System emulation should provide access to all registers, userspace
emulation should only provide access to unprivileged registers.
Record register flags from GDB register map definition, calculate both
num_regs and num_core_regs if either is zero. Use num_regs in system
emulation, num_core_regs in userspace emulation gdbstub.
Signed-off-by: Max Filippov <jcmvbkbc@gmail.com>
Add arrows that mark beginning of register windows and position of the
current window in the windowed register file.
Signed-off-by: Max Filippov <jcmvbkbc@gmail.com>
xtensa_cpu_dump_state outputs CPU physical registers as is, without
synchronization from current window. That may result in different values
printed for the current window and corresponding physical registers.
Synchronize physical registers from window before dumping.
Cc: qemu-stable@nongnu.org
Signed-off-by: Max Filippov <jcmvbkbc@gmail.com>
When starting QEMU management apps will usually setup a monitor socket, and
then open it immediately after startup. If not using QEMU's own -daemonize
arg, this process can be troublesome to handle correctly. The mgmt app will
need to repeatedly call connect() until it succeeds, because it does not
know when QEMU has created the listener socket. If can't retry connect()
forever though, because an error might have caused QEMU to exit before it
even creates the monitor.
The obvious way to fix this kind of problem is to just pass in a pre-opened
socket file descriptor for the QEMU monitor to listen on. The management
app can now immediately call connect() just once. If connect() fails it
knows that QEMU has exited with an error.
The SocketAddress(Legacy) structs allow for FD passing via the monitor, and
now via inherited file descriptors from the process that spawned QEMU. The
final missing piece is adding a 'fd' parameter in the socket chardev
options.
This allows both HMP usage, pass any FD number with SCM_RIGHTS, then
running HMP commands:
getfd myfd
chardev-add socket,fd=myfd
Note that numeric FDs cannot be referenced directly in HMP, only named FDs.
And also CLI usage, by leak FD 3 from parent by clearing O_CLOEXEC, then
spawning QEMU with
-chardev socket,fd=3,id=mon
-mon chardev=mon,mode=control
Note that named FDs cannot be referenced in CLI args, only numeric FDs.
We do not wire this up in the legacy chardev syntax, so you cannot use FD
passing with '-qmp', you must use the modern '-mon' + '-chardev' pair.
When passing pre-opened FDs there is a restriction on use of TLS encryption.
It can be used on a server socket chardev, but cannot be used for a client
socket chardev. This is because when validating a server's certificate, the
client needs to have a hostname available to match against the certificate
identity.
An illustrative example of usage is:
#!/usr/bin/perl
use IO::Socket::UNIX;
use Fcntl;
unlink "/tmp/qmp";
my $srv = IO::Socket::UNIX->new(
Type => SOCK_STREAM(),
Local => "/tmp/qmp",
Listen => 1,
);
my $flags = fcntl $srv, F_GETFD, 0;
fcntl $srv, F_SETFD, $flags & ~FD_CLOEXEC;
my $fd = $srv->fileno();
exec "qemu-system-x86_64", \
"-chardev", "socket,fd=$fd,server,nowait,id=mon", \
"-mon", "chardev=mon,mode=control";
Reviewed-by: Eric Blake <eblake@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Daniel P. Berrange <berrange@redhat.com>
To prepare for handling more address types, refactor the parsing of
socket address information to make it more robust and extensible.
Reviewed-by: Eric Blake <eblake@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Marc-André Lureau <marcandre.lureau@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Daniel P. Berrange <berrange@redhat.com>
The SocketAddress 'fd' kind accepts the name of a file descriptor passed
to the monitor with the 'getfd' command. This makes it impossible to use
the 'fd' kind in cases where a monitor is not available. This can apply in
handling command line argv at startup, or simply if internal code wants to
use SocketAddress and pass a numeric FD it has acquired from elsewhere.
Fortunately the 'getfd' command mandated that the FD names must not start
with a leading digit. We can thus safely extend semantics of the
SocketAddress 'fd' kind, to allow a purely numeric name to reference an
file descriptor that QEMU already has open. There will be restrictions on
when each kind can be used.
In codepaths where we are handling a monitor command (ie cur_mon != NULL),
we will only support use of named file descriptors as before. Use of FD
numbers is still not permitted for monitor commands.
In codepaths where we are not handling a monitor command (ie cur_mon ==
NULL), we will not support named file descriptors. Instead we can reference
FD numers explicitly. This allows the app spawning QEMU to intentionally
"leak" a pre-opened socket to QEMU and reference that in a SocketAddress
definition, or for code inside QEMU to pass pre-opened FDs around.
Reviewed-by: Eric Blake <eblake@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Marc-André Lureau <marcandre.lureau@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Daniel P. Berrange <berrange@redhat.com>
The SocketAddress struct has an "fd" type, which references the name of a
file descriptor passed over the monitor using the "getfd" command. We
currently blindly assume the FD is a socket, which can lead to hard to
diagnose errors later. This adds an explicit check that the FD is actually
a socket to improve the error diagnosis.
Reviewed-by: Eric Blake <eblake@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Marc-André Lureau <marcandre.lureau@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Daniel P. Berrange <berrange@redhat.com>
The fd_is_socket() helper method is useful in a few places, so put it in
the common sockets code. Make the code more compact while moving it.
Reviewed-by: Eric Blake <eblake@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Marc-André Lureau <marcandre.lureau@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Daniel P. Berrange <berrange@redhat.com>
Instead of just checking whether it is possible to bind() on a socket, also
check that we can successfully connect() to the socket we bound to. This
more closely replicates the level of functionality that tests will actually
use.
Reviewed-by: Eric Blake <eblake@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Marc-André Lureau <marcandre.lureau@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Daniel P. Berrange <berrange@redhat.com>
The test-io-channel-socket.c file has some useful helper functions for
checking if a specific IP protocol is available. Other tests need to
perform similar kinds of checks to avoid running tests that will fail
due to missing IP protocols.
Reviewed-by: Eric Blake <eblake@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Marc-André Lureau <marcandre.lureau@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Daniel P. Berrange <berrange@redhat.com>
There are qemu_strtoNN functions for various sized integers. This adds two
more for plain int & unsigned int types, with suitable range checking.
Reviewed-by: Eric Blake <eblake@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Marc-André Lureau <marcandre.lureau@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Daniel P. Berrange <berrange@redhat.com>
This adds a possibility for the platform to tell VFIO not to emulate MSIX
so MMIO memory regions do not get split into chunks in flatview and
the entire page can be registered as a KVM memory slot and make direct
MMIO access possible for the guest.
This enables the entire MSIX BAR mapping to the guest for the pseries
platform in order to achieve the maximum MMIO preformance for certain
devices.
Tested on:
LSI Logic / Symbios Logic SAS3008 PCI-Express Fusion-MPT SAS-3 (rev 02)
Signed-off-by: Alexey Kardashevskiy <aik@ozlabs.ru>
Reviewed-by: David Gibson <david@gibson.dropbear.id.au>
Signed-off-by: Alex Williamson <alex.williamson@redhat.com>
At the moment we unconditionally avoid mapping MSIX data of a BAR and
emulate MSIX table in QEMU. However it is 1) not always necessary as
a platform may provide a paravirt interface for MSIX configuration;
2) can affect the speed of MMIO access by emulating them in QEMU when
frequently accessed registers share same system page with MSIX data,
this is particularly a problem for systems with the page size bigger
than 4KB.
A new capability - VFIO_REGION_INFO_CAP_MSIX_MAPPABLE - has been added
to the kernel [1] which tells the userspace that mapping of the MSIX data
is possible now. This makes use of it so from now on QEMU tries mapping
the entire BAR as a whole and emulate MSIX on top of that.
[1] https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/commit/?id=a32295c612c57990d17fb0f41e7134394b2f35f6
Signed-off-by: Alexey Kardashevskiy <aik@ozlabs.ru>
Reviewed-by: David Gibson <david@gibson.dropbear.id.au>
Signed-off-by: Alex Williamson <alex.williamson@redhat.com>
At the moment if vfio_memory_listener is registered in the system memory
address space, it maps/unmaps every RAM memory region for DMA.
It expects system page size aligned memory sections so vfio_dma_map
would not fail and so far this has been the case. A mapping failure
would be fatal. A side effect of such behavior is that some MMIO pages
would not be mapped silently.
However we are going to change MSIX BAR handling so we will end having
non-aligned sections in vfio_memory_listener (more details is in
the next patch) and vfio_dma_map will exit QEMU.
In order to avoid fatal failures on what previously was not a failure and
was just silently ignored, this checks the section alignment to
the smallest supported IOMMU page size and prints an error if not aligned;
it also prints an error if vfio_dma_map failed despite the page size check.
Both errors are not fatal; only MMIO RAM regions are checked
(aka "RAM device" regions).
If the amount of errors printed is overwhelming, the MSIX relocation
could be used to avoid excessive error output.
This is unlikely to cause any behavioral change.
Signed-off-by: Alexey Kardashevskiy <aik@ozlabs.ru>
[aw: Fix Int128 bit ops]
Signed-off-by: Alex Williamson <alex.williamson@redhat.com>
Infrastructure for display support. Must be enabled
using 'display' property.
Signed-off-by: Gerd Hoffmann <kraxel@redhat.com>
Reviewed By: Kirti Wankhede <kwankhede@nvidia.com>
Signed-off-by: Alex Williamson <alex.williamson@redhat.com>
Using the new graphic_console_close() function.
Signed-off-by: Gerd Hoffmann <kraxel@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Alex Williamson <alex.williamson@redhat.com>
This patch allows to unbind devices from QemuConsoles, using the new
graphic_console_close() function. The QemuConsole will show a static
display then, saying the device was unplugged. When re-plugging a
display later on the QemuConsole will be reused.
Eventually we will allocate and release QemuConsoles dynamically at some
point in the future, that'll need more infrastructure though to notify
user interfaces (gtk, sdl, spice, ...) about QemuConsoles coming and
going.
Signed-off-by: Gerd Hoffmann <kraxel@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Alex Williamson <alex.williamson@redhat.com>
So we can use the drm fourcc codes without a dependency on libdrm-devel.
Signed-off-by: Gerd Hoffmann <kraxel@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Alex Williamson <alex.williamson@redhat.com>
The function can be used to get the current SEV capabilities.
The capabilities include platform diffie-hellman key (pdh) and certificate
chain. The key can be provided to the external entities which wants to
establish a trusted channel between SEV firmware and guest owner.
Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Cc: Richard Henderson <rth@twiddle.net>
Cc: Eduardo Habkost <ehabkost@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
The command can be used by libvirt to query the SEV capabilities.
Cc: "Daniel P. Berrangé" <berrange@redhat.com>
Cc: "Dr. David Alan Gilbert" <dgilbert@redhat.com>
Cc: Markus Armbruster <armbru@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
The command can be used by libvirt to retrieve the measurement of SEV guest.
This measurement is a signature of the memory contents that was encrypted
through the LAUNCH_UPDATE_DATA.
Cc: "Daniel P. Berrangé" <berrange@redhat.com>
Cc: "Dr. David Alan Gilbert" <dgilbert@redhat.com>
Cc: Markus Armbruster <armbru@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Eric Blake <eblake@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
The command can be used to show the SEV information when memory
encryption is enabled on AMD platform.
Cc: Eric Blake <eblake@redhat.com>
Cc: "Daniel P. Berrangé" <berrange@redhat.com>
Cc: "Dr. David Alan Gilbert" <dgilbert@redhat.com>
Cc: Markus Armbruster <armbru@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: "Dr. David Alan Gilbert" <dgilbert@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
When SEV is enabled, CPUID 0x8000_001F should provide additional
information regarding the feature (such as which page table bit is used
to mark the pages as encrypted etc).
The details for memory encryption CPUID is available in AMD APM
(https://support.amd.com/TechDocs/24594.pdf) Section E.4.17
Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Cc: Richard Henderson <rth@twiddle.net>
Cc: Eduardo Habkost <ehabkost@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Eduardo Habkost <ehabkost@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
SEV guest migration is not implemented yet.
Signed-off-by: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
Reviewed-by: Dr. David Alan Gilbert <dgilbert@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
SEV launch flow requires us to issue LAUNCH_FINISH command before guest
is ready to run.
Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Cc: Richard Henderson <rth@twiddle.net>
Cc: Eduardo Habkost <ehabkost@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
During machine creation we encrypted the guest bios image, the
LAUNCH_MEASURE command can be used to retrieve the measurement of
the encrypted memory region. This measurement is a signature of
the memory contents that can be sent to the guest owner as an
attestation that the memory was encrypted correctly by the firmware.
VM management tools like libvirt can query the measurement using
query-sev-launch-measure QMP command.
Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Cc: Richard Henderson <rth@twiddle.net>
Cc: Eduardo Habkost <ehabkost@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
SEV requires that guest bios must be encrypted before booting the guest.
Cc: "Michael S. Tsirkin" <mst@redhat.com>
Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Cc: Richard Henderson <rth@twiddle.net>
Cc: Eduardo Habkost <ehabkost@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
The KVM_SEV_LAUNCH_UPDATE_DATA command is used to encrypt a guest memory
region using the VM Encryption Key created using LAUNCH_START.
Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Cc: Richard Henderson <rth@twiddle.net>
Cc: Eduardo Habkost <ehabkost@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
The KVM_SEV_LAUNCH_START command creates a new VM encryption key (VEK).
The encryption key created with the command will be used for encrypting
the bootstrap images (such as guest bios).
Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Cc: Richard Henderson <rth@twiddle.net>
Cc: Eduardo Habkost <ehabkost@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
When SEV is enabled, the hardware encryption engine uses a tweak such
that the two identical plaintext at different location will have a
different ciphertexts. So swapping or moving a ciphertexts of two guest
pages will not result in plaintexts being swapped. Hence relocating
a physical backing pages of the SEV guest will require some additional
steps in KVM driver. The KVM_MEMORY_ENCRYPT_{UN,}REG_REGION ioctl can be
used to register/unregister the guest memory region which may contain the
encrypted data. KVM driver will internally handle the relocating physical
backing pages of registered memory regions.
Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Cc: Richard Henderson <rth@twiddle.net>
Cc: Eduardo Habkost <ehabkost@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
When memory encryption is enabled, KVM_SEV_INIT command is used to
initialize the platform. The command loads the SEV related persistent
data from non-volatile storage and initializes the platform context.
This command should be first issued before invoking any other guest
commands provided by the SEV firmware.
Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Cc: Richard Henderson <rth@twiddle.net>
Cc: Eduardo Habkost <ehabkost@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Even if common tn3270 implementations do not support TLS, it is trivial to
have them proxied over a proxy like stunnel which adds TLS at the sockets
layer. We should thus not silently skip tn3270 protocol initialization
when TLS is enabled.
Reviewed-by: Eric Blake <eblake@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Cornelia Huck <cohuck@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Daniel P. Berrange <berrange@redhat.com>
As all the disabled features only affect system emulation we might as
well disable user mode to save compile time.
Signed-off-by: Alex Bennée <alex.bennee@linaro.org>
Reviewed-by: Daniel P. Berrangé <berrange@redhat.com>
As the build times have risen we keep timing out. Split the default
config into system and user builds.
Signed-off-by: Alex Bennée <alex.bennee@linaro.org>
Reviewed-by: Daniel P. Berrangé <berrange@redhat.com>
The log backend is the default one, we don't need to explicitly set it.
Signed-off-by: Alex Bennée <alex.bennee@linaro.org>
Reviewed-by: Daniel P. Berrangé <berrange@redhat.com>
Using a local m68k floatx80_cosh()
[copied from previous:
Written by Andreas Grabher for Previous, NeXT Computer Emulator.]
Signed-off-by: Laurent Vivier <laurent@vivier.eu>
Message-Id: <20180312202728.23790-12-laurent@vivier.eu>
Using a local m68k floatx80_sinh()
[copied from previous:
Written by Andreas Grabher for Previous, NeXT Computer Emulator.]
Signed-off-by: Laurent Vivier <laurent@vivier.eu>
Message-Id: <20180312202728.23790-11-laurent@vivier.eu>
Using local m68k floatx80_tanh() and floatx80_etoxm1()
[copied from previous:
Written by Andreas Grabher for Previous, NeXT Computer Emulator.]
Signed-off-by: Laurent Vivier <laurent@vivier.eu>
Message-Id: <20180312202728.23790-10-laurent@vivier.eu>
Using a local m68k floatx80_atanh()
[copied from previous:
Written by Andreas Grabher for Previous, NeXT Computer Emulator.]
Signed-off-by: Laurent Vivier <laurent@vivier.eu>
Message-Id: <20180312202728.23790-9-laurent@vivier.eu>
Using a local m68k floatx80_acos()
[copied from previous:
Written by Andreas Grabher for Previous, NeXT Computer Emulator.]
Signed-off-by: Laurent Vivier <laurent@vivier.eu>
Message-Id: <20180312202728.23790-8-laurent@vivier.eu>
Using a local m68k floatx80_asin()
[copied from previous:
Written by Andreas Grabher for Previous, NeXT Computer Emulator.]
Signed-off-by: Laurent Vivier <laurent@vivier.eu>
Message-Id: <20180312202728.23790-7-laurent@vivier.eu>
Using a local m68k floatx80_atan()
[copied from previous:
Written by Andreas Grabher for Previous, NeXT Computer Emulator.]
Signed-off-by: Laurent Vivier <laurent@vivier.eu>
Message-Id: <20180312202728.23790-6-laurent@vivier.eu>
Using a local m68k floatx80_cos()
[copied from previous:
Written by Andreas Grabher for Previous, NeXT Computer Emulator.]
Signed-off-by: Laurent Vivier <laurent@vivier.eu>
Message-Id: <20180312202728.23790-4-laurent@vivier.eu>
