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target/arm: Implement FEAT_PAN3

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FEAT_PAN3 adds an EPAN bit to SCTLR_EL1 and SCTLR_EL2, which allows
the PAN bit to make memory non-privileged-read/write if it is
user-executable as well as if it is user-read/write.

Implement this feature and enable it in the AArch64 'max' CPU.

Signed-off-by: Peter Maydell <peter.maydell@linaro.org>
Reviewed-by: Richard Henderson <richard.henderson@linaro.org>
Message-id: 20230331145045.2584941-4-peter.maydell@linaro.org
This commit is contained in:
Peter Maydell 2023-04-20 10:21:16 +01:00
parent a3856808d9
commit dd17143fce
4 changed files with 20 additions and 2 deletions
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1
docs/system/arm/emulation.rst
View File

@ -56,6 +56,7 @@ the following architecture extensions:
- FEAT_MTE3 (MTE Asymmetric Fault Handling)
- FEAT_PAN (Privileged access never)
- FEAT_PAN2 (AT S1E1R and AT S1E1W instruction variants affected by PSTATE.PAN)
- FEAT_PAN3 (Support for SCTLR_ELx.EPAN)
- FEAT_PAuth (Pointer authentication)
- FEAT_PMULL (PMULL, PMULL2 instructions)
- FEAT_PMUv3p1 (PMU Extensions v3.1)

5
target/arm/cpu.h
View File

@ -3823,6 +3823,11 @@ static inline bool isar_feature_aa64_ats1e1(const ARMISARegisters *id)
return FIELD_EX64(id->id_aa64mmfr1, ID_AA64MMFR1, PAN) >= 2;
}
static inline bool isar_feature_aa64_pan3(const ARMISARegisters *id)
{
return FIELD_EX64(id->id_aa64mmfr1, ID_AA64MMFR1, PAN) >= 3;
}
static inline bool isar_feature_aa64_hcx(const ARMISARegisters *id)
{
return FIELD_EX64(id->id_aa64mmfr1, ID_AA64MMFR1, HCX) != 0;

2
target/arm/cpu64.c
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@ -1302,7 +1302,7 @@ static void aarch64_max_initfn(Object *obj)
t = FIELD_DP64(t, ID_AA64MMFR1, VH, 1); /* FEAT_VHE */
t = FIELD_DP64(t, ID_AA64MMFR1, HPDS, 1); /* FEAT_HPDS */
t = FIELD_DP64(t, ID_AA64MMFR1, LO, 1); /* FEAT_LOR */
t = FIELD_DP64(t, ID_AA64MMFR1, PAN, 2); /* FEAT_PAN2 */
t = FIELD_DP64(t, ID_AA64MMFR1, PAN, 3); /* FEAT_PAN3 */
t = FIELD_DP64(t, ID_AA64MMFR1, XNX, 1); /* FEAT_XNX */
t = FIELD_DP64(t, ID_AA64MMFR1, ETS, 1); /* FEAT_ETS */
t = FIELD_DP64(t, ID_AA64MMFR1, HCX, 1); /* FEAT_HCX */

14
target/arm/ptw.c
View File

@ -947,6 +947,7 @@ static int get_S2prot(CPUARMState *env, int s2ap, int xn, bool s1_is_el0)
static int get_S1prot(CPUARMState *env, ARMMMUIdx mmu_idx, bool is_aa64,
int ap, int ns, int xn, int pxn)
{
ARMCPU *cpu = env_archcpu(env);
bool is_user = regime_is_user(env, mmu_idx);
int prot_rw, user_rw;
bool have_wxn;
@ -958,8 +959,19 @@ static int get_S1prot(CPUARMState *env, ARMMMUIdx mmu_idx, bool is_aa64,
if (is_user) {
prot_rw = user_rw;
} else {
/*
* PAN controls can forbid data accesses but don't affect insn fetch.
* Plain PAN forbids data accesses if EL0 has data permissions;
* PAN3 forbids data accesses if EL0 has either data or exec perms.
* Note that for AArch64 the 'user can exec' case is exactly !xn.
* We make the IMPDEF choices that SCR_EL3.SIF and Realm EL2&0
* do not affect EPAN.
*/
if (user_rw && regime_is_pan(env, mmu_idx)) {
/* PAN forbids data accesses but doesn't affect insn fetch */
prot_rw = 0;
} else if (cpu_isar_feature(aa64_pan3, cpu) && is_aa64 &&
regime_is_pan(env, mmu_idx) &&
(regime_sctlr(env, mmu_idx) & SCTLR_EPAN) && !xn) {
prot_rw = 0;
} else {
prot_rw = simple_ap_to_rw_prot_is_user(ap, false);