ui: avoid risk of 32-bit int overflow in VNC buffer check
For very large framebuffers, it is theoretically possible for the result of 'vs->throttle_output_offset * VNC_THROTTLE_OUTPUT_LIMIT_SCALE' to exceed the size of a 32-bit int. For this to happen in practice, the video RAM would have to be set to a large enough value, which is not likely today. None the less we can be paranoid against future growth by using division instead of multiplication when checking the limits. Reported-by: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Daniel P. Berrangé <berrange@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Philippe Mathieu-Daudé <f4bug@amsat.org> Message-id: 20180205114938.15784-2-berrange@redhat.com Signed-off-by: Gerd Hoffmann <kraxel@redhat.com>
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ui/vnc.c
4
ui/vnc.c
@ -1579,8 +1579,8 @@ void vnc_write(VncState *vs, const void *data, size_t len)
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* handshake, or from the job thread's VncState clone
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*/
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if (vs->throttle_output_offset != 0 &&
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vs->output.offset > (vs->throttle_output_offset *
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VNC_THROTTLE_OUTPUT_LIMIT_SCALE)) {
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(vs->output.offset / VNC_THROTTLE_OUTPUT_LIMIT_SCALE) >
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vs->throttle_output_offset) {
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trace_vnc_client_output_limit(vs, vs->ioc, vs->output.offset,
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vs->throttle_output_offset);
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vnc_disconnect_start(vs);
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