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Merge misc patches

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Merge remote-tracking branch 'remotes/berrange-gitlab/tags/misc-fixes-pull-request' into staging

Merge misc patches

# gpg: Signature made Mon 14 Jun 2021 15:14:48 BST
# gpg:                using RSA key DAF3A6FDB26B62912D0E8E3FBE86EBB415104FDF
# gpg: Good signature from "Daniel P. Berrange <dan@berrange.com>" [full]
# gpg:                 aka "Daniel P. Berrange <berrange@redhat.com>" [full]
# Primary key fingerprint: DAF3 A6FD B26B 6291 2D0E  8E3F BE86 EBB4 1510 4FDF

* remotes/berrange-gitlab/tags/misc-fixes-pull-request:
  usb/dev-mtp: use GDateTime for formatting timestamp for objects
  block: use GDateTime for formatting timestamp when dumping snapshot info
  migration: use GDateTime for formatting timestamp in snapshot names
  block: remove duplicate trace.h include
  block: add trace point when fdatasync fails
  block: preserve errno from fdatasync failures
  softmmu: add trace point when bdrv_flush_all fails
  migration: add trace point when vm_stop_force_state fails
  sasl: remove comment about obsolete kerberos versions
  docs: recommend SCRAM-SHA-256 SASL mech instead of SHA-1 variant
  docs: document usage of the authorization framework
  docs: document how to pass secret data to QEMU
  docs: add table of contents to QAPI references

Signed-off-by: Peter Maydell <peter.maydell@linaro.org>
This commit is contained in:
Peter Maydell 2021-06-14 15:59:13 +01:00
commit 1ea06abcee
17 changed files with 475 additions and 39 deletions
Show Stats Download Patch File Download Diff File Expand all files Collapse all files

10
block/file-posix.c
View File

@ -106,8 +106,6 @@
#include <xfs/xfs.h>
#endif
#include "trace.h"
/* OS X does not have O_DSYNC */
#ifndef O_DSYNC
#ifdef O_SYNC
@ -160,7 +158,7 @@ typedef struct BDRVRawState {
bool discard_zeroes:1;
bool use_linux_aio:1;
bool use_linux_io_uring:1;
bool page_cache_inconsistent:1;
int page_cache_inconsistent; /* errno from fdatasync failure */
bool has_fallocate;
bool needs_alignment;
bool drop_cache;
@ -1333,11 +1331,13 @@ static int handle_aiocb_flush(void *opaque)
int ret;
if (s->page_cache_inconsistent) {
return -EIO;
return -s->page_cache_inconsistent;
}
ret = qemu_fdatasync(aiocb->aio_fildes);
if (ret == -1) {
trace_file_flush_fdatasync_failed(errno);
/* There is no clear definition of the semantics of a failing fsync(),
* so we may have to assume the worst. The sad truth is that this
* assumption is correct for Linux. Some pages are now probably marked
@ -1352,7 +1352,7 @@ static int handle_aiocb_flush(void *opaque)
* Obviously, this doesn't affect O_DIRECT, which bypasses the page
* cache. */
if ((s->open_flags & O_DIRECT) == 0) {
s->page_cache_inconsistent = true;
s->page_cache_inconsistent = errno;
}
return -errno;
}

11
block/qapi.c
View File

@ -663,10 +663,8 @@ BlockStatsList *qmp_query_blockstats(bool has_query_nodes,
void bdrv_snapshot_dump(QEMUSnapshotInfo *sn)
{
char date_buf[128], clock_buf[128];
char clock_buf[128];
char icount_buf[128] = {0};
struct tm tm;
time_t ti;
int64_t secs;
char *sizing = NULL;
@ -674,10 +672,9 @@ void bdrv_snapshot_dump(QEMUSnapshotInfo *sn)
qemu_printf("%-10s%-17s%8s%20s%13s%11s",
"ID", "TAG", "VM SIZE", "DATE", "VM CLOCK", "ICOUNT");
} else {
ti = sn->date_sec;
localtime_r(&ti, &tm);
strftime(date_buf, sizeof(date_buf),
"%Y-%m-%d %H:%M:%S", &tm);
g_autoptr(GDateTime) date = g_date_time_new_from_unix_local(sn->date_sec);
g_autofree char *date_buf = g_date_time_format(date, "%Y-%m-%d %H:%M:%S");
secs = sn->vm_clock_nsec / 1000000000;
snprintf(clock_buf, sizeof(clock_buf),
"%02d:%02d:%02d.%03d",

1
block/trace-events
View File

@ -206,6 +206,7 @@ file_copy_file_range(void *bs, int src, int64_t src_off, int dst, int64_t dst_of
file_FindEjectableOpticalMedia(const char *media) "Matching using %s"
file_setup_cdrom(const char *partition) "Using %s as optical disc"
file_hdev_is_sg(int type, int version) "SG device found: type=%d, version=%d"
file_flush_fdatasync_failed(int err) "errno %d"
# ssh.c
sftp_error(const char *op, const char *ssh_err, int ssh_err_code, int sftp_err_code) "%s failed: %s (libssh error code: %d, sftp error code: %d)"

3
docs/interop/qemu-ga-ref.rst
View File

@ -10,4 +10,7 @@ QEMU Guest Agent Protocol Reference
TODO: display the QEMU version, both here and in our Sphinx manuals
more generally.
.. contents::
:depth: 3
.. qapi-doc:: qga/qapi-schema.json

3
docs/interop/qemu-qmp-ref.rst
View File

@ -10,4 +10,7 @@ QEMU QMP Reference Manual
TODO: display the QEMU version, both here and in our Sphinx manuals
more generally.
.. contents::
:depth: 3
.. qapi-doc:: qapi/qapi-schema.json

3
docs/interop/qemu-storage-daemon-qmp-ref.rst
View File

@ -10,4 +10,7 @@ QEMU Storage Daemon QMP Reference Manual
TODO: display the QEMU version, both here and in our Sphinx manuals
more generally.
.. contents::
:depth: 3
.. qapi-doc:: storage-daemon/qapi/qapi-schema.json

263
docs/system/authz.rst Normal file
View File

@ -0,0 +1,263 @@
.. _client authorization:
Client authorization
--------------------
When configuring a QEMU network backend with either TLS certificates or SASL
authentication, access will be granted if the client successfully proves
their identity. If the authorization identity database is scoped to the QEMU
client this may be sufficient. It is common, however, for the identity database
to be much broader and thus authentication alone does not enable sufficient
access control. In this case QEMU provides a flexible system for enforcing
finer grained authorization on clients post-authentication.
Identity providers
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
At the time of writing there are two authentication frameworks used by QEMU
that emit an identity upon completion.
* TLS x509 certificate distinguished name.
When configuring the QEMU backend as a network server with TLS, there
are a choice of credentials to use. The most common scenario is to utilize
x509 certificates. The simplest configuration only involves issuing
certificates to the servers, allowing the client to avoid a MITM attack
against their intended server.
It is possible, however, to enable mutual verification by requiring that
the client provide a certificate to the server to prove its own identity.
This is done by setting the property ``verify-peer=yes`` on the
``tls-creds-x509`` object, which is in fact the default.
When peer verification is enabled, client will need to be issued with a
certificate by the same certificate authority as the server. If this is
still not sufficiently strong access control the Distinguished Name of
the certificate can be used as an identity in the QEMU authorization
framework.
* SASL username.
When configuring the QEMU backend as a network server with SASL, upon
completion of the SASL authentication mechanism, a username will be
provided. The format of this username will vary depending on the choice
of mechanism configured for SASL. It might be a simple UNIX style user
``joebloggs``, while if using Kerberos/GSSAPI it can have a realm
attached ``joebloggs@QEMU.ORG``. Whatever format the username is presented
in, it can be used with the QEMU authorization framework.
Authorization drivers
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
The QEMU authorization framework is a general purpose design with choice of
user customizable drivers. These are provided as objects that can be
created at startup using the ``-object`` argument, or at runtime using the
``object_add`` monitor command.
Simple
^^^^^^
This authorization driver provides a simple mechanism for granting access
based on an exact match against a single identity. This is useful when it is
known that only a single client is to be allowed access.
A possible use case would be when configuring QEMU for an incoming live
migration. It is known exactly which source QEMU the migration is expected
to arrive from. The x509 certificate associated with this source QEMU would
thus be used as the identity to match against. Alternatively if the virtual
machine is dedicated to a specific tenant, then the VNC server would be
configured with SASL and the username of only that tenant listed.
To create an instance of this driver via QMP:
::
{
"execute": "object-add",
"arguments": {
"qom-type": "authz-simple",
"id": "authz0",
"props": {
"identity": "fred"
}
}
}
Or via the command line
::
-object authz-simple,id=authz0,identity=fred
List
^^^^
In some network backends it will be desirable to grant access to a range of
clients. This authorization driver provides a list mechanism for granting
access by matching identities against a list of permitted one. Each match
rule has an associated policy and a catch all policy applies if no rule
matches. The match can either be done as an exact string comparison, or can
use the shell-like glob syntax, which allows for use of wildcards.
To create an instance of this class via QMP:
::
{
"execute": "object-add",
"arguments": {
"qom-type": "authz-list",
"id": "authz0",
"props": {
"rules": [
{ "match": "fred", "policy": "allow", "format": "exact" },
{ "match": "bob", "policy": "allow", "format": "exact" },
{ "match": "danb", "policy": "deny", "format": "exact" },
{ "match": "dan*", "policy": "allow", "format": "glob" }
],
"policy": "deny"
}
}
}
Due to the way this driver requires setting nested properties, creating
it on the command line will require use of the JSON syntax for ``-object``.
In most cases, however, the next driver will be more suitable.
List file
^^^^^^^^^
This is a variant on the previous driver that allows for a more dynamic
access control policy by storing the match rules in a standalone file
that can be reloaded automatically upon change.
To create an instance of this class via QMP:
::
{
"execute": "object-add",
"arguments": {
"qom-type": "authz-list-file",
"id": "authz0",
"props": {
"filename": "/etc/qemu/myvm-vnc.acl",
"refresh": true
}
}
}
If ``refresh`` is ``yes``, inotify is used to monitor for changes
to the file and auto-reload the rules.
The ``myvm-vnc.acl`` file should contain the match rules in a format that
closely matches the previous driver:
::
{
"rules": [
{ "match": "fred", "policy": "allow", "format": "exact" },
{ "match": "bob", "policy": "allow", "format": "exact" },
{ "match": "danb", "policy": "deny", "format": "exact" },
{ "match": "dan*", "policy": "allow", "format": "glob" }
],
"policy": "deny"
}
The object can be created on the command line using
::
-object authz-list-file,id=authz0,\
filename=/etc/qemu/myvm-vnc.acl,refresh=on
PAM
^^^
In some scenarios it might be desirable to integrate with authorization
mechanisms that are implemented outside of QEMU. In order to allow maximum
flexibility, QEMU provides a driver that uses the ``PAM`` framework.
To create an instance of this class via QMP:
::
{
"execute": "object-add",
"arguments": {
"qom-type": "authz-pam",
"id": "authz0",
"parameters": {
"service": "qemu-vnc-tls"
}
}
}
The driver only uses the PAM "account" verification
subsystem. The above config would require a config
file /etc/pam.d/qemu-vnc-tls. For a simple file
lookup it would contain
::
account requisite pam_listfile.so item=user sense=allow \
file=/etc/qemu/vnc.allow
The external file would then contain a list of usernames.
If x509 cert was being used as the username, a suitable
entry would match the distinguished name:
::
CN=laptop.berrange.com,O=Berrange Home,L=London,ST=London,C=GB
On the command line it can be created using
::
-object authz-pam,id=authz0,service=qemu-vnc-tls
There are a variety of PAM plugins that can be used which are not illustrated
here, and it is possible to implement brand new plugins using the PAM API.
Connecting backends
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
The authorization driver is created using the ``-object`` argument and then
needs to be associated with a network service. The authorization driver object
will be given a unique ID that needs to be referenced.
The property to set in the network service will vary depending on the type of
identity to verify. By convention, any network server backend that uses TLS
will provide ``tls-authz`` property, while any server using SASL will provide
a ``sasl-authz`` property.
Thus an example using SASL and authorization for the VNC server would look
like:
::
$QEMU --object authz-simple,id=authz0,identity=fred \
--vnc 0.0.0.0:1,sasl,sasl-authz=authz0
While to validate both the x509 certificate and SASL username:
::
echo "CN=laptop.qemu.org,O=QEMU Project,L=London,ST=London,C=GB" >> tls.acl
$QEMU --object authz-simple,id=authz0,identity=fred \
--object authz-list-file,id=authz1,filename=tls.acl \
--object tls-creds-x509,id=tls0,dir=/etc/qemu/tls,verify-peer=yes \
--vnc 0.0.0.0:1,sasl,sasl-authz=auth0,tls-creds=tls0,tls-authz=authz1

2
docs/system/index.rst
View File

@ -30,6 +30,8 @@ Contents:
guest-loader
vnc-security
tls
secrets
authz
gdb
managed-startup
cpu-hotplug

162
docs/system/secrets.rst Normal file
View File

@ -0,0 +1,162 @@
.. _secret data:
Providing secret data to QEMU
-----------------------------
There are a variety of objects in QEMU which require secret data to be provided
by the administrator or management application. For example, network block
devices often require a password, LUKS block devices require a passphrase to
unlock key material, remote desktop services require an access password.
QEMU has a general purpose mechanism for providing secret data to QEMU in a
secure manner, using the ``secret`` object type.
At startup this can be done using the ``-object secret,...`` command line
argument. At runtime this can be done using the ``object_add`` QMP / HMP
monitor commands. The examples that follow will illustrate use of ``-object``
command lines, but they all apply equivalentely in QMP / HMP. When creating
a ``secret`` object it must be given a unique ID string. This ID is then
used to identify the object when configuring the thing which need the data.
INSECURE: Passing secrets as clear text inline
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
**The following should never be done in a production environment or on a
multi-user host. Command line arguments are usually visible in the process
listings and are often collected in log files by system monitoring agents
or bug reporting tools. QMP/HMP commands and their arguments are also often
logged and attached to bug reports. This all risks compromising secrets that
are passed inline.**
For the convenience of people debugging / developing with QEMU, it is possible
to pass secret data inline on the command line.
::
-object secret,id=secvnc0,data=87539319
Again it is possible to provide the data in base64 encoded format, which is
particularly useful if the data contains binary characters that would clash
with argument parsing.
::
-object secret,id=secvnc0,data=ODc1MzkzMTk=,format=base64
**Note: base64 encoding does not provide any security benefit.**
Passing secrets as clear text via a file
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
The simplest approach to providing data securely is to use a file to store
the secret:
::
-object secret,id=secvnc0,file=vnc-password.txt
In this example the file ``vnc-password.txt`` contains the plain text secret
data. It is important to note that the contents of the file are treated as an
opaque blob. The entire raw file contents is used as the value, thus it is
important not to mistakenly add any trailing newline character in the file if
this newline is not intended to be part of the secret data.
In some cases it might be more convenient to pass the secret data in base64
format and have QEMU decode to get the raw bytes before use:
::
-object secret,id=sec0,file=vnc-password.txt,format=base64
The file should generally be given mode ``0600`` or ``0400`` permissions, and
have its user/group ownership set to the same account that the QEMU process
will be launched under. If using mandatory access control such as SELinux, then
the file should be labelled to only grant access to the specific QEMU process
that needs access. This will prevent other processes/users from compromising the
secret data.
Passing secrets as cipher text inline
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
To address the insecurity of passing secrets inline as clear text, it is
possible to configure a second secret as an AES key to use for decrypting
the data.
The secret used as the AES key must always be configured using the file based
storage mechanism:
::
-object secret,id=secmaster,file=masterkey.data,format=base64
In this case the ``masterkey.data`` file would be initialized with 32
cryptographically secure random bytes, which are then base64 encoded.
The contents of this file will by used as an AES-256 key to encrypt the
real secret that can now be safely passed to QEMU inline as cipher text
::
-object secret,id=secvnc0,keyid=secmaster,data=BASE64-CIPHERTEXT,iv=BASE64-IV,format=base64
In this example ``BASE64-CIPHERTEXT`` is the result of AES-256-CBC encrypting
the secret with ``masterkey.data`` and then base64 encoding the ciphertext.
The ``BASE64-IV`` data is 16 random bytes which have been base64 encrypted.
These bytes are used as the initialization vector for the AES-256-CBC value.
A single master key can be used to encrypt all subsequent secrets, **but it is
critical that a different initialization vector is used for every secret**.
Passing secrets via the Linux keyring
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
The earlier mechanisms described are platform agnostic. If using QEMU on a Linux
host, it is further possible to pass secrets to QEMU using the Linux keyring:
::
-object secret_keyring,id=secvnc0,serial=1729
This instructs QEMU to load data from the Linux keyring secret identified by
the serial number ``1729``. It is possible to combine use of the keyring with
other features mentioned earlier such as base64 encoding:
::
-object secret_keyring,id=secvnc0,serial=1729,format=base64
and also encryption with a master key:
::
-object secret_keyring,id=secvnc0,keyid=secmaster,serial=1729,iv=BASE64-IV
Best practice
~~~~~~~~~~~~~
It is recommended for production deployments to use a master key secret, and
then pass all subsequent inline secrets encrypted with the master key.
Each QEMU instance must have a distinct master key, and that must be generated
from a cryptographically secure random data source. The master key should be
deleted immediately upon QEMU shutdown. If passing the master key as a file,
the key file must have access control rules applied that restrict access to
just the one QEMU process that is intended to use it. Alternatively the Linux
keyring can be used to pass the master key to QEMU.
The secrets for individual QEMU device backends must all then be encrypted
with this master key.
This procedure helps ensure that the individual secrets for QEMU backends will
not be compromised, even if ``-object`` CLI args or ``object_add`` monitor
commands are collected in log files and attached to public bug support tickets.
The only item that needs strongly protecting is the master key file.

7
docs/system/vnc-security.rst
View File

@ -168,7 +168,7 @@ used is drastically reduced. In fact only the GSSAPI SASL mechanism
provides an acceptable level of security by modern standards. Previous
versions of QEMU referred to the DIGEST-MD5 mechanism, however, it has
multiple serious flaws described in detail in RFC 6331 and thus should
never be used any more. The SCRAM-SHA-1 mechanism provides a simple
never be used any more. The SCRAM-SHA-256 mechanism provides a simple
username/password auth facility similar to DIGEST-MD5, but does not
support session encryption, so can only be used in combination with TLS.
@ -191,11 +191,12 @@ reasonable configuration is
::
mech_list: scram-sha-1
mech_list: scram-sha-256
sasldb_path: /etc/qemu/passwd.db
The ``saslpasswd2`` program can be used to populate the ``passwd.db``
file with accounts.
file with accounts. Note that the ``passwd.db`` file stores passwords
in clear text.
Other SASL configurations will be left as an exercise for the reader.
Note that all mechanisms, except GSSAPI, should be combined with use of

9
hw/usb/dev-mtp.c
View File

@ -772,12 +772,9 @@ static void usb_mtp_add_str(MTPData *data, const char *str)
static void usb_mtp_add_time(MTPData *data, time_t time)
{
char buf[16];
struct tm tm;
gmtime_r(&time, &tm);
strftime(buf, sizeof(buf), "%Y%m%dT%H%M%S", &tm);
usb_mtp_add_str(data, buf);
g_autoptr(GDateTime) then = g_date_time_new_from_unix_utc(time);
g_autofree char *thenstr = g_date_time_format(then, "%Y%m%dT%H%M%S");
usb_mtp_add_str(data, thenstr);
}
/* ----------------------------------------------------------------------- */

1
migration/migration.c
View File

@ -3115,6 +3115,7 @@ static void migration_completion(MigrationState *s)
if (!ret) {
bool inactivate = !migrate_colo_enabled();
ret = vm_stop_force_state(RUN_STATE_FINISH_MIGRATE);
trace_migration_completion_vm_stop(ret);
if (ret >= 0) {
ret = migration_maybe_pause(s, &current_active_state,
MIGRATION_STATUS_DEVICE);

13
migration/savevm.c
View File

@ -2775,8 +2775,7 @@ bool save_snapshot(const char *name, bool overwrite, const char *vmstate,
QEMUFile *f;
int saved_vm_running;
uint64_t vm_state_size;
qemu_timeval tv;
struct tm tm;
g_autoptr(GDateTime) now = g_date_time_new_now_local();
AioContext *aio_context;
if (migration_is_blocked(errp)) {
@ -2836,9 +2835,8 @@ bool save_snapshot(const char *name, bool overwrite, const char *vmstate,
memset(sn, 0, sizeof(*sn));
/* fill auxiliary fields */
qemu_gettimeofday(&tv);
sn->date_sec = tv.tv_sec;
sn->date_nsec = tv.tv_usec * 1000;
sn->date_sec = g_date_time_to_unix(now);
sn->date_nsec = g_date_time_get_microsecond(now) * 1000;
sn->vm_clock_nsec = qemu_clock_get_ns(QEMU_CLOCK_VIRTUAL);
if (replay_mode != REPLAY_MODE_NONE) {
sn->icount = replay_get_current_icount();
@ -2849,9 +2847,8 @@ bool save_snapshot(const char *name, bool overwrite, const char *vmstate,
if (name) {
pstrcpy(sn->name, sizeof(sn->name), name);
} else {
/* cast below needed for OpenBSD where tv_sec is still 'long' */
localtime_r((const time_t *)&tv.tv_sec, &tm);
strftime(sn->name, sizeof(sn->name), "vm-%Y%m%d%H%M%S", &tm);
g_autofree char *autoname = g_date_time_format(now, "vm-%Y%m%d%H%M%S");
pstrcpy(sn->name, sizeof(sn->name), autoname);
}
/* save the VM state */

1
migration/trace-events
View File

@ -149,6 +149,7 @@ migrate_pending(uint64_t size, uint64_t max, uint64_t pre, uint64_t compat, uint
migrate_send_rp_message(int msg_type, uint16_t len) "%d: len %d"
migrate_send_rp_recv_bitmap(char *name, int64_t size) "block '%s' size 0x%"PRIi64
migration_completion_file_err(void) ""
migration_completion_vm_stop(int ret) "ret %d"
migration_completion_postcopy_end(void) ""
migration_completion_postcopy_end_after_complete(void) ""
migration_rate_limit_pre(int ms) "%d ms"

15
qemu.sasl
View File

@ -19,26 +19,23 @@ mech_list: gssapi
# If using TLS with VNC, or a UNIX socket only, it is possible to
# enable plugins which don't provide session encryption. The
# 'scram-sha-1' plugin allows plain username/password authentication
# 'scram-sha-256' plugin allows plain username/password authentication
# to be performed
#
#mech_list: scram-sha-1
#mech_list: scram-sha-256
# You can also list many mechanisms at once, and the VNC server will
# negotiate which to use by considering the list enabled on the VNC
# client.
#mech_list: scram-sha-1 gssapi
#mech_list: scram-sha-256 gssapi
# Some older builds of MIT kerberos on Linux ignore this option &
# instead need KRB5_KTNAME env var.
# For modern Linux, and other OS, this should be sufficient
#
# This file needs to be populated with the service principal that
# was created on the Kerberos v5 server. If switching to a non-gssapi
# mechanism this can be commented out.
keytab: /etc/qemu/krb5.tab
# If using scram-sha-1 for username/passwds, then this is the file
# If using scram-sha-256 for username/passwds, then this is the file
# containing the passwds. Use 'saslpasswd2 -a qemu [username]'
# to add entries, and 'sasldblistusers2 -f [sasldb_path]' to browse it
# to add entries, and 'sasldblistusers2 -f [sasldb_path]' to browse it.
# Note that this file stores passwords in clear text.
#sasldb_path: /etc/qemu/passwd.db

7
softmmu/cpus.c
View File

@ -44,6 +44,7 @@
#include "sysemu/whpx.h"
#include "hw/boards.h"
#include "hw/hw.h"
#include "trace.h"
#ifdef CONFIG_LINUX
@ -266,6 +267,7 @@ static int do_vm_stop(RunState state, bool send_stop)
bdrv_drain_all();
ret = bdrv_flush_all();
trace_vm_stop_flush_all(ret);
return ret;
}
@ -704,12 +706,15 @@ int vm_stop_force_state(RunState state)
if (runstate_is_running()) {
return vm_stop(state);
} else {
int ret;
runstate_set(state);
bdrv_drain_all();
/* Make sure to return an error if the flush in a previous vm_stop()
* failed. */
return bdrv_flush_all();
ret = bdrv_flush_all();
trace_vm_stop_flush_all(ret);
return ret;
}
}

3
softmmu/trace-events
View File

@ -19,6 +19,9 @@ flatview_new(void *view, void *root) "%p (root %p)"
flatview_destroy(void *view, void *root) "%p (root %p)"
flatview_destroy_rcu(void *view, void *root) "%p (root %p)"
# softmmu.c
vm_stop_flush_all(int ret) "ret %d"
# vl.c
vm_state_notify(int running, int reason, const char *reason_str) "running %d reason %d (%s)"
load_file(const char *name, const char *path) "name %s location %s"