qemu-e2k/hw/ppc/spapr_hcall.c

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#include "qemu/osdep.h"
2016-03-14 09:01:28 +01:00
#include "qapi/error.h"
#include "sysemu/hw_accel.h"
#include "sysemu/sysemu.h"
#include "qemu/log.h"
#include "cpu.h"
#include "exec/exec-all.h"
#include "helper_regs.h"
#include "hw/ppc/spapr.h"
#include "mmu-hash64.h"
#include "cpu-models.h"
#include "trace.h"
#include "kvm_ppc.h"
#include "hw/ppc/spapr_ovec.h"
#include "qemu/error-report.h"
#include "mmu-book3s-v3.h"
struct SPRSyncState {
int spr;
target_ulong value;
target_ulong mask;
};
static void do_spr_sync(CPUState *cs, run_on_cpu_data arg)
{
struct SPRSyncState *s = arg.host_ptr;
PowerPCCPU *cpu = POWERPC_CPU(cs);
CPUPPCState *env = &cpu->env;
cpu_synchronize_state(cs);
env->spr[s->spr] &= ~s->mask;
env->spr[s->spr] |= s->value;
}
static void set_spr(CPUState *cs, int spr, target_ulong value,
target_ulong mask)
{
struct SPRSyncState s = {
.spr = spr,
.value = value,
.mask = mask
};
run_on_cpu(cs, do_spr_sync, RUN_ON_CPU_HOST_PTR(&s));
}
static bool has_spr(PowerPCCPU *cpu, int spr)
{
/* We can test whether the SPR is defined by checking for a valid name */
return cpu->env.spr_cb[spr].name != NULL;
}
static inline bool valid_ptex(PowerPCCPU *cpu, target_ulong ptex)
{
/*
* hash value/pteg group index is normalized by HPT mask
*/
if (((ptex & ~7ULL) / HPTES_PER_GROUP) & ~ppc_hash64_hpt_mask(cpu)) {
return false;
}
return true;
}
static bool is_ram_address(sPAPRMachineState *spapr, hwaddr addr)
{
MachineState *machine = MACHINE(spapr);
MemoryHotplugState *hpms = &spapr->hotplug_memory;
if (addr < machine->ram_size) {
return true;
}
if ((addr >= hpms->base)
&& ((addr - hpms->base) < memory_region_size(&hpms->mr))) {
return true;
}
return false;
}
static target_ulong h_enter(PowerPCCPU *cpu, sPAPRMachineState *spapr,
target_ulong opcode, target_ulong *args)
{
target_ulong flags = args[0];
target_ulong ptex = args[1];
target_ulong pteh = args[2];
target_ulong ptel = args[3];
unsigned apshift;
target_ulong raddr;
target_ulong slot;
target/ppc: Cleanup HPTE accessors for 64-bit hash MMU Accesses to the hashed page table (HPT) are complicated by the fact that the HPT could be in one of three places: 1) Within guest memory - when we're emulating a full guest CPU at the hardware level (e.g. powernv, mac99, g3beige) 2) Within qemu, but outside guest memory - when we're emulating user and supervisor instructions within TCG, but instead of emulating the CPU's hypervisor mode, we just emulate a hypervisor's behaviour (pseries in TCG or KVM-PR) 3) Within the host kernel - a pseries machine using KVM-HV acceleration. Mostly accesses to the HPT are handled by KVM, but there are a few cases where qemu needs to access it via a special fd for the purpose. In order to batch accesses to the fd in case (3), we use a somewhat awkward ppc_hash64_start_access() / ppc_hash64_stop_access() pair, which for case (3) reads / releases several HPTEs from the kernel as a batch (usually a whole PTEG). For cases (1) & (2) it just returns an address value. The actual HPTE load helpers then need to interpret the returned token differently in the 3 cases. This patch keeps the same basic structure, but simplfiies the details. First start_access() / stop_access() are renamed to map_hptes() and unmap_hptes() to make their operation more obvious. Second, map_hptes() now always returns a qemu pointer, which can always be used in the same way by the load_hpte() helpers. In case (1) it comes from address_space_map() in case (2) directly from qemu's HPT buffer and in case (3) from a temporary buffer read from the KVM fd. While we're at it, make things a bit more consistent in terms of types and variable names: avoid variables named 'index' (it shadows index(3) which can lead to confusing results), use 'hwaddr ptex' for HPTE indices and uint64_t for each of the HPTE words, use ptex throughout the call stack instead of pte_offset in some places (we still need that at the bottom layer, but nowhere else). Signed-off-by: David Gibson <david@gibson.dropbear.id.au>
2017-02-27 06:03:41 +01:00
const ppc_hash_pte64_t *hptes;
apshift = ppc_hash64_hpte_page_shift_noslb(cpu, pteh, ptel);
if (!apshift) {
/* Bad page size encoding */
return H_PARAMETER;
}
raddr = (ptel & HPTE64_R_RPN) & ~((1ULL << apshift) - 1);
if (is_ram_address(spapr, raddr)) {
/* Regular RAM - should have WIMG=0010 */
if ((ptel & HPTE64_R_WIMG) != HPTE64_R_M) {
return H_PARAMETER;
}
} else {
target_ulong wimg_flags;
/* Looks like an IO address */
/* FIXME: What WIMG combinations could be sensible for IO?
* For now we allow WIMG=010x, but are there others? */
/* FIXME: Should we check against registered IO addresses? */
wimg_flags = (ptel & (HPTE64_R_W | HPTE64_R_I | HPTE64_R_M));
if (wimg_flags != HPTE64_R_I &&
wimg_flags != (HPTE64_R_I | HPTE64_R_M)) {
return H_PARAMETER;
}
}
pteh &= ~0x60ULL;
if (!valid_ptex(cpu, ptex)) {
return H_PARAMETER;
}
slot = ptex & 7ULL;
ptex = ptex & ~7ULL;
if (likely((flags & H_EXACT) == 0)) {
target/ppc: Cleanup HPTE accessors for 64-bit hash MMU Accesses to the hashed page table (HPT) are complicated by the fact that the HPT could be in one of three places: 1) Within guest memory - when we're emulating a full guest CPU at the hardware level (e.g. powernv, mac99, g3beige) 2) Within qemu, but outside guest memory - when we're emulating user and supervisor instructions within TCG, but instead of emulating the CPU's hypervisor mode, we just emulate a hypervisor's behaviour (pseries in TCG or KVM-PR) 3) Within the host kernel - a pseries machine using KVM-HV acceleration. Mostly accesses to the HPT are handled by KVM, but there are a few cases where qemu needs to access it via a special fd for the purpose. In order to batch accesses to the fd in case (3), we use a somewhat awkward ppc_hash64_start_access() / ppc_hash64_stop_access() pair, which for case (3) reads / releases several HPTEs from the kernel as a batch (usually a whole PTEG). For cases (1) & (2) it just returns an address value. The actual HPTE load helpers then need to interpret the returned token differently in the 3 cases. This patch keeps the same basic structure, but simplfiies the details. First start_access() / stop_access() are renamed to map_hptes() and unmap_hptes() to make their operation more obvious. Second, map_hptes() now always returns a qemu pointer, which can always be used in the same way by the load_hpte() helpers. In case (1) it comes from address_space_map() in case (2) directly from qemu's HPT buffer and in case (3) from a temporary buffer read from the KVM fd. While we're at it, make things a bit more consistent in terms of types and variable names: avoid variables named 'index' (it shadows index(3) which can lead to confusing results), use 'hwaddr ptex' for HPTE indices and uint64_t for each of the HPTE words, use ptex throughout the call stack instead of pte_offset in some places (we still need that at the bottom layer, but nowhere else). Signed-off-by: David Gibson <david@gibson.dropbear.id.au>
2017-02-27 06:03:41 +01:00
hptes = ppc_hash64_map_hptes(cpu, ptex, HPTES_PER_GROUP);
for (slot = 0; slot < 8; slot++) {
target/ppc: Cleanup HPTE accessors for 64-bit hash MMU Accesses to the hashed page table (HPT) are complicated by the fact that the HPT could be in one of three places: 1) Within guest memory - when we're emulating a full guest CPU at the hardware level (e.g. powernv, mac99, g3beige) 2) Within qemu, but outside guest memory - when we're emulating user and supervisor instructions within TCG, but instead of emulating the CPU's hypervisor mode, we just emulate a hypervisor's behaviour (pseries in TCG or KVM-PR) 3) Within the host kernel - a pseries machine using KVM-HV acceleration. Mostly accesses to the HPT are handled by KVM, but there are a few cases where qemu needs to access it via a special fd for the purpose. In order to batch accesses to the fd in case (3), we use a somewhat awkward ppc_hash64_start_access() / ppc_hash64_stop_access() pair, which for case (3) reads / releases several HPTEs from the kernel as a batch (usually a whole PTEG). For cases (1) & (2) it just returns an address value. The actual HPTE load helpers then need to interpret the returned token differently in the 3 cases. This patch keeps the same basic structure, but simplfiies the details. First start_access() / stop_access() are renamed to map_hptes() and unmap_hptes() to make their operation more obvious. Second, map_hptes() now always returns a qemu pointer, which can always be used in the same way by the load_hpte() helpers. In case (1) it comes from address_space_map() in case (2) directly from qemu's HPT buffer and in case (3) from a temporary buffer read from the KVM fd. While we're at it, make things a bit more consistent in terms of types and variable names: avoid variables named 'index' (it shadows index(3) which can lead to confusing results), use 'hwaddr ptex' for HPTE indices and uint64_t for each of the HPTE words, use ptex throughout the call stack instead of pte_offset in some places (we still need that at the bottom layer, but nowhere else). Signed-off-by: David Gibson <david@gibson.dropbear.id.au>
2017-02-27 06:03:41 +01:00
if (!(ppc_hash64_hpte0(cpu, hptes, slot) & HPTE64_V_VALID)) {
break;
}
}
target/ppc: Cleanup HPTE accessors for 64-bit hash MMU Accesses to the hashed page table (HPT) are complicated by the fact that the HPT could be in one of three places: 1) Within guest memory - when we're emulating a full guest CPU at the hardware level (e.g. powernv, mac99, g3beige) 2) Within qemu, but outside guest memory - when we're emulating user and supervisor instructions within TCG, but instead of emulating the CPU's hypervisor mode, we just emulate a hypervisor's behaviour (pseries in TCG or KVM-PR) 3) Within the host kernel - a pseries machine using KVM-HV acceleration. Mostly accesses to the HPT are handled by KVM, but there are a few cases where qemu needs to access it via a special fd for the purpose. In order to batch accesses to the fd in case (3), we use a somewhat awkward ppc_hash64_start_access() / ppc_hash64_stop_access() pair, which for case (3) reads / releases several HPTEs from the kernel as a batch (usually a whole PTEG). For cases (1) & (2) it just returns an address value. The actual HPTE load helpers then need to interpret the returned token differently in the 3 cases. This patch keeps the same basic structure, but simplfiies the details. First start_access() / stop_access() are renamed to map_hptes() and unmap_hptes() to make their operation more obvious. Second, map_hptes() now always returns a qemu pointer, which can always be used in the same way by the load_hpte() helpers. In case (1) it comes from address_space_map() in case (2) directly from qemu's HPT buffer and in case (3) from a temporary buffer read from the KVM fd. While we're at it, make things a bit more consistent in terms of types and variable names: avoid variables named 'index' (it shadows index(3) which can lead to confusing results), use 'hwaddr ptex' for HPTE indices and uint64_t for each of the HPTE words, use ptex throughout the call stack instead of pte_offset in some places (we still need that at the bottom layer, but nowhere else). Signed-off-by: David Gibson <david@gibson.dropbear.id.au>
2017-02-27 06:03:41 +01:00
ppc_hash64_unmap_hptes(cpu, hptes, ptex, HPTES_PER_GROUP);
if (slot == 8) {
return H_PTEG_FULL;
}
} else {
target/ppc: Cleanup HPTE accessors for 64-bit hash MMU Accesses to the hashed page table (HPT) are complicated by the fact that the HPT could be in one of three places: 1) Within guest memory - when we're emulating a full guest CPU at the hardware level (e.g. powernv, mac99, g3beige) 2) Within qemu, but outside guest memory - when we're emulating user and supervisor instructions within TCG, but instead of emulating the CPU's hypervisor mode, we just emulate a hypervisor's behaviour (pseries in TCG or KVM-PR) 3) Within the host kernel - a pseries machine using KVM-HV acceleration. Mostly accesses to the HPT are handled by KVM, but there are a few cases where qemu needs to access it via a special fd for the purpose. In order to batch accesses to the fd in case (3), we use a somewhat awkward ppc_hash64_start_access() / ppc_hash64_stop_access() pair, which for case (3) reads / releases several HPTEs from the kernel as a batch (usually a whole PTEG). For cases (1) & (2) it just returns an address value. The actual HPTE load helpers then need to interpret the returned token differently in the 3 cases. This patch keeps the same basic structure, but simplfiies the details. First start_access() / stop_access() are renamed to map_hptes() and unmap_hptes() to make their operation more obvious. Second, map_hptes() now always returns a qemu pointer, which can always be used in the same way by the load_hpte() helpers. In case (1) it comes from address_space_map() in case (2) directly from qemu's HPT buffer and in case (3) from a temporary buffer read from the KVM fd. While we're at it, make things a bit more consistent in terms of types and variable names: avoid variables named 'index' (it shadows index(3) which can lead to confusing results), use 'hwaddr ptex' for HPTE indices and uint64_t for each of the HPTE words, use ptex throughout the call stack instead of pte_offset in some places (we still need that at the bottom layer, but nowhere else). Signed-off-by: David Gibson <david@gibson.dropbear.id.au>
2017-02-27 06:03:41 +01:00
hptes = ppc_hash64_map_hptes(cpu, ptex + slot, 1);
if (ppc_hash64_hpte0(cpu, hptes, 0) & HPTE64_V_VALID) {
ppc_hash64_unmap_hptes(cpu, hptes, ptex + slot, 1);
return H_PTEG_FULL;
}
target/ppc: Cleanup HPTE accessors for 64-bit hash MMU Accesses to the hashed page table (HPT) are complicated by the fact that the HPT could be in one of three places: 1) Within guest memory - when we're emulating a full guest CPU at the hardware level (e.g. powernv, mac99, g3beige) 2) Within qemu, but outside guest memory - when we're emulating user and supervisor instructions within TCG, but instead of emulating the CPU's hypervisor mode, we just emulate a hypervisor's behaviour (pseries in TCG or KVM-PR) 3) Within the host kernel - a pseries machine using KVM-HV acceleration. Mostly accesses to the HPT are handled by KVM, but there are a few cases where qemu needs to access it via a special fd for the purpose. In order to batch accesses to the fd in case (3), we use a somewhat awkward ppc_hash64_start_access() / ppc_hash64_stop_access() pair, which for case (3) reads / releases several HPTEs from the kernel as a batch (usually a whole PTEG). For cases (1) & (2) it just returns an address value. The actual HPTE load helpers then need to interpret the returned token differently in the 3 cases. This patch keeps the same basic structure, but simplfiies the details. First start_access() / stop_access() are renamed to map_hptes() and unmap_hptes() to make their operation more obvious. Second, map_hptes() now always returns a qemu pointer, which can always be used in the same way by the load_hpte() helpers. In case (1) it comes from address_space_map() in case (2) directly from qemu's HPT buffer and in case (3) from a temporary buffer read from the KVM fd. While we're at it, make things a bit more consistent in terms of types and variable names: avoid variables named 'index' (it shadows index(3) which can lead to confusing results), use 'hwaddr ptex' for HPTE indices and uint64_t for each of the HPTE words, use ptex throughout the call stack instead of pte_offset in some places (we still need that at the bottom layer, but nowhere else). Signed-off-by: David Gibson <david@gibson.dropbear.id.au>
2017-02-27 06:03:41 +01:00
ppc_hash64_unmap_hptes(cpu, hptes, ptex, 1);
}
ppc_hash64_store_hpte(cpu, ptex + slot, pteh | HPTE64_V_HPTE_DIRTY, ptel);
args[0] = ptex + slot;
return H_SUCCESS;
}
typedef enum {
REMOVE_SUCCESS = 0,
REMOVE_NOT_FOUND = 1,
REMOVE_PARM = 2,
REMOVE_HW = 3,
} RemoveResult;
static RemoveResult remove_hpte(PowerPCCPU *cpu, target_ulong ptex,
target_ulong avpn,
target_ulong flags,
target_ulong *vp, target_ulong *rp)
{
target/ppc: Cleanup HPTE accessors for 64-bit hash MMU Accesses to the hashed page table (HPT) are complicated by the fact that the HPT could be in one of three places: 1) Within guest memory - when we're emulating a full guest CPU at the hardware level (e.g. powernv, mac99, g3beige) 2) Within qemu, but outside guest memory - when we're emulating user and supervisor instructions within TCG, but instead of emulating the CPU's hypervisor mode, we just emulate a hypervisor's behaviour (pseries in TCG or KVM-PR) 3) Within the host kernel - a pseries machine using KVM-HV acceleration. Mostly accesses to the HPT are handled by KVM, but there are a few cases where qemu needs to access it via a special fd for the purpose. In order to batch accesses to the fd in case (3), we use a somewhat awkward ppc_hash64_start_access() / ppc_hash64_stop_access() pair, which for case (3) reads / releases several HPTEs from the kernel as a batch (usually a whole PTEG). For cases (1) & (2) it just returns an address value. The actual HPTE load helpers then need to interpret the returned token differently in the 3 cases. This patch keeps the same basic structure, but simplfiies the details. First start_access() / stop_access() are renamed to map_hptes() and unmap_hptes() to make their operation more obvious. Second, map_hptes() now always returns a qemu pointer, which can always be used in the same way by the load_hpte() helpers. In case (1) it comes from address_space_map() in case (2) directly from qemu's HPT buffer and in case (3) from a temporary buffer read from the KVM fd. While we're at it, make things a bit more consistent in terms of types and variable names: avoid variables named 'index' (it shadows index(3) which can lead to confusing results), use 'hwaddr ptex' for HPTE indices and uint64_t for each of the HPTE words, use ptex throughout the call stack instead of pte_offset in some places (we still need that at the bottom layer, but nowhere else). Signed-off-by: David Gibson <david@gibson.dropbear.id.au>
2017-02-27 06:03:41 +01:00
const ppc_hash_pte64_t *hptes;
target_ulong v, r;
if (!valid_ptex(cpu, ptex)) {
return REMOVE_PARM;
}
target/ppc: Cleanup HPTE accessors for 64-bit hash MMU Accesses to the hashed page table (HPT) are complicated by the fact that the HPT could be in one of three places: 1) Within guest memory - when we're emulating a full guest CPU at the hardware level (e.g. powernv, mac99, g3beige) 2) Within qemu, but outside guest memory - when we're emulating user and supervisor instructions within TCG, but instead of emulating the CPU's hypervisor mode, we just emulate a hypervisor's behaviour (pseries in TCG or KVM-PR) 3) Within the host kernel - a pseries machine using KVM-HV acceleration. Mostly accesses to the HPT are handled by KVM, but there are a few cases where qemu needs to access it via a special fd for the purpose. In order to batch accesses to the fd in case (3), we use a somewhat awkward ppc_hash64_start_access() / ppc_hash64_stop_access() pair, which for case (3) reads / releases several HPTEs from the kernel as a batch (usually a whole PTEG). For cases (1) & (2) it just returns an address value. The actual HPTE load helpers then need to interpret the returned token differently in the 3 cases. This patch keeps the same basic structure, but simplfiies the details. First start_access() / stop_access() are renamed to map_hptes() and unmap_hptes() to make their operation more obvious. Second, map_hptes() now always returns a qemu pointer, which can always be used in the same way by the load_hpte() helpers. In case (1) it comes from address_space_map() in case (2) directly from qemu's HPT buffer and in case (3) from a temporary buffer read from the KVM fd. While we're at it, make things a bit more consistent in terms of types and variable names: avoid variables named 'index' (it shadows index(3) which can lead to confusing results), use 'hwaddr ptex' for HPTE indices and uint64_t for each of the HPTE words, use ptex throughout the call stack instead of pte_offset in some places (we still need that at the bottom layer, but nowhere else). Signed-off-by: David Gibson <david@gibson.dropbear.id.au>
2017-02-27 06:03:41 +01:00
hptes = ppc_hash64_map_hptes(cpu, ptex, 1);
v = ppc_hash64_hpte0(cpu, hptes, 0);
r = ppc_hash64_hpte1(cpu, hptes, 0);
ppc_hash64_unmap_hptes(cpu, hptes, ptex, 1);
if ((v & HPTE64_V_VALID) == 0 ||
((flags & H_AVPN) && (v & ~0x7fULL) != avpn) ||
((flags & H_ANDCOND) && (v & avpn) != 0)) {
return REMOVE_NOT_FOUND;
}
*vp = v;
*rp = r;
ppc_hash64_store_hpte(cpu, ptex, HPTE64_V_HPTE_DIRTY, 0);
ppc_hash64_tlb_flush_hpte(cpu, ptex, v, r);
return REMOVE_SUCCESS;
}
static target_ulong h_remove(PowerPCCPU *cpu, sPAPRMachineState *spapr,
target_ulong opcode, target_ulong *args)
{
CPUPPCState *env = &cpu->env;
target_ulong flags = args[0];
target_ulong ptex = args[1];
target_ulong avpn = args[2];
RemoveResult ret;
ret = remove_hpte(cpu, ptex, avpn, flags,
&args[0], &args[1]);
switch (ret) {
case REMOVE_SUCCESS:
check_tlb_flush(env, true);
return H_SUCCESS;
case REMOVE_NOT_FOUND:
return H_NOT_FOUND;
case REMOVE_PARM:
return H_PARAMETER;
case REMOVE_HW:
return H_HARDWARE;
}
g_assert_not_reached();
}
#define H_BULK_REMOVE_TYPE 0xc000000000000000ULL
#define H_BULK_REMOVE_REQUEST 0x4000000000000000ULL
#define H_BULK_REMOVE_RESPONSE 0x8000000000000000ULL
#define H_BULK_REMOVE_END 0xc000000000000000ULL
#define H_BULK_REMOVE_CODE 0x3000000000000000ULL
#define H_BULK_REMOVE_SUCCESS 0x0000000000000000ULL
#define H_BULK_REMOVE_NOT_FOUND 0x1000000000000000ULL
#define H_BULK_REMOVE_PARM 0x2000000000000000ULL
#define H_BULK_REMOVE_HW 0x3000000000000000ULL
#define H_BULK_REMOVE_RC 0x0c00000000000000ULL
#define H_BULK_REMOVE_FLAGS 0x0300000000000000ULL
#define H_BULK_REMOVE_ABSOLUTE 0x0000000000000000ULL
#define H_BULK_REMOVE_ANDCOND 0x0100000000000000ULL
#define H_BULK_REMOVE_AVPN 0x0200000000000000ULL
#define H_BULK_REMOVE_PTEX 0x00ffffffffffffffULL
#define H_BULK_REMOVE_MAX_BATCH 4
static target_ulong h_bulk_remove(PowerPCCPU *cpu, sPAPRMachineState *spapr,
target_ulong opcode, target_ulong *args)
{
CPUPPCState *env = &cpu->env;
int i;
target_ulong rc = H_SUCCESS;
for (i = 0; i < H_BULK_REMOVE_MAX_BATCH; i++) {
target_ulong *tsh = &args[i*2];
target_ulong tsl = args[i*2 + 1];
target_ulong v, r, ret;
if ((*tsh & H_BULK_REMOVE_TYPE) == H_BULK_REMOVE_END) {
break;
} else if ((*tsh & H_BULK_REMOVE_TYPE) != H_BULK_REMOVE_REQUEST) {
return H_PARAMETER;
}
*tsh &= H_BULK_REMOVE_PTEX | H_BULK_REMOVE_FLAGS;
*tsh |= H_BULK_REMOVE_RESPONSE;
if ((*tsh & H_BULK_REMOVE_ANDCOND) && (*tsh & H_BULK_REMOVE_AVPN)) {
*tsh |= H_BULK_REMOVE_PARM;
return H_PARAMETER;
}
ret = remove_hpte(cpu, *tsh & H_BULK_REMOVE_PTEX, tsl,
(*tsh & H_BULK_REMOVE_FLAGS) >> 26,
&v, &r);
*tsh |= ret << 60;
switch (ret) {
case REMOVE_SUCCESS:
*tsh |= (r & (HPTE64_R_C | HPTE64_R_R)) << 43;
break;
case REMOVE_PARM:
rc = H_PARAMETER;
goto exit;
case REMOVE_HW:
rc = H_HARDWARE;
goto exit;
}
}
exit:
check_tlb_flush(env, true);
return rc;
}
static target_ulong h_protect(PowerPCCPU *cpu, sPAPRMachineState *spapr,
target_ulong opcode, target_ulong *args)
{
CPUPPCState *env = &cpu->env;
target_ulong flags = args[0];
target_ulong ptex = args[1];
target_ulong avpn = args[2];
target/ppc: Cleanup HPTE accessors for 64-bit hash MMU Accesses to the hashed page table (HPT) are complicated by the fact that the HPT could be in one of three places: 1) Within guest memory - when we're emulating a full guest CPU at the hardware level (e.g. powernv, mac99, g3beige) 2) Within qemu, but outside guest memory - when we're emulating user and supervisor instructions within TCG, but instead of emulating the CPU's hypervisor mode, we just emulate a hypervisor's behaviour (pseries in TCG or KVM-PR) 3) Within the host kernel - a pseries machine using KVM-HV acceleration. Mostly accesses to the HPT are handled by KVM, but there are a few cases where qemu needs to access it via a special fd for the purpose. In order to batch accesses to the fd in case (3), we use a somewhat awkward ppc_hash64_start_access() / ppc_hash64_stop_access() pair, which for case (3) reads / releases several HPTEs from the kernel as a batch (usually a whole PTEG). For cases (1) & (2) it just returns an address value. The actual HPTE load helpers then need to interpret the returned token differently in the 3 cases. This patch keeps the same basic structure, but simplfiies the details. First start_access() / stop_access() are renamed to map_hptes() and unmap_hptes() to make their operation more obvious. Second, map_hptes() now always returns a qemu pointer, which can always be used in the same way by the load_hpte() helpers. In case (1) it comes from address_space_map() in case (2) directly from qemu's HPT buffer and in case (3) from a temporary buffer read from the KVM fd. While we're at it, make things a bit more consistent in terms of types and variable names: avoid variables named 'index' (it shadows index(3) which can lead to confusing results), use 'hwaddr ptex' for HPTE indices and uint64_t for each of the HPTE words, use ptex throughout the call stack instead of pte_offset in some places (we still need that at the bottom layer, but nowhere else). Signed-off-by: David Gibson <david@gibson.dropbear.id.au>
2017-02-27 06:03:41 +01:00
const ppc_hash_pte64_t *hptes;
target_ulong v, r;
if (!valid_ptex(cpu, ptex)) {
return H_PARAMETER;
}
target/ppc: Cleanup HPTE accessors for 64-bit hash MMU Accesses to the hashed page table (HPT) are complicated by the fact that the HPT could be in one of three places: 1) Within guest memory - when we're emulating a full guest CPU at the hardware level (e.g. powernv, mac99, g3beige) 2) Within qemu, but outside guest memory - when we're emulating user and supervisor instructions within TCG, but instead of emulating the CPU's hypervisor mode, we just emulate a hypervisor's behaviour (pseries in TCG or KVM-PR) 3) Within the host kernel - a pseries machine using KVM-HV acceleration. Mostly accesses to the HPT are handled by KVM, but there are a few cases where qemu needs to access it via a special fd for the purpose. In order to batch accesses to the fd in case (3), we use a somewhat awkward ppc_hash64_start_access() / ppc_hash64_stop_access() pair, which for case (3) reads / releases several HPTEs from the kernel as a batch (usually a whole PTEG). For cases (1) & (2) it just returns an address value. The actual HPTE load helpers then need to interpret the returned token differently in the 3 cases. This patch keeps the same basic structure, but simplfiies the details. First start_access() / stop_access() are renamed to map_hptes() and unmap_hptes() to make their operation more obvious. Second, map_hptes() now always returns a qemu pointer, which can always be used in the same way by the load_hpte() helpers. In case (1) it comes from address_space_map() in case (2) directly from qemu's HPT buffer and in case (3) from a temporary buffer read from the KVM fd. While we're at it, make things a bit more consistent in terms of types and variable names: avoid variables named 'index' (it shadows index(3) which can lead to confusing results), use 'hwaddr ptex' for HPTE indices and uint64_t for each of the HPTE words, use ptex throughout the call stack instead of pte_offset in some places (we still need that at the bottom layer, but nowhere else). Signed-off-by: David Gibson <david@gibson.dropbear.id.au>
2017-02-27 06:03:41 +01:00
hptes = ppc_hash64_map_hptes(cpu, ptex, 1);
v = ppc_hash64_hpte0(cpu, hptes, 0);
r = ppc_hash64_hpte1(cpu, hptes, 0);
ppc_hash64_unmap_hptes(cpu, hptes, ptex, 1);
if ((v & HPTE64_V_VALID) == 0 ||
((flags & H_AVPN) && (v & ~0x7fULL) != avpn)) {
return H_NOT_FOUND;
}
r &= ~(HPTE64_R_PP0 | HPTE64_R_PP | HPTE64_R_N |
HPTE64_R_KEY_HI | HPTE64_R_KEY_LO);
r |= (flags << 55) & HPTE64_R_PP0;
r |= (flags << 48) & HPTE64_R_KEY_HI;
r |= flags & (HPTE64_R_PP | HPTE64_R_N | HPTE64_R_KEY_LO);
ppc_hash64_store_hpte(cpu, ptex,
(v & ~HPTE64_V_VALID) | HPTE64_V_HPTE_DIRTY, 0);
ppc_hash64_tlb_flush_hpte(cpu, ptex, v, r);
/* Flush the tlb */
check_tlb_flush(env, true);
/* Don't need a memory barrier, due to qemu's global lock */
ppc_hash64_store_hpte(cpu, ptex, v | HPTE64_V_HPTE_DIRTY, r);
return H_SUCCESS;
}
static target_ulong h_read(PowerPCCPU *cpu, sPAPRMachineState *spapr,
target_ulong opcode, target_ulong *args)
{
target_ulong flags = args[0];
target_ulong ptex = args[1];
uint8_t *hpte;
int i, ridx, n_entries = 1;
if (!valid_ptex(cpu, ptex)) {
return H_PARAMETER;
}
if (flags & H_READ_4) {
/* Clear the two low order bits */
ptex &= ~(3ULL);
n_entries = 4;
}
hpte = spapr->htab + (ptex * HASH_PTE_SIZE_64);
for (i = 0, ridx = 0; i < n_entries; i++) {
args[ridx++] = ldq_p(hpte);
args[ridx++] = ldq_p(hpte + (HASH_PTE_SIZE_64/2));
hpte += HASH_PTE_SIZE_64;
}
return H_SUCCESS;
}
static target_ulong h_set_sprg0(PowerPCCPU *cpu, sPAPRMachineState *spapr,
target_ulong opcode, target_ulong *args)
{
cpu_synchronize_state(CPU(cpu));
cpu->env.spr[SPR_SPRG0] = args[0];
return H_SUCCESS;
}
static target_ulong h_set_dabr(PowerPCCPU *cpu, sPAPRMachineState *spapr,
target_ulong opcode, target_ulong *args)
{
if (!has_spr(cpu, SPR_DABR)) {
return H_HARDWARE; /* DABR register not available */
}
cpu_synchronize_state(CPU(cpu));
if (has_spr(cpu, SPR_DABRX)) {
cpu->env.spr[SPR_DABRX] = 0x3; /* Use Problem and Privileged state */
} else if (!(args[0] & 0x4)) { /* Breakpoint Translation set? */
return H_RESERVED_DABR;
}
cpu->env.spr[SPR_DABR] = args[0];
return H_SUCCESS;
}
static target_ulong h_set_xdabr(PowerPCCPU *cpu, sPAPRMachineState *spapr,
target_ulong opcode, target_ulong *args)
{
target_ulong dabrx = args[1];
if (!has_spr(cpu, SPR_DABR) || !has_spr(cpu, SPR_DABRX)) {
return H_HARDWARE;
}
if ((dabrx & ~0xfULL) != 0 || (dabrx & H_DABRX_HYPERVISOR) != 0
|| (dabrx & (H_DABRX_KERNEL | H_DABRX_USER)) == 0) {
return H_PARAMETER;
}
cpu_synchronize_state(CPU(cpu));
cpu->env.spr[SPR_DABRX] = dabrx;
cpu->env.spr[SPR_DABR] = args[0];
return H_SUCCESS;
}
static target_ulong h_page_init(PowerPCCPU *cpu, sPAPRMachineState *spapr,
target_ulong opcode, target_ulong *args)
{
target_ulong flags = args[0];
hwaddr dst = args[1];
hwaddr src = args[2];
hwaddr len = TARGET_PAGE_SIZE;
uint8_t *pdst, *psrc;
target_long ret = H_SUCCESS;
if (flags & ~(H_ICACHE_SYNCHRONIZE | H_ICACHE_INVALIDATE
| H_COPY_PAGE | H_ZERO_PAGE)) {
qemu_log_mask(LOG_UNIMP, "h_page_init: Bad flags (" TARGET_FMT_lx "\n",
flags);
return H_PARAMETER;
}
/* Map-in destination */
if (!is_ram_address(spapr, dst) || (dst & ~TARGET_PAGE_MASK) != 0) {
return H_PARAMETER;
}
pdst = cpu_physical_memory_map(dst, &len, 1);
if (!pdst || len != TARGET_PAGE_SIZE) {
return H_PARAMETER;
}
if (flags & H_COPY_PAGE) {
/* Map-in source, copy to destination, and unmap source again */
if (!is_ram_address(spapr, src) || (src & ~TARGET_PAGE_MASK) != 0) {
ret = H_PARAMETER;
goto unmap_out;
}
psrc = cpu_physical_memory_map(src, &len, 0);
if (!psrc || len != TARGET_PAGE_SIZE) {
ret = H_PARAMETER;
goto unmap_out;
}
memcpy(pdst, psrc, len);
cpu_physical_memory_unmap(psrc, len, 0, len);
} else if (flags & H_ZERO_PAGE) {
memset(pdst, 0, len); /* Just clear the destination page */
}
if (kvm_enabled() && (flags & H_ICACHE_SYNCHRONIZE) != 0) {
kvmppc_dcbst_range(cpu, pdst, len);
}
if (flags & (H_ICACHE_SYNCHRONIZE | H_ICACHE_INVALIDATE)) {
if (kvm_enabled()) {
kvmppc_icbi_range(cpu, pdst, len);
} else {
tb_flush(CPU(cpu));
}
}
unmap_out:
cpu_physical_memory_unmap(pdst, TARGET_PAGE_SIZE, 1, len);
return ret;
}
#define FLAGS_REGISTER_VPA 0x0000200000000000ULL
#define FLAGS_REGISTER_DTL 0x0000400000000000ULL
#define FLAGS_REGISTER_SLBSHADOW 0x0000600000000000ULL
#define FLAGS_DEREGISTER_VPA 0x0000a00000000000ULL
#define FLAGS_DEREGISTER_DTL 0x0000c00000000000ULL
#define FLAGS_DEREGISTER_SLBSHADOW 0x0000e00000000000ULL
#define VPA_MIN_SIZE 640
#define VPA_SIZE_OFFSET 0x4
#define VPA_SHARED_PROC_OFFSET 0x9
#define VPA_SHARED_PROC_VAL 0x2
static target_ulong register_vpa(CPUPPCState *env, target_ulong vpa)
{
CPUState *cs = CPU(ppc_env_get_cpu(env));
uint16_t size;
uint8_t tmp;
if (vpa == 0) {
hcall_dprintf("Can't cope with registering a VPA at logical 0\n");
return H_HARDWARE;
}
if (vpa % env->dcache_line_size) {
return H_PARAMETER;
}
/* FIXME: bounds check the address */
size = lduw_be_phys(cs->as, vpa + 0x4);
if (size < VPA_MIN_SIZE) {
return H_PARAMETER;
}
/* VPA is not allowed to cross a page boundary */
if ((vpa / 4096) != ((vpa + size - 1) / 4096)) {
return H_PARAMETER;
}
env->vpa_addr = vpa;
tmp = ldub_phys(cs->as, env->vpa_addr + VPA_SHARED_PROC_OFFSET);
tmp |= VPA_SHARED_PROC_VAL;
stb_phys(cs->as, env->vpa_addr + VPA_SHARED_PROC_OFFSET, tmp);
return H_SUCCESS;
}
static target_ulong deregister_vpa(CPUPPCState *env, target_ulong vpa)
{
if (env->slb_shadow_addr) {
return H_RESOURCE;
}
if (env->dtl_addr) {
return H_RESOURCE;
}
env->vpa_addr = 0;
return H_SUCCESS;
}
static target_ulong register_slb_shadow(CPUPPCState *env, target_ulong addr)
{
CPUState *cs = CPU(ppc_env_get_cpu(env));
uint32_t size;
if (addr == 0) {
hcall_dprintf("Can't cope with SLB shadow at logical 0\n");
return H_HARDWARE;
}
size = ldl_be_phys(cs->as, addr + 0x4);
if (size < 0x8) {
return H_PARAMETER;
}
if ((addr / 4096) != ((addr + size - 1) / 4096)) {
return H_PARAMETER;
}
if (!env->vpa_addr) {
return H_RESOURCE;
}
env->slb_shadow_addr = addr;
env->slb_shadow_size = size;
return H_SUCCESS;
}
static target_ulong deregister_slb_shadow(CPUPPCState *env, target_ulong addr)
{
env->slb_shadow_addr = 0;
env->slb_shadow_size = 0;
return H_SUCCESS;
}
static target_ulong register_dtl(CPUPPCState *env, target_ulong addr)
{
CPUState *cs = CPU(ppc_env_get_cpu(env));
uint32_t size;
if (addr == 0) {
hcall_dprintf("Can't cope with DTL at logical 0\n");
return H_HARDWARE;
}
size = ldl_be_phys(cs->as, addr + 0x4);
if (size < 48) {
return H_PARAMETER;
}
if (!env->vpa_addr) {
return H_RESOURCE;
}
env->dtl_addr = addr;
env->dtl_size = size;
return H_SUCCESS;
}
static target_ulong deregister_dtl(CPUPPCState *env, target_ulong addr)
{
env->dtl_addr = 0;
env->dtl_size = 0;
return H_SUCCESS;
}
static target_ulong h_register_vpa(PowerPCCPU *cpu, sPAPRMachineState *spapr,
target_ulong opcode, target_ulong *args)
{
target_ulong flags = args[0];
target_ulong procno = args[1];
target_ulong vpa = args[2];
target_ulong ret = H_PARAMETER;
CPUPPCState *tenv;
PowerPCCPU *tcpu;
tcpu = ppc_get_vcpu_by_dt_id(procno);
if (!tcpu) {
return H_PARAMETER;
}
tenv = &tcpu->env;
switch (flags) {
case FLAGS_REGISTER_VPA:
ret = register_vpa(tenv, vpa);
break;
case FLAGS_DEREGISTER_VPA:
ret = deregister_vpa(tenv, vpa);
break;
case FLAGS_REGISTER_SLBSHADOW:
ret = register_slb_shadow(tenv, vpa);
break;
case FLAGS_DEREGISTER_SLBSHADOW:
ret = deregister_slb_shadow(tenv, vpa);
break;
case FLAGS_REGISTER_DTL:
ret = register_dtl(tenv, vpa);
break;
case FLAGS_DEREGISTER_DTL:
ret = deregister_dtl(tenv, vpa);
break;
}
return ret;
}
static target_ulong h_cede(PowerPCCPU *cpu, sPAPRMachineState *spapr,
target_ulong opcode, target_ulong *args)
{
CPUPPCState *env = &cpu->env;
CPUState *cs = CPU(cpu);
env->msr |= (1ULL << MSR_EE);
hreg_compute_hflags(env);
if (!cpu_has_work(cs)) {
cs->halted = 1;
cs->exception_index = EXCP_HLT;
cs->exit_request = 1;
}
return H_SUCCESS;
}
static target_ulong h_rtas(PowerPCCPU *cpu, sPAPRMachineState *spapr,
target_ulong opcode, target_ulong *args)
{
target_ulong rtas_r3 = args[0];
uint32_t token = rtas_ld(rtas_r3, 0);
uint32_t nargs = rtas_ld(rtas_r3, 1);
uint32_t nret = rtas_ld(rtas_r3, 2);
return spapr_rtas_call(cpu, spapr, token, nargs, rtas_r3 + 12,
nret, rtas_r3 + 12 + 4*nargs);
}
static target_ulong h_logical_load(PowerPCCPU *cpu, sPAPRMachineState *spapr,
target_ulong opcode, target_ulong *args)
{
CPUState *cs = CPU(cpu);
target_ulong size = args[0];
target_ulong addr = args[1];
switch (size) {
case 1:
args[0] = ldub_phys(cs->as, addr);
return H_SUCCESS;
case 2:
args[0] = lduw_phys(cs->as, addr);
return H_SUCCESS;
case 4:
args[0] = ldl_phys(cs->as, addr);
return H_SUCCESS;
case 8:
args[0] = ldq_phys(cs->as, addr);
return H_SUCCESS;
}
return H_PARAMETER;
}
static target_ulong h_logical_store(PowerPCCPU *cpu, sPAPRMachineState *spapr,
target_ulong opcode, target_ulong *args)
{
CPUState *cs = CPU(cpu);
target_ulong size = args[0];
target_ulong addr = args[1];
target_ulong val = args[2];
switch (size) {
case 1:
stb_phys(cs->as, addr, val);
return H_SUCCESS;
case 2:
stw_phys(cs->as, addr, val);
return H_SUCCESS;
case 4:
stl_phys(cs->as, addr, val);
return H_SUCCESS;
case 8:
stq_phys(cs->as, addr, val);
return H_SUCCESS;
}
return H_PARAMETER;
}
static target_ulong h_logical_memop(PowerPCCPU *cpu, sPAPRMachineState *spapr,
target_ulong opcode, target_ulong *args)
{
CPUState *cs = CPU(cpu);
target_ulong dst = args[0]; /* Destination address */
target_ulong src = args[1]; /* Source address */
target_ulong esize = args[2]; /* Element size (0=1,1=2,2=4,3=8) */
target_ulong count = args[3]; /* Element count */
target_ulong op = args[4]; /* 0 = copy, 1 = invert */
uint64_t tmp;
unsigned int mask = (1 << esize) - 1;
int step = 1 << esize;
if (count > 0x80000000) {
return H_PARAMETER;
}
if ((dst & mask) || (src & mask) || (op > 1)) {
return H_PARAMETER;
}
if (dst >= src && dst < (src + (count << esize))) {
dst = dst + ((count - 1) << esize);
src = src + ((count - 1) << esize);
step = -step;
}
while (count--) {
switch (esize) {
case 0:
tmp = ldub_phys(cs->as, src);
break;
case 1:
tmp = lduw_phys(cs->as, src);
break;
case 2:
tmp = ldl_phys(cs->as, src);
break;
case 3:
tmp = ldq_phys(cs->as, src);
break;
default:
return H_PARAMETER;
}
if (op == 1) {
tmp = ~tmp;
}
switch (esize) {
case 0:
stb_phys(cs->as, dst, tmp);
break;
case 1:
stw_phys(cs->as, dst, tmp);
break;
case 2:
stl_phys(cs->as, dst, tmp);
break;
case 3:
stq_phys(cs->as, dst, tmp);
break;
}
dst = dst + step;
src = src + step;
}
return H_SUCCESS;
}
static target_ulong h_logical_icbi(PowerPCCPU *cpu, sPAPRMachineState *spapr,
target_ulong opcode, target_ulong *args)
{
/* Nothing to do on emulation, KVM will trap this in the kernel */
return H_SUCCESS;
}
static target_ulong h_logical_dcbf(PowerPCCPU *cpu, sPAPRMachineState *spapr,
target_ulong opcode, target_ulong *args)
{
/* Nothing to do on emulation, KVM will trap this in the kernel */
return H_SUCCESS;
}
static target_ulong h_set_mode_resource_le(PowerPCCPU *cpu,
target_ulong mflags,
target_ulong value1,
target_ulong value2)
{
CPUState *cs;
if (value1) {
return H_P3;
}
if (value2) {
return H_P4;
}
switch (mflags) {
case H_SET_MODE_ENDIAN_BIG:
CPU_FOREACH(cs) {
set_spr(cs, SPR_LPCR, 0, LPCR_ILE);
}
spapr_pci_switch_vga(true);
return H_SUCCESS;
case H_SET_MODE_ENDIAN_LITTLE:
CPU_FOREACH(cs) {
set_spr(cs, SPR_LPCR, LPCR_ILE, LPCR_ILE);
}
spapr_pci_switch_vga(false);
return H_SUCCESS;
}
return H_UNSUPPORTED_FLAG;
}
static target_ulong h_set_mode_resource_addr_trans_mode(PowerPCCPU *cpu,
target_ulong mflags,
target_ulong value1,
target_ulong value2)
{
CPUState *cs;
PowerPCCPUClass *pcc = POWERPC_CPU_GET_CLASS(cpu);
if (!(pcc->insns_flags2 & PPC2_ISA207S)) {
return H_P2;
}
if (value1) {
return H_P3;
}
if (value2) {
return H_P4;
}
if (mflags == AIL_RESERVED) {
return H_UNSUPPORTED_FLAG;
}
CPU_FOREACH(cs) {
set_spr(cs, SPR_LPCR, mflags << LPCR_AIL_SHIFT, LPCR_AIL);
}
return H_SUCCESS;
}
static target_ulong h_set_mode(PowerPCCPU *cpu, sPAPRMachineState *spapr,
target_ulong opcode, target_ulong *args)
{
target_ulong resource = args[1];
target_ulong ret = H_P2;
switch (resource) {
case H_SET_MODE_RESOURCE_LE:
ret = h_set_mode_resource_le(cpu, args[0], args[2], args[3]);
break;
case H_SET_MODE_RESOURCE_ADDR_TRANS_MODE:
ret = h_set_mode_resource_addr_trans_mode(cpu, args[0],
args[2], args[3]);
break;
}
return ret;
}
static target_ulong h_clean_slb(PowerPCCPU *cpu, sPAPRMachineState *spapr,
target_ulong opcode, target_ulong *args)
{
qemu_log_mask(LOG_UNIMP, "Unimplemented SPAPR hcall 0x"TARGET_FMT_lx"%s\n",
opcode, " (H_CLEAN_SLB)");
return H_FUNCTION;
}
static target_ulong h_invalidate_pid(PowerPCCPU *cpu, sPAPRMachineState *spapr,
target_ulong opcode, target_ulong *args)
{
qemu_log_mask(LOG_UNIMP, "Unimplemented SPAPR hcall 0x"TARGET_FMT_lx"%s\n",
opcode, " (H_INVALIDATE_PID)");
return H_FUNCTION;
}
static void spapr_check_setup_free_hpt(sPAPRMachineState *spapr,
uint64_t patbe_old, uint64_t patbe_new)
{
/*
* We have 4 Options:
* HASH->HASH || RADIX->RADIX || NOTHING->RADIX : Do Nothing
* HASH->RADIX : Free HPT
* RADIX->HASH : Allocate HPT
* NOTHING->HASH : Allocate HPT
* Note: NOTHING implies the case where we said the guest could choose
* later and so assumed radix and now it's called H_REG_PROC_TBL
*/
if ((patbe_old & PATBE1_GR) == (patbe_new & PATBE1_GR)) {
/* We assume RADIX, so this catches all the "Do Nothing" cases */
} else if (!(patbe_old & PATBE1_GR)) {
/* HASH->RADIX : Free HPT */
spapr_free_hpt(spapr);
} else if (!(patbe_new & PATBE1_GR)) {
/* RADIX->HASH || NOTHING->HASH : Allocate HPT */
spapr_setup_hpt_and_vrma(spapr);
}
return;
}
#define FLAGS_MASK 0x01FULL
#define FLAG_MODIFY 0x10
#define FLAG_REGISTER 0x08
#define FLAG_RADIX 0x04
#define FLAG_HASH_PROC_TBL 0x02
#define FLAG_GTSE 0x01
static target_ulong h_register_process_table(PowerPCCPU *cpu,
sPAPRMachineState *spapr,
target_ulong opcode,
target_ulong *args)
{
CPUState *cs;
target_ulong flags = args[0];
target_ulong proc_tbl = args[1];
target_ulong page_size = args[2];
target_ulong table_size = args[3];
uint64_t cproc;
if (flags & ~FLAGS_MASK) { /* Check no reserved bits are set */
return H_PARAMETER;
}
if (flags & FLAG_MODIFY) {
if (flags & FLAG_REGISTER) {
if (flags & FLAG_RADIX) { /* Register new RADIX process table */
if (proc_tbl & 0xfff || proc_tbl >> 60) {
return H_P2;
} else if (page_size) {
return H_P3;
} else if (table_size > 24) {
return H_P4;
}
cproc = PATBE1_GR | proc_tbl | table_size;
} else { /* Register new HPT process table */
if (flags & FLAG_HASH_PROC_TBL) { /* Hash with Segment Tables */
/* TODO - Not Supported */
/* Technically caused by flag bits => H_PARAMETER */
return H_PARAMETER;
} else { /* Hash with SLB */
if (proc_tbl >> 38) {
return H_P2;
} else if (page_size & ~0x7) {
return H_P3;
} else if (table_size > 24) {
return H_P4;
}
}
cproc = (proc_tbl << 25) | page_size << 5 | table_size;
}
} else { /* Deregister current process table */
/* Set to benign value: (current GR) | 0. This allows
* deregistration in KVM to succeed even if the radix bit in flags
* doesn't match the radix bit in the old PATB. */
cproc = spapr->patb_entry & PATBE1_GR;
}
} else { /* Maintain current registration */
if (!(flags & FLAG_RADIX) != !(spapr->patb_entry & PATBE1_GR)) {
/* Technically caused by flag bits => H_PARAMETER */
return H_PARAMETER; /* Existing Process Table Mismatch */
}
cproc = spapr->patb_entry;
}
/* Check if we need to setup OR free the hpt */
spapr_check_setup_free_hpt(spapr, spapr->patb_entry, cproc);
spapr->patb_entry = cproc; /* Save new process table */
/* Update the UPRT and GTSE bits in the LPCR for all cpus */
CPU_FOREACH(cs) {
set_spr(cs, SPR_LPCR,
((flags & (FLAG_RADIX | FLAG_HASH_PROC_TBL)) ? LPCR_UPRT : 0) |
((flags & FLAG_GTSE) ? LPCR_GTSE : 0),
LPCR_UPRT | LPCR_GTSE);
}
if (kvm_enabled()) {
return kvmppc_configure_v3_mmu(cpu, flags & FLAG_RADIX,
flags & FLAG_GTSE, cproc);
}
return H_SUCCESS;
}
#define H_SIGNAL_SYS_RESET_ALL -1
#define H_SIGNAL_SYS_RESET_ALLBUTSELF -2
static target_ulong h_signal_sys_reset(PowerPCCPU *cpu,
sPAPRMachineState *spapr,
target_ulong opcode, target_ulong *args)
{
target_long target = args[0];
CPUState *cs;
if (target < 0) {
/* Broadcast */
if (target < H_SIGNAL_SYS_RESET_ALLBUTSELF) {
return H_PARAMETER;
}
CPU_FOREACH(cs) {
PowerPCCPU *c = POWERPC_CPU(cs);
if (target == H_SIGNAL_SYS_RESET_ALLBUTSELF) {
if (c == cpu) {
continue;
}
}
run_on_cpu(cs, spapr_do_system_reset_on_cpu, RUN_ON_CPU_NULL);
}
return H_SUCCESS;
} else {
/* Unicast */
CPU_FOREACH(cs) {
if (cpu->cpu_dt_id == target) {
run_on_cpu(cs, spapr_do_system_reset_on_cpu, RUN_ON_CPU_NULL);
return H_SUCCESS;
}
}
return H_PARAMETER;
}
}
static uint32_t cas_check_pvr(sPAPRMachineState *spapr, PowerPCCPU *cpu,
target_ulong *addr, Error **errp)
spapr: Add ibm, client-architecture-support call The PAPR+ specification defines a ibm,client-architecture-support (CAS) RTAS call which purpose is to provide a negotiation mechanism for the guest and the hypervisor to work out the best compatibility parameters. During the negotiation process, the guest provides an array of various options and capabilities which it supports, the hypervisor adjusts the device tree and (optionally) reboots the guest. At the moment the Linux guest calls CAS method at early boot so SLOF gets called. SLOF allocates a memory buffer for the device tree changes and calls a custom KVMPPC_H_CAS hypercall. QEMU parses the options, composes a diff for the device tree, copies it to the buffer provided by SLOF and returns to SLOF. SLOF updates the device tree and returns control to the guest kernel. Only then the Linux guest parses the device tree so it is possible to avoid unnecessary reboot in most cases. The device tree diff is a header with an update format version (defined as 1 in this patch) followed by a device tree with the properties which require update. If QEMU detects that it has to reboot the guest, it silently does so as the guest expects reboot to happen because this is usual pHyp firmware behavior. This defines custom KVMPPC_H_CAS hypercall. The current SLOF already has support for it. This implements stub which returns very basic tree (root node, no properties) to the guest. As the return buffer does not contain any change, no change in behavior is expected. Signed-off-by: Alexey Kardashevskiy <aik@ozlabs.ru> Signed-off-by: Alexander Graf <agraf@suse.de>
2014-05-23 04:26:54 +02:00
{
bool explicit_match = false; /* Matched the CPU's real PVR */
uint32_t max_compat = spapr->max_compat_pvr;
uint32_t best_compat = 0;
int i;
/*
* We scan the supplied table of PVRs looking for two things
* 1. Is our real CPU PVR in the list?
* 2. What's the "best" listed logical PVR
*/
for (i = 0; i < 512; ++i) {
uint32_t pvr, pvr_mask;
pvr_mask = ldl_be_phys(&address_space_memory, *addr);
pvr = ldl_be_phys(&address_space_memory, *addr + 4);
*addr += 8;
if (~pvr_mask & pvr) {
break; /* Terminator record */
}
if ((cpu->env.spr[SPR_PVR] & pvr_mask) == (pvr & pvr_mask)) {
explicit_match = true;
} else {
if (ppc_check_compat(cpu, pvr, best_compat, max_compat)) {
best_compat = pvr;
}
}
}
if ((best_compat == 0) && (!explicit_match || max_compat)) {
/* We couldn't find a suitable compatibility mode, and either
* the guest doesn't support "raw" mode for this CPU, or raw
* mode is disabled because a maximum compat mode is set */
error_setg(errp, "Couldn't negotiate a suitable PVR during CAS");
return 0;
}
/* Parsing finished */
trace_spapr_cas_pvr(cpu->compat_pvr, explicit_match, best_compat);
return best_compat;
}
static target_ulong h_client_architecture_support(PowerPCCPU *cpu,
sPAPRMachineState *spapr,
target_ulong opcode,
target_ulong *args)
{
/* Working address in data buffer */
target_ulong addr = ppc64_phys_to_real(args[0]);
target_ulong ov_table;
uint32_t cas_pvr;
sPAPROptionVector *ov1_guest, *ov5_guest, *ov5_cas_old, *ov5_updates;
bool guest_radix;
Error *local_err = NULL;
cas_pvr = cas_check_pvr(spapr, cpu, &addr, &local_err);
if (local_err) {
error_report_err(local_err);
return H_HARDWARE;
}
/* Update CPUs */
if (cpu->compat_pvr != cas_pvr) {
ppc_set_compat_all(cas_pvr, &local_err);
if (local_err) {
error_report_err(local_err);
return H_HARDWARE;
}
}
/* For the future use: here @ov_table points to the first option vector */
ov_table = addr;
ov1_guest = spapr_ovec_parse_vector(ov_table, 1);
ov5_guest = spapr_ovec_parse_vector(ov_table, 5);
if (spapr_ovec_test(ov5_guest, OV5_MMU_BOTH)) {
error_report("guest requested hash and radix MMU, which is invalid.");
exit(EXIT_FAILURE);
}
/* The radix/hash bit in byte 24 requires special handling: */
guest_radix = spapr_ovec_test(ov5_guest, OV5_MMU_RADIX_300);
spapr_ovec_clear(ov5_guest, OV5_MMU_RADIX_300);
spapr: Add ibm, client-architecture-support call The PAPR+ specification defines a ibm,client-architecture-support (CAS) RTAS call which purpose is to provide a negotiation mechanism for the guest and the hypervisor to work out the best compatibility parameters. During the negotiation process, the guest provides an array of various options and capabilities which it supports, the hypervisor adjusts the device tree and (optionally) reboots the guest. At the moment the Linux guest calls CAS method at early boot so SLOF gets called. SLOF allocates a memory buffer for the device tree changes and calls a custom KVMPPC_H_CAS hypercall. QEMU parses the options, composes a diff for the device tree, copies it to the buffer provided by SLOF and returns to SLOF. SLOF updates the device tree and returns control to the guest kernel. Only then the Linux guest parses the device tree so it is possible to avoid unnecessary reboot in most cases. The device tree diff is a header with an update format version (defined as 1 in this patch) followed by a device tree with the properties which require update. If QEMU detects that it has to reboot the guest, it silently does so as the guest expects reboot to happen because this is usual pHyp firmware behavior. This defines custom KVMPPC_H_CAS hypercall. The current SLOF already has support for it. This implements stub which returns very basic tree (root node, no properties) to the guest. As the return buffer does not contain any change, no change in behavior is expected. Signed-off-by: Alexey Kardashevskiy <aik@ozlabs.ru> Signed-off-by: Alexander Graf <agraf@suse.de>
2014-05-23 04:26:54 +02:00
/* NOTE: there are actually a number of ov5 bits where input from the
* guest is always zero, and the platform/QEMU enables them independently
* of guest input. To model these properly we'd want some sort of mask,
* but since they only currently apply to memory migration as defined
* by LoPAPR 1.1, 14.5.4.8, which QEMU doesn't implement, we don't need
spapr: add option vector handling in CAS-generated resets In some cases, ibm,client-architecture-support calls can fail. This could happen in the current code for situations where the modified device tree segment exceeds the buffer size provided by the guest via the call parameters. In these cases, QEMU will reset, allowing an opportunity to regenerate the device tree from scratch via boot-time handling. There are potentially other scenarios as well, not currently reachable in the current code, but possible in theory, such as cases where device-tree properties or nodes need to be removed. We currently don't handle either of these properly for option vector capabilities however. Instead of carrying the negotiated capability beyond the reset and creating the boot-time device tree accordingly, we start from scratch, generating the same boot-time device tree as we did prior to the CAS-generated and the same device tree updates as we did before. This could (in theory) cause us to get stuck in a reset loop. This hasn't been observed, but depending on the extensiveness of CAS-induced device tree updates in the future, could eventually become an issue. Address this by pulling capability-related device tree updates resulting from CAS calls into a common routine, spapr_dt_cas_updates(), and adding an sPAPROptionVector* parameter that allows us to test for newly-negotiated capabilities. We invoke it as follows: 1) When ibm,client-architecture-support gets called, we call spapr_dt_cas_updates() with the set of capabilities added since the previous call to ibm,client-architecture-support. For the initial boot, or a system reset generated by something other than the CAS call itself, this set will consist of *all* options supported both the platform and the guest. For calls to ibm,client-architecture-support immediately after a CAS-induced reset, we call spapr_dt_cas_updates() with only the set of capabilities added since the previous call, since the other capabilities will have already been addressed by the boot-time device-tree this time around. In the unlikely event that capabilities are *removed* since the previous CAS, we will generate a CAS-induced reset. In the unlikely event that we cannot fit the device-tree updates into the buffer provided by the guest, well generate a CAS-induced reset. 2) When a CAS update results in the need to reset the machine and include the updates in the boot-time device tree, we call the spapr_dt_cas_updates() using the full set of negotiated capabilities as part of the reset path. At initial boot, or after a reset generated by something other than the CAS call itself, this set will be empty, resulting in what should be the same boot-time device-tree as we generated prior to this patch. For CAS-induced reset, this routine will be called with the full set of capabilities negotiated by the platform/guest in the previous CAS call, which should result in CAS updates from previous call being accounted for in the initial boot-time device tree. Signed-off-by: Michael Roth <mdroth@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Reviewed-by: David Gibson <david@gibson.dropbear.id.au> [dwg: Changed an int -> bool conversion to be more explicit] Signed-off-by: David Gibson <david@gibson.dropbear.id.au>
2016-10-25 06:47:29 +02:00
* to worry about this for now.
*/
spapr: add option vector handling in CAS-generated resets In some cases, ibm,client-architecture-support calls can fail. This could happen in the current code for situations where the modified device tree segment exceeds the buffer size provided by the guest via the call parameters. In these cases, QEMU will reset, allowing an opportunity to regenerate the device tree from scratch via boot-time handling. There are potentially other scenarios as well, not currently reachable in the current code, but possible in theory, such as cases where device-tree properties or nodes need to be removed. We currently don't handle either of these properly for option vector capabilities however. Instead of carrying the negotiated capability beyond the reset and creating the boot-time device tree accordingly, we start from scratch, generating the same boot-time device tree as we did prior to the CAS-generated and the same device tree updates as we did before. This could (in theory) cause us to get stuck in a reset loop. This hasn't been observed, but depending on the extensiveness of CAS-induced device tree updates in the future, could eventually become an issue. Address this by pulling capability-related device tree updates resulting from CAS calls into a common routine, spapr_dt_cas_updates(), and adding an sPAPROptionVector* parameter that allows us to test for newly-negotiated capabilities. We invoke it as follows: 1) When ibm,client-architecture-support gets called, we call spapr_dt_cas_updates() with the set of capabilities added since the previous call to ibm,client-architecture-support. For the initial boot, or a system reset generated by something other than the CAS call itself, this set will consist of *all* options supported both the platform and the guest. For calls to ibm,client-architecture-support immediately after a CAS-induced reset, we call spapr_dt_cas_updates() with only the set of capabilities added since the previous call, since the other capabilities will have already been addressed by the boot-time device-tree this time around. In the unlikely event that capabilities are *removed* since the previous CAS, we will generate a CAS-induced reset. In the unlikely event that we cannot fit the device-tree updates into the buffer provided by the guest, well generate a CAS-induced reset. 2) When a CAS update results in the need to reset the machine and include the updates in the boot-time device tree, we call the spapr_dt_cas_updates() using the full set of negotiated capabilities as part of the reset path. At initial boot, or after a reset generated by something other than the CAS call itself, this set will be empty, resulting in what should be the same boot-time device-tree as we generated prior to this patch. For CAS-induced reset, this routine will be called with the full set of capabilities negotiated by the platform/guest in the previous CAS call, which should result in CAS updates from previous call being accounted for in the initial boot-time device tree. Signed-off-by: Michael Roth <mdroth@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Reviewed-by: David Gibson <david@gibson.dropbear.id.au> [dwg: Changed an int -> bool conversion to be more explicit] Signed-off-by: David Gibson <david@gibson.dropbear.id.au>
2016-10-25 06:47:29 +02:00
ov5_cas_old = spapr_ovec_clone(spapr->ov5_cas);
/* full range of negotiated ov5 capabilities */
spapr_ovec_intersect(spapr->ov5_cas, spapr->ov5, ov5_guest);
spapr_ovec_cleanup(ov5_guest);
spapr: add option vector handling in CAS-generated resets In some cases, ibm,client-architecture-support calls can fail. This could happen in the current code for situations where the modified device tree segment exceeds the buffer size provided by the guest via the call parameters. In these cases, QEMU will reset, allowing an opportunity to regenerate the device tree from scratch via boot-time handling. There are potentially other scenarios as well, not currently reachable in the current code, but possible in theory, such as cases where device-tree properties or nodes need to be removed. We currently don't handle either of these properly for option vector capabilities however. Instead of carrying the negotiated capability beyond the reset and creating the boot-time device tree accordingly, we start from scratch, generating the same boot-time device tree as we did prior to the CAS-generated and the same device tree updates as we did before. This could (in theory) cause us to get stuck in a reset loop. This hasn't been observed, but depending on the extensiveness of CAS-induced device tree updates in the future, could eventually become an issue. Address this by pulling capability-related device tree updates resulting from CAS calls into a common routine, spapr_dt_cas_updates(), and adding an sPAPROptionVector* parameter that allows us to test for newly-negotiated capabilities. We invoke it as follows: 1) When ibm,client-architecture-support gets called, we call spapr_dt_cas_updates() with the set of capabilities added since the previous call to ibm,client-architecture-support. For the initial boot, or a system reset generated by something other than the CAS call itself, this set will consist of *all* options supported both the platform and the guest. For calls to ibm,client-architecture-support immediately after a CAS-induced reset, we call spapr_dt_cas_updates() with only the set of capabilities added since the previous call, since the other capabilities will have already been addressed by the boot-time device-tree this time around. In the unlikely event that capabilities are *removed* since the previous CAS, we will generate a CAS-induced reset. In the unlikely event that we cannot fit the device-tree updates into the buffer provided by the guest, well generate a CAS-induced reset. 2) When a CAS update results in the need to reset the machine and include the updates in the boot-time device tree, we call the spapr_dt_cas_updates() using the full set of negotiated capabilities as part of the reset path. At initial boot, or after a reset generated by something other than the CAS call itself, this set will be empty, resulting in what should be the same boot-time device-tree as we generated prior to this patch. For CAS-induced reset, this routine will be called with the full set of capabilities negotiated by the platform/guest in the previous CAS call, which should result in CAS updates from previous call being accounted for in the initial boot-time device tree. Signed-off-by: Michael Roth <mdroth@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Reviewed-by: David Gibson <david@gibson.dropbear.id.au> [dwg: Changed an int -> bool conversion to be more explicit] Signed-off-by: David Gibson <david@gibson.dropbear.id.au>
2016-10-25 06:47:29 +02:00
/* capabilities that have been added since CAS-generated guest reset.
* if capabilities have since been removed, generate another reset
*/
ov5_updates = spapr_ovec_new();
spapr->cas_reboot = spapr_ovec_diff(ov5_updates,
ov5_cas_old, spapr->ov5_cas);
/* Now that processing is finished, set the radix/hash bit for the
* guest if it requested a valid mode; otherwise terminate the boot. */
if (guest_radix) {
if (kvm_enabled() && !kvmppc_has_cap_mmu_radix()) {
error_report("Guest requested unavailable MMU mode (radix).");
exit(EXIT_FAILURE);
}
spapr_ovec_set(spapr->ov5_cas, OV5_MMU_RADIX_300);
} else {
if (kvm_enabled() && kvmppc_has_cap_mmu_radix()
&& !kvmppc_has_cap_mmu_hash_v3()) {
error_report("Guest requested unavailable MMU mode (hash).");
exit(EXIT_FAILURE);
}
}
spapr->cas_legacy_guest_workaround = !spapr_ovec_test(ov1_guest,
OV1_PPC_3_00);
spapr: add option vector handling in CAS-generated resets In some cases, ibm,client-architecture-support calls can fail. This could happen in the current code for situations where the modified device tree segment exceeds the buffer size provided by the guest via the call parameters. In these cases, QEMU will reset, allowing an opportunity to regenerate the device tree from scratch via boot-time handling. There are potentially other scenarios as well, not currently reachable in the current code, but possible in theory, such as cases where device-tree properties or nodes need to be removed. We currently don't handle either of these properly for option vector capabilities however. Instead of carrying the negotiated capability beyond the reset and creating the boot-time device tree accordingly, we start from scratch, generating the same boot-time device tree as we did prior to the CAS-generated and the same device tree updates as we did before. This could (in theory) cause us to get stuck in a reset loop. This hasn't been observed, but depending on the extensiveness of CAS-induced device tree updates in the future, could eventually become an issue. Address this by pulling capability-related device tree updates resulting from CAS calls into a common routine, spapr_dt_cas_updates(), and adding an sPAPROptionVector* parameter that allows us to test for newly-negotiated capabilities. We invoke it as follows: 1) When ibm,client-architecture-support gets called, we call spapr_dt_cas_updates() with the set of capabilities added since the previous call to ibm,client-architecture-support. For the initial boot, or a system reset generated by something other than the CAS call itself, this set will consist of *all* options supported both the platform and the guest. For calls to ibm,client-architecture-support immediately after a CAS-induced reset, we call spapr_dt_cas_updates() with only the set of capabilities added since the previous call, since the other capabilities will have already been addressed by the boot-time device-tree this time around. In the unlikely event that capabilities are *removed* since the previous CAS, we will generate a CAS-induced reset. In the unlikely event that we cannot fit the device-tree updates into the buffer provided by the guest, well generate a CAS-induced reset. 2) When a CAS update results in the need to reset the machine and include the updates in the boot-time device tree, we call the spapr_dt_cas_updates() using the full set of negotiated capabilities as part of the reset path. At initial boot, or after a reset generated by something other than the CAS call itself, this set will be empty, resulting in what should be the same boot-time device-tree as we generated prior to this patch. For CAS-induced reset, this routine will be called with the full set of capabilities negotiated by the platform/guest in the previous CAS call, which should result in CAS updates from previous call being accounted for in the initial boot-time device tree. Signed-off-by: Michael Roth <mdroth@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Reviewed-by: David Gibson <david@gibson.dropbear.id.au> [dwg: Changed an int -> bool conversion to be more explicit] Signed-off-by: David Gibson <david@gibson.dropbear.id.au>
2016-10-25 06:47:29 +02:00
if (!spapr->cas_reboot) {
spapr->cas_reboot =
(spapr_h_cas_compose_response(spapr, args[1], args[2],
spapr: add option vector handling in CAS-generated resets In some cases, ibm,client-architecture-support calls can fail. This could happen in the current code for situations where the modified device tree segment exceeds the buffer size provided by the guest via the call parameters. In these cases, QEMU will reset, allowing an opportunity to regenerate the device tree from scratch via boot-time handling. There are potentially other scenarios as well, not currently reachable in the current code, but possible in theory, such as cases where device-tree properties or nodes need to be removed. We currently don't handle either of these properly for option vector capabilities however. Instead of carrying the negotiated capability beyond the reset and creating the boot-time device tree accordingly, we start from scratch, generating the same boot-time device tree as we did prior to the CAS-generated and the same device tree updates as we did before. This could (in theory) cause us to get stuck in a reset loop. This hasn't been observed, but depending on the extensiveness of CAS-induced device tree updates in the future, could eventually become an issue. Address this by pulling capability-related device tree updates resulting from CAS calls into a common routine, spapr_dt_cas_updates(), and adding an sPAPROptionVector* parameter that allows us to test for newly-negotiated capabilities. We invoke it as follows: 1) When ibm,client-architecture-support gets called, we call spapr_dt_cas_updates() with the set of capabilities added since the previous call to ibm,client-architecture-support. For the initial boot, or a system reset generated by something other than the CAS call itself, this set will consist of *all* options supported both the platform and the guest. For calls to ibm,client-architecture-support immediately after a CAS-induced reset, we call spapr_dt_cas_updates() with only the set of capabilities added since the previous call, since the other capabilities will have already been addressed by the boot-time device-tree this time around. In the unlikely event that capabilities are *removed* since the previous CAS, we will generate a CAS-induced reset. In the unlikely event that we cannot fit the device-tree updates into the buffer provided by the guest, well generate a CAS-induced reset. 2) When a CAS update results in the need to reset the machine and include the updates in the boot-time device tree, we call the spapr_dt_cas_updates() using the full set of negotiated capabilities as part of the reset path. At initial boot, or after a reset generated by something other than the CAS call itself, this set will be empty, resulting in what should be the same boot-time device-tree as we generated prior to this patch. For CAS-induced reset, this routine will be called with the full set of capabilities negotiated by the platform/guest in the previous CAS call, which should result in CAS updates from previous call being accounted for in the initial boot-time device tree. Signed-off-by: Michael Roth <mdroth@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Reviewed-by: David Gibson <david@gibson.dropbear.id.au> [dwg: Changed an int -> bool conversion to be more explicit] Signed-off-by: David Gibson <david@gibson.dropbear.id.au>
2016-10-25 06:47:29 +02:00
ov5_updates) != 0);
}
spapr_ovec_cleanup(ov5_updates);
spapr: add option vector handling in CAS-generated resets In some cases, ibm,client-architecture-support calls can fail. This could happen in the current code for situations where the modified device tree segment exceeds the buffer size provided by the guest via the call parameters. In these cases, QEMU will reset, allowing an opportunity to regenerate the device tree from scratch via boot-time handling. There are potentially other scenarios as well, not currently reachable in the current code, but possible in theory, such as cases where device-tree properties or nodes need to be removed. We currently don't handle either of these properly for option vector capabilities however. Instead of carrying the negotiated capability beyond the reset and creating the boot-time device tree accordingly, we start from scratch, generating the same boot-time device tree as we did prior to the CAS-generated and the same device tree updates as we did before. This could (in theory) cause us to get stuck in a reset loop. This hasn't been observed, but depending on the extensiveness of CAS-induced device tree updates in the future, could eventually become an issue. Address this by pulling capability-related device tree updates resulting from CAS calls into a common routine, spapr_dt_cas_updates(), and adding an sPAPROptionVector* parameter that allows us to test for newly-negotiated capabilities. We invoke it as follows: 1) When ibm,client-architecture-support gets called, we call spapr_dt_cas_updates() with the set of capabilities added since the previous call to ibm,client-architecture-support. For the initial boot, or a system reset generated by something other than the CAS call itself, this set will consist of *all* options supported both the platform and the guest. For calls to ibm,client-architecture-support immediately after a CAS-induced reset, we call spapr_dt_cas_updates() with only the set of capabilities added since the previous call, since the other capabilities will have already been addressed by the boot-time device-tree this time around. In the unlikely event that capabilities are *removed* since the previous CAS, we will generate a CAS-induced reset. In the unlikely event that we cannot fit the device-tree updates into the buffer provided by the guest, well generate a CAS-induced reset. 2) When a CAS update results in the need to reset the machine and include the updates in the boot-time device tree, we call the spapr_dt_cas_updates() using the full set of negotiated capabilities as part of the reset path. At initial boot, or after a reset generated by something other than the CAS call itself, this set will be empty, resulting in what should be the same boot-time device-tree as we generated prior to this patch. For CAS-induced reset, this routine will be called with the full set of capabilities negotiated by the platform/guest in the previous CAS call, which should result in CAS updates from previous call being accounted for in the initial boot-time device tree. Signed-off-by: Michael Roth <mdroth@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Reviewed-by: David Gibson <david@gibson.dropbear.id.au> [dwg: Changed an int -> bool conversion to be more explicit] Signed-off-by: David Gibson <david@gibson.dropbear.id.au>
2016-10-25 06:47:29 +02:00
if (spapr->cas_reboot) {
qemu_system_reset_request(SHUTDOWN_CAUSE_GUEST_RESET);
} else {
/* If ppc_spapr_reset() did not set up a HPT but one is necessary
* (because the guest isn't going to use radix) then set it up here. */
if ((spapr->patb_entry & PATBE1_GR) && !guest_radix) {
/* legacy hash or new hash: */
spapr_setup_hpt_and_vrma(spapr);
}
spapr: Add ibm, client-architecture-support call The PAPR+ specification defines a ibm,client-architecture-support (CAS) RTAS call which purpose is to provide a negotiation mechanism for the guest and the hypervisor to work out the best compatibility parameters. During the negotiation process, the guest provides an array of various options and capabilities which it supports, the hypervisor adjusts the device tree and (optionally) reboots the guest. At the moment the Linux guest calls CAS method at early boot so SLOF gets called. SLOF allocates a memory buffer for the device tree changes and calls a custom KVMPPC_H_CAS hypercall. QEMU parses the options, composes a diff for the device tree, copies it to the buffer provided by SLOF and returns to SLOF. SLOF updates the device tree and returns control to the guest kernel. Only then the Linux guest parses the device tree so it is possible to avoid unnecessary reboot in most cases. The device tree diff is a header with an update format version (defined as 1 in this patch) followed by a device tree with the properties which require update. If QEMU detects that it has to reboot the guest, it silently does so as the guest expects reboot to happen because this is usual pHyp firmware behavior. This defines custom KVMPPC_H_CAS hypercall. The current SLOF already has support for it. This implements stub which returns very basic tree (root node, no properties) to the guest. As the return buffer does not contain any change, no change in behavior is expected. Signed-off-by: Alexey Kardashevskiy <aik@ozlabs.ru> Signed-off-by: Alexander Graf <agraf@suse.de>
2014-05-23 04:26:54 +02:00
}
return H_SUCCESS;
}
static spapr_hcall_fn papr_hypercall_table[(MAX_HCALL_OPCODE / 4) + 1];
static spapr_hcall_fn kvmppc_hypercall_table[KVMPPC_HCALL_MAX - KVMPPC_HCALL_BASE + 1];
void spapr_register_hypercall(target_ulong opcode, spapr_hcall_fn fn)
{
spapr_hcall_fn *slot;
if (opcode <= MAX_HCALL_OPCODE) {
assert((opcode & 0x3) == 0);
slot = &papr_hypercall_table[opcode / 4];
} else {
assert((opcode >= KVMPPC_HCALL_BASE) && (opcode <= KVMPPC_HCALL_MAX));
slot = &kvmppc_hypercall_table[opcode - KVMPPC_HCALL_BASE];
}
assert(!(*slot));
*slot = fn;
}
target_ulong spapr_hypercall(PowerPCCPU *cpu, target_ulong opcode,
target_ulong *args)
{
sPAPRMachineState *spapr = SPAPR_MACHINE(qdev_get_machine());
if ((opcode <= MAX_HCALL_OPCODE)
&& ((opcode & 0x3) == 0)) {
spapr_hcall_fn fn = papr_hypercall_table[opcode / 4];
if (fn) {
return fn(cpu, spapr, opcode, args);
}
} else if ((opcode >= KVMPPC_HCALL_BASE) &&
(opcode <= KVMPPC_HCALL_MAX)) {
spapr_hcall_fn fn = kvmppc_hypercall_table[opcode - KVMPPC_HCALL_BASE];
if (fn) {
return fn(cpu, spapr, opcode, args);
}
}
qemu_log_mask(LOG_UNIMP, "Unimplemented SPAPR hcall 0x" TARGET_FMT_lx "\n",
opcode);
return H_FUNCTION;
}
static void hypercall_register_types(void)
{
/* hcall-pft */
spapr_register_hypercall(H_ENTER, h_enter);
spapr_register_hypercall(H_REMOVE, h_remove);
spapr_register_hypercall(H_PROTECT, h_protect);
spapr_register_hypercall(H_READ, h_read);
/* hcall-bulk */
spapr_register_hypercall(H_BULK_REMOVE, h_bulk_remove);
/* hcall-splpar */
spapr_register_hypercall(H_REGISTER_VPA, h_register_vpa);
spapr_register_hypercall(H_CEDE, h_cede);
spapr_register_hypercall(H_SIGNAL_SYS_RESET, h_signal_sys_reset);
/* processor register resource access h-calls */
spapr_register_hypercall(H_SET_SPRG0, h_set_sprg0);
spapr_register_hypercall(H_SET_DABR, h_set_dabr);
spapr_register_hypercall(H_SET_XDABR, h_set_xdabr);
spapr_register_hypercall(H_PAGE_INIT, h_page_init);
spapr_register_hypercall(H_SET_MODE, h_set_mode);
/* In Memory Table MMU h-calls */
spapr_register_hypercall(H_CLEAN_SLB, h_clean_slb);
spapr_register_hypercall(H_INVALIDATE_PID, h_invalidate_pid);
spapr_register_hypercall(H_REGISTER_PROC_TBL, h_register_process_table);
/* "debugger" hcalls (also used by SLOF). Note: We do -not- differenciate
* here between the "CI" and the "CACHE" variants, they will use whatever
* mapping attributes qemu is using. When using KVM, the kernel will
* enforce the attributes more strongly
*/
spapr_register_hypercall(H_LOGICAL_CI_LOAD, h_logical_load);
spapr_register_hypercall(H_LOGICAL_CI_STORE, h_logical_store);
spapr_register_hypercall(H_LOGICAL_CACHE_LOAD, h_logical_load);
spapr_register_hypercall(H_LOGICAL_CACHE_STORE, h_logical_store);
spapr_register_hypercall(H_LOGICAL_ICBI, h_logical_icbi);
spapr_register_hypercall(H_LOGICAL_DCBF, h_logical_dcbf);
spapr_register_hypercall(KVMPPC_H_LOGICAL_MEMOP, h_logical_memop);
/* qemu/KVM-PPC specific hcalls */
spapr_register_hypercall(KVMPPC_H_RTAS, h_rtas);
spapr: Add ibm, client-architecture-support call The PAPR+ specification defines a ibm,client-architecture-support (CAS) RTAS call which purpose is to provide a negotiation mechanism for the guest and the hypervisor to work out the best compatibility parameters. During the negotiation process, the guest provides an array of various options and capabilities which it supports, the hypervisor adjusts the device tree and (optionally) reboots the guest. At the moment the Linux guest calls CAS method at early boot so SLOF gets called. SLOF allocates a memory buffer for the device tree changes and calls a custom KVMPPC_H_CAS hypercall. QEMU parses the options, composes a diff for the device tree, copies it to the buffer provided by SLOF and returns to SLOF. SLOF updates the device tree and returns control to the guest kernel. Only then the Linux guest parses the device tree so it is possible to avoid unnecessary reboot in most cases. The device tree diff is a header with an update format version (defined as 1 in this patch) followed by a device tree with the properties which require update. If QEMU detects that it has to reboot the guest, it silently does so as the guest expects reboot to happen because this is usual pHyp firmware behavior. This defines custom KVMPPC_H_CAS hypercall. The current SLOF already has support for it. This implements stub which returns very basic tree (root node, no properties) to the guest. As the return buffer does not contain any change, no change in behavior is expected. Signed-off-by: Alexey Kardashevskiy <aik@ozlabs.ru> Signed-off-by: Alexander Graf <agraf@suse.de>
2014-05-23 04:26:54 +02:00
/* ibm,client-architecture-support support */
spapr_register_hypercall(KVMPPC_H_CAS, h_client_architecture_support);
}
type_init(hypercall_register_types)