confidential guest support: Move SEV initialization into arch specific code
While we've abstracted some (potential) differences between mechanisms for securing guest memory, the initialization is still specific to SEV. Given that, move it into x86's kvm_arch_init() code, rather than the generic kvm_init() code. Signed-off-by: David Gibson <david@gibson.dropbear.id.au> Reviewed-by: Cornelia Huck <cohuck@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Greg Kurz <groug@kaod.org>
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@ -2180,20 +2180,6 @@ static int kvm_init(MachineState *ms)
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kvm_state = s;
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/*
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* if memory encryption object is specified then initialize the memory
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* encryption context.
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*/
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if (ms->cgs) {
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Error *local_err = NULL;
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/* FIXME handle mechanisms other than SEV */
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ret = sev_kvm_init(ms->cgs, &local_err);
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if (ret < 0) {
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error_report_err(local_err);
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goto err;
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}
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}
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ret = kvm_arch_init(ms, s);
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if (ret < 0) {
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goto err;
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@ -17,6 +17,6 @@
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int sev_kvm_init(ConfidentialGuestSupport *cgs, Error **errp)
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{
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/* SEV can't be selected if it's not compiled */
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g_assert_not_reached();
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/* If we get here, cgs must be some non-SEV thing */
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return 0;
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}
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@ -42,6 +42,7 @@
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#include "hw/i386/intel_iommu.h"
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#include "hw/i386/x86-iommu.h"
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#include "hw/i386/e820_memory_layout.h"
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#include "sysemu/sev.h"
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#include "hw/pci/pci.h"
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#include "hw/pci/msi.h"
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@ -2135,6 +2136,25 @@ int kvm_arch_init(MachineState *ms, KVMState *s)
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uint64_t shadow_mem;
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int ret;
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struct utsname utsname;
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Error *local_err = NULL;
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/*
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* Initialize SEV context, if required
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*
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* If no memory encryption is requested (ms->cgs == NULL) this is
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* a no-op.
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*
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* It's also a no-op if a non-SEV confidential guest support
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* mechanism is selected. SEV is the only mechanism available to
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* select on x86 at present, so this doesn't arise, but if new
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* mechanisms are supported in future (e.g. TDX), they'll need
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* their own initialization either here or elsewhere.
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*/
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ret = sev_kvm_init(ms->cgs, &local_err);
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if (ret < 0) {
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error_report_err(local_err);
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return ret;
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}
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if (!kvm_check_extension(s, KVM_CAP_IRQ_ROUTING)) {
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error_report("kvm: KVM_CAP_IRQ_ROUTING not supported by KVM");
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@ -664,13 +664,18 @@ sev_vm_state_change(void *opaque, int running, RunState state)
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int sev_kvm_init(ConfidentialGuestSupport *cgs, Error **errp)
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{
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SevGuestState *sev = SEV_GUEST(cgs);
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SevGuestState *sev
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= (SevGuestState *)object_dynamic_cast(OBJECT(cgs), TYPE_SEV_GUEST);
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char *devname;
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int ret, fw_error;
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uint32_t ebx;
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uint32_t host_cbitpos;
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struct sev_user_data_status status = {};
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if (!sev) {
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return 0;
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}
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ret = ram_block_discard_disable(true);
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if (ret) {
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error_report("%s: cannot disable RAM discard", __func__);
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