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Migration and virtiofs pull 2021-07-01 v2 

Dropped Peter Xu's migration-test fix to reenable
 most of the migration tests when uffd isn't available;
 we're seeing at least one seg in github CI (on qemu-system-i386)
 and Peter Maydell is reporting a hang on Openbsd.
 
 Signed-off-by: Dr. David Alan Gilbert <dgilbert@redhat.com>
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Merge remote-tracking branch 'remotes/dgilbert-gitlab/tags/pull-migration-20210705a' into staging

Migration and virtiofs pull 2021-07-01 v2

Dropped Peter Xu's migration-test fix to reenable
most of the migration tests when uffd isn't available;
we're seeing at least one seg in github CI (on qemu-system-i386)
and Peter Maydell is reporting a hang on Openbsd.

Signed-off-by: Dr. David Alan Gilbert <dgilbert@redhat.com>

# gpg: Signature made Mon 05 Jul 2021 11:01:35 BST
# gpg:                using RSA key 45F5C71B4A0CB7FB977A9FA90516331EBC5BFDE7
# gpg: Good signature from "Dr. David Alan Gilbert (RH2) <dgilbert@redhat.com>" [full]
# Primary key fingerprint: 45F5 C71B 4A0C B7FB 977A  9FA9 0516 331E BC5B FDE7

* remotes/dgilbert-gitlab/tags/pull-migration-20210705a:
  migration/rdma: Use error_report to suppress errno message
  tests/migration: fix "downtime_limit" type when "migrate-set-parameters"
  tests/migration: parse the thread-id key of CpuInfoFast
  virtiofsd: Add an option to enable/disable posix acls
  virtiofsd: Switch creds, drop FSETID for system.posix_acl_access xattr
  virtiofsd: Add capability to change/restore umask
  virtiofsd: Add umask to seccom allow list
  virtiofsd: Add support for extended setxattr
  virtiofsd: Fix xattr operations overwriting errno
  virtiofsd: Fix fuse setxattr() API change issue
  virtiofsd: Don't allow file creation with FUSE_OPEN
  docs: describe the security considerations with virtiofsd xattr mapping
  virtiofsd: use GDateTime for formatting timestamp for debug messages
  migration: failover: continue to wait card unplug on error
  migration: move wait-unplug loop to its own function
  migration: Allow reset of postcopy_recover_triggered when failed
  migration: Move yank outside qemu_start_incoming_migration()
  migration: fix the memory overwriting risk in add_to_iovec
  tests: migration-test: Add dirty ring test

Signed-off-by: Peter Maydell <peter.maydell@linaro.org>
This commit is contained in:
Peter Maydell 2021-07-05 12:45:24 +01:00
parent 4fb2820854 e5f607913c
commit 715167a36c
12 changed files with 423 additions and 83 deletions
Show Stats Download Patch File Download Diff File Expand all files Collapse all files

58
docs/tools/virtiofsd.rst
View File

@ -101,6 +101,9 @@ Options
Enable/disable extended attributes (xattr) on files and directories. The
default is ``no_xattr``.
* posix_acl|no_posix_acl -
Enable/disable posix acl support. Posix ACLs are disabled by default`.
.. option:: --socket-path=PATH
Listen on vhost-user UNIX domain socket at PATH.
@ -127,8 +130,8 @@ Options
timeout. ``always`` sets a long cache lifetime at the expense of coherency.
The default is ``auto``.
xattr-mapping
-------------
Extended attribute (xattr) mapping
----------------------------------
By default the name of xattr's used by the client are passed through to the server
file system. This can be a problem where either those xattr names are used
@ -136,6 +139,9 @@ by something on the server (e.g. selinux client/server confusion) or if the
virtiofsd is running in a container with restricted privileges where it cannot
access some attributes.
Mapping syntax
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
A mapping of xattr names can be made using -o xattrmap=mapping where the ``mapping``
string consists of a series of rules.
@ -232,8 +238,48 @@ Note: When the 'security.capability' xattr is remapped, the daemon has to do
extra work to remove it during many operations, which the host kernel normally
does itself.
xattr-mapping Examples
----------------------
Security considerations
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
Operating systems typically partition the xattr namespace using
well defined name prefixes. Each partition may have different
access controls applied. For example, on Linux there are multiple
partitions
* ``system.*`` - access varies depending on attribute & filesystem
* ``security.*`` - only processes with CAP_SYS_ADMIN
* ``trusted.*`` - only processes with CAP_SYS_ADMIN
* ``user.*`` - any process granted by file permissions / ownership
While other OS such as FreeBSD have different name prefixes
and access control rules.
When remapping attributes on the host, it is important to
ensure that the remapping does not allow a guest user to
evade the guest access control rules.
Consider if ``trusted.*`` from the guest was remapped to
``user.virtiofs.trusted*`` in the host. An unprivileged
user in a Linux guest has the ability to write to xattrs
under ``user.*``. Thus the user can evade the access
control restriction on ``trusted.*`` by instead writing
to ``user.virtiofs.trusted.*``.
As noted above, the partitions used and access controls
applied, will vary across guest OS, so it is not wise to
try to predict what the guest OS will use.
The simplest way to avoid an insecure configuration is
to remap all xattrs at once, to a given fixed prefix.
This is shown in example (1) below.
If selectively mapping only a subset of xattr prefixes,
then rules must be added to explicitly block direct
access to the target of the remapping. This is shown
in example (2) below.
Mapping examples
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
1) Prefix all attributes with 'user.virtiofs.'
@ -271,7 +317,9 @@ stripping of 'user.virtiofs.'.
The second rule hides unprefixed 'trusted.' attributes
on the host.
The third rule stops a guest from explicitly setting
the 'user.virtiofs.' path directly.
the 'user.virtiofs.' path directly to prevent access
control bypass on the target of the earlier prefix
remapping.
Finally, the fourth rule lets all remaining attributes
through.

89
migration/migration.c
View File

@ -456,10 +456,6 @@ static void qemu_start_incoming_migration(const char *uri, Error **errp)
{
const char *p = NULL;
if (!yank_register_instance(MIGRATION_YANK_INSTANCE, errp)) {
return;
}
qapi_event_send_migration(MIGRATION_STATUS_SETUP);
if (strstart(uri, "tcp:", &p) ||
strstart(uri, "unix:", NULL) ||
@ -474,7 +470,6 @@ static void qemu_start_incoming_migration(const char *uri, Error **errp)
} else if (strstart(uri, "fd:", &p)) {
fd_start_incoming_migration(p, errp);
} else {
yank_unregister_instance(MIGRATION_YANK_INSTANCE);
error_setg(errp, "unknown migration protocol: %s", uri);
}
}
@ -2083,9 +2078,14 @@ void qmp_migrate_incoming(const char *uri, Error **errp)
return;
}
if (!yank_register_instance(MIGRATION_YANK_INSTANCE, errp)) {
return;
}
qemu_start_incoming_migration(uri, &local_err);
if (local_err) {
yank_unregister_instance(MIGRATION_YANK_INSTANCE);
error_propagate(errp, local_err);
return;
}
@ -2097,6 +2097,13 @@ void qmp_migrate_recover(const char *uri, Error **errp)
{
MigrationIncomingState *mis = migration_incoming_get_current();
/*
* Don't even bother to use ERRP_GUARD() as it _must_ always be set by
* callers (no one should ignore a recover failure); if there is, it's a
* programming error.
*/
assert(errp);
if (mis->state != MIGRATION_STATUS_POSTCOPY_PAUSED) {
error_setg(errp, "Migrate recover can only be run "
"when postcopy is paused.");
@ -2114,8 +2121,13 @@ void qmp_migrate_recover(const char *uri, Error **errp)
* only re-setup the migration stream and poke existing migration
* to continue using that newly established channel.
*/
yank_unregister_instance(MIGRATION_YANK_INSTANCE);
qemu_start_incoming_migration(uri, errp);
/* Safe to dereference with the assert above */
if (*errp) {
/* Reset the flag so user could still retry */
qatomic_set(&mis->postcopy_recover_triggered, false);
}
}
void qmp_migrate_pause(Error **errp)
@ -3664,6 +3676,39 @@ bool migration_rate_limit(void)
return urgent;
}
/*
* if failover devices are present, wait they are completely
* unplugged
*/
static void qemu_savevm_wait_unplug(MigrationState *s, int old_state,
int new_state)
{
if (qemu_savevm_state_guest_unplug_pending()) {
migrate_set_state(&s->state, old_state, MIGRATION_STATUS_WAIT_UNPLUG);
while (s->state == MIGRATION_STATUS_WAIT_UNPLUG &&
qemu_savevm_state_guest_unplug_pending()) {
qemu_sem_timedwait(&s->wait_unplug_sem, 250);
}
if (s->state != MIGRATION_STATUS_WAIT_UNPLUG) {
int timeout = 120; /* 30 seconds */
/*
* migration has been canceled
* but as we have started an unplug we must wait the end
* to be able to plug back the card
*/
while (timeout-- && qemu_savevm_state_guest_unplug_pending()) {
qemu_sem_timedwait(&s->wait_unplug_sem, 250);
}
}
migrate_set_state(&s->state, MIGRATION_STATUS_WAIT_UNPLUG, new_state);
} else {
migrate_set_state(&s->state, old_state, new_state);
}
}
/*
* Master migration thread on the source VM.
* It drives the migration and pumps the data down the outgoing channel.
@ -3710,22 +3755,10 @@ static void *migration_thread(void *opaque)
qemu_savevm_state_setup(s->to_dst_file);
if (qemu_savevm_state_guest_unplug_pending()) {
migrate_set_state(&s->state, MIGRATION_STATUS_SETUP,
MIGRATION_STATUS_WAIT_UNPLUG);
while (s->state == MIGRATION_STATUS_WAIT_UNPLUG &&
qemu_savevm_state_guest_unplug_pending()) {
qemu_sem_timedwait(&s->wait_unplug_sem, 250);
}
migrate_set_state(&s->state, MIGRATION_STATUS_WAIT_UNPLUG,
MIGRATION_STATUS_ACTIVE);
}
qemu_savevm_wait_unplug(s, MIGRATION_STATUS_SETUP,
MIGRATION_STATUS_ACTIVE);
s->setup_time = qemu_clock_get_ms(QEMU_CLOCK_HOST) - setup_start;
migrate_set_state(&s->state, MIGRATION_STATUS_SETUP,
MIGRATION_STATUS_ACTIVE);
trace_migration_thread_setup_complete();
@ -3833,21 +3866,9 @@ static void *bg_migration_thread(void *opaque)
qemu_savevm_state_header(s->to_dst_file);
qemu_savevm_state_setup(s->to_dst_file);
if (qemu_savevm_state_guest_unplug_pending()) {
migrate_set_state(&s->state, MIGRATION_STATUS_SETUP,
MIGRATION_STATUS_WAIT_UNPLUG);
qemu_savevm_wait_unplug(s, MIGRATION_STATUS_SETUP,
MIGRATION_STATUS_ACTIVE);
while (s->state == MIGRATION_STATUS_WAIT_UNPLUG &&
qemu_savevm_state_guest_unplug_pending()) {
qemu_sem_timedwait(&s->wait_unplug_sem, 250);
}
migrate_set_state(&s->state, MIGRATION_STATUS_WAIT_UNPLUG,
MIGRATION_STATUS_ACTIVE);
} else {
migrate_set_state(&s->state, MIGRATION_STATUS_SETUP,
MIGRATION_STATUS_ACTIVE);
}
s->setup_time = qemu_clock_get_ms(QEMU_CLOCK_HOST) - setup_start;
trace_migration_thread_setup_complete();

5
migration/qemu-file.c
View File

@ -416,6 +416,11 @@ static int add_to_iovec(QEMUFile *f, const uint8_t *buf, size_t size,
{
f->iov[f->iovcnt - 1].iov_len += size;
} else {
if (f->iovcnt >= MAX_IOV_SIZE) {
/* Should only happen if a previous fflush failed */
assert(f->shutdown || !qemu_file_is_writable(f));
return 1;
}
if (may_free) {
set_bit(f->iovcnt, f->may_free);
}

4
migration/rdma.c
View File

@ -1006,7 +1006,7 @@ route:
if (cm_event->event != RDMA_CM_EVENT_ADDR_RESOLVED) {
ERROR(errp, "result not equal to event_addr_resolved %s",
rdma_event_str(cm_event->event));
perror("rdma_resolve_addr");
error_report("rdma_resolve_addr");
rdma_ack_cm_event(cm_event);
ret = -EINVAL;
goto err_resolve_get_addr;
@ -2544,7 +2544,7 @@ static int qemu_rdma_connect(RDMAContext *rdma, Error **errp, bool return_path)
}
if (cm_event->event != RDMA_CM_EVENT_ESTABLISHED) {
perror("rdma_get_cm_event != EVENT_ESTABLISHED after rdma_connect");
error_report("rdma_get_cm_event != EVENT_ESTABLISHED after rdma_connect");
ERROR(errp, "connecting to destination!");
rdma_ack_cm_event(cm_event);
goto err_rdma_source_connect;

4
tests/migration/guestperf/engine.py
View File

@ -113,7 +113,7 @@ class Engine(object):
vcpus = src.command("query-cpus-fast")
src_threads = []
for vcpu in vcpus:
src_threads.append(vcpu["thread_id"])
src_threads.append(vcpu["thread-id"])
# XXX how to get dst timings on remote host ?
@ -153,7 +153,7 @@ class Engine(object):
max_bandwidth=scenario._bandwidth * 1024 * 1024)
resp = src.command("migrate-set-parameters",
downtime_limit=scenario._downtime / 1024.0)
downtime_limit=scenario._downtime)
if scenario._compression_mt:
resp = src.command("migrate-set-capabilities",

58
tests/qtest/migration-test.c
View File

@ -27,6 +27,10 @@
#include "migration-helpers.h"
#include "tests/migration/migration-test.h"
#if defined(__linux__)
#include "linux/kvm.h"
#endif
/* TODO actually test the results and get rid of this */
#define qtest_qmp_discard_response(...) qobject_unref(qtest_qmp(__VA_ARGS__))
@ -467,6 +471,8 @@ typedef struct {
bool use_shmem;
/* only launch the target process */
bool only_target;
/* Use dirty ring if true; dirty logging otherwise */
bool use_dirty_ring;
char *opts_source;
char *opts_target;
} MigrateStart;
@ -573,11 +579,13 @@ static int test_migrate_start(QTestState **from, QTestState **to,
shmem_opts = g_strdup("");
}
cmd_source = g_strdup_printf("-accel kvm -accel tcg%s%s "
cmd_source = g_strdup_printf("-accel kvm%s -accel tcg%s%s "
"-name source,debug-threads=on "
"-m %s "
"-serial file:%s/src_serial "
"%s %s %s %s",
args->use_dirty_ring ?
",dirty-ring-size=4096" : "",
machine_opts ? " -machine " : "",
machine_opts ? machine_opts : "",
memory_size, tmpfs,
@ -587,12 +595,14 @@ static int test_migrate_start(QTestState **from, QTestState **to,
*from = qtest_init(cmd_source);
}
cmd_target = g_strdup_printf("-accel kvm -accel tcg%s%s "
cmd_target = g_strdup_printf("-accel kvm%s -accel tcg%s%s "
"-name target,debug-threads=on "
"-m %s "
"-serial file:%s/dest_serial "
"-incoming %s "
"%s %s %s %s",
args->use_dirty_ring ?
",dirty-ring-size=4096" : "",
machine_opts ? " -machine " : "",
machine_opts ? machine_opts : "",
memory_size, tmpfs, uri,
@ -785,12 +795,14 @@ static void test_baddest(void)
test_migrate_end(from, to, false);
}
static void test_precopy_unix(void)
static void test_precopy_unix_common(bool dirty_ring)
{
g_autofree char *uri = g_strdup_printf("unix:%s/migsocket", tmpfs);
MigrateStart *args = migrate_start_new();
QTestState *from, *to;
args->use_dirty_ring = dirty_ring;
if (test_migrate_start(&from, &to, uri, args)) {
return;
}
@ -825,6 +837,18 @@ static void test_precopy_unix(void)
test_migrate_end(from, to, true);
}
static void test_precopy_unix(void)
{
/* Using default dirty logging */
test_precopy_unix_common(false);
}
static void test_precopy_unix_dirty_ring(void)
{
/* Using dirty ring tracking */
test_precopy_unix_common(true);
}
#if 0
/* Currently upset on aarch64 TCG */
static void test_ignore_shared(void)
@ -1369,6 +1393,29 @@ static void test_multifd_tcp_cancel(void)
test_migrate_end(from, to2, true);
}
static bool kvm_dirty_ring_supported(void)
{
#if defined(__linux__)
int ret, kvm_fd = open("/dev/kvm", O_RDONLY);
if (kvm_fd < 0) {
return false;
}
ret = ioctl(kvm_fd, KVM_CHECK_EXTENSION, KVM_CAP_DIRTY_LOG_RING);
close(kvm_fd);
/* We test with 4096 slots */
if (ret < 4096) {
return false;
}
return true;
#else
return false;
#endif
}
int main(int argc, char **argv)
{
char template[] = "/tmp/migration-test-XXXXXX";
@ -1439,6 +1486,11 @@ int main(int argc, char **argv)
qtest_add_func("/migration/multifd/tcp/zstd", test_multifd_tcp_zstd);
#endif
if (kvm_dirty_ring_supported()) {
qtest_add_func("/migration/dirty_ring",
test_precopy_unix_dirty_ring);
}
ret = g_test_run();
g_assert_cmpint(ret, ==, 0);

5
tools/virtiofsd/fuse_common.h
View File

@ -372,6 +372,11 @@ struct fuse_file_info {
*/
#define FUSE_CAP_HANDLE_KILLPRIV_V2 (1 << 28)
/**
* Indicates that file server supports extended struct fuse_setxattr_in
*/
#define FUSE_CAP_SETXATTR_EXT (1 << 29)
/**
* Ioctl flags
*

24
tools/virtiofsd/fuse_lowlevel.c
View File

@ -1084,6 +1084,12 @@ static void do_open(fuse_req_t req, fuse_ino_t nodeid,
return;
}
/* File creation is handled by do_create() or do_mknod() */
if (arg->flags & (O_CREAT | O_TMPFILE)) {
fuse_reply_err(req, EINVAL);
return;
}
memset(&fi, 0, sizeof(fi));
fi.flags = arg->flags;
fi.kill_priv = arg->open_flags & FUSE_OPEN_KILL_SUIDGID;
@ -1419,8 +1425,13 @@ static void do_setxattr(fuse_req_t req, fuse_ino_t nodeid,
struct fuse_setxattr_in *arg;
const char *name;
const char *value;
bool setxattr_ext = req->se->conn.want & FUSE_CAP_SETXATTR_EXT;
arg = fuse_mbuf_iter_advance(iter, sizeof(*arg));
if (setxattr_ext) {
arg = fuse_mbuf_iter_advance(iter, sizeof(*arg));
} else {
arg = fuse_mbuf_iter_advance(iter, FUSE_COMPAT_SETXATTR_IN_SIZE);
}
name = fuse_mbuf_iter_advance_str(iter);
if (!arg || !name) {
fuse_reply_err(req, EINVAL);
@ -1434,7 +1445,9 @@ static void do_setxattr(fuse_req_t req, fuse_ino_t nodeid,
}
if (req->se->op.setxattr) {
req->se->op.setxattr(req, nodeid, name, value, arg->size, arg->flags);
uint32_t setxattr_flags = setxattr_ext ? arg->setxattr_flags : 0;
req->se->op.setxattr(req, nodeid, name, value, arg->size, arg->flags,
setxattr_flags);
} else {
fuse_reply_err(req, ENOSYS);
}
@ -1981,6 +1994,9 @@ static void do_init(fuse_req_t req, fuse_ino_t nodeid,
if (arg->flags & FUSE_HANDLE_KILLPRIV_V2) {
se->conn.capable |= FUSE_CAP_HANDLE_KILLPRIV_V2;
}
if (arg->flags & FUSE_SETXATTR_EXT) {
se->conn.capable |= FUSE_CAP_SETXATTR_EXT;
}
#ifdef HAVE_SPLICE
#ifdef HAVE_VMSPLICE
se->conn.capable |= FUSE_CAP_SPLICE_WRITE | FUSE_CAP_SPLICE_MOVE;
@ -2116,6 +2132,10 @@ static void do_init(fuse_req_t req, fuse_ino_t nodeid,
outarg.flags |= FUSE_HANDLE_KILLPRIV_V2;
}
if (se->conn.want & FUSE_CAP_SETXATTR_EXT) {
outarg.flags |= FUSE_SETXATTR_EXT;
}
fuse_log(FUSE_LOG_DEBUG, " INIT: %u.%u\n", outarg.major, outarg.minor);
fuse_log(FUSE_LOG_DEBUG, " flags=0x%08x\n", outarg.flags);
fuse_log(FUSE_LOG_DEBUG, " max_readahead=0x%08x\n", outarg.max_readahead);

3
tools/virtiofsd/fuse_lowlevel.h
View File

@ -798,7 +798,8 @@ struct fuse_lowlevel_ops {
* fuse_reply_err
*/
void (*setxattr)(fuse_req_t req, fuse_ino_t ino, const char *name,
const char *value, size_t size, int flags);
const char *value, size_t size, int flags,
uint32_t setxattr_flags);
/**
* Get an extended attribute

1
tools/virtiofsd/helper.c
View File

@ -186,6 +186,7 @@ void fuse_cmdline_help(void)
" to virtiofsd from guest applications.\n"
" default: no_allow_direct_io\n"
" -o announce_submounts Announce sub-mount points to the guest\n"
" -o posix_acl/no_posix_acl Enable/Disable posix_acl. (default: disabled)\n"
);
}

254
tools/virtiofsd/passthrough_ll.c
View File

@ -122,6 +122,7 @@ struct lo_inode {
struct lo_cred {
uid_t euid;
gid_t egid;
mode_t umask;
};
enum {
@ -172,6 +173,9 @@ struct lo_data {
/* An O_PATH file descriptor to /proc/self/fd/ */
int proc_self_fd;
int user_killpriv_v2, killpriv_v2;
/* If set, virtiofsd is responsible for setting umask during creation */
bool change_umask;
int user_posix_acl, posix_acl;
};
static const struct fuse_opt lo_opts[] = {
@ -204,6 +208,8 @@ static const struct fuse_opt lo_opts[] = {
{ "announce_submounts", offsetof(struct lo_data, announce_submounts), 1 },
{ "killpriv_v2", offsetof(struct lo_data, user_killpriv_v2), 1 },
{ "no_killpriv_v2", offsetof(struct lo_data, user_killpriv_v2), 0 },
{ "posix_acl", offsetof(struct lo_data, user_posix_acl), 1 },
{ "no_posix_acl", offsetof(struct lo_data, user_posix_acl), 0 },
FUSE_OPT_END
};
static bool use_syslog = false;
@ -702,6 +708,32 @@ static void lo_init(void *userdata, struct fuse_conn_info *conn)
conn->want &= ~FUSE_CAP_HANDLE_KILLPRIV_V2;
lo->killpriv_v2 = 0;
}
if (lo->user_posix_acl == 1) {
/*
* User explicitly asked for this option. Enable it unconditionally.
* If connection does not have this capability, print error message
* now. It will fail later in fuse_lowlevel.c
*/
if (!(conn->capable & FUSE_CAP_POSIX_ACL) ||
!(conn->capable & FUSE_CAP_DONT_MASK) ||
!(conn->capable & FUSE_CAP_SETXATTR_EXT)) {
fuse_log(FUSE_LOG_ERR, "lo_init: Can not enable posix acl."
" kernel does not support FUSE_POSIX_ACL, FUSE_DONT_MASK"
" or FUSE_SETXATTR_EXT capability.\n");
} else {
fuse_log(FUSE_LOG_DEBUG, "lo_init: enabling posix acl\n");
}
conn->want |= FUSE_CAP_POSIX_ACL | FUSE_CAP_DONT_MASK |
FUSE_CAP_SETXATTR_EXT;
lo->change_umask = true;
lo->posix_acl = true;
} else {
/* User either did not specify anything or wants it disabled */
fuse_log(FUSE_LOG_DEBUG, "lo_init: disabling posix_acl\n");
conn->want &= ~FUSE_CAP_POSIX_ACL;
}
}
static void lo_getattr(fuse_req_t req, fuse_ino_t ino,
@ -1134,7 +1166,8 @@ static void lo_lookup(fuse_req_t req, fuse_ino_t parent, const char *name)
* ownership of caller.
* TODO: What about selinux context?
*/
static int lo_change_cred(fuse_req_t req, struct lo_cred *old)
static int lo_change_cred(fuse_req_t req, struct lo_cred *old,
bool change_umask)
{
int res;
@ -1154,11 +1187,14 @@ static int lo_change_cred(fuse_req_t req, struct lo_cred *old)
return errno_save;
}
if (change_umask) {
old->umask = umask(req->ctx.umask);
}
return 0;
}
/* Regain Privileges */
static void lo_restore_cred(struct lo_cred *old)
static void lo_restore_cred(struct lo_cred *old, bool restore_umask)
{
int res;
@ -1173,6 +1209,54 @@ static void lo_restore_cred(struct lo_cred *old)
fuse_log(FUSE_LOG_ERR, "setegid(%u): %m\n", old->egid);
exit(1);
}
if (restore_umask)
umask(old->umask);
}
/*
* A helper to change cred and drop capability. Returns 0 on success and
* errno on error
*/
static int lo_drop_cap_change_cred(fuse_req_t req, struct lo_cred *old,
bool change_umask, const char *cap_name,
bool *cap_dropped)
{
int ret;
bool __cap_dropped;
assert(cap_name);
ret = drop_effective_cap(cap_name, &__cap_dropped);
if (ret) {
return ret;
}
ret = lo_change_cred(req, old, change_umask);
if (ret) {
if (__cap_dropped) {
if (gain_effective_cap(cap_name)) {
fuse_log(FUSE_LOG_ERR, "Failed to gain CAP_%s\n", cap_name);
}
}
}
if (cap_dropped) {
*cap_dropped = __cap_dropped;
}
return ret;
}
static void lo_restore_cred_gain_cap(struct lo_cred *old, bool restore_umask,
const char *cap_name)
{
assert(cap_name);
lo_restore_cred(old, restore_umask);
if (gain_effective_cap(cap_name)) {
fuse_log(FUSE_LOG_ERR, "Failed to gain CAP_%s\n", cap_name);
}
}
static void lo_mknod_symlink(fuse_req_t req, fuse_ino_t parent,
@ -1202,7 +1286,7 @@ static void lo_mknod_symlink(fuse_req_t req, fuse_ino_t parent,
return;
}
saverr = lo_change_cred(req, &old);
saverr = lo_change_cred(req, &old, lo->change_umask && !S_ISLNK(mode));
if (saverr) {
goto out;
}
@ -1211,7 +1295,7 @@ static void lo_mknod_symlink(fuse_req_t req, fuse_ino_t parent,
saverr = errno;
lo_restore_cred(&old);
lo_restore_cred(&old, lo->change_umask && !S_ISLNK(mode));
if (res == -1) {
goto out;
@ -1917,7 +2001,7 @@ static void lo_create(fuse_req_t req, fuse_ino_t parent, const char *name,
return;
}
err = lo_change_cred(req, &old);
err = lo_change_cred(req, &old, lo->change_umask);
if (err) {
goto out;
}
@ -1928,7 +2012,7 @@ static void lo_create(fuse_req_t req, fuse_ino_t parent, const char *name,
fd = openat(parent_inode->fd, name, fi->flags | O_CREAT | O_EXCL, mode);
err = fd == -1 ? errno : 0;
lo_restore_cred(&old);
lo_restore_cred(&old, lo->change_umask);
/* Ignore the error if file exists and O_EXCL was not given */
if (err && (err != EEXIST || (fi->flags & O_EXCL))) {
@ -2727,6 +2811,63 @@ static int xattr_map_server(const struct lo_data *lo, const char *server_name,
assert(fchdir_res == 0); \
} while (0)
static bool block_xattr(struct lo_data *lo, const char *name)
{
/*
* If user explicitly enabled posix_acl or did not provide any option,
* do not block acl. Otherwise block system.posix_acl_access and
* system.posix_acl_default xattrs.
*/
if (lo->user_posix_acl) {
return false;
}
if (!strcmp(name, "system.posix_acl_access") ||
!strcmp(name, "system.posix_acl_default"))
return true;
return false;
}
/*
* Returns number of bytes in xattr_list after filtering on success. This
* could be zero as well if nothing is left after filtering.
*
* Returns negative error code on failure.
* xattr_list is modified in place.
*/
static int remove_blocked_xattrs(struct lo_data *lo, char *xattr_list,
unsigned in_size)
{
size_t out_index, in_index;
/*
* As of now we only filter out acl xattrs. If acls are enabled or
* they have not been explicitly disabled, there is nothing to
* filter.
*/
if (lo->user_posix_acl) {
return in_size;
}
out_index = 0;
in_index = 0;
while (in_index < in_size) {
char *in_ptr = xattr_list + in_index;
/* Length of current attribute name */
size_t in_len = strlen(xattr_list + in_index) + 1;
if (!block_xattr(lo, in_ptr)) {
if (in_index != out_index) {
memmove(xattr_list + out_index, xattr_list + in_index, in_len);
}
out_index += in_len;
}
in_index += in_len;
}
return out_index;
}
static void lo_getxattr(fuse_req_t req, fuse_ino_t ino, const char *in_name,
size_t size)
{
@ -2740,6 +2881,11 @@ static void lo_getxattr(fuse_req_t req, fuse_ino_t ino, const char *in_name,
int saverr;
int fd = -1;
if (block_xattr(lo, in_name)) {
fuse_reply_err(req, EOPNOTSUPP);
return;
}
mapped_name = NULL;
name = in_name;
if (lo->xattrmap) {
@ -2791,15 +2937,17 @@ static void lo_getxattr(fuse_req_t req, fuse_ino_t ino, const char *in_name,
goto out_err;
}
ret = fgetxattr(fd, name, value, size);
saverr = ret == -1 ? errno : 0;
} else {
/* fchdir should not fail here */
FCHDIR_NOFAIL(lo->proc_self_fd);
ret = getxattr(procname, name, value, size);
saverr = ret == -1 ? errno : 0;
FCHDIR_NOFAIL(lo->root.fd);
}
if (ret == -1) {
goto out_err;
goto out;
}
if (size) {
saverr = 0;
@ -2864,15 +3012,17 @@ static void lo_listxattr(fuse_req_t req, fuse_ino_t ino, size_t size)
goto out_err;
}
ret = flistxattr(fd, value, size);
saverr = ret == -1 ? errno : 0;
} else {
/* fchdir should not fail here */
FCHDIR_NOFAIL(lo->proc_self_fd);
ret = listxattr(procname, value, size);
saverr = ret == -1 ? errno : 0;
FCHDIR_NOFAIL(lo->root.fd);
}
if (ret == -1) {
goto out_err;
goto out;
}
if (size) {
saverr = 0;
@ -2926,6 +3076,12 @@ static void lo_listxattr(fuse_req_t req, fuse_ino_t ino, size_t size)
goto out;
}
}
ret = remove_blocked_xattrs(lo, value, ret);
if (ret <= 0) {
saverr = -ret;
goto out;
}
fuse_reply_buf(req, value, ret);
} else {
/*
@ -2951,7 +3107,8 @@ out:
}
static void lo_setxattr(fuse_req_t req, fuse_ino_t ino, const char *in_name,
const char *value, size_t size, int flags)
const char *value, size_t size, int flags,
uint32_t extra_flags)
{
char procname[64];
const char *name;
@ -2961,6 +3118,14 @@ static void lo_setxattr(fuse_req_t req, fuse_ino_t ino, const char *in_name,
ssize_t ret;
int saverr;
int fd = -1;
bool switched_creds = false;
bool cap_fsetid_dropped = false;
struct lo_cred old = {};
if (block_xattr(lo, in_name)) {
fuse_reply_err(req, EOPNOTSUPP);
return;
}
mapped_name = NULL;
name = in_name;
@ -2991,6 +3156,26 @@ static void lo_setxattr(fuse_req_t req, fuse_ino_t ino, const char *in_name,
", name=%s value=%s size=%zd)\n", ino, name, value, size);
sprintf(procname, "%i", inode->fd);
/*
* If we are setting posix access acl and if SGID needs to be
* cleared, then switch to caller's gid and drop CAP_FSETID
* and that should make sure host kernel clears SGID.
*
* This probably will not work when we support idmapped mounts.
* In that case we will need to find a non-root gid and switch
* to it. (Instead of gid in request). Fix it when we support
* idmapped mounts.
*/
if (lo->posix_acl && !strcmp(name, "system.posix_acl_access")
&& (extra_flags & FUSE_SETXATTR_ACL_KILL_SGID)) {
ret = lo_drop_cap_change_cred(req, &old, false, "FSETID",
&cap_fsetid_dropped);
if (ret) {
saverr = ret;
goto out;
}
switched_creds = true;
}
if (S_ISREG(inode->filetype) || S_ISDIR(inode->filetype)) {
fd = openat(lo->proc_self_fd, procname, O_RDONLY);
if (fd < 0) {
@ -2998,14 +3183,20 @@ static void lo_setxattr(fuse_req_t req, fuse_ino_t ino, const char *in_name,
goto out;
}
ret = fsetxattr(fd, name, value, size, flags);
saverr = ret == -1 ? errno : 0;
} else {
/* fchdir should not fail here */
FCHDIR_NOFAIL(lo->proc_self_fd);
ret = setxattr(procname, name, value, size, flags);
saverr = ret == -1 ? errno : 0;
FCHDIR_NOFAIL(lo->root.fd);
}
saverr = ret == -1 ? errno : 0;
if (switched_creds) {
if (cap_fsetid_dropped)
lo_restore_cred_gain_cap(&old, false, "FSETID");
else
lo_restore_cred(&old, false);
}
out:
if (fd >= 0) {
@ -3028,6 +3219,11 @@ static void lo_removexattr(fuse_req_t req, fuse_ino_t ino, const char *in_name)
int saverr;
int fd = -1;
if (block_xattr(lo, in_name)) {
fuse_reply_err(req, EOPNOTSUPP);
return;
}
mapped_name = NULL;
name = in_name;
if (lo->xattrmap) {
@ -3064,15 +3260,15 @@ static void lo_removexattr(fuse_req_t req, fuse_ino_t ino, const char *in_name)
goto out;
}
ret = fremovexattr(fd, name);
saverr = ret == -1 ? errno : 0;
} else {
/* fchdir should not fail here */
FCHDIR_NOFAIL(lo->proc_self_fd);
ret = removexattr(procname, name);
saverr = ret == -1 ? errno : 0;
FCHDIR_NOFAIL(lo->root.fd);
}
saverr = ret == -1 ? errno : 0;
out:
if (fd >= 0) {
close(fd);
@ -3559,10 +3755,6 @@ static void setup_nofile_rlimit(unsigned long rlimit_nofile)
static void log_func(enum fuse_log_level level, const char *fmt, va_list ap)
{
g_autofree char *localfmt = NULL;
struct timespec ts;
struct tm tm;
char sec_fmt[sizeof "2020-12-07 18:17:54"];
char zone_fmt[sizeof "+0100"];
if (current_log_level < level) {
return;
@ -3574,23 +3766,10 @@ static void log_func(enum fuse_log_level level, const char *fmt, va_list ap)
localfmt = g_strdup_printf("[ID: %08ld] %s", syscall(__NR_gettid),
fmt);
} else {
/* try formatting a broken-down timestamp */
if (clock_gettime(CLOCK_REALTIME, &ts) != -1 &&
localtime_r(&ts.tv_sec, &tm) != NULL &&
strftime(sec_fmt, sizeof sec_fmt, "%Y-%m-%d %H:%M:%S",
&tm) != 0 &&
strftime(zone_fmt, sizeof zone_fmt, "%z", &tm) != 0) {
localfmt = g_strdup_printf("[%s.%02ld%s] [ID: %08ld] %s",
sec_fmt,
ts.tv_nsec / (10L * 1000 * 1000),
zone_fmt, syscall(__NR_gettid),
fmt);
} else {
/* fall back to a flat timestamp */
localfmt = g_strdup_printf("[%" PRId64 "] [ID: %08ld] %s",
get_clock(), syscall(__NR_gettid),
fmt);
}
g_autoptr(GDateTime) now = g_date_time_new_now_utc();
g_autofree char *nowstr = g_date_time_format(now, "%Y-%m-%d %H:%M:%S.%f%z");
localfmt = g_strdup_printf("[%s] [ID: %08ld] %s",
nowstr, syscall(__NR_gettid), fmt);
}
fmt = localfmt;
}
@ -3722,6 +3901,7 @@ int main(int argc, char *argv[])
.allow_direct_io = 0,
.proc_self_fd = -1,
.user_killpriv_v2 = -1,
.user_posix_acl = -1,
};
struct lo_map_elem *root_elem;
struct lo_map_elem *reserve_elem;
@ -3850,6 +4030,12 @@ int main(int argc, char *argv[])
exit(1);
}
if (lo.user_posix_acl == 1 && !lo.xattr) {
fuse_log(FUSE_LOG_ERR, "Can't enable posix ACLs. xattrs are disabled."
"\n");
exit(1);
}
lo.use_statx = true;
se = fuse_session_new(&args, &lo_oper, sizeof(lo_oper), &lo);

1
tools/virtiofsd/passthrough_seccomp.c
View File

@ -114,6 +114,7 @@ static const int syscall_allowlist[] = {
SCMP_SYS(utimensat),
SCMP_SYS(write),
SCMP_SYS(writev),
SCMP_SYS(umask),
};
/* Syscalls used when --syslog is enabled */