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qemu-e2k/target/i386/trace-events

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docs: fix broken paths to docs/devel/tracing.txt With the move of some docs/ to docs/devel/ on ac06724a71, no references were updated. Signed-off-by: Philippe Mathieu-Daudé <f4bug@amsat.org> Reviewed-by: Stefan Hajnoczi <stefanha@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Michael Tokarev <mjt@tls.msk.ru>
2017-07-29 00:46:05 +02:00
# See docs/devel/tracing.txt for syntax documentation.
intel_iommu: add support for split irqchip In split irqchip mode, IOAPIC is working in user space, only update kernel irq routes when entry changed. When IR is enabled, we directly update the kernel with translated messages. It works just like a kernel cache for the remapping entries. Since KVM irqfd is using kernel gsi routes to deliver interrupts, as long as we can support split irqchip, we will support irqfd as well. Also, since kernel gsi routes will cache translated interrupts, irqfd delivery will not suffer from any performance impact due to IR. And, since we supported irqfd, vhost devices will be able to work seamlessly with IR now. Logically this should contain both vhost-net and vhost-user case. Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com> [move trace-events lines into target-i386/trace-events] Signed-off-by: Peter Xu <peterx@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com>
2016-07-14 07:56:25 +02:00
trace-events: Shorten file names in comments We spell out sub/dir/ in sub/dir/trace-events' comments pointing to source files. That's because when trace-events got split up, the comments were moved verbatim. Delete the sub/dir/ part from these comments. Gets rid of several misspellings. Signed-off-by: Markus Armbruster <armbru@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Philippe Mathieu-Daudé <philmd@redhat.com> Message-id: 20190314180929.27722-3-armbru@redhat.com Message-Id: <20190314180929.27722-3-armbru@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Stefan Hajnoczi <stefanha@redhat.com>
2019-03-14 19:09:26 +01:00
# sev.c
sev/i386: add command to initialize the memory encryption context When memory encryption is enabled, KVM_SEV_INIT command is used to initialize the platform. The command loads the SEV related persistent data from non-volatile storage and initializes the platform context. This command should be first issued before invoking any other guest commands provided by the SEV firmware. Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com> Cc: Richard Henderson <rth@twiddle.net> Cc: Eduardo Habkost <ehabkost@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com> Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
2018-03-08 13:48:44 +01:00
kvm_sev_init(void) ""
target/i386: tracing: format length values as hex Three trace events had a literal "0x" prefix but the 'len' values were formatted in decimal base. Keep the prefix and format the numbers as hex, as is usually the case for length of memory regions. Signed-off-by: Dov Murik <dovmurik@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Reviewed-by: Philippe Mathieu-Daudé <philmd@redhat.com> Message-Id: <20201103100745.160409-1-dovmurik@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Laurent Vivier <laurent@vivier.eu>
2020-11-03 11:07:45 +01:00
kvm_memcrypt_register_region(void *addr, size_t len) "addr %p len 0x%zx"
kvm_memcrypt_unregister_region(void *addr, size_t len) "addr %p len 0x%zx"
sev/i386: add command to create launch memory encryption context The KVM_SEV_LAUNCH_START command creates a new VM encryption key (VEK). The encryption key created with the command will be used for encrypting the bootstrap images (such as guest bios). Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com> Cc: Richard Henderson <rth@twiddle.net> Cc: Eduardo Habkost <ehabkost@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com> Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
2018-03-08 13:48:48 +01:00
kvm_sev_change_state(const char *old, const char *new) "%s -> %s"
kvm_sev_launch_start(int policy, void *session, void *pdh) "policy 0x%x session %p pdh %p"
target/i386: tracing: format length values as hex Three trace events had a literal "0x" prefix but the 'len' values were formatted in decimal base. Keep the prefix and format the numbers as hex, as is usually the case for length of memory regions. Signed-off-by: Dov Murik <dovmurik@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Reviewed-by: Philippe Mathieu-Daudé <philmd@redhat.com> Message-Id: <20201103100745.160409-1-dovmurik@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Laurent Vivier <laurent@vivier.eu>
2020-11-03 11:07:45 +01:00
kvm_sev_launch_update_data(void *addr, uint64_t len) "addr %p len 0x%" PRIx64
sev/i386: add support to LAUNCH_MEASURE command During machine creation we encrypted the guest bios image, the LAUNCH_MEASURE command can be used to retrieve the measurement of the encrypted memory region. This measurement is a signature of the memory contents that can be sent to the guest owner as an attestation that the memory was encrypted correctly by the firmware. VM management tools like libvirt can query the measurement using query-sev-launch-measure QMP command. Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com> Cc: Richard Henderson <rth@twiddle.net> Cc: Eduardo Habkost <ehabkost@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com> Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
2018-03-08 13:48:51 +01:00
kvm_sev_launch_measurement(const char *value) "data %s"
sev/i386: finalize the SEV guest launch flow SEV launch flow requires us to issue LAUNCH_FINISH command before guest is ready to run. Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com> Cc: Richard Henderson <rth@twiddle.net> Cc: Eduardo Habkost <ehabkost@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com> Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
2018-03-08 13:48:52 +01:00
kvm_sev_launch_finish(void) ""
sev: add sev-inject-launch-secret AMD SEV allows a guest owner to inject a secret blob into the memory of a virtual machine. The secret is encrypted with the SEV Transport Encryption Key and integrity is guaranteed with the Transport Integrity Key. Although QEMU facilitates the injection of the launch secret, it cannot access the secret. Signed-off-by: Tobin Feldman-Fitzthum <tobin@linux.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Eduardo Habkost <ehabkost@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Daniel P. Berrangé <berrange@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com> Message-Id: <20201027170303.47550-1-tobin@linux.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Eduardo Habkost <ehabkost@redhat.com>
2020-10-27 18:03:03 +01:00
kvm_sev_launch_secret(uint64_t hpa, uint64_t hva, uint64_t secret, int len) "hpa 0x%" PRIx64 " hva 0x%" PRIx64 " data 0x%" PRIx64 " len %d"
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