9pfs: local: fix fchmodat_nofollow() limitations
This function has to ensure it doesn't follow a symlink that could be used to escape the virtfs directory. This could be easily achieved if fchmodat() on linux honored the AT_SYMLINK_NOFOLLOW flag as described in POSIX, but it doesn't. There was a tentative to implement a new fchmodat2() syscall with the correct semantics: https://patchwork.kernel.org/patch/9596301/ but it didn't gain much momentum. Also it was suggested to look at an O_PATH based solution in the first place. The current implementation covers most use-cases, but it notably fails if: - the target path has access rights equal to 0000 (openat() returns EPERM), => once you've done chmod(0000) on a file, you can never chmod() again - the target path is UNIX domain socket (openat() returns ENXIO) => bind() of UNIX domain sockets fails if the file is on 9pfs The solution is to use O_PATH: openat() now succeeds in both cases, and we can ensure the path isn't a symlink with fstat(). The associated entry in "/proc/self/fd" can hence be safely passed to the regular chmod() syscall. The previous behavior is kept for older systems that don't have O_PATH. Signed-off-by: Greg Kurz <groug@kaod.org> Reviewed-by: Eric Blake <eblake@redhat.com> Tested-by: Zhi Yong Wu <zhiyong.wu@ucloud.cn> Acked-by: Philippe Mathieu-Daudé <f4bug@amsat.org>
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@ -333,17 +333,27 @@ update_map_file:
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static int fchmodat_nofollow(int dirfd, const char *name, mode_t mode)
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{
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struct stat stbuf;
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int fd, ret;
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/* FIXME: this should be handled with fchmodat(AT_SYMLINK_NOFOLLOW).
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* Unfortunately, the linux kernel doesn't implement it yet. As an
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* alternative, let's open the file and use fchmod() instead. This
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* may fail depending on the permissions of the file, but it is the
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* best we can do to avoid TOCTTOU. We first try to open read-only
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* in case name points to a directory. If that fails, we try write-only
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* in case name doesn't point to a directory.
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* Unfortunately, the linux kernel doesn't implement it yet.
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*/
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fd = openat_file(dirfd, name, O_RDONLY, 0);
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/* First, we clear non-racing symlinks out of the way. */
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if (fstatat(dirfd, name, &stbuf, AT_SYMLINK_NOFOLLOW)) {
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return -1;
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}
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if (S_ISLNK(stbuf.st_mode)) {
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errno = ELOOP;
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return -1;
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}
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/* Access modes are ignored when O_PATH is supported. We try O_RDONLY and
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* O_WRONLY for old-systems that don't support O_PATH.
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*/
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fd = openat_file(dirfd, name, O_RDONLY | O_PATH_9P_UTIL, 0);
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#if O_PATH_9P_UTIL == 0
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if (fd == -1) {
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/* In case the file is writable-only and isn't a directory. */
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if (errno == EACCES) {
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@ -357,6 +367,24 @@ static int fchmodat_nofollow(int dirfd, const char *name, mode_t mode)
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return -1;
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}
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ret = fchmod(fd, mode);
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#else
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if (fd == -1) {
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return -1;
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}
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/* Now we handle racing symlinks. */
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ret = fstat(fd, &stbuf);
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if (!ret) {
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if (S_ISLNK(stbuf.st_mode)) {
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errno = ELOOP;
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ret = -1;
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} else {
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char *proc_path = g_strdup_printf("/proc/self/fd/%d", fd);
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ret = chmod(proc_path, mode);
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g_free(proc_path);
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}
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}
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#endif
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close_preserve_errno(fd);
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return ret;
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}
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@ -13,6 +13,12 @@
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#ifndef QEMU_9P_UTIL_H
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#define QEMU_9P_UTIL_H
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#ifdef O_PATH
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#define O_PATH_9P_UTIL O_PATH
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#else
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#define O_PATH_9P_UTIL 0
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#endif
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static inline void close_preserve_errno(int fd)
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{
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int serrno = errno;
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@ -22,13 +28,8 @@ static inline void close_preserve_errno(int fd)
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static inline int openat_dir(int dirfd, const char *name)
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{
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#ifdef O_PATH
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#define OPENAT_DIR_O_PATH O_PATH
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#else
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#define OPENAT_DIR_O_PATH 0
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#endif
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return openat(dirfd, name,
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O_DIRECTORY | O_RDONLY | O_NOFOLLOW | OPENAT_DIR_O_PATH);
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O_DIRECTORY | O_RDONLY | O_NOFOLLOW | O_PATH_9P_UTIL);
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}
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static inline int openat_file(int dirfd, const char *name, int flags,
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@ -43,9 +44,14 @@ static inline int openat_file(int dirfd, const char *name, int flags,
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}
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serrno = errno;
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/* O_NONBLOCK was only needed to open the file. Let's drop it. */
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ret = fcntl(fd, F_SETFL, flags);
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assert(!ret);
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/* O_NONBLOCK was only needed to open the file. Let's drop it. We don't
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* do that with O_PATH since fcntl(F_SETFL) isn't supported, and openat()
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* ignored it anyway.
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*/
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if (!(flags & O_PATH_9P_UTIL)) {
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ret = fcntl(fd, F_SETFL, flags);
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assert(!ret);
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}
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errno = serrno;
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return fd;
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}
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