msix: fix msix_vector_masked

commit 428c3ece97 ("fix MSI injection on Xen")
inadvertently enabled the xen-specific logic unconditionally.
Limit it to only when xen is enabled.
Additionally, msix data should be read with pci_get_log
since the format is pci little-endian.

Reported-by: "Daniel P. Berrange" <berrange@redhat.com>
Cc: Stefano Stabellini <stefano.stabellini@eu.citrix.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com>
This commit is contained in:
Michael S. Tsirkin 2016-02-13 20:50:50 +02:00
parent e5157e313c
commit e1e4bf2252

View File

@ -80,10 +80,10 @@ static void msix_clr_pending(PCIDevice *dev, int vector)
static bool msix_vector_masked(PCIDevice *dev, unsigned int vector, bool fmask) static bool msix_vector_masked(PCIDevice *dev, unsigned int vector, bool fmask)
{ {
unsigned offset = vector * PCI_MSIX_ENTRY_SIZE; unsigned offset = vector * PCI_MSIX_ENTRY_SIZE;
uint32_t *data = (uint32_t *)&dev->msix_table[offset + PCI_MSIX_ENTRY_DATA]; uint8_t *data = &dev->msix_table[offset + PCI_MSIX_ENTRY_DATA];
/* MSIs on Xen can be remapped into pirqs. In those cases, masking /* MSIs on Xen can be remapped into pirqs. In those cases, masking
* and unmasking go through the PV evtchn path. */ * and unmasking go through the PV evtchn path. */
if (xen_is_pirq_msi(*data)) { if (xen_enabled() && xen_is_pirq_msi(pci_get_long(data))) {
return false; return false;
} }
return fmask || dev->msix_table[offset + PCI_MSIX_ENTRY_VECTOR_CTRL] & return fmask || dev->msix_table[offset + PCI_MSIX_ENTRY_VECTOR_CTRL] &