riscv_cpu_tlb_fill() uses the `size` parameter to check PMP violation
using pmp_hart_has_privs().
However, if the size is unknown (=0), the ending address will be
`addr - 1` as it is `addr + size - 1` in `pmp_hart_has_privs()`.
This always causes a false PMP violation on the starting address of the
range, as `addr - 1` is not in the range.
In order to fix, we just assume that all bytes from addr to the end of
the page will be accessed if the size is unknown.
Signed-off-by: Dayeol Lee <dayeol@berkeley.edu>
Reviewed-by: Richard Henderson <richard.henderson@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: Palmer Dabbelt <palmer@sifive.com>
Use the always-compiled trace events, remove the now unused
RISCV_DEBUG_PMP definition.
Note pmpaddr_csr_read() could previously do out-of-bound accesses
passing addr_index >= MAX_RISCV_PMPS.
Signed-off-by: Philippe Mathieu-Daudé <philmd@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Alistair Francis <alistair.francis@wdc.com>
Signed-off-by: Palmer Dabbelt <palmer@sifive.com>
The RISC-V Physical Memory Protection is restricted to privileged
modes. Restrict its compilation to QEMU system builds.
Signed-off-by: Philippe Mathieu-Daudé <philmd@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Alistair Francis <alistair.francis@wdc.com>
Signed-off-by: Palmer Dabbelt <palmer@sifive.com>
The current implementation returns 1 (PMP check success) if the address is in
range even if the PMP entry is off. This is a bug.
For example, if there is a PMP check in S-Mode which is in range, but its PMP
entry is off, this will succeed, which it should not.
The patch fixes this bug by only checking the PMP permissions if the address is
in range and its corresponding PMP entry it not off. Otherwise, it will keep
the ret = -1 which will be checked and handled correctly at the end of the
function.
Signed-off-by: Hesham Almatary <Hesham.Almatary@cl.cam.ac.uk>
Reviewed-by: Alistair Francis <alistair.francis@wdc.com>
Signed-off-by: Palmer Dabbelt <palmer@sifive.com>
The current PMP check function checks for env->priv which is not the effective
memory privilege mode.
For example, mstatus.MPRV could be set while executing in M-Mode, and in that
case the privilege mode for the PMP check should be S-Mode rather than M-Mode
(in env->priv) if mstatus.MPP == PRV_S.
This patch passes the effective memory privilege mode to the PMP check.
Functions that call the PMP check should pass the correct memory privilege mode
after reading mstatus' MPRV/MPP or hstatus.SPRV (if Hypervisor mode exists).
Suggested-by: Alistair Francis <alistair.francis@wdc.com>
Signed-off-by: Hesham Almatary <Hesham.Almatary@cl.cam.ac.uk>
Reviewed-by: Palmer Dabbelt <palmer@sifive.com>
Signed-off-by: Palmer Dabbelt <palmer@sifive.com>
A wrong address is passed to `pmp_is_in_range` while checking if a
memory access is within a PMP range.
Since the ending address of the pmp range (i.e., pmp_state.addr[i].ea)
is set to the last address in the range (i.e., pmp base + pmp size - 1),
memory accesses containg the last address in the range will always fail.
For example, assume that a PMP range is 4KB from 0x87654000 such that
the last address within the range is 0x87654fff.
1-byte access to 0x87654fff should be considered to be fully inside the
PMP range.
However the access now fails and complains partial inclusion because
pmp_is_in_range(env, i, addr + size) returns 0 whereas
pmp_is_in_range(env, i, addr) returns 1.
Signed-off-by: Dayeol Lee <dayeol@berkeley.edu>
Reviewed-by: Alistair Francis <alistair.francis@wdc.com>
Reviewed-by: Michael Clark <mjc@sifive.com>
Signed-off-by: Alistair Francis <alistair.francis@wdc.com>
Signed-off-by: Palmer Dabbelt <palmer@sifive.com>
No header includes qemu-common.h after this commit, as prescribed by
qemu-common.h's file comment.
Signed-off-by: Markus Armbruster <armbru@redhat.com>
Message-Id: <20190523143508.25387-5-armbru@redhat.com>
[Rebased with conflicts resolved automatically, except for
include/hw/arm/xlnx-zynqmp.h hw/arm/nrf51_soc.c hw/arm/msf2-soc.c
block/qcow2-refcount.c block/qcow2-cluster.c block/qcow2-cache.c
target/arm/cpu.h target/lm32/cpu.h target/m68k/cpu.h target/mips/cpu.h
target/moxie/cpu.h target/nios2/cpu.h target/openrisc/cpu.h
target/riscv/cpu.h target/tilegx/cpu.h target/tricore/cpu.h
target/unicore32/cpu.h target/xtensa/cpu.h; bsd-user/main.c and
net/tap-bsd.c fixed up]
Currently, start and end address of a PMP region are not decoded
correctly by pmp_decode_napot().
Let's say we have a 128KB PMP region with base address as 0x80000000.
Now, the PMPADDRx CSR value for this region will be 0x20003fff.
The current pmp_decode_napot() implementation will decode PMPADDRx
CSR as t1=14, base=0x100000000, and range=0x1ffff whereas it should
have decoded PMPADDRx CSR as t1=14, base=0x80000000, and range=0x1fff.
This patch fixes the base value decoding in pmp_decode_napot() when
PMPADDRx CSR is not -1 (i.e. 0xffffffffffffffff).
Signed-off-by: Anup Patel <anup@brainfault.org>
Signed-off-by: Anup Patel <anup.patel@wdc.com>
Signed-off-by: Alistair Francis <alistair.francis@wdc.com>
Reviewed-by: Palmer Dabbelt <palmer@sifive.com>
Signed-off-by: Palmer Dabbelt <palmer@sifive.com>
pmp_read_cfg() returns 8-bit value, which is combined together to form a single pmpcfg CSR.
The default promotion rules will result in an integer here ("i*8" is integer, which
flows through) resulting in a 32-bit signed value on most hosts.
That's bogus on RV64I, with the high bits of the CSR being wrong.
Signed-off-by: Dayeol Lee <dayeol@berkeley.edu>
Reviewed-by: Palmer Dabbelt <palmer@sifive.com>
Reviewed-by: Alistair Francis <alistair.francis@wdc.com>
Signed-off-by: Palmer Dabbelt <palmer@sifive.com>
Implements the physical memory protection extension as specified in
Privileged ISA Version 1.10.
PMP (Physical Memory Protection) is as-of-yet unused and needs testing.
The SiFive verification team have PMP test cases that will be run.
Nothing currently depends on PMP support. It would be preferable to keep
the code in-tree for folk that are interested in RISC-V PMP support.
Reviewed-by: Richard Henderson <richard.henderson@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: Daire McNamara <daire.mcnamara@emdalo.com>
Signed-off-by: Ivan Griffin <ivan.griffin@emdalo.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael Clark <mjc@sifive.com>
Dayeol Lee