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qemu-e2k/tests/qemu-iotests/198.out

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qcow2: fix image corruption after committing qcow2 image into base After committing the qcow2 image contents into the base image, qemu-img will call bdrv_make_empty to drop the payload in the layered image. When this is done for qcow2 images, it blows away the LUKS encryption header, making the resulting image unusable. There are two codepaths for emptying a qcow2 image, and the second (slower) codepath leaves the LUKS header intact, so force use of that codepath. Reviewed-by: Eric Blake <eblake@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Daniel P. Berrange <berrange@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Kevin Wolf <kwolf@redhat.com>
2017-11-17 12:29:13 +01:00
QA output created by 198
== create base ==
Formatting 'TEST_DIR/t.IMGFMT.base', fmt=IMGFMT size=16777216 encrypt.format=luks encrypt.key-secret=sec0 encrypt.iter-time=10
== writing whole image base ==
wrote 16777216/16777216 bytes at offset 0
16 MiB, X ops; XX:XX:XX.X (XXX YYY/sec and XXX ops/sec)
== create overlay ==
Formatting 'TEST_DIR/t.IMGFMT', fmt=IMGFMT size=16777216 backing_file=TEST_DIR/t.IMGFMT.base encrypt.format=luks encrypt.key-secret=sec1 encrypt.iter-time=10
== writing whole image layer ==
wrote 16777216/16777216 bytes at offset 0
16 MiB, X ops; XX:XX:XX.X (XXX YYY/sec and XXX ops/sec)
== verify pattern base ==
read 16777216/16777216 bytes at offset 0
16 MiB, X ops; XX:XX:XX.X (XXX YYY/sec and XXX ops/sec)
== verify pattern layer ==
read 16777216/16777216 bytes at offset 0
16 MiB, X ops; XX:XX:XX.X (XXX YYY/sec and XXX ops/sec)
== committing layer into base ==
Image committed.
== verify pattern base ==
read 16777216/16777216 bytes at offset 0
16 MiB, X ops; XX:XX:XX.X (XXX YYY/sec and XXX ops/sec)
== verify pattern layer ==
read 16777216/16777216 bytes at offset 0
16 MiB, X ops; XX:XX:XX.X (XXX YYY/sec and XXX ops/sec)
== checking image base ==
image: json:{"encrypt.key-secret": "sec0", "driver": "IMGFMT", "file": {"driver": "file", "filename": "TEST_DIR/t.IMGFMT.base"}}
file format: IMGFMT
qemu-img: Saner printing of large file sizes Disk sizes close to INT64_MAX cause overflow, for some pretty ridiculous output: $ ./nbdkit -U - memory size=$((2**63 - 512)) --run 'qemu-img info $nbd' image: nbd+unix://?socket=/tmp/nbdkitHSAzNz/socket file format: raw virtual size: -8388607T (9223372036854775296 bytes) disk size: unavailable But there's no reason to have two separate implementations of integer to human-readable abbreviation, where one has overflow and stops at 'T', while the other avoids overflow and goes all the way to 'E'. With this patch, the output now claims 8EiB instead of -8388607T, which really is the correct rounding of largest file size supported by qemu (we could go 511 bytes larger if we used byte-accurate sizing instead of rounding up to the next sector boundary, but that wouldn't change the human-readable result). Quite a few iotests need updates to expected output to match. Reported-by: Richard W.M. Jones <rjones@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Eric Blake <eblake@redhat.com> Tested-by: Richard W.M. Jones <rjones@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Alberto Garcia <berto@igalia.com> Reviewed-by: Vladimir Sementsov-Ogievskiy <vsementsov@virtuozzo.com> Signed-off-by: Kevin Wolf <kwolf@redhat.com> Tested-by: Max Reitz <mreitz@redhat.com>
2019-04-17 19:11:01 +02:00
virtual size: 16 MiB (16777216 bytes)
qcow2: fix image corruption after committing qcow2 image into base After committing the qcow2 image contents into the base image, qemu-img will call bdrv_make_empty to drop the payload in the layered image. When this is done for qcow2 images, it blows away the LUKS encryption header, making the resulting image unusable. There are two codepaths for emptying a qcow2 image, and the second (slower) codepath leaves the LUKS header intact, so force use of that codepath. Reviewed-by: Eric Blake <eblake@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Daniel P. Berrange <berrange@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Kevin Wolf <kwolf@redhat.com>
2017-11-17 12:29:13 +01:00
Format specific information:
encrypt:
ivgen alg: plain64
hash alg: sha256
cipher alg: aes-256
uuid: 00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000
format: luks
cipher mode: xts
slots:
[0]:
active: true
iters: 1024
key offset: 4096
stripes: 4000
[1]:
active: false
key offset: 262144
[2]:
active: false
key offset: 520192
[3]:
active: false
key offset: 778240
[4]:
active: false
key offset: 1036288
[5]:
active: false
key offset: 1294336
[6]:
active: false
key offset: 1552384
[7]:
active: false
key offset: 1810432
payload offset: 2068480
master key iters: 1024
== checking image layer ==
image: json:{"encrypt.key-secret": "sec1", "driver": "IMGFMT", "file": {"driver": "file", "filename": "TEST_DIR/t.IMGFMT"}}
file format: IMGFMT
qemu-img: Saner printing of large file sizes Disk sizes close to INT64_MAX cause overflow, for some pretty ridiculous output: $ ./nbdkit -U - memory size=$((2**63 - 512)) --run 'qemu-img info $nbd' image: nbd+unix://?socket=/tmp/nbdkitHSAzNz/socket file format: raw virtual size: -8388607T (9223372036854775296 bytes) disk size: unavailable But there's no reason to have two separate implementations of integer to human-readable abbreviation, where one has overflow and stops at 'T', while the other avoids overflow and goes all the way to 'E'. With this patch, the output now claims 8EiB instead of -8388607T, which really is the correct rounding of largest file size supported by qemu (we could go 511 bytes larger if we used byte-accurate sizing instead of rounding up to the next sector boundary, but that wouldn't change the human-readable result). Quite a few iotests need updates to expected output to match. Reported-by: Richard W.M. Jones <rjones@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Eric Blake <eblake@redhat.com> Tested-by: Richard W.M. Jones <rjones@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Alberto Garcia <berto@igalia.com> Reviewed-by: Vladimir Sementsov-Ogievskiy <vsementsov@virtuozzo.com> Signed-off-by: Kevin Wolf <kwolf@redhat.com> Tested-by: Max Reitz <mreitz@redhat.com>
2019-04-17 19:11:01 +02:00
virtual size: 16 MiB (16777216 bytes)
qcow2: fix image corruption after committing qcow2 image into base After committing the qcow2 image contents into the base image, qemu-img will call bdrv_make_empty to drop the payload in the layered image. When this is done for qcow2 images, it blows away the LUKS encryption header, making the resulting image unusable. There are two codepaths for emptying a qcow2 image, and the second (slower) codepath leaves the LUKS header intact, so force use of that codepath. Reviewed-by: Eric Blake <eblake@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Daniel P. Berrange <berrange@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Kevin Wolf <kwolf@redhat.com>
2017-11-17 12:29:13 +01:00
backing file: TEST_DIR/t.IMGFMT.base
Format specific information:
encrypt:
ivgen alg: plain64
hash alg: sha256
cipher alg: aes-256
uuid: 00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000
format: luks
cipher mode: xts
slots:
[0]:
active: true
iters: 1024
key offset: 4096
stripes: 4000
[1]:
active: false
key offset: 262144
[2]:
active: false
key offset: 520192
[3]:
active: false
key offset: 778240
[4]:
active: false
key offset: 1036288
[5]:
active: false
key offset: 1294336
[6]:
active: false
key offset: 1552384
[7]:
active: false
key offset: 1810432
payload offset: 2068480
master key iters: 1024
*** done
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