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Default to GSSAPI (Kerberos) instead of DIGEST-MD5 for SASL

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RFC 6331 documents a number of serious security weaknesses in
the SASL DIGEST-MD5 mechanism. As such, QEMU should not be
using or recommending it as a default mechanism for VNC auth
with SASL.

GSSAPI (Kerberos) is the only other viable SASL mechanism that
can provide secure session encryption so enable that by defalt
as the replacement. If users have TLS enabled for VNC, they can
optionally decide to use SCRAM-SHA-1 instead of GSSAPI, allowing
plain username and password auth.

Reviewed-by: Eric Blake <eblake@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Daniel P. Berrange <berrange@redhat.com>
This commit is contained in:
Daniel P. Berrange 2017-03-15 11:53:22 +00:00
parent dd1559bb26
commit c6a9a9f575
2 changed files with 63 additions and 47 deletions
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54
qemu-doc.texi
View File

@ -1732,37 +1732,45 @@ SASL service config /etc/sasl2/qemu.conf. If running QEMU as an
unprivileged user, an environment variable SASL_CONF_PATH can be used unprivileged user, an environment variable SASL_CONF_PATH can be used
to make it search alternate locations for the service config. to make it search alternate locations for the service config.
The default configuration might contain If the TLS option is enabled for VNC, then it will provide session encryption,
otherwise the SASL mechanism will have to provide encryption. In the latter
case the list of possible plugins that can be used is drastically reduced. In
fact only the GSSAPI SASL mechanism provides an acceptable level of security
by modern standards. Previous versions of QEMU referred to the DIGEST-MD5
mechanism, however, it has multiple serious flaws described in detail in
RFC 6331 and thus should never be used any more. The SCRAM-SHA-1 mechanism
provides a simple username/password auth facility similar to DIGEST-MD5, but
does not support session encryption, so can only be used in combination with
TLS.
@example When not using TLS the recommended configuration is
mech_list: digest-md5
sasldb_path: /etc/qemu/passwd.db
@end example
This says to use the 'Digest MD5' mechanism, which is similar to the HTTP
Digest-MD5 mechanism. The list of valid usernames & passwords is maintained
in the /etc/qemu/passwd.db file, and can be updated using the saslpasswd2
command. While this mechanism is easy to configure and use, it is not
considered secure by modern standards, so only suitable for developers /
ad-hoc testing.
A more serious deployment might use Kerberos, which is done with the 'gssapi'
mechanism
@example @example
mech_list: gssapi mech_list: gssapi
keytab: /etc/qemu/krb5.tab keytab: /etc/qemu/krb5.tab
@end example @end example
For this to work the administrator of your KDC must generate a Kerberos This says to use the 'GSSAPI' mechanism with the Kerberos v5 protocol, with
principal for the server, with a name of 'qemu/somehost.example.com@@EXAMPLE.COM' the server principal stored in /etc/qemu/krb5.tab. For this to work the
replacing 'somehost.example.com' with the fully qualified host name of the administrator of your KDC must generate a Kerberos principal for the server,
machine running QEMU, and 'EXAMPLE.COM' with the Kerberos Realm. with a name of 'qemu/somehost.example.com@@EXAMPLE.COM' replacing
'somehost.example.com' with the fully qualified host name of the machine
running QEMU, and 'EXAMPLE.COM' with the Kerberos Realm.
Other configurations will be left as an exercise for the reader. It should When using TLS, if username+password authentication is desired, then a
be noted that only Digest-MD5 and GSSAPI provides a SSF layer for data reasonable configuration is
encryption. For all other mechanisms, VNC should always be configured to
use TLS and x509 certificates to protect security credentials from snooping. @example
mech_list: scram-sha-1
sasldb_path: /etc/qemu/passwd.db
@end example
The saslpasswd2 program can be used to populate the passwd.db file with
accounts.
Other SASL configurations will be left as an exercise for the reader. Note that
all mechanisms except GSSAPI, should be combined with use of TLS to ensure a
secure data channel.
@node gdb_usage @node gdb_usage
@section GDB usage @section GDB usage

56
qemu.sasl
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@ -1,36 +1,44 @@
# If you want to use the non-TLS socket, then you *must* include # If you want to use VNC remotely without TLS, then you *must*
# the GSSAPI or DIGEST-MD5 mechanisms, because they are the only # pick a mechanism which provides session encryption as well
# ones that can offer session encryption as well as authentication. # as authentication.
# #
# If you're only using TLS, then you can turn on any mechanisms # If you are only using TLS, then you can turn on any mechanisms
# you like for authentication, because TLS provides the encryption # you like for authentication, because TLS provides the encryption
# #
# Default to a simple username+password mechanism # If you are only using UNIX sockets then encryption is not
# NB digest-md5 is no longer considered secure by current standards # required at all.
mech_list: digest-md5
# Before you can use GSSAPI, you need a service principle on the
# KDC server for libvirt, and that to be exported to the keytab
# file listed below
#mech_list: gssapi
# #
# You can also list many mechanisms at once, then the user can choose # NB, previously DIGEST-MD5 was set as the default mechanism for
# by adding '?auth=sasl.gssapi' to their libvirt URI, eg # QEMU VNC. Per RFC 6331 this is vulnerable to many serious security
# qemu+tcp://hostname/system?auth=sasl.gssapi # flaws as should no longer be used. Thus GSSAPI is now the default.
#mech_list: digest-md5 gssapi #
# To use GSSAPI requires that a QEMU service principal is
# added to the Kerberos server for each host running QEMU.
# This principal needs to be exported to the keytab file listed below
mech_list: gssapi
# If using TLS with VNC, or a UNIX socket only, it is possible to
# enable plugins which don't provide session encryption. The
# 'scram-sha-1' plugin allows plain username/password authentication
# to be performed
#
#mech_list: scram-sha-1
# You can also list many mechanisms at once, and the VNC server will
# negotiate which to use by considering the list enabled on the VNC
# client.
#mech_list: scram-sha-1 gssapi
# Some older builds of MIT kerberos on Linux ignore this option & # Some older builds of MIT kerberos on Linux ignore this option &
# instead need KRB5_KTNAME env var. # instead need KRB5_KTNAME env var.
# For modern Linux, and other OS, this should be sufficient # For modern Linux, and other OS, this should be sufficient
# #
# There is no default value here, uncomment if you need this # This file needs to be populated with the service principal that
#keytab: /etc/qemu/krb5.tab # was created on the Kerberos v5 server. If switching to a non-gssapi
# mechanism this can be commented out.
keytab: /etc/qemu/krb5.tab
# If using digest-md5 for username/passwds, then this is the file # If using scram-sha-1 for username/passwds, then this is the file
# containing the passwds. Use 'saslpasswd2 -a qemu [username]' # containing the passwds. Use 'saslpasswd2 -a qemu [username]'
# to add entries, and 'sasldblistusers2 -f [sasldb_path]' to browse it # to add entries, and 'sasldblistusers2 -f [sasldb_path]' to browse it
sasldb_path: /etc/qemu/passwd.db #sasldb_path: /etc/qemu/passwd.db
auxprop_plugin: sasldb