Commit Graph

7 Commits

Author SHA1 Message Date
Yang Zhong 1105812382 numa: Enable numa for SGX EPC sections
The basic SGX did not enable numa for SGX EPC sections, which
result in all EPC sections located in numa node 0. This patch
enable SGX numa function in the guest and the EPC section can
work with RAM as one numa node.

The Guest kernel related log:
[    0.009981] ACPI: SRAT: Node 0 PXM 0 [mem 0x180000000-0x183ffffff]
[    0.009982] ACPI: SRAT: Node 1 PXM 1 [mem 0x184000000-0x185bfffff]
The SRAT table can normally show SGX EPC sections menory info in different
numa nodes.

The SGX EPC numa related command:
 ......
 -m 4G,maxmem=20G \
 -smp sockets=2,cores=2 \
 -cpu host,+sgx-provisionkey \
 -object memory-backend-ram,size=2G,host-nodes=0,policy=bind,id=node0 \
 -object memory-backend-epc,id=mem0,size=64M,prealloc=on,host-nodes=0,policy=bind \
 -numa node,nodeid=0,cpus=0-1,memdev=node0 \
 -object memory-backend-ram,size=2G,host-nodes=1,policy=bind,id=node1 \
 -object memory-backend-epc,id=mem1,size=28M,prealloc=on,host-nodes=1,policy=bind \
 -numa node,nodeid=1,cpus=2-3,memdev=node1 \
 -M sgx-epc.0.memdev=mem0,sgx-epc.0.node=0,sgx-epc.1.memdev=mem1,sgx-epc.1.node=1 \
 ......

Signed-off-by: Yang Zhong <yang.zhong@intel.com>
Message-Id: <20211101162009.62161-2-yang.zhong@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
2021-12-10 09:47:18 +01:00
Philippe Mathieu-Daudé 6e81733e27 hw/i386/sgx: Move qmp_query_sgx() and hmp_info_sgx() to hw/i386/sgx.c
Move qmp_query_sgx() and hmp_info_sgx() from target/i386/monitor.c
to hw/i386/sgx.c, removing the sgx_get_info() indirection and the
"hw/i386/sgx.h" header.

Suggested-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Philippe Mathieu-Daudé <philmd@redhat.com>
Message-Id: <20211007175612.496366-5-philmd@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
2021-10-13 10:47:50 +02:00
Philippe Mathieu-Daudé 021658566b hw/i386/sgx: Move qmp_query_sgx_capabilities() to hw/i386/sgx.c
Move qmp_query_sgx_capabilities() from target/i386/monitor.c to
hw/i386/sgx.c, removing the sgx_get_capabilities() indirection.

Suggested-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Philippe Mathieu-Daudé <philmd@redhat.com>
Message-Id: <20211007175612.496366-4-philmd@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
2021-10-13 10:47:49 +02:00
Philippe Mathieu-Daudé 05fc8db720 hw/i386/sgx: Have sgx_epc_get_section() return a boolean
Signed-off-by: Philippe Mathieu-Daudé <philmd@redhat.com>
Message-Id: <20211007175612.496366-3-philmd@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
2021-10-13 10:47:49 +02:00
Yang Zhong 0205c4fa1e target/i386: Add the query-sgx-capabilities QMP command
Libvirt can use query-sgx-capabilities to get the host
sgx capabilities to decide how to allocate SGX EPC size to VM.

Signed-off-by: Yang Zhong <yang.zhong@intel.com>
Message-Id: <20210910102258.46648-3-yang.zhong@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
2021-09-30 15:30:24 +02:00
Yang Zhong 57d874c4c7 target/i386: Add HMP and QMP interfaces for SGX
The QMP and HMP interfaces can be used by monitor or QMP tools to retrieve
the SGX information from VM side when SGX is enabled on Intel platform.

Signed-off-by: Yang Zhong <yang.zhong@intel.com>
Message-Id: <20210910102258.46648-2-yang.zhong@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
2021-09-30 15:30:24 +02:00
Sean Christopherson 1dec2e1f19 i386: Update SGX CPUID info according to hardware/KVM/user input
Expose SGX to the guest if and only if KVM is enabled and supports
virtualization of SGX.  While the majority of ENCLS can be emulated to
some degree, because SGX uses a hardware-based root of trust, the
attestation aspects of SGX cannot be emulated in software, i.e.
ultimately emulation will fail as software cannot generate a valid
quote/report.  The complexity of partially emulating SGX in Qemu far
outweighs the value added, e.g. an SGX specific simulator for userspace
applications can emulate SGX for development and testing purposes.

Note, access to the PROVISIONKEY is not yet advertised to the guest as
KVM blocks access to the PROVISIONKEY by default and requires userspace
to provide additional credentials (via ioctl()) to expose PROVISIONKEY.

Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Yang Zhong <yang.zhong@intel.com>
Message-Id: <20210719112136.57018-13-yang.zhong@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
2021-09-30 14:50:20 +02:00