authz: add QAuthZPAM object type for authorizing using PAM
Add an authorization backend that talks to PAM to check whether the user
identity is allowed. This only uses the PAM account validation facility,
which is essentially just a check to see if the provided username is permitted
access. It doesn't use the authentication or session parts of PAM, since
that's dealt with by the relevant part of QEMU (eg VNC server).
Consider starting QEMU with a VNC server and telling it to use TLS with
x509 client certificates and configuring it to use an PAM to validate
the x509 distinguished name. In this example we're telling it to use PAM
for the QAuthZ impl with a service name of "qemu-vnc"
$ qemu-system-x86_64 \
-object tls-creds-x509,id=tls0,dir=/home/berrange/security/qemutls,\
endpoint=server,verify-peer=yes \
-object authz-pam,id=authz0,service=qemu-vnc \
-vnc :1,tls-creds=tls0,tls-authz=authz0
This requires an /etc/pam/qemu-vnc file to be created with the auth
rules. A very simple file based whitelist can be setup using
$ cat > /etc/pam/qemu-vnc <<EOF
account requisite pam_listfile.so item=user sense=allow file=/etc/qemu/vnc.allow
EOF
The /etc/qemu/vnc.allow file simply contains one username per line. Any
username not in the file is denied. The usernames in this example are
the x509 distinguished name from the client's x509 cert.
$ cat > /etc/qemu/vnc.allow <<EOF
CN=laptop.berrange.com,O=Berrange Home,L=London,ST=London,C=GB
EOF
More interesting would be to configure PAM to use an LDAP backend, so
that the QEMU authorization check data can be centralized instead of
requiring each compute host to have file maintained.
The main limitation with this PAM module is that the rules apply to all
QEMU instances on the host. Setting up different rules per VM, would
require creating a separate PAM service name & config file for every
guest. An alternative approach for the future might be to not pass in
the plain username to PAM, but instead combine the VM name or UUID with
the username. This requires further consideration though.
Tested-by: Philippe Mathieu-Daudé <philmd@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Philippe Mathieu-Daudé <philmd@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Daniel P. Berrange <berrange@redhat.com>
2016-07-27 15:13:56 +02:00
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* QEMU PAM authorization object tests
|
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
* Copyright (c) 2018 Red Hat, Inc.
|
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
* This library is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
|
|
|
|
* modify it under the terms of the GNU Lesser General Public
|
|
|
|
* License as published by the Free Software Foundation; either
|
2020-10-14 15:49:02 +02:00
|
|
|
* version 2.1 of the License, or (at your option) any later version.
|
authz: add QAuthZPAM object type for authorizing using PAM
Add an authorization backend that talks to PAM to check whether the user
identity is allowed. This only uses the PAM account validation facility,
which is essentially just a check to see if the provided username is permitted
access. It doesn't use the authentication or session parts of PAM, since
that's dealt with by the relevant part of QEMU (eg VNC server).
Consider starting QEMU with a VNC server and telling it to use TLS with
x509 client certificates and configuring it to use an PAM to validate
the x509 distinguished name. In this example we're telling it to use PAM
for the QAuthZ impl with a service name of "qemu-vnc"
$ qemu-system-x86_64 \
-object tls-creds-x509,id=tls0,dir=/home/berrange/security/qemutls,\
endpoint=server,verify-peer=yes \
-object authz-pam,id=authz0,service=qemu-vnc \
-vnc :1,tls-creds=tls0,tls-authz=authz0
This requires an /etc/pam/qemu-vnc file to be created with the auth
rules. A very simple file based whitelist can be setup using
$ cat > /etc/pam/qemu-vnc <<EOF
account requisite pam_listfile.so item=user sense=allow file=/etc/qemu/vnc.allow
EOF
The /etc/qemu/vnc.allow file simply contains one username per line. Any
username not in the file is denied. The usernames in this example are
the x509 distinguished name from the client's x509 cert.
$ cat > /etc/qemu/vnc.allow <<EOF
CN=laptop.berrange.com,O=Berrange Home,L=London,ST=London,C=GB
EOF
More interesting would be to configure PAM to use an LDAP backend, so
that the QEMU authorization check data can be centralized instead of
requiring each compute host to have file maintained.
The main limitation with this PAM module is that the rules apply to all
QEMU instances on the host. Setting up different rules per VM, would
require creating a separate PAM service name & config file for every
guest. An alternative approach for the future might be to not pass in
the plain username to PAM, but instead combine the VM name or UUID with
the username. This requires further consideration though.
Tested-by: Philippe Mathieu-Daudé <philmd@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Philippe Mathieu-Daudé <philmd@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Daniel P. Berrange <berrange@redhat.com>
2016-07-27 15:13:56 +02:00
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
* This library is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
|
|
|
|
* but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
|
|
|
|
* MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the GNU
|
|
|
|
* Lesser General Public License for more details.
|
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
* You should have received a copy of the GNU Lesser General Public
|
|
|
|
* License along with this library; if not, see <http://www.gnu.org/licenses/>.
|
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
#include "qemu/osdep.h"
|
|
|
|
#include "qapi/error.h"
|
2019-05-23 16:35:07 +02:00
|
|
|
#include "qemu/module.h"
|
authz: add QAuthZPAM object type for authorizing using PAM
Add an authorization backend that talks to PAM to check whether the user
identity is allowed. This only uses the PAM account validation facility,
which is essentially just a check to see if the provided username is permitted
access. It doesn't use the authentication or session parts of PAM, since
that's dealt with by the relevant part of QEMU (eg VNC server).
Consider starting QEMU with a VNC server and telling it to use TLS with
x509 client certificates and configuring it to use an PAM to validate
the x509 distinguished name. In this example we're telling it to use PAM
for the QAuthZ impl with a service name of "qemu-vnc"
$ qemu-system-x86_64 \
-object tls-creds-x509,id=tls0,dir=/home/berrange/security/qemutls,\
endpoint=server,verify-peer=yes \
-object authz-pam,id=authz0,service=qemu-vnc \
-vnc :1,tls-creds=tls0,tls-authz=authz0
This requires an /etc/pam/qemu-vnc file to be created with the auth
rules. A very simple file based whitelist can be setup using
$ cat > /etc/pam/qemu-vnc <<EOF
account requisite pam_listfile.so item=user sense=allow file=/etc/qemu/vnc.allow
EOF
The /etc/qemu/vnc.allow file simply contains one username per line. Any
username not in the file is denied. The usernames in this example are
the x509 distinguished name from the client's x509 cert.
$ cat > /etc/qemu/vnc.allow <<EOF
CN=laptop.berrange.com,O=Berrange Home,L=London,ST=London,C=GB
EOF
More interesting would be to configure PAM to use an LDAP backend, so
that the QEMU authorization check data can be centralized instead of
requiring each compute host to have file maintained.
The main limitation with this PAM module is that the rules apply to all
QEMU instances on the host. Setting up different rules per VM, would
require creating a separate PAM service name & config file for every
guest. An alternative approach for the future might be to not pass in
the plain username to PAM, but instead combine the VM name or UUID with
the username. This requires further consideration though.
Tested-by: Philippe Mathieu-Daudé <philmd@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Philippe Mathieu-Daudé <philmd@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Daniel P. Berrange <berrange@redhat.com>
2016-07-27 15:13:56 +02:00
|
|
|
#include "authz/pamacct.h"
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
#include <security/pam_appl.h>
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
static bool failauth;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/*
|
2021-01-28 18:11:27 +01:00
|
|
|
* These three functions are exported by libpam.so.
|
authz: add QAuthZPAM object type for authorizing using PAM
Add an authorization backend that talks to PAM to check whether the user
identity is allowed. This only uses the PAM account validation facility,
which is essentially just a check to see if the provided username is permitted
access. It doesn't use the authentication or session parts of PAM, since
that's dealt with by the relevant part of QEMU (eg VNC server).
Consider starting QEMU with a VNC server and telling it to use TLS with
x509 client certificates and configuring it to use an PAM to validate
the x509 distinguished name. In this example we're telling it to use PAM
for the QAuthZ impl with a service name of "qemu-vnc"
$ qemu-system-x86_64 \
-object tls-creds-x509,id=tls0,dir=/home/berrange/security/qemutls,\
endpoint=server,verify-peer=yes \
-object authz-pam,id=authz0,service=qemu-vnc \
-vnc :1,tls-creds=tls0,tls-authz=authz0
This requires an /etc/pam/qemu-vnc file to be created with the auth
rules. A very simple file based whitelist can be setup using
$ cat > /etc/pam/qemu-vnc <<EOF
account requisite pam_listfile.so item=user sense=allow file=/etc/qemu/vnc.allow
EOF
The /etc/qemu/vnc.allow file simply contains one username per line. Any
username not in the file is denied. The usernames in this example are
the x509 distinguished name from the client's x509 cert.
$ cat > /etc/qemu/vnc.allow <<EOF
CN=laptop.berrange.com,O=Berrange Home,L=London,ST=London,C=GB
EOF
More interesting would be to configure PAM to use an LDAP backend, so
that the QEMU authorization check data can be centralized instead of
requiring each compute host to have file maintained.
The main limitation with this PAM module is that the rules apply to all
QEMU instances on the host. Setting up different rules per VM, would
require creating a separate PAM service name & config file for every
guest. An alternative approach for the future might be to not pass in
the plain username to PAM, but instead combine the VM name or UUID with
the username. This requires further consideration though.
Tested-by: Philippe Mathieu-Daudé <philmd@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Philippe Mathieu-Daudé <philmd@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Daniel P. Berrange <berrange@redhat.com>
2016-07-27 15:13:56 +02:00
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
* By defining them again here, our impls are resolved
|
|
|
|
* by the linker instead of those in libpam.so
|
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
* The test suite is thus isolated from the host system
|
|
|
|
* PAM setup, so we can do predictable test scenarios
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
int
|
|
|
|
pam_start(const char *service_name, const char *user,
|
|
|
|
const struct pam_conv *pam_conversation,
|
|
|
|
pam_handle_t **pamh)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
failauth = true;
|
|
|
|
if (!g_str_equal(service_name, "qemu-vnc")) {
|
|
|
|
return PAM_AUTH_ERR;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (g_str_equal(user, "fred")) {
|
|
|
|
failauth = false;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2021-01-28 18:11:27 +01:00
|
|
|
*pamh = (pam_handle_t *)0xbadeaffe;
|
authz: add QAuthZPAM object type for authorizing using PAM
Add an authorization backend that talks to PAM to check whether the user
identity is allowed. This only uses the PAM account validation facility,
which is essentially just a check to see if the provided username is permitted
access. It doesn't use the authentication or session parts of PAM, since
that's dealt with by the relevant part of QEMU (eg VNC server).
Consider starting QEMU with a VNC server and telling it to use TLS with
x509 client certificates and configuring it to use an PAM to validate
the x509 distinguished name. In this example we're telling it to use PAM
for the QAuthZ impl with a service name of "qemu-vnc"
$ qemu-system-x86_64 \
-object tls-creds-x509,id=tls0,dir=/home/berrange/security/qemutls,\
endpoint=server,verify-peer=yes \
-object authz-pam,id=authz0,service=qemu-vnc \
-vnc :1,tls-creds=tls0,tls-authz=authz0
This requires an /etc/pam/qemu-vnc file to be created with the auth
rules. A very simple file based whitelist can be setup using
$ cat > /etc/pam/qemu-vnc <<EOF
account requisite pam_listfile.so item=user sense=allow file=/etc/qemu/vnc.allow
EOF
The /etc/qemu/vnc.allow file simply contains one username per line. Any
username not in the file is denied. The usernames in this example are
the x509 distinguished name from the client's x509 cert.
$ cat > /etc/qemu/vnc.allow <<EOF
CN=laptop.berrange.com,O=Berrange Home,L=London,ST=London,C=GB
EOF
More interesting would be to configure PAM to use an LDAP backend, so
that the QEMU authorization check data can be centralized instead of
requiring each compute host to have file maintained.
The main limitation with this PAM module is that the rules apply to all
QEMU instances on the host. Setting up different rules per VM, would
require creating a separate PAM service name & config file for every
guest. An alternative approach for the future might be to not pass in
the plain username to PAM, but instead combine the VM name or UUID with
the username. This requires further consideration though.
Tested-by: Philippe Mathieu-Daudé <philmd@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Philippe Mathieu-Daudé <philmd@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Daniel P. Berrange <berrange@redhat.com>
2016-07-27 15:13:56 +02:00
|
|
|
return PAM_SUCCESS;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
int
|
|
|
|
pam_acct_mgmt(pam_handle_t *pamh, int flags)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
if (failauth) {
|
|
|
|
return PAM_AUTH_ERR;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
return PAM_SUCCESS;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
2021-01-28 18:11:27 +01:00
|
|
|
int
|
|
|
|
pam_end(pam_handle_t *pamh, int status)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
return PAM_SUCCESS;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
authz: add QAuthZPAM object type for authorizing using PAM
Add an authorization backend that talks to PAM to check whether the user
identity is allowed. This only uses the PAM account validation facility,
which is essentially just a check to see if the provided username is permitted
access. It doesn't use the authentication or session parts of PAM, since
that's dealt with by the relevant part of QEMU (eg VNC server).
Consider starting QEMU with a VNC server and telling it to use TLS with
x509 client certificates and configuring it to use an PAM to validate
the x509 distinguished name. In this example we're telling it to use PAM
for the QAuthZ impl with a service name of "qemu-vnc"
$ qemu-system-x86_64 \
-object tls-creds-x509,id=tls0,dir=/home/berrange/security/qemutls,\
endpoint=server,verify-peer=yes \
-object authz-pam,id=authz0,service=qemu-vnc \
-vnc :1,tls-creds=tls0,tls-authz=authz0
This requires an /etc/pam/qemu-vnc file to be created with the auth
rules. A very simple file based whitelist can be setup using
$ cat > /etc/pam/qemu-vnc <<EOF
account requisite pam_listfile.so item=user sense=allow file=/etc/qemu/vnc.allow
EOF
The /etc/qemu/vnc.allow file simply contains one username per line. Any
username not in the file is denied. The usernames in this example are
the x509 distinguished name from the client's x509 cert.
$ cat > /etc/qemu/vnc.allow <<EOF
CN=laptop.berrange.com,O=Berrange Home,L=London,ST=London,C=GB
EOF
More interesting would be to configure PAM to use an LDAP backend, so
that the QEMU authorization check data can be centralized instead of
requiring each compute host to have file maintained.
The main limitation with this PAM module is that the rules apply to all
QEMU instances on the host. Setting up different rules per VM, would
require creating a separate PAM service name & config file for every
guest. An alternative approach for the future might be to not pass in
the plain username to PAM, but instead combine the VM name or UUID with
the username. This requires further consideration though.
Tested-by: Philippe Mathieu-Daudé <philmd@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Philippe Mathieu-Daudé <philmd@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Daniel P. Berrange <berrange@redhat.com>
2016-07-27 15:13:56 +02:00
|
|
|
static void test_authz_unknown_service(void)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
Error *local_err = NULL;
|
|
|
|
QAuthZPAM *auth = qauthz_pam_new("auth0",
|
|
|
|
"qemu-does-not-exist",
|
|
|
|
&error_abort);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
g_assert_nonnull(auth);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
g_assert_false(qauthz_is_allowed(QAUTHZ(auth), "fred", &local_err));
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
error_free_or_abort(&local_err);
|
|
|
|
object_unparent(OBJECT(auth));
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
static void test_authz_good_user(void)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
QAuthZPAM *auth = qauthz_pam_new("auth0",
|
|
|
|
"qemu-vnc",
|
|
|
|
&error_abort);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
g_assert_nonnull(auth);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
g_assert_true(qauthz_is_allowed(QAUTHZ(auth), "fred", &error_abort));
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
object_unparent(OBJECT(auth));
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
static void test_authz_bad_user(void)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
Error *local_err = NULL;
|
|
|
|
QAuthZPAM *auth = qauthz_pam_new("auth0",
|
|
|
|
"qemu-vnc",
|
|
|
|
&error_abort);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
g_assert_nonnull(auth);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
g_assert_false(qauthz_is_allowed(QAUTHZ(auth), "bob", &local_err));
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
error_free_or_abort(&local_err);
|
|
|
|
object_unparent(OBJECT(auth));
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
int main(int argc, char **argv)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
g_test_init(&argc, &argv, NULL);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
module_call_init(MODULE_INIT_QOM);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
g_test_add_func("/auth/pam/unknown-service", test_authz_unknown_service);
|
|
|
|
g_test_add_func("/auth/pam/good-user", test_authz_good_user);
|
|
|
|
g_test_add_func("/auth/pam/bad-user", test_authz_bad_user);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
return g_test_run();
|
|
|
|
}
|