileged users may not have access to the full range of SASL mechanisms, since some of them require some administrative privileges to configure. The patch includes an example SASL configuration file which illustrates config for GSSAPI and Digest-MD5, though it should be noted that the latter is not really considered secure any more. Most of the SASL authentication code is located in a separate source file, vnc-auth-sasl.c. The main vnc.c file only contains minimal integration glue, specifically parsing of command line flags / setup, and calls to start the SASL auth process, to do encoding/decoding for data. There are several possible stacks for reading & writing of data, depending on the combo of VNC authentication methods in use - Clear. read/write straight to socket - TLS. read/write via GNUTLS helpers - SASL. encode/decode via SASL SSF layer, then read/write to socket - SASL+TLS. encode/decode via SASL SSF layer, then read/write via GNUTLS Hence, the vnc_client_read & vnc_client_write methods have been refactored a little. vnc_client_read: main entry point for reading, calls either - vnc_client_read_plain reading, with no intermediate decoding - vnc_client_read_sasl reading, with SASL SSF decoding These two methods, then call vnc_client_read_buf(). This decides whether to write to the socket directly or write via GNUTLS. The situation is the same for writing data. More extensive comments have been added in the code / patch. The vnc_client_read_sasl and vnc_client_write_sasl method implementations live in the separate vnc-auth-sasl.c file. The state required for the SASL auth mechanism is kept in a separate VncStateSASL struct, defined in vnc-auth-sasl.h and included in the main VncState. The configure script probes for SASL and automatically enables it if found, unless --disable-vnc-sasl was given to override it. Makefile | 7 Makefile.target | 5 b/qemu.sasl | 34 ++ b/vnc-auth-sasl.c | 626 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ b/vnc-auth-sasl.h | 67 +++++ configure | 34 ++ qemu-doc.texi | 97 ++++++++ vnc-auth-vencrypt.c | 12 vnc.c | 249 ++++++++++++++++++-- vnc.h | 31 ++ 10 files changed, 1129 insertions(+), 33 deletions(-) Signed-off-by: Daniel P. Berrange <berrange@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Anthony Liguori <aliguori@us.ibm.com> git-svn-id: svn://svn.savannah.nongnu.org/qemu/trunk@6724 c046a42c-6fe2-441c-8c8c-71466251a162
2009-03-06 21:27:28 +01:00
@node vnc_sec_sasl
@subsection With SASL authentication
The SASL authentication method is a VNC extension, that provides an
easily extendable, pluggable authentication method. This allows for
integration with a wide range of authentication mechanisms, such as
PAM, GSSAPI/Kerberos, LDAP, SQL databases, one-time keys and more.
The strength of the authentication depends on the exact mechanism
configured. If the chosen mechanism also provides a SSF layer, then
it will encrypt the datastream as well.
Refer to the later docs on how to choose the exact SASL mechanism
used for authentication, but assuming use of one supporting SSF,
then QEMU can be launched with:
@example
qemu-system-i386 [...OPTIONS...] -vnc :1,sasl -monitor stdio
Add SASL authentication support ("Daniel P. Berrange") This patch adds the new SASL authentication protocol to the VNC server. It is enabled by setting the 'sasl' flag when launching VNC. SASL can optionally provide encryption via its SSF layer, if a suitable mechanism is configured (eg, GSSAPI/Kerberos, or Digest-MD5). If an SSF layer is not available, then it should be combined with the x509 VNC authentication protocol which provides encryption. eg, if using GSSAPI qemu -vnc localhost:1,sasl eg if using TLS/x509 for encryption qemu -vnc localhost:1,sasl,tls,x509 By default the Cyrus SASL library will look for its configuration in the file /etc/sasl2/qemu.conf. For non-root users, this can be overridden by setting the SASL_CONF_PATH environment variable, eg to make it look in $HOME/.sasl2. NB unprivileged users may not have access to the full range of SASL mechanisms, since some of them require some administrative privileges to configure. The patch includes an example SASL configuration file which illustrates config for GSSAPI and Digest-MD5, though it should be noted that the latter is not really considered secure any more. Most of the SASL authentication code is located in a separate source file, vnc-auth-sasl.c. The main vnc.c file only contains minimal integration glue, specifically parsing of command line flags / setup, and calls to start the SASL auth process, to do encoding/decoding for data. There are several possible stacks for reading & writing of data, depending on the combo of VNC authentication methods in use - Clear. read/write straight to socket - TLS. read/write via GNUTLS helpers - SASL. encode/decode via SASL SSF layer, then read/write to socket - SASL+TLS. encode/decode via SASL SSF layer, then read/write via GNUTLS Hence, the vnc_client_read & vnc_client_write methods have been refactored a little. vnc_client_read: main entry point for reading, calls either - vnc_client_read_plain reading, with no intermediate decoding - vnc_client_read_sasl reading, with SASL SSF decoding These two methods, then call vnc_client_read_buf(). This decides whether to write to the socket directly or write via GNUTLS. The situation is the same for writing data. More extensive comments have been added in the code / patch. The vnc_client_read_sasl and vnc_client_write_sasl method implementations live in the separate vnc-auth-sasl.c file. The state required for the SASL auth mechanism is kept in a separate VncStateSASL struct, defined in vnc-auth-sasl.h and included in the main VncState. The configure script probes for SASL and automatically enables it if found, unless --disable-vnc-sasl was given to override it. Makefile | 7 Makefile.target | 5 b/qemu.sasl | 34 ++ b/vnc-auth-sasl.c | 626 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ b/vnc-auth-sasl.h | 67 +++++ configure | 34 ++ qemu-doc.texi | 97 ++++++++ vnc-auth-vencrypt.c | 12 vnc.c | 249 ++++++++++++++++++-- vnc.h | 31 ++ 10 files changed, 1129 insertions(+), 33 deletions(-) Signed-off-by: Daniel P. Berrange <berrange@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Anthony Liguori <aliguori@us.ibm.com> git-svn-id: svn://svn.savannah.nongnu.org/qemu/trunk@6724 c046a42c-6fe2-441c-8c8c-71466251a162
2009-03-06 21:27:28 +01:00
@end example
@node vnc_sec_certificate_sasl
@subsection With x509 certificates and SASL authentication
If the desired SASL authentication mechanism does not supported
SSF layers, then it is strongly advised to run it in combination
with TLS and x509 certificates. This provides securely encrypted
data stream, avoiding risk of compromising of the security
credentials. This can be enabled, by combining the 'sasl' option
with the aforementioned TLS + x509 options:
@example
qemu-system-i386 [...OPTIONS...] -vnc :1,tls,x509,sasl -monitor stdio
Add SASL authentication support ("Daniel P. Berrange") This patch adds the new SASL authentication protocol to the VNC server. It is enabled by setting the 'sasl' flag when launching VNC. SASL can optionally provide encryption via its SSF layer, if a suitable mechanism is configured (eg, GSSAPI/Kerberos, or Digest-MD5). If an SSF layer is not available, then it should be combined with the x509 VNC authentication protocol which provides encryption. eg, if using GSSAPI qemu -vnc localhost:1,sasl eg if using TLS/x509 for encryption qemu -vnc localhost:1,sasl,tls,x509 By default the Cyrus SASL library will look for its configuration in the file /etc/sasl2/qemu.conf. For non-root users, this can be overridden by setting the SASL_CONF_PATH environment variable, eg to make it look in $HOME/.sasl2. NB unprivileged users may not have access to the full range of SASL mechanisms, since some of them require some administrative privileges to configure. The patch includes an example SASL configuration file which illustrates config for GSSAPI and Digest-MD5, though it should be noted that the latter is not really considered secure any more. Most of the SASL authentication code is located in a separate source file, vnc-auth-sasl.c. The main vnc.c file only contains minimal integration glue, specifically parsing of command line flags / setup, and calls to start the SASL auth process, to do encoding/decoding for data. There are several possible stacks for reading & writing of data, depending on the combo of VNC authentication methods in use - Clear. read/write straight to socket - TLS. read/write via GNUTLS helpers - SASL. encode/decode via SASL SSF layer, then read/write to socket - SASL+TLS. encode/decode via SASL SSF layer, then read/write via GNUTLS Hence, the vnc_client_read & vnc_client_write methods have been refactored a little. vnc_client_read: main entry point for reading, calls either - vnc_client_read_plain reading, with no intermediate decoding - vnc_client_read_sasl reading, with SASL SSF decoding These two methods, then call vnc_client_read_buf(). This decides whether to write to the socket directly or write via GNUTLS. The situation is the same for writing data. More extensive comments have been added in the code / patch. The vnc_client_read_sasl and vnc_client_write_sasl method implementations live in the separate vnc-auth-sasl.c file. The state required for the SASL auth mechanism is kept in a separate VncStateSASL struct, defined in vnc-auth-sasl.h and included in the main VncState. The configure script probes for SASL and automatically enables it if found, unless --disable-vnc-sasl was given to override it. Makefile | 7 Makefile.target | 5 b/qemu.sasl | 34 ++ b/vnc-auth-sasl.c | 626 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ b/vnc-auth-sasl.h | 67 +++++ configure | 34 ++ qemu-doc.texi | 97 ++++++++ vnc-auth-vencrypt.c | 12 vnc.c | 249 ++++++++++++++++++-- vnc.h | 31 ++ 10 files changed, 1129 insertions(+), 33 deletions(-) Signed-off-by: Daniel P. Berrange <berrange@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Anthony Liguori <aliguori@us.ibm.com> git-svn-id: svn://svn.savannah.nongnu.org/qemu/trunk@6724 c046a42c-6fe2-441c-8c8c-71466251a162
2009-03-06 21:27:28 +01:00
@end example
@node vnc_generate_cert
@subsection Generating certificates for VNC
The GNU TLS packages provides a command called @code{certtool} which can
be used to generate certificates and keys in PEM format. At a minimum it
is necessary to setup a certificate authority, and issue certificates to
each server. If using certificates for authentication, then each client
will also need to be issued a certificate. The recommendation is for the
server to keep its certificates in either @code{/etc/pki/qemu} or for
unprivileged users in @code{$HOME/.pki/qemu}.
@menu
* vnc_generate_ca::
* vnc_generate_server::
* vnc_generate_client::
@end menu
@node vnc_generate_ca
@subsubsection Setup the Certificate Authority
This step only needs to be performed once per organization / organizational
unit. First the CA needs a private key. This key must be kept VERY secret
and secure. If this key is compromised the entire trust chain of the certificates
issued with it is lost.
@example
# certtool --generate-privkey > ca-key.pem
@end example
A CA needs to have a public certificate. For simplicity it can be a self-signed
certificate, or one issue by a commercial certificate issuing authority. To
generate a self-signed certificate requires one core piece of information, the
name of the organization.
@example
# cat > ca.info <<EOF
cn = Name of your organization
ca
cert_signing_key
EOF
# certtool --generate-self-signed \
--load-privkey ca-key.pem
--template ca.info \
--outfile ca-cert.pem
@end example
The @code{ca-cert.pem} file should be copied to all servers and clients wishing to utilize
TLS support in the VNC server. The @code{ca-key.pem} must not be disclosed/copied at all.
@node vnc_generate_server
@subsubsection Issuing server certificates
Each server (or host) needs to be issued with a key and certificate. When connecting
the certificate is sent to the client which validates it against the CA certificate.
The core piece of information for a server certificate is the hostname. This should
be the fully qualified hostname that the client will connect with, since the client
will typically also verify the hostname in the certificate. On the host holding the
secure CA private key:
@example
# cat > server.info <<EOF
organization = Name of your organization
cn = server.foo.example.com
tls_www_server
encryption_key
signing_key
EOF
# certtool --generate-privkey > server-key.pem
# certtool --generate-certificate \
--load-ca-certificate ca-cert.pem \
--load-ca-privkey ca-key.pem \
--load-privkey server-key.pem \
--template server.info \
--outfile server-cert.pem
@end example
The @code{server-key.pem} and @code{server-cert.pem} files should now be securely copied
to the server for which they were generated. The @code{server-key.pem} is security
sensitive and should be kept protected with file mode 0600 to prevent disclosure.
@node vnc_generate_client
@subsubsection Issuing client certificates
If the QEMU VNC server is to use the @code{x509verify} option to validate client
certificates as its authentication mechanism, each client also needs to be issued
a certificate. The client certificate contains enough metadata to uniquely identify
the client, typically organization, state, city, building, etc. On the host holding
the secure CA private key:
@example
# cat > client.info <<EOF
country = GB
state = London
locality = London
organization = Name of your organization
cn = client.foo.example.com
tls_www_client
encryption_key
signing_key
EOF
# certtool --generate-privkey > client-key.pem
# certtool --generate-certificate \
--load-ca-certificate ca-cert.pem \
--load-ca-privkey ca-key.pem \
--load-privkey client-key.pem \
--template client.info \
--outfile client-cert.pem
@end example
The @code{client-key.pem} and @code{client-cert.pem} files should now be securely
copied to the client for which they were generated.
Add SASL authentication support ("Daniel P. Berrange") This patch adds the new SASL authentication protocol to the VNC server. It is enabled by setting the 'sasl' flag when launching VNC. SASL can optionally provide encryption via its SSF layer, if a suitable mechanism is configured (eg, GSSAPI/Kerberos, or Digest-MD5). If an SSF layer is not available, then it should be combined with the x509 VNC authentication protocol which provides encryption. eg, if using GSSAPI qemu -vnc localhost:1,sasl eg if using TLS/x509 for encryption qemu -vnc localhost:1,sasl,tls,x509 By default the Cyrus SASL library will look for its configuration in the file /etc/sasl2/qemu.conf. For non-root users, this can be overridden by setting the SASL_CONF_PATH environment variable, eg to make it look in $HOME/.sasl2. NB unprivileged users may not have access to the full range of SASL mechanisms, since some of them require some administrative privileges to configure. The patch includes an example SASL configuration file which illustrates config for GSSAPI and Digest-MD5, though it should be noted that the latter is not really considered secure any more. Most of the SASL authentication code is located in a separate source file, vnc-auth-sasl.c. The main vnc.c file only contains minimal integration glue, specifically parsing of command line flags / setup, and calls to start the SASL auth process, to do encoding/decoding for data. There are several possible stacks for reading & writing of data, depending on the combo of VNC authentication methods in use - Clear. read/write straight to socket - TLS. read/write via GNUTLS helpers - SASL. encode/decode via SASL SSF layer, then read/write to socket - SASL+TLS. encode/decode via SASL SSF layer, then read/write via GNUTLS Hence, the vnc_client_read & vnc_client_write methods have been refactored a little. vnc_client_read: main entry point for reading, calls either - vnc_client_read_plain reading, with no intermediate decoding - vnc_client_read_sasl reading, with SASL SSF decoding These two methods, then call vnc_client_read_buf(). This decides whether to write to the socket directly or write via GNUTLS. The situation is the same for writing data. More extensive comments have been added in the code / patch. The vnc_client_read_sasl and vnc_client_write_sasl method implementations live in the separate vnc-auth-sasl.c file. The state required for the SASL auth mechanism is kept in a separate VncStateSASL struct, defined in vnc-auth-sasl.h and included in the main VncState. The configure script probes for SASL and automatically enables it if found, unless --disable-vnc-sasl was given to override it. Makefile | 7 Makefile.target | 5 b/qemu.sasl | 34 ++ b/vnc-auth-sasl.c | 626 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ b/vnc-auth-sasl.h | 67 +++++ configure | 34 ++ qemu-doc.texi | 97 ++++++++ vnc-auth-vencrypt.c | 12 vnc.c | 249 ++++++++++++++++++-- vnc.h | 31 ++ 10 files changed, 1129 insertions(+), 33 deletions(-) Signed-off-by: Daniel P. Berrange <berrange@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Anthony Liguori <aliguori@us.ibm.com> git-svn-id: svn://svn.savannah.nongnu.org/qemu/trunk@6724 c046a42c-6fe2-441c-8c8c-71466251a162
2009-03-06 21:27:28 +01:00
@node vnc_setup_sasl
@subsection Configuring SASL mechanisms
The following documentation assumes use of the Cyrus SASL implementation on a
Linux host, but the principals should apply to any other SASL impl. When SASL
is enabled, the mechanism configuration will be loaded from system default
SASL service config /etc/sasl2/qemu.conf. If running QEMU as an
unprivileged user, an environment variable SASL_CONF_PATH can be used
to make it search alternate locations for the service config.
If the TLS option is enabled for VNC, then it will provide session encryption,
otherwise the SASL mechanism will have to provide encryption. In the latter
case the list of possible plugins that can be used is drastically reduced. In
fact only the GSSAPI SASL mechanism provides an acceptable level of security
by modern standards. Previous versions of QEMU referred to the DIGEST-MD5
mechanism, however, it has multiple serious flaws described in detail in
RFC 6331 and thus should never be used any more. The SCRAM-SHA-1 mechanism
provides a simple username/password auth facility similar to DIGEST-MD5, but
does not support session encryption, so can only be used in combination with
TLS.
When not using TLS the recommended configuration is
Add SASL authentication support ("Daniel P. Berrange") This patch adds the new SASL authentication protocol to the VNC server. It is enabled by setting the 'sasl' flag when launching VNC. SASL can optionally provide encryption via its SSF layer, if a suitable mechanism is configured (eg, GSSAPI/Kerberos, or Digest-MD5). If an SSF layer is not available, then it should be combined with the x509 VNC authentication protocol which provides encryption. eg, if using GSSAPI qemu -vnc localhost:1,sasl eg if using TLS/x509 for encryption qemu -vnc localhost:1,sasl,tls,x509 By default the Cyrus SASL library will look for its configuration in the file /etc/sasl2/qemu.conf. For non-root users, this can be overridden by setting the SASL_CONF_PATH environment variable, eg to make it look in $HOME/.sasl2. NB unprivileged users may not have access to the full range of SASL mechanisms, since some of them require some administrative privileges to configure. The patch includes an example SASL configuration file which illustrates config for GSSAPI and Digest-MD5, though it should be noted that the latter is not really considered secure any more. Most of the SASL authentication code is located in a separate source file, vnc-auth-sasl.c. The main vnc.c file only contains minimal integration glue, specifically parsing of command line flags / setup, and calls to start the SASL auth process, to do encoding/decoding for data. There are several possible stacks for reading & writing of data, depending on the combo of VNC authentication methods in use - Clear. read/write straight to socket - TLS. read/write via GNUTLS helpers - SASL. encode/decode via SASL SSF layer, then read/write to socket - SASL+TLS. encode/decode via SASL SSF layer, then read/write via GNUTLS Hence, the vnc_client_read & vnc_client_write methods have been refactored a little. vnc_client_read: main entry point for reading, calls either - vnc_client_read_plain reading, with no intermediate decoding - vnc_client_read_sasl reading, with SASL SSF decoding These two methods, then call vnc_client_read_buf(). This decides whether to write to the socket directly or write via GNUTLS. The situation is the same for writing data. More extensive comments have been added in the code / patch. The vnc_client_read_sasl and vnc_client_write_sasl method implementations live in the separate vnc-auth-sasl.c file. The state required for the SASL auth mechanism is kept in a separate VncStateSASL struct, defined in vnc-auth-sasl.h and included in the main VncState. The configure script probes for SASL and automatically enables it if found, unless --disable-vnc-sasl was given to override it. Makefile | 7 Makefile.target | 5 b/qemu.sasl | 34 ++ b/vnc-auth-sasl.c | 626 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ b/vnc-auth-sasl.h | 67 +++++ configure | 34 ++ qemu-doc.texi | 97 ++++++++ vnc-auth-vencrypt.c | 12 vnc.c | 249 ++++++++++++++++++-- vnc.h | 31 ++ 10 files changed, 1129 insertions(+), 33 deletions(-) Signed-off-by: Daniel P. Berrange <berrange@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Anthony Liguori <aliguori@us.ibm.com> git-svn-id: svn://svn.savannah.nongnu.org/qemu/trunk@6724 c046a42c-6fe2-441c-8c8c-71466251a162
2009-03-06 21:27:28 +01:00
@example
mech_list: gssapi
keytab: /etc/qemu/krb5.tab
Add SASL authentication support ("Daniel P. Berrange") This patch adds the new SASL authentication protocol to the VNC server. It is enabled by setting the 'sasl' flag when launching VNC. SASL can optionally provide encryption via its SSF layer, if a suitable mechanism is configured (eg, GSSAPI/Kerberos, or Digest-MD5). If an SSF layer is not available, then it should be combined with the x509 VNC authentication protocol which provides encryption. eg, if using GSSAPI qemu -vnc localhost:1,sasl eg if using TLS/x509 for encryption qemu -vnc localhost:1,sasl,tls,x509 By default the Cyrus SASL library will look for its configuration in the file /etc/sasl2/qemu.conf. For non-root users, this can be overridden by setting the SASL_CONF_PATH environment variable, eg to make it look in $HOME/.sasl2. NB unprivileged users may not have access to the full range of SASL mechanisms, since some of them require some administrative privileges to configure. The patch includes an example SASL configuration file which illustrates config for GSSAPI and Digest-MD5, though it should be noted that the latter is not really considered secure any more. Most of the SASL authentication code is located in a separate source file, vnc-auth-sasl.c. The main vnc.c file only contains minimal integration glue, specifically parsing of command line flags / setup, and calls to start the SASL auth process, to do encoding/decoding for data. There are several possible stacks for reading & writing of data, depending on the combo of VNC authentication methods in use - Clear. read/write straight to socket - TLS. read/write via GNUTLS helpers - SASL. encode/decode via SASL SSF layer, then read/write to socket - SASL+TLS. encode/decode via SASL SSF layer, then read/write via GNUTLS Hence, the vnc_client_read & vnc_client_write methods have been refactored a little. vnc_client_read: main entry point for reading, calls either - vnc_client_read_plain reading, with no intermediate decoding - vnc_client_read_sasl reading, with SASL SSF decoding These two methods, then call vnc_client_read_buf(). This decides whether to write to the socket directly or write via GNUTLS. The situation is the same for writing data. More extensive comments have been added in the code / patch. The vnc_client_read_sasl and vnc_client_write_sasl method implementations live in the separate vnc-auth-sasl.c file. The state required for the SASL auth mechanism is kept in a separate VncStateSASL struct, defined in vnc-auth-sasl.h and included in the main VncState. The configure script probes for SASL and automatically enables it if found, unless --disable-vnc-sasl was given to override it. Makefile | 7 Makefile.target | 5 b/qemu.sasl | 34 ++ b/vnc-auth-sasl.c | 626 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ b/vnc-auth-sasl.h | 67 +++++ configure | 34 ++ qemu-doc.texi | 97 ++++++++ vnc-auth-vencrypt.c | 12 vnc.c | 249 ++++++++++++++++++-- vnc.h | 31 ++ 10 files changed, 1129 insertions(+), 33 deletions(-) Signed-off-by: Daniel P. Berrange <berrange@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Anthony Liguori <aliguori@us.ibm.com> git-svn-id: svn://svn.savannah.nongnu.org/qemu/trunk@6724 c046a42c-6fe2-441c-8c8c-71466251a162
2009-03-06 21:27:28 +01:00
@end example
This says to use the 'GSSAPI' mechanism with the Kerberos v5 protocol, with
the server principal stored in /etc/qemu/krb5.tab. For this to work the
administrator of your KDC must generate a Kerberos principal for the server,
with a name of 'qemu/somehost.example.com@@EXAMPLE.COM' replacing
'somehost.example.com' with the fully qualified host name of the machine
running QEMU, and 'EXAMPLE.COM' with the Kerberos Realm.
Add SASL authentication support ("Daniel P. Berrange") This patch adds the new SASL authentication protocol to the VNC server. It is enabled by setting the 'sasl' flag when launching VNC. SASL can optionally provide encryption via its SSF layer, if a suitable mechanism is configured (eg, GSSAPI/Kerberos, or Digest-MD5). If an SSF layer is not available, then it should be combined with the x509 VNC authentication protocol which provides encryption. eg, if using GSSAPI qemu -vnc localhost:1,sasl eg if using TLS/x509 for encryption qemu -vnc localhost:1,sasl,tls,x509 By default the Cyrus SASL library will look for its configuration in the file /etc/sasl2/qemu.conf. For non-root users, this can be overridden by setting the SASL_CONF_PATH environment variable, eg to make it look in $HOME/.sasl2. NB unprivileged users may not have access to the full range of SASL mechanisms, since some of them require some administrative privileges to configure. The patch includes an example SASL configuration file which illustrates config for GSSAPI and Digest-MD5, though it should be noted that the latter is not really considered secure any more. Most of the SASL authentication code is located in a separate source file, vnc-auth-sasl.c. The main vnc.c file only contains minimal integration glue, specifically parsing of command line flags / setup, and calls to start the SASL auth process, to do encoding/decoding for data. There are several possible stacks for reading & writing of data, depending on the combo of VNC authentication methods in use - Clear. read/write straight to socket - TLS. read/write via GNUTLS helpers - SASL. encode/decode via SASL SSF layer, then read/write to socket - SASL+TLS. encode/decode via SASL SSF layer, then read/write via GNUTLS Hence, the vnc_client_read & vnc_client_write methods have been refactored a little. vnc_client_read: main entry point for reading, calls either - vnc_client_read_plain reading, with no intermediate decoding - vnc_client_read_sasl reading, with SASL SSF decoding These two methods, then call vnc_client_read_buf(). This decides whether to write to the socket directly or write via GNUTLS. The situation is the same for writing data. More extensive comments have been added in the code / patch. The vnc_client_read_sasl and vnc_client_write_sasl method implementations live in the separate vnc-auth-sasl.c file. The state required for the SASL auth mechanism is kept in a separate VncStateSASL struct, defined in vnc-auth-sasl.h and included in the main VncState. The configure script probes for SASL and automatically enables it if found, unless --disable-vnc-sasl was given to override it. Makefile | 7 Makefile.target | 5 b/qemu.sasl | 34 ++ b/vnc-auth-sasl.c | 626 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ b/vnc-auth-sasl.h | 67 +++++ configure | 34 ++ qemu-doc.texi | 97 ++++++++ vnc-auth-vencrypt.c | 12 vnc.c | 249 ++++++++++++++++++-- vnc.h | 31 ++ 10 files changed, 1129 insertions(+), 33 deletions(-) Signed-off-by: Daniel P. Berrange <berrange@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Anthony Liguori <aliguori@us.ibm.com> git-svn-id: svn://svn.savannah.nongnu.org/qemu/trunk@6724 c046a42c-6fe2-441c-8c8c-71466251a162
2009-03-06 21:27:28 +01:00
When using TLS, if username+password authentication is desired, then a
reasonable configuration is
Add SASL authentication support ("Daniel P. Berrange") This patch adds the new SASL authentication protocol to the VNC server. It is enabled by setting the 'sasl' flag when launching VNC. SASL can optionally provide encryption via its SSF layer, if a suitable mechanism is configured (eg, GSSAPI/Kerberos, or Digest-MD5). If an SSF layer is not available, then it should be combined with the x509 VNC authentication protocol which provides encryption. eg, if using GSSAPI qemu -vnc localhost:1,sasl eg if using TLS/x509 for encryption qemu -vnc localhost:1,sasl,tls,x509 By default the Cyrus SASL library will look for its configuration in the file /etc/sasl2/qemu.conf. For non-root users, this can be overridden by setting the SASL_CONF_PATH environment variable, eg to make it look in $HOME/.sasl2. NB unprivileged users may not have access to the full range of SASL mechanisms, since some of them require some administrative privileges to configure. The patch includes an example SASL configuration file which illustrates config for GSSAPI and Digest-MD5, though it should be noted that the latter is not really considered secure any more. Most of the SASL authentication code is located in a separate source file, vnc-auth-sasl.c. The main vnc.c file only contains minimal integration glue, specifically parsing of command line flags / setup, and calls to start the SASL auth process, to do encoding/decoding for data. There are several possible stacks for reading & writing of data, depending on the combo of VNC authentication methods in use - Clear. read/write straight to socket - TLS. read/write via GNUTLS helpers - SASL. encode/decode via SASL SSF layer, then read/write to socket - SASL+TLS. encode/decode via SASL SSF layer, then read/write via GNUTLS Hence, the vnc_client_read & vnc_client_write methods have been refactored a little. vnc_client_read: main entry point for reading, calls either - vnc_client_read_plain reading, with no intermediate decoding - vnc_client_read_sasl reading, with SASL SSF decoding These two methods, then call vnc_client_read_buf(). This decides whether to write to the socket directly or write via GNUTLS. The situation is the same for writing data. More extensive comments have been added in the code / patch. The vnc_client_read_sasl and vnc_client_write_sasl method implementations live in the separate vnc-auth-sasl.c file. The state required for the SASL auth mechanism is kept in a separate VncStateSASL struct, defined in vnc-auth-sasl.h and included in the main VncState. The configure script probes for SASL and automatically enables it if found, unless --disable-vnc-sasl was given to override it. Makefile | 7 Makefile.target | 5 b/qemu.sasl | 34 ++ b/vnc-auth-sasl.c | 626 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ b/vnc-auth-sasl.h | 67 +++++ configure | 34 ++ qemu-doc.texi | 97 ++++++++ vnc-auth-vencrypt.c | 12 vnc.c | 249 ++++++++++++++++++-- vnc.h | 31 ++ 10 files changed, 1129 insertions(+), 33 deletions(-) Signed-off-by: Daniel P. Berrange <berrange@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Anthony Liguori <aliguori@us.ibm.com> git-svn-id: svn://svn.savannah.nongnu.org/qemu/trunk@6724 c046a42c-6fe2-441c-8c8c-71466251a162
2009-03-06 21:27:28 +01:00
@example
mech_list: scram-sha-1
sasldb_path: /etc/qemu/passwd.db
Add SASL authentication support ("Daniel P. Berrange") This patch adds the new SASL authentication protocol to the VNC server. It is enabled by setting the 'sasl' flag when launching VNC. SASL can optionally provide encryption via its SSF layer, if a suitable mechanism is configured (eg, GSSAPI/Kerberos, or Digest-MD5). If an SSF layer is not available, then it should be combined with the x509 VNC authentication protocol which provides encryption. eg, if using GSSAPI qemu -vnc localhost:1,sasl eg if using TLS/x509 for encryption qemu -vnc localhost:1,sasl,tls,x509 By default the Cyrus SASL library will look for its configuration in the file /etc/sasl2/qemu.conf. For non-root users, this can be overridden by setting the SASL_CONF_PATH environment variable, eg to make it look in $HOME/.sasl2. NB unprivileged users may not have access to the full range of SASL mechanisms, since some of them require some administrative privileges to configure. The patch includes an example SASL configuration file which illustrates config for GSSAPI and Digest-MD5, though it should be noted that the latter is not really considered secure any more. Most of the SASL authentication code is located in a separate source file, vnc-auth-sasl.c. The main vnc.c file only contains minimal integration glue, specifically parsing of command line flags / setup, and calls to start the SASL auth process, to do encoding/decoding for data. There are several possible stacks for reading & writing of data, depending on the combo of VNC authentication methods in use - Clear. read/write straight to socket - TLS. read/write via GNUTLS helpers - SASL. encode/decode via SASL SSF layer, then read/write to socket - SASL+TLS. encode/decode via SASL SSF layer, then read/write via GNUTLS Hence, the vnc_client_read & vnc_client_write methods have been refactored a little. vnc_client_read: main entry point for reading, calls either - vnc_client_read_plain reading, with no intermediate decoding - vnc_client_read_sasl reading, with SASL SSF decoding These two methods, then call vnc_client_read_buf(). This decides whether to write to the socket directly or write via GNUTLS. The situation is the same for writing data. More extensive comments have been added in the code / patch. The vnc_client_read_sasl and vnc_client_write_sasl method implementations live in the separate vnc-auth-sasl.c file. The state required for the SASL auth mechanism is kept in a separate VncStateSASL struct, defined in vnc-auth-sasl.h and included in the main VncState. The configure script probes for SASL and automatically enables it if found, unless --disable-vnc-sasl was given to override it. Makefile | 7 Makefile.target | 5 b/qemu.sasl | 34 ++ b/vnc-auth-sasl.c | 626 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ b/vnc-auth-sasl.h | 67 +++++ configure | 34 ++ qemu-doc.texi | 97 ++++++++ vnc-auth-vencrypt.c | 12 vnc.c | 249 ++++++++++++++++++-- vnc.h | 31 ++ 10 files changed, 1129 insertions(+), 33 deletions(-) Signed-off-by: Daniel P. Berrange <berrange@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Anthony Liguori <aliguori@us.ibm.com> git-svn-id: svn://svn.savannah.nongnu.org/qemu/trunk@6724 c046a42c-6fe2-441c-8c8c-71466251a162
2009-03-06 21:27:28 +01:00
@end example
The saslpasswd2 program can be used to populate the passwd.db file with
accounts.
Add SASL authentication support ("Daniel P. Berrange") This patch adds the new SASL authentication protocol to the VNC server. It is enabled by setting the 'sasl' flag when launching VNC. SASL can optionally provide encryption via its SSF layer, if a suitable mechanism is configured (eg, GSSAPI/Kerberos, or Digest-MD5). If an SSF layer is not available, then it should be combined with the x509 VNC authentication protocol which provides encryption. eg, if using GSSAPI qemu -vnc localhost:1,sasl eg if using TLS/x509 for encryption qemu -vnc localhost:1,sasl,tls,x509 By default the Cyrus SASL library will look for its configuration in the file /etc/sasl2/qemu.conf. For non-root users, this can be overridden by setting the SASL_CONF_PATH environment variable, eg to make it look in $HOME/.sasl2. NB unprivileged users may not have access to the full range of SASL mechanisms, since some of them require some administrative privileges to configure. The patch includes an example SASL configuration file which illustrates config for GSSAPI and Digest-MD5, though it should be noted that the latter is not really considered secure any more. Most of the SASL authentication code is located in a separate source file, vnc-auth-sasl.c. The main vnc.c file only contains minimal integration glue, specifically parsing of command line flags / setup, and calls to start the SASL auth process, to do encoding/decoding for data. There are several possible stacks for reading & writing of data, depending on the combo of VNC authentication methods in use - Clear. read/write straight to socket - TLS. read/write via GNUTLS helpers - SASL. encode/decode via SASL SSF layer, then read/write to socket - SASL+TLS. encode/decode via SASL SSF layer, then read/write via GNUTLS Hence, the vnc_client_read & vnc_client_write methods have been refactored a little. vnc_client_read: main entry point for reading, calls either - vnc_client_read_plain reading, with no intermediate decoding - vnc_client_read_sasl reading, with SASL SSF decoding These two methods, then call vnc_client_read_buf(). This decides whether to write to the socket directly or write via GNUTLS. The situation is the same for writing data. More extensive comments have been added in the code / patch. The vnc_client_read_sasl and vnc_client_write_sasl method implementations live in the separate vnc-auth-sasl.c file. The state required for the SASL auth mechanism is kept in a separate VncStateSASL struct, defined in vnc-auth-sasl.h and included in the main VncState. The configure script probes for SASL and automatically enables it if found, unless --disable-vnc-sasl was given to override it. Makefile | 7 Makefile.target | 5 b/qemu.sasl | 34 ++ b/vnc-auth-sasl.c | 626 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ b/vnc-auth-sasl.h | 67 +++++ configure | 34 ++ qemu-doc.texi | 97 ++++++++ vnc-auth-vencrypt.c | 12 vnc.c | 249 ++++++++++++++++++-- vnc.h | 31 ++ 10 files changed, 1129 insertions(+), 33 deletions(-) Signed-off-by: Daniel P. Berrange <berrange@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Anthony Liguori <aliguori@us.ibm.com> git-svn-id: svn://svn.savannah.nongnu.org/qemu/trunk@6724 c046a42c-6fe2-441c-8c8c-71466251a162
2009-03-06 21:27:28 +01:00
Other SASL configurations will be left as an exercise for the reader. Note that
all mechanisms except GSSAPI, should be combined with use of TLS to ensure a
secure data channel.
Add SASL authentication support ("Daniel P. Berrange") This patch adds the new SASL authentication protocol to the VNC server. It is enabled by setting the 'sasl' flag when launching VNC. SASL can optionally provide encryption via its SSF layer, if a suitable mechanism is configured (eg, GSSAPI/Kerberos, or Digest-MD5). If an SSF layer is not available, then it should be combined with the x509 VNC authentication protocol which provides encryption. eg, if using GSSAPI qemu -vnc localhost:1,sasl eg if using TLS/x509 for encryption qemu -vnc localhost:1,sasl,tls,x509 By default the Cyrus SASL library will look for its configuration in the file /etc/sasl2/qemu.conf. For non-root users, this can be overridden by setting the SASL_CONF_PATH environment variable, eg to make it look in $HOME/.sasl2. NB unprivileged users may not have access to the full range of SASL mechanisms, since some of them require some administrative privileges to configure. The patch includes an example SASL configuration file which illustrates config for GSSAPI and Digest-MD5, though it should be noted that the latter is not really considered secure any more. Most of the SASL authentication code is located in a separate source file, vnc-auth-sasl.c. The main vnc.c file only contains minimal integration glue, specifically parsing of command line flags / setup, and calls to start the SASL auth process, to do encoding/decoding for data. There are several possible stacks for reading & writing of data, depending on the combo of VNC authentication methods in use - Clear. read/write straight to socket - TLS. read/write via GNUTLS helpers - SASL. encode/decode via SASL SSF layer, then read/write to socket - SASL+TLS. encode/decode via SASL SSF layer, then read/write via GNUTLS Hence, the vnc_client_read & vnc_client_write methods have been refactored a little. vnc_client_read: main entry point for reading, calls either - vnc_client_read_plain reading, with no intermediate decoding - vnc_client_read_sasl reading, with SASL SSF decoding These two methods, then call vnc_client_read_buf(). This decides whether to write to the socket directly or write via GNUTLS. The situation is the same for writing data. More extensive comments have been added in the code / patch. The vnc_client_read_sasl and vnc_client_write_sasl method implementations live in the separate vnc-auth-sasl.c file. The state required for the SASL auth mechanism is kept in a separate VncStateSASL struct, defined in vnc-auth-sasl.h and included in the main VncState. The configure script probes for SASL and automatically enables it if found, unless --disable-vnc-sasl was given to override it. Makefile | 7 Makefile.target | 5 b/qemu.sasl | 34 ++ b/vnc-auth-sasl.c | 626 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ b/vnc-auth-sasl.h | 67 +++++ configure | 34 ++ qemu-doc.texi | 97 ++++++++ vnc-auth-vencrypt.c | 12 vnc.c | 249 ++++++++++++++++++-- vnc.h | 31 ++ 10 files changed, 1129 insertions(+), 33 deletions(-) Signed-off-by: Daniel P. Berrange <berrange@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Anthony Liguori <aliguori@us.ibm.com> git-svn-id: svn://svn.savannah.nongnu.org/qemu/trunk@6724 c046a42c-6fe2-441c-8c8c-71466251a162
2009-03-06 21:27:28 +01:00
@node gdb_usage
@section GDB usage
QEMU has a primitive support to work with gdb, so that you can do
'Ctrl-C' while the virtual machine is running and inspect its state.
In order to use gdb, launch QEMU with the '-s' option. It will wait for a
gdb connection:
@example
qemu-system-i386 -s -kernel arch/i386/boot/bzImage -hda root-2.4.20.img \
-append "root=/dev/hda"
Connected to host network interface: tun0
Waiting gdb connection on port 1234
@end example
Then launch gdb on the 'vmlinux' executable:
@example
> gdb vmlinux
@end example
In gdb, connect to QEMU:
@example
(gdb) target remote localhost:1234
@end example
Then you can use gdb normally. For example, type 'c' to launch the kernel:
@example
(gdb) c
@end example
Here are some useful tips in order to use gdb on system code:
@enumerate
@item
Use @code{info reg} to display all the CPU registers.
@item
Use @code{x/10i $eip} to display the code at the PC position.
@item
Use @code{set architecture i8086} to dump 16 bit code. Then use
@code{x/10i $cs*16+$eip} to dump the code at the PC position.
@end enumerate
Advanced debugging options:
The default single stepping behavior is step with the IRQs and timer service routines off. It is set this way because when gdb executes a single step it expects to advance beyond the current instruction. With the IRQs and timer service routines on, a single step might jump into the one of the interrupt or exception vectors instead of executing the current instruction. This means you may hit the same breakpoint a number of times before executing the instruction gdb wants to have executed. Because there are rare circumstances where you want to single step into an interrupt vector the behavior can be controlled from GDB. There are three commands you can query and set the single step behavior:
@table @code
@item maintenance packet qqemu.sstepbits
This will display the MASK bits used to control the single stepping IE:
@example
(gdb) maintenance packet qqemu.sstepbits
sending: "qqemu.sstepbits"
received: "ENABLE=1,NOIRQ=2,NOTIMER=4"
@end example
@item maintenance packet qqemu.sstep
This will display the current value of the mask used when single stepping IE:
@example
(gdb) maintenance packet qqemu.sstep
sending: "qqemu.sstep"
received: "0x7"
@end example
@item maintenance packet Qqemu.sstep=HEX_VALUE
This will change the single step mask, so if wanted to enable IRQs on the single step, but not timers, you would use:
@example
(gdb) maintenance packet Qqemu.sstep=0x5
sending: "qemu.sstep=0x5"
received: "OK"
@end example
@end table
@node pcsys_os_specific
@section Target OS specific information
@subsection Linux
To have access to SVGA graphic modes under X11, use the @code{vesa} or
the @code{cirrus} X11 driver. For optimal performances, use 16 bit
color depth in the guest and the host OS.
When using a 2.6 guest Linux kernel, you should add the option
@code{clock=pit} on the kernel command line because the 2.6 Linux
kernels make very strict real time clock checks by default that QEMU
cannot simulate exactly.
When using a 2.6 guest Linux kernel, verify that the 4G/4G patch is
not activated because QEMU is slower with this patch. The QEMU
Accelerator Module is also much slower in this case. Earlier Fedora
Core 3 Linux kernel (< 2.6.9-1.724_FC3) were known to incorporate this
patch by default. Newer kernels don't have it.
@subsection Windows
If you have a slow host, using Windows 95 is better as it gives the
best speed. Windows 2000 is also a good choice.
@subsubsection SVGA graphic modes support
QEMU emulates a Cirrus Logic GD5446 Video
card. All Windows versions starting from Windows 95 should recognize
and use this graphic card. For optimal performances, use 16 bit color
depth in the guest and the host OS.
If you are using Windows XP as guest OS and if you want to use high
resolution modes which the Cirrus Logic BIOS does not support (i.e. >=
1280x1024x16), then you should use the VESA VBE virtual graphic card
(option @option{-std-vga}).
@subsubsection CPU usage reduction
Windows 9x does not correctly use the CPU HLT
instruction. The result is that it takes host CPU cycles even when
idle. You can install the utility from
@url{https://web.archive.org/web/20060212132151/http://www.user.cityline.ru/~maxamn/amnhltm.zip}
to solve this problem. Note that no such tool is needed for NT, 2000 or XP.
@subsubsection Windows 2000 disk full problem
Windows 2000 has a bug which gives a disk full problem during its
installation. When installing it, use the @option{-win2k-hack} QEMU
option to enable a specific workaround. After Windows 2000 is
installed, you no longer need this option (this option slows down the
IDE transfers).
@subsubsection Windows 2000 shutdown
Windows 2000 cannot automatically shutdown in QEMU although Windows 98
can. It comes from the fact that Windows 2000 does not automatically
use the APM driver provided by the BIOS.
In order to correct that, do the following (thanks to Struan
Bartlett): go to the Control Panel => Add/Remove Hardware & Next =>
Add/Troubleshoot a device => Add a new device & Next => No, select the
hardware from a list & Next => NT Apm/Legacy Support & Next => Next
(again) a few times. Now the driver is installed and Windows 2000 now
correctly instructs QEMU to shutdown at the appropriate moment.
@subsubsection Share a directory between Unix and Windows
See @ref{sec_invocation} about the help of the option
@option{'-netdev user,smb=...'}.
@subsubsection Windows XP security problem
Some releases of Windows XP install correctly but give a security
error when booting:
@example
A problem is preventing Windows from accurately checking the
license for this computer. Error code: 0x800703e6.
@end example
The workaround is to install a service pack for XP after a boot in safe
mode. Then reboot, and the problem should go away. Since there is no
network while in safe mode, its recommended to download the full
installation of SP1 or SP2 and transfer that via an ISO or using the
vvfat block device ("-hdb fat:directory_which_holds_the_SP").
@subsection MS-DOS and FreeDOS
@subsubsection CPU usage reduction
DOS does not correctly use the CPU HLT instruction. The result is that
it takes host CPU cycles even when idle. You can install the utility from
@url{https://web.archive.org/web/20051222085335/http://www.vmware.com/software/dosidle210.zip}
to solve this problem.
@node QEMU System emulator for non PC targets
@chapter QEMU System emulator for non PC targets
QEMU is a generic emulator and it emulates many non PC
machines. Most of the options are similar to the PC emulator. The
differences are mentioned in the following sections.
@menu
* PowerPC System emulator::
* Sparc32 System emulator::
* Sparc64 System emulator::
* MIPS System emulator::
* ARM System emulator::
* ColdFire System emulator::
* Cris System emulator::
* Microblaze System emulator::
* SH4 System emulator::
* Xtensa System emulator::
@end menu
@node PowerPC System emulator
@section PowerPC System emulator
@cindex system emulation (PowerPC)
Use the executable @file{qemu-system-ppc} to simulate a complete PREP
or PowerMac PowerPC system.
QEMU emulates the following PowerMac peripherals:
@itemize @minus
@item
UniNorth or Grackle PCI Bridge
@item
PCI VGA compatible card with VESA Bochs Extensions
@item
2 PMAC IDE interfaces with hard disk and CD-ROM support
@item
NE2000 PCI adapters
@item
Non Volatile RAM
@item
VIA-CUDA with ADB keyboard and mouse.
@end itemize
QEMU emulates the following PREP peripherals:
@itemize @minus
@item
PCI Bridge
@item
PCI VGA compatible card with VESA Bochs Extensions
@item
2 IDE interfaces with hard disk and CD-ROM support
@item
Floppy disk
@item
NE2000 network adapters
@item
Serial port
@item
PREP Non Volatile RAM
@item
PC compatible keyboard and mouse.
@end itemize
QEMU uses the Open Hack'Ware Open Firmware Compatible BIOS available at
@url{http://perso.magic.fr/l_indien/OpenHackWare/index.htm}.
Since version 0.9.1, QEMU uses OpenBIOS @url{https://www.openbios.org/}
for the g3beige and mac99 PowerMac machines. OpenBIOS is a free (GPL
v2) portable firmware implementation. The goal is to implement a 100%
IEEE 1275-1994 (referred to as Open Firmware) compliant firmware.
@c man begin OPTIONS
The following options are specific to the PowerPC emulation:
@table @option
@item -g @var{W}x@var{H}[x@var{DEPTH}]
Set the initial VGA graphic mode. The default is 800x600x32.
@item -prom-env @var{string}
Set OpenBIOS variables in NVRAM, for example:
@example
qemu-system-ppc -prom-env 'auto-boot?=false' \
-prom-env 'boot-device=hd:2,\yaboot' \
-prom-env 'boot-args=conf=hd:2,\yaboot.conf'
@end example
These variables are not used by Open Hack'Ware.
@end table
@c man end
More information is available at
@url{http://perso.magic.fr/l_indien/qemu-ppc/}.
@node Sparc32 System emulator
@section Sparc32 System emulator
@cindex system emulation (Sparc32)
Use the executable @file{qemu-system-sparc} to simulate the following
Sun4m architecture machines:
@itemize @minus
@item
SPARCstation 4
@item
SPARCstation 5
@item
SPARCstation 10
@item
SPARCstation 20
@item
SPARCserver 600MP
@item
SPARCstation LX
@item
SPARCstation Voyager
@item
SPARCclassic
@item
SPARCbook
@end itemize
The emulation is somewhat complete. SMP up to 16 CPUs is supported,
but Linux limits the number of usable CPUs to 4.
QEMU emulates the following sun4m peripherals:
@itemize @minus
@item
IOMMU
@item
TCX or cgthree Frame buffer
@item
Lance (Am7990) Ethernet
@item
Non Volatile RAM M48T02/M48T08
@item
Slave I/O: timers, interrupt controllers, Zilog serial ports, keyboard
and power/reset logic
@item
ESP SCSI controller with hard disk and CD-ROM support
@item
Floppy drive (not on SS-600MP)
@item
CS4231 sound device (only on SS-5, not working yet)
@end itemize
The number of peripherals is fixed in the architecture. Maximum
memory size depends on the machine type, for SS-5 it is 256MB and for
others 2047MB.
Since version 0.8.2, QEMU uses OpenBIOS
@url{https://www.openbios.org/}. OpenBIOS is a free (GPL v2) portable
firmware implementation. The goal is to implement a 100% IEEE
1275-1994 (referred to as Open Firmware) compliant firmware.
A sample Linux 2.6 series kernel and ram disk image are available on
the QEMU web site. There are still issues with NetBSD and OpenBSD, but
most kernel versions work. Please note that currently older Solaris kernels
don't work probably due to interface issues between OpenBIOS and
Solaris.
@c man begin OPTIONS
The following options are specific to the Sparc32 emulation:
@table @option
@item -g @var{W}x@var{H}x[x@var{DEPTH}]
Set the initial graphics mode. For TCX, the default is 1024x768x8 with the
option of 1024x768x24. For cgthree, the default is 1024x768x8 with the option
of 1152x900x8 for people who wish to use OBP.
@item -prom-env @var{string}
Set OpenBIOS variables in NVRAM, for example:
@example
qemu-system-sparc -prom-env 'auto-boot?=false' \
-prom-env 'boot-device=sd(0,2,0):d' -prom-env 'boot-args=linux single'
@end example
@item -M [SS-4|SS-5|SS-10|SS-20|SS-600MP|LX|Voyager|SPARCClassic] [|SPARCbook]
Set the emulated machine type. Default is SS-5.
@end table
@c man end
@node Sparc64 System emulator
@section Sparc64 System emulator
@cindex system emulation (Sparc64)
Use the executable @file{qemu-system-sparc64} to simulate a Sun4u
(UltraSPARC PC-like machine), Sun4v (T1 PC-like machine), or generic
Niagara (T1) machine. The Sun4u emulator is mostly complete, being
able to run Linux, NetBSD and OpenBSD in headless (-nographic) mode. The
Sun4v emulator is still a work in progress.
The Niagara T1 emulator makes use of firmware and OS binaries supplied in the S10image/ directory
of the OpenSPARC T1 project @url{http://download.oracle.com/technetwork/systems/opensparc/OpenSPARCT1_Arch.1.5.tar.bz2}
and is able to boot the disk.s10hw2 Solaris image.
@example
qemu-system-sparc64 -M niagara -L /path-to/S10image/ \
-nographic -m 256 \
-drive if=pflash,readonly=on,file=/S10image/disk.s10hw2
@end example
QEMU emulates the following peripherals:
@itemize @minus
@item
UltraSparc IIi APB PCI Bridge
@item
PCI VGA compatible card with VESA Bochs Extensions
@item
PS/2 mouse and keyboard
@item
Non Volatile RAM M48T59
@item
PC-compatible serial ports
@item
2 PCI IDE interfaces with hard disk and CD-ROM support
@item
Floppy disk
@end itemize
@c man begin OPTIONS
The following options are specific to the Sparc64 emulation:
@table @option
@item -prom-env @var{string}
Set OpenBIOS variables in NVRAM, for example:
@example
qemu-system-sparc64 -prom-env 'auto-boot?=false'
@end example
@item -M [sun4u|sun4v|niagara]
Set the emulated machine type. The default is sun4u.
@end table
@c man end
@node MIPS System emulator
@section MIPS System emulator
@cindex system emulation (MIPS)
Four executables cover simulation of 32 and 64-bit MIPS systems in
both endian options, @file{qemu-system-mips}, @file{qemu-system-mipsel}
@file{qemu-system-mips64} and @file{qemu-system-mips64el}.
Five different machine types are emulated:
@itemize @minus
@item
A generic ISA PC-like machine "mips"
@item
The MIPS Malta prototype board "malta"
@item
An ACER Pica "pica61". This machine needs the 64-bit emulator.
@item
MIPS emulator pseudo board "mipssim"
@item
A MIPS Magnum R4000 machine "magnum". This machine needs the 64-bit emulator.
@end itemize
The generic emulation is supported by Debian 'Etch' and is able to
install Debian into a virtual disk image. The following devices are
emulated:
@itemize @minus
@item
A range of MIPS CPUs, default is the 24Kf
@item
PC style serial port
@item
PC style IDE disk
@item
NE2000 network card
@end itemize
The Malta emulation supports the following devices:
@itemize @minus
@item
Core board with MIPS 24Kf CPU and Galileo system controller
@item
PIIX4 PCI/USB/SMbus controller
@item
The Multi-I/O chip's serial device
@item
PCI network cards (PCnet32 and others)
@item
Malta FPGA serial device
@item
Cirrus (default) or any other PCI VGA graphics card
@end itemize
The ACER Pica emulation supports:
@itemize @minus
@item
MIPS R4000 CPU
@item
PC-style IRQ and DMA controllers
@item
PC Keyboard
@item
IDE controller
@end itemize
The mipssim pseudo board emulation provides an environment similar
to what the proprietary MIPS emulator uses for running Linux.
It supports:
@itemize @minus
@item
A range of MIPS CPUs, default is the 24Kf
@item
PC style serial port
@item
MIPSnet network emulation
@end itemize
The MIPS Magnum R4000 emulation supports:
@itemize @minus
@item
MIPS R4000 CPU
@item
PC-style IRQ controller
@item
PC Keyboard
@item
SCSI controller
@item
G364 framebuffer
@end itemize
@node ARM System emulator
@section ARM System emulator
@cindex system emulation (ARM)
Use the executable @file{qemu-system-arm} to simulate a ARM
machine. The ARM Integrator/CP board is emulated with the following
devices:
@itemize @minus
@item
ARM926E, ARM1026E, ARM946E, ARM1136 or Cortex-A8 CPU
@item
Two PL011 UARTs
@item
SMC 91c111 Ethernet adapter
@item
PL110 LCD controller
@item
PL050 KMI with PS/2 keyboard and mouse.
@item
PL181 MultiMedia Card Interface with SD card.
@end itemize
The ARM Versatile baseboard is emulated with the following devices:
@itemize @minus
@item
ARM926E, ARM1136 or Cortex-A8 CPU
@item
PL190 Vectored Interrupt Controller
@item
Four PL011 UARTs
@item
SMC 91c111 Ethernet adapter
@item
PL110 LCD controller
@item
PL050 KMI with PS/2 keyboard and mouse.
@item
PCI host bridge. Note the emulated PCI bridge only provides access to
PCI memory space. It does not provide access to PCI IO space.
This means some devices (eg. ne2k_pci NIC) are not usable, and others
(eg. rtl8139 NIC) are only usable when the guest drivers use the memory
mapped control registers.
@item
PCI OHCI USB controller.
@item
LSI53C895A PCI SCSI Host Bus Adapter with hard disk and CD-ROM devices.
@item
PL181 MultiMedia Card Interface with SD card.
@end itemize
Several variants of the ARM RealView baseboard are emulated,
including the EB, PB-A8 and PBX-A9. Due to interactions with the
bootloader, only certain Linux kernel configurations work out
of the box on these boards.
Kernels for the PB-A8 board should have CONFIG_REALVIEW_HIGH_PHYS_OFFSET
enabled in the kernel, and expect 512M RAM. Kernels for The PBX-A9 board
should have CONFIG_SPARSEMEM enabled, CONFIG_REALVIEW_HIGH_PHYS_OFFSET
disabled and expect 1024M RAM.
The following devices are emulated:
@itemize @minus
@item
ARM926E, ARM1136, ARM11MPCore, Cortex-A8 or Cortex-A9 MPCore CPU
@item
ARM AMBA Generic/Distributed Interrupt Controller
@item
Four PL011 UARTs
@item
SMC 91c111 or SMSC LAN9118 Ethernet adapter
@item
PL110 LCD controller
@item
PL050 KMI with PS/2 keyboard and mouse
@item
PCI host bridge
@item
PCI OHCI USB controller
@item
LSI53C895A PCI SCSI Host Bus Adapter with hard disk and CD-ROM devices
@item
PL181 MultiMedia Card Interface with SD card.
@end itemize
The XScale-based clamshell PDA models ("Spitz", "Akita", "Borzoi"
and "Terrier") emulation includes the following peripherals:
@itemize @minus
@item
Intel PXA270 System-on-chip (ARM V5TE core)
@item
NAND Flash memory
@item
IBM/Hitachi DSCM microdrive in a PXA PCMCIA slot - not in "Akita"
@item
On-chip OHCI USB controller
@item
On-chip LCD controller
@item
On-chip Real Time Clock
@item
TI ADS7846 touchscreen controller on SSP bus
@item
Maxim MAX1111 analog-digital converter on I@math{^2}C bus
@item
GPIO-connected keyboard controller and LEDs
@item
Secure Digital card connected to PXA MMC/SD host
@item
Three on-chip UARTs
@item
WM8750 audio CODEC on I@math{^2}C and I@math{^2}S busses
@end itemize
The Palm Tungsten|E PDA (codename "Cheetah") emulation includes the
following elements:
@itemize @minus
@item
Texas Instruments OMAP310 System-on-chip (ARM 925T core)
@item
ROM and RAM memories (ROM firmware image can be loaded with -option-rom)
@item
On-chip LCD controller
@item
On-chip Real Time Clock
@item
TI TSC2102i touchscreen controller / analog-digital converter / Audio
CODEC, connected through MicroWire and I@math{^2}S busses
@item
GPIO-connected matrix keypad
@item
Secure Digital card connected to OMAP MMC/SD host
@item
Three on-chip UARTs
@end itemize
Nokia N800 and N810 internet tablets (known also as RX-34 and RX-44 / 48)
emulation supports the following elements:
@itemize @minus
@item
Texas Instruments OMAP2420 System-on-chip (ARM 1136 core)
@item
RAM and non-volatile OneNAND Flash memories
@item
Display connected to EPSON remote framebuffer chip and OMAP on-chip
display controller and a LS041y3 MIPI DBI-C controller
@item
TI TSC2301 (in N800) and TI TSC2005 (in N810) touchscreen controllers
driven through SPI bus
@item
National Semiconductor LM8323-controlled qwerty keyboard driven
through I@math{^2}C bus
@item
Secure Digital card connected to OMAP MMC/SD host
@item
Three OMAP on-chip UARTs and on-chip STI debugging console
@item
A Bluetooth(R) transceiver and HCI connected to an UART
@item
Mentor Graphics "Inventra" dual-role USB controller embedded in a TI
TUSB6010 chip - only USB host mode is supported
@item
TI TMP105 temperature sensor driven through I@math{^2}C bus
@item
TI TWL92230C power management companion with an RTC on I@math{^2}C bus
@item
Nokia RETU and TAHVO multi-purpose chips with an RTC, connected
through CBUS
@end itemize
The Luminary Micro Stellaris LM3S811EVB emulation includes the following
devices:
@itemize @minus
@item
Cortex-M3 CPU core.
@item
64k Flash and 8k SRAM.
@item
Timers, UARTs, ADC and I@math{^2}C interface.
@item
OSRAM Pictiva 96x16 OLED with SSD0303 controller on I@math{^2}C bus.
@end itemize
The Luminary Micro Stellaris LM3S6965EVB emulation includes the following
devices:
@itemize @minus
@item
Cortex-M3 CPU core.
@item
256k Flash and 64k SRAM.
@item
Timers, UARTs, ADC, I@math{^2}C and SSI interfaces.
@item
OSRAM Pictiva 128x64 OLED with SSD0323 controller connected via SSI.
@end itemize
The Freecom MusicPal internet radio emulation includes the following
elements:
@itemize @minus
@item
Marvell MV88W8618 ARM core.
@item
32 MB RAM, 256 KB SRAM, 8 MB flash.
@item
Up to 2 16550 UARTs
@item
MV88W8xx8 Ethernet controller
@item
MV88W8618 audio controller, WM8750 CODEC and mixer
@item
128×64 display with brightness control
@item
2 buttons, 2 navigation wheels with button function
@end itemize
The Siemens SX1 models v1 and v2 (default) basic emulation.
The emulation includes the following elements:
@itemize @minus
@item
Texas Instruments OMAP310 System-on-chip (ARM 925T core)
@item
ROM and RAM memories (ROM firmware image can be loaded with -pflash)
V1
1 Flash of 16MB and 1 Flash of 8MB
V2
1 Flash of 32MB
@item
On-chip LCD controller
@item
On-chip Real Time Clock
@item
Secure Digital card connected to OMAP MMC/SD host
@item
Three on-chip UARTs
@end itemize
A Linux 2.6 test image is available on the QEMU web site. More
information is available in the QEMU mailing-list archive.
@c man begin OPTIONS
The following options are specific to the ARM emulation:
@table @option
@item -semihosting
Enable semihosting syscall emulation.
On ARM this implements the "Angel" interface.
Note that this allows guest direct access to the host filesystem,
so should only be used with trusted guest OS.
@end table
@c man end
@node ColdFire System emulator
@section ColdFire System emulator
@cindex system emulation (ColdFire)
@cindex system emulation (M68K)
Use the executable @file{qemu-system-m68k} to simulate a ColdFire machine.
The emulator is able to boot a uClinux kernel.
The M5208EVB emulation includes the following devices:
@itemize @minus
@item
MCF5208 ColdFire V2 Microprocessor (ISA A+ with EMAC).
@item
Three Two on-chip UARTs.
@item
Fast Ethernet Controller (FEC)
@end itemize
The AN5206 emulation includes the following devices:
@itemize @minus
@item
MCF5206 ColdFire V2 Microprocessor.
@item
Two on-chip UARTs.
@end itemize
@c man begin OPTIONS
The following options are specific to the ColdFire emulation:
@table @option
@item -semihosting
Enable semihosting syscall emulation.
On M68K this implements the "ColdFire GDB" interface used by libgloss.
Note that this allows guest direct access to the host filesystem,
so should only be used with trusted guest OS.
@end table
@c man end
@node Cris System emulator
@section Cris System emulator
@cindex system emulation (Cris)
TODO
@node Microblaze System emulator
@section Microblaze System emulator
@cindex system emulation (Microblaze)
TODO
@node SH4 System emulator
@section SH4 System emulator
@cindex system emulation (SH4)
TODO
@node Xtensa System emulator
@section Xtensa System emulator
@cindex system emulation (Xtensa)
Two executables cover simulation of both Xtensa endian options,
@file{qemu-system-xtensa} and @file{qemu-system-xtensaeb}.
Two different machine types are emulated:
@itemize @minus
@item
Xtensa emulator pseudo board "sim"
@item
Avnet LX60/LX110/LX200 board
@end itemize
The sim pseudo board emulation provides an environment similar
to one provided by the proprietary Tensilica ISS.
It supports:
@itemize @minus
@item
A range of Xtensa CPUs, default is the DC232B
@item
Console and filesystem access via semihosting calls
@end itemize
The Avnet LX60/LX110/LX200 emulation supports:
@itemize @minus
@item
A range of Xtensa CPUs, default is the DC232B
@item
16550 UART
@item
OpenCores 10/100 Mbps Ethernet MAC
@end itemize
@c man begin OPTIONS
The following options are specific to the Xtensa emulation:
@table @option
@item -semihosting
Enable semihosting syscall emulation.
Xtensa semihosting provides basic file IO calls, such as open/read/write/seek/select.
Tensilica baremetal libc for ISS and linux platform "sim" use this interface.
Note that this allows guest direct access to the host filesystem,
so should only be used with trusted guest OS.
@end table
@c man end
@node QEMU Guest Agent
@chapter QEMU Guest Agent invocation
@include qemu-ga.texi
@node QEMU User space emulator
@chapter QEMU User space emulator
@menu
* Supported Operating Systems ::
* Features::
* Linux User space emulator::
* BSD User space emulator ::
@end menu
@node Supported Operating Systems
@section Supported Operating Systems
The following OS are supported in user space emulation:
@itemize @minus
@item
Linux (referred as qemu-linux-user)
@item
BSD (referred as qemu-bsd-user)
@end itemize
@node Features
@section Features
QEMU user space emulation has the following notable features:
@table @strong
@item System call translation:
QEMU includes a generic system call translator. This means that
the parameters of the system calls can be converted to fix
endianness and 32/64-bit mismatches between hosts and targets.
IOCTLs can be converted too.
@item POSIX signal handling:
QEMU can redirect to the running program all signals coming from
the host (such as @code{SIGALRM}), as well as synthesize signals from
virtual CPU exceptions (for example @code{SIGFPE} when the program
executes a division by zero).
QEMU relies on the host kernel to emulate most signal system
calls, for example to emulate the signal mask. On Linux, QEMU
supports both normal and real-time signals.
@item Threading:
On Linux, QEMU can emulate the @code{clone} syscall and create a real
host thread (with a separate virtual CPU) for each emulated thread.
Note that not all targets currently emulate atomic operations correctly.
x86 and ARM use a global lock in order to preserve their semantics.
@end table
QEMU was conceived so that ultimately it can emulate itself. Although
it is not very useful, it is an important test to show the power of the
emulator.
@node Linux User space emulator
@section Linux User space emulator
@menu
* Quick Start::
* Wine launch::
* Command line options::
* Other binaries::
@end menu
@node Quick Start
@subsection Quick Start
In order to launch a Linux process, QEMU needs the process executable
itself and all the target (x86) dynamic libraries used by it.
@itemize
@item On x86, you can just try to launch any process by using the native
libraries:
@example
qemu-i386 -L / /bin/ls
@end example
@code{-L /} tells that the x86 dynamic linker must be searched with a
@file{/} prefix.
@item Since QEMU is also a linux process, you can launch QEMU with
QEMU (NOTE: you can only do that if you compiled QEMU from the sources):
@example
qemu-i386 -L / qemu-i386 -L / /bin/ls
@end example
@item On non x86 CPUs, you need first to download at least an x86 glibc
(@file{qemu-runtime-i386-XXX-.tar.gz} on the QEMU web page). Ensure that
@code{LD_LIBRARY_PATH} is not set:
@example
unset LD_LIBRARY_PATH
@end example
Then you can launch the precompiled @file{ls} x86 executable:
@example
qemu-i386 tests/i386/ls
@end example
You can look at @file{scripts/qemu-binfmt-conf.sh} so that
QEMU is automatically launched by the Linux kernel when you try to
launch x86 executables. It requires the @code{binfmt_misc} module in the
Linux kernel.
@item The x86 version of QEMU is also included. You can try weird things such as:
@example
qemu-i386 /usr/local/qemu-i386/bin/qemu-i386 \
/usr/local/qemu-i386/bin/ls-i386
@end example
@end itemize
@node Wine launch
@subsection Wine launch
@itemize
@item Ensure that you have a working QEMU with the x86 glibc
distribution (see previous section). In order to verify it, you must be
able to do:
@example
qemu-i386 /usr/local/qemu-i386/bin/ls-i386
@end example
@item Download the binary x86 Wine install
(@file{qemu-XXX-i386-wine.tar.gz} on the QEMU web page).
@item Configure Wine on your account. Look at the provided script
@file{/usr/local/qemu-i386/@/bin/wine-conf.sh}. Your previous
@code{$@{HOME@}/.wine} directory is saved to @code{$@{HOME@}/.wine.org}.
@item Then you can try the example @file{putty.exe}:
@example
qemu-i386 /usr/local/qemu-i386/wine/bin/wine \
/usr/local/qemu-i386/wine/c/Program\ Files/putty.exe
@end example
@end itemize
@node Command line options
@subsection Command line options
@example
@command{qemu-i386} [@option{-h]} [@option{-d]} [@option{-L} @var{path}] [@option{-s} @var{size}] [@option{-cpu} @var{model}] [@option{-g} @var{port}] [@option{-B} @var{offset}] [@option{-R} @var{size}] @var{program} [@var{arguments}...]
@end example
@table @option
@item -h
Print the help
@item -L path
Set the x86 elf interpreter prefix (default=/usr/local/qemu-i386)
@item -s size
Set the x86 stack size in bytes (default=524288)
@item -cpu model
Select CPU model (-cpu help for list and additional feature selection)
@item -E @var{var}=@var{value}
Set environment @var{var} to @var{value}.
@item -U @var{var}
Remove @var{var} from the environment.
@item -B offset
Offset guest address by the specified number of bytes. This is useful when
the address region required by guest applications is reserved on the host.
This option is currently only supported on some hosts.
@item -R size
Pre-allocate a guest virtual address space of the given size (in bytes).
"G", "M", and "k" suffixes may be used when specifying the size.
@end table
Debug options:
@table @option
@item -d item1,...
Activate logging of the specified items (use '-d help' for a list of log items)
@item -p pagesize
Act as if the host page size was 'pagesize' bytes
@item -g port
Wait gdb connection to port
@item -singlestep
Run the emulation in single step mode.
@end table
Environment variables:
@table @env
@item QEMU_STRACE
Print system calls and arguments similar to the 'strace' program
(NOTE: the actual 'strace' program will not work because the user
space emulator hasn't implemented ptrace). At the moment this is
incomplete. All system calls that don't have a specific argument
format are printed with information for six arguments. Many
flag-style arguments don't have decoders and will show up as numbers.
@end table
@node Other binaries
@subsection Other binaries
@cindex user mode (Alpha)
@command{qemu-alpha} TODO.
@cindex user mode (ARM)
@command{qemu-armeb} TODO.
@cindex user mode (ARM)
@command{qemu-arm} is also capable of running ARM "Angel" semihosted ELF
binaries (as implemented by the arm-elf and arm-eabi Newlib/GDB
configurations), and arm-uclinux bFLT format binaries.
@cindex user mode (ColdFire)
@cindex user mode (M68K)
@command{qemu-m68k} is capable of running semihosted binaries using the BDM
(m5xxx-ram-hosted.ld) or m68k-sim (sim.ld) syscall interfaces, and
coldfire uClinux bFLT format binaries.
The binary format is detected automatically.
@cindex user mode (Cris)
@command{qemu-cris} TODO.
@cindex user mode (i386)
@command{qemu-i386} TODO.
@command{qemu-x86_64} TODO.
@cindex user mode (Microblaze)
@command{qemu-microblaze} TODO.
@cindex user mode (MIPS)
@command{qemu-mips} TODO.
@command{qemu-mipsel} TODO.
@cindex user mode (NiosII)
@command{qemu-nios2} TODO.
@cindex user mode (PowerPC)
@command{qemu-ppc64abi32} TODO.
@command{qemu-ppc64} TODO.
@command{qemu-ppc} TODO.
@cindex user mode (SH4)
@command{qemu-sh4eb} TODO.
@command{qemu-sh4} TODO.
@cindex user mode (SPARC)
@command{qemu-sparc} can execute Sparc32 binaries (Sparc32 CPU, 32 bit ABI).
@command{qemu-sparc32plus} can execute Sparc32 and SPARC32PLUS binaries
(Sparc64 CPU, 32 bit ABI).
@command{qemu-sparc64} can execute some Sparc64 (Sparc64 CPU, 64 bit ABI) and
SPARC32PLUS binaries (Sparc64 CPU, 32 bit ABI).
@node BSD User space emulator
@section BSD User space emulator
@menu
* BSD Status::
* BSD Quick Start::
* BSD Command line options::
@end menu
@node BSD Status
@subsection BSD Status
@itemize @minus
@item
target Sparc64 on Sparc64: Some trivial programs work.
@end itemize
@node BSD Quick Start
@subsection Quick Start
In order to launch a BSD process, QEMU needs the process executable
itself and all the target dynamic libraries used by it.
@itemize
@item On Sparc64, you can just try to launch any process by using the native
libraries:
@example
qemu-sparc64 /bin/ls
@end example
@end itemize
@node BSD Command line options
@subsection Command line options
@example
@command{qemu-sparc64} [@option{-h]} [@option{-d]} [@option{-L} @var{path}] [@option{-s} @var{size}] [@option{-bsd} @var{type}] @var{program} [@var{arguments}...]
@end example
@table @option
@item -h
Print the help
@item -L path
Set the library root path (default=/)
@item -s size
Set the stack size in bytes (default=524288)
@item -ignore-environment
Start with an empty environment. Without this option,
the initial environment is a copy of the caller's environment.
@item -E @var{var}=@var{value}
Set environment @var{var} to @var{value}.
@item -U @var{var}
Remove @var{var} from the environment.
@item -bsd type
Set the type of the emulated BSD Operating system. Valid values are
FreeBSD, NetBSD and OpenBSD (default).
@end table
Debug options:
@table @option
@item -d item1,...
Activate logging of the specified items (use '-d help' for a list of log items)
@item -p pagesize
Act as if the host page size was 'pagesize' bytes
@item -singlestep
Run the emulation in single step mode.
@end table
@include qemu-tech.texi
@node Deprecated features
@appendix Deprecated features
In general features are intended to be supported indefinitely once
introduced into QEMU. In the event that a feature needs to be removed,
it will be listed in this appendix. The feature will remain functional
for 2 releases prior to actual removal. Deprecated features may also
generate warnings on the console when QEMU starts up, or if activated
via a monitor command, however, this is not a mandatory requirement.
Prior to the 2.10.0 release there was no official policy on how
long features would be deprecated prior to their removal, nor
any documented list of which features were deprecated. Thus
any features deprecated prior to 2.10.0 will be treated as if
they were first deprecated in the 2.10.0 release.
What follows is a list of all features currently marked as
deprecated.
@section Build options
@subsection GTK 2.x
Previously QEMU has supported building against both GTK 2.x
and 3.x series APIs. Support for the GTK 2.x builds will be
discontinued, so maintainers should switch to using GTK 3.x,
which is the default.
@subsection SDL 1.2
Previously QEMU has supported building against both SDL 1.2
and 2.0 series APIs. Support for the SDL 1.2 builds will be
discontinued, so maintainers should switch to using SDL 2.0,
which is the default.
@section System emulator command line arguments
@subsection -tdf (since 1.3.0)
The ``-tdf'' argument is ignored. The behaviour implemented
by this argument is now the default when using the KVM PIT,
but can be requested explicitly using
``-global kvm-pit.lost_tick_policy=slew''.
@subsection -no-kvm-pit-reinjection (since 1.3.0)
The ``-no-kvm-pit-reinjection'' argument is now a
synonym for setting ``-global kvm-pit.lost_tick_policy=discard''.
@subsection -no-kvm-irqchip (since 1.3.0)
The ``-no-kvm-irqchip'' argument is now a synonym for
setting ``-machine kernel_irqchip=off''.
@subsection -no-kvm (since 1.3.0)
The ``-no-kvm'' argument is now a synonym for setting
``-machine accel=tcg''.
@subsection -mon default=on (since 2.4.0)
The ``default'' option to the ``-mon'' argument is
now ignored. When multiple monitors were enabled, it
indicated which monitor would receive log messages
from the various subsystems. This feature is no longer
required as messages are now only sent to the monitor
in response to explicitly monitor commands.
@subsection -vnc tls (since 2.5.0)
The ``-vnc tls'' argument is now a synonym for setting
``-object tls-creds-anon,id=tls0'' combined with
``-vnc tls-creds=tls0'
@subsection -vnc x509 (since 2.5.0)
The ``-vnc x509=/path/to/certs'' argument is now a
synonym for setting
``-object tls-creds-x509,dir=/path/to/certs,id=tls0,verify-peer=no''
combined with ``-vnc tls-creds=tls0'
@subsection -vnc x509verify (since 2.5.0)
The ``-vnc x509verify=/path/to/certs'' argument is now a
synonym for setting
``-object tls-creds-x509,dir=/path/to/certs,id=tls0,verify-peer=yes''
combined with ``-vnc tls-creds=tls0'
@subsection -tftp (since 2.6.0)
The ``-tftp /some/dir'' argument is replaced by
``-netdev user,id=x,tftp=/some/dir'', either accompanied with
``-device ...,netdev=x'' (for pluggable NICs) or ``-net nic,netdev=x''
(for embedded NICs). The new syntax allows different settings to be
provided per NIC.
@subsection -bootp (since 2.6.0)
The ``-bootp /some/file'' argument is replaced by
``-netdev user,id=x,bootp=/some/file'', either accompanied with
``-device ...,netdev=x'' (for pluggable NICs) or ``-net nic,netdev=x''
(for embedded NICs). The new syntax allows different settings to be
provided per NIC.
@subsection -redir (since 2.6.0)
The ``-redir [tcp|udp]:hostport:[guestaddr]:guestport'' argument is
replaced by ``-netdev
user,id=x,hostfwd=[tcp|udp]:[hostaddr]:hostport-[guestaddr]:guestport'',
either accompanied with ``-device ...,netdev=x'' (for pluggable NICs) or
``-net nic,netdev=x'' (for embedded NICs). The new syntax allows different
settings to be provided per NIC.
@subsection -smb (since 2.6.0)
The ``-smb /some/dir'' argument is replaced by
``-netdev user,id=x,smb=/some/dir'', either accompanied with
``-device ...,netdev=x'' (for pluggable NICs) or ``-net nic,netdev=x''
(for embedded NICs). The new syntax allows different settings to be
provided per NIC.
@subsection -net vlan (since 2.9.0)
The ``-net vlan=NN'' argument is partially replaced with the
new ``-netdev'' argument. The remaining use cases will no
longer be directly supported in QEMU.
@subsection -drive if=scsi (since 2.9.0)
The ``-drive if=scsi'' argument is replaced by the the
``-device BUS-TYPE'' argument combined with ``-drive if=none''.
@subsection -drive cyls=...,heads=...,secs=...,trans=... (since 2.10.0)
The drive geometry arguments are replaced by the the geometry arguments
that can be specified with the ``-device'' parameter.
@subsection -drive serial=... (since 2.10.0)
The drive serial argument is replaced by the the serial argument
that can be specified with the ``-device'' parameter.
@subsection -drive addr=... (since 2.10.0)
The drive addr argument is replaced by the the addr argument
that can be specified with the ``-device'' parameter.
@subsection -net dump (since 2.10.0)
The ``--net dump'' argument is now replaced with the
``-object filter-dump'' argument which works in combination
with the modern ``-netdev`` backends instead.
@subsection -usbdevice (since 2.10.0)
The ``-usbdevice DEV'' argument is now a synonym for setting
the ``-device usb-DEV'' argument instead. The deprecated syntax
would automatically enable USB support on the machine type.
If using the new syntax, USB support must be explicitly
enabled via the ``-machine usb=on'' argument.
@subsection -nodefconfig (since 2.11.0)
The ``-nodefconfig`` argument is a synonym for ``-no-user-config``.
@subsection -machine s390-squash-mcss=on|off (since 2.12.0)
The ``s390-squash-mcss=on`` property has been obsoleted by allowing the
cssid to be chosen freely. Instead of squashing subchannels into the
default channel subsystem image for guests that do not support multiple
channel subsystems, all devices can be put into the default channel
subsystem image.
@subsection -fsdev handle (since 2.12.0)
The ``handle'' fsdev backend does not support symlinks and causes the 9p
filesystem in the guest to fail a fair amount of tests from the PJD POSIX
filesystem test suite. Also it requires the CAP_DAC_READ_SEARCH capability,
which is not the recommended way to run QEMU. This backend should not be
used and it will be removed with no replacement.
@section qemu-img command line arguments
@subsection convert -s (since 2.0.0)
The ``convert -s snapshot_id_or_name'' argument is obsoleted
by the ``convert -l snapshot_param'' argument instead.
@section System emulator human monitor commands
@subsection host_net_add (since 2.10.0)
The ``host_net_add'' command is replaced by the ``netdev_add'' command.
@subsection host_net_remove (since 2.10.0)
The ``host_net_remove'' command is replaced by the ``netdev_del'' command.
@section System emulator devices
@subsection ivshmem (since 2.6.0)
The ``ivshmem'' device type is replaced by either the ``ivshmem-plain''
or ``ivshmem-doorbell`` device types.
@subsection Page size support < 4k for embedded PowerPC CPUs (since 2.12.0)
qemu-system-ppcemb will be removed. qemu-system-ppc (or qemu-system-ppc64)
should be used instead. That means that embedded 4xx PowerPC CPUs will not
support page sizes < 4096 any longer.
@section System emulator machines
@subsection Xilinx EP108 (since 2.11.0)
The ``xlnx-ep108'' machine has been replaced by the ``xlnx-zcu102'' machine.
The ``xlnx-zcu102'' machine has the same features and capabilites in QEMU.
@node License
@appendix License
QEMU is a trademark of Fabrice Bellard.
QEMU is released under the
@url{https://www.gnu.org/licenses/gpl-2.0.txt,GNU General Public License},
version 2. Parts of QEMU have specific licenses, see file
@url{https://git.qemu.org/?p=qemu.git;a=blob_plain;f=LICENSE,LICENSE}.
@node Index
@appendix Index
@menu
* Concept Index::
* Function Index::
* Keystroke Index::
* Program Index::
* Data Type Index::
* Variable Index::
@end menu
@node Concept Index
@section Concept Index
This is the main index. Should we combine all keywords in one index? TODO
@printindex cp
@node Function Index
@section Function Index
This index could be used for command line options and monitor functions.
@printindex fn
@node Keystroke Index
@section Keystroke Index
This is a list of all keystrokes which have a special function
in system emulation.
@printindex ky
@node Program Index
@section Program Index
@printindex pg
@node Data Type Index
@section Data Type Index
This index could be used for qdev device names and options.
@printindex tp
@node Variable Index
@section Variable Index
@printindex vr
@bye