Limits the rate kbd events from the vnc server are forwarded to the
guest, so input devices which are typically low-bandwidth can keep
up even on bulky input.
v2: update documentation too.
v3: spell fixes.
Signed-off-by: Gerd Hoffmann <kraxel@redhat.com>
Tested-by: Yang Hongyang <hongyang.yang@easystack.cn>
Message-id: 1464762150-25817-1-git-send-email-kraxel@redhat.com
Clean up includes so that osdep.h is included first and headers
which it implies are not included manually.
This commit was created with scripts/clean-includes.
Signed-off-by: Peter Maydell <peter.maydell@linaro.org>
Reviewed-by: Eric Blake <eblake@redhat.com>
Remove custom websock handling code from the VNC server and use
the QIOChannelWebsock class instead.
Reviewed-by: Gerd Hoffmann <kraxel@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Daniel P. Berrange <berrange@redhat.com>
Switch VNC server over to using the QIOChannelTLS object for
the TLS session. This removes all remaining VNC specific code
for dealing with TLS handshakes.
Reviewed-by: Gerd Hoffmann <kraxel@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Daniel P. Berrange <berrange@redhat.com>
The minimal first step conversion to use QIOChannelSocket
classes instead of directly using POSIX sockets API. This
will later be extended to also cover the TLS, SASL and
websockets code.
Reviewed-by: Gerd Hoffmann <kraxel@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Daniel P. Berrange <berrange@redhat.com>
The Buffer code in the VNC server is useful for the IO channel
code, so pull it out into a shared module, QIOBuffer.
Signed-off-by: Daniel P. Berrange <berrange@redhat.com>
Switch VNC server over to using the QCryptoTLSSession object
for the TLS session. This removes the direct use of gnutls
from the VNC server code. It also removes most knowledge
about TLS certificate handling from the VNC server code.
This has the nice effect that all the CONFIG_VNC_TLS
conditionals go away and the user gets an actual error
message when requesting TLS instead of it being silently
ignored.
With this change, the existing configuration options for
enabling TLS with -vnc are deprecated.
Old syntax for anon-DH credentials:
-vnc hostname:0,tls
New syntax:
-object tls-creds-anon,id=tls0,endpoint=server \
-vnc hostname:0,tls-creds=tls0
Old syntax for x509 credentials, no client certs:
-vnc hostname:0,tls,x509=/path/to/certs
New syntax:
-object tls-creds-x509,id=tls0,dir=/path/to/certs,endpoint=server,verify-peer=no \
-vnc hostname:0,tls-creds=tls0
Old syntax for x509 credentials, requiring client certs:
-vnc hostname:0,tls,x509verify=/path/to/certs
New syntax:
-object tls-creds-x509,id=tls0,dir=/path/to/certs,endpoint=server,verify-peer=yes \
-vnc hostname:0,tls-creds=tls0
This aligns VNC with the way TLS credentials are to be
configured in the future for chardev, nbd and migration
backends. It also has the benefit that the same TLS
credentials can be shared across multiple VNC server
instances, if desired.
If someone uses the deprecated syntax, it will internally
result in the creation of a 'tls-creds' object with an ID
based on the VNC server ID. This allows backwards compat
with the CLI syntax, while still deleting all the original
TLS code from the VNC server.
Signed-off-by: Daniel P. Berrange <berrange@redhat.com>
Various VNC server I/O functions return 'long' and then
also pass this to a method accepting 'int'. All these
should be ssize_t to match the signature of read/write
APIs and thus avoid potential for integer truncation /
wraparound.
Signed-off-by: Daniel P. Berrange <berrange@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Eric Blake <eblake@redhat.com>
Remove the direct use of gnutls for hash processing in the
websockets code, in favour of using the crypto APIs. This
allows the websockets code to be built unconditionally
removing countless conditional checks from the VNC code.
Signed-off-by: Daniel P. Berrange <berrange@redhat.com>
Message-Id: <1435770638-25715-9-git-send-email-berrange@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
The logic for decoding websocket frames wants to fully
decode the frame header and payload, before allowing the
VNC server to see any of the payload data. There is no
size limit on websocket payloads, so this allows a
malicious network client to consume 2^64 bytes in memory
in QEMU. It can trigger this denial of service before
the VNC server even performs any authentication.
The fix is to decode the header, and then incrementally
decode the payload data as it is needed. With this fix
the websocket decoder will allow at most 4k of data to
be buffered before decoding and processing payload.
Signed-off-by: Daniel P. Berrange <berrange@redhat.com>
[ kraxel: fix frequent spurious disconnects, suggested by Peter Maydell ]
@@ -361,7 +361,7 @@ int vncws_decode_frame_payload(Buffer *input,
- *payload_size = input->offset;
+ *payload_size = *payload_remain;
[ kraxel: fix 32bit build ]
@@ -306,7 +306,7 @@ struct VncState
- uint64_t ws_payload_remain;
+ size_t ws_payload_remain;
Signed-off-by: Gerd Hoffmann <kraxel@redhat.com>
The previous change to the auth scheme handling guarantees we
can never have nested TLS sessions in the VNC websockets server.
Thus we can remove the separate gnutls_session instance.
Signed-off-by: Daniel P. Berrange <berrange@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Gerd Hoffmann <kraxel@redhat.com>
The way the websockets TLS code was integrated into the VNC server
made it essentially useless. The only time that the websockets TLS
support could be used is if the primary VNC server had its existing
TLS support disabled. ie QEMU had to be launched with:
# qemu -vnc localhost:1,websockets=5902,x509=/path/to/certs
Note the absence of the 'tls' flag. This is already a bug, because
the docs indicate that 'x509' is ignored unless 'tls' is given.
If the primary VNC server had TLS turned on via the 'tls' flag,
then this prevented the websockets TLS support from being used,
because it activates the VeNCrypt auth which would have resulted
in TLS being run over a TLS session. Of course no websockets VNC
client supported VeNCrypt so in practice, since the browser clients
cannot setup a nested TLS session over the main HTTPS connection,
so it would not even get past auth.
This patch causes us to decide our auth scheme separately for the
main VNC server vs the websockets VNC server. We take account of
the fact that if TLS is enabled, then the websockets client will
use https, so setting up VeNCrypt is thus redundant as it would
lead to nested TLS sessions.
Signed-off-by: Daniel P. Berrange <berrange@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Gerd Hoffmann <kraxel@redhat.com>
If the VNC server is built without tls, sasl or websocket support
and the user requests one of these features, they are just silently
ignored. This is bad because it means the VNC server ends up running
in a configuration that is less secure than the user asked for.
It also leads to an tangled mass of preprocessor conditionals when
configuring the VNC server.
This ensures that the tls, sasl & websocket options are always
processed and an error is reported back to the user if any of
them were disabled at build time.
Signed-off-by: Daniel P. Berrange <berrange@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Gerd Hoffmann <kraxel@redhat.com>
Nobody cares about those strings, they are only used to check whenever
the vnc server / websocket support is enabled or not. Add bools for
this and drop the strings.
Signed-off-by: Gerd Hoffmann <kraxel@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Gonglei <arei.gonglei@huawei.com>
Also track the number of connections in "connecting" and "shared" state
(in addition to the "exclusive" state). Apply a configurable limit to
these connections.
The logic to apply the limit to connections in "shared" state is pretty
simple: When the limit is reached no new connections are allowed.
The logic to apply the limit to connections in "connecting" state (this
is the state you are in *before* successful authentication) is
slightly different: A new connect kicks out the oldest client which is
still in "connecting" state. This avoids a easy DoS by unauthenticated
users by simply opening connections until the limit is reached.
Cc: Dr. David Alan Gilbert <dgilbert@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Gerd Hoffmann <kraxel@redhat.com>
Replace with a vnc_displays list, so we can have multiple vnc server
instances. Add vnc_server_find function to lookup a display by id.
With no id supplied return the first vnc server, for backward
compatibility reasons.
It is not possible (yet) to actually create multiple vnc server
instances.
Signed-off-by: Gerd Hoffmann <kraxel@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Gonglei <arei.gonglei@huawei.com>
We need to remember has_updates for each vnc client. Otherwise it might
happen that vnc_update_client(has_dirty=1) takes the first exit due to
output buffers not being flushed yet and subsequent calls with
has_dirty=0 take the second exit, wrongly assuming there is nothing to
do because the work defered in the first call is ignored.
Signed-off-by: Gerd Hoffmann <kraxel@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Peter Lieven <pl@kamp.de>
this patch makes the VNC server work correctly if the
server surface and the guest surface have different sizes.
Basically the server surface is adjusted to not exceed VNC_MAX_WIDTH
x VNC_MAX_HEIGHT and additionally the width is rounded up to multiple of
VNC_DIRTY_PIXELS_PER_BIT.
If we have a resolution whose width is not dividable by VNC_DIRTY_PIXELS_PER_BIT
we now get a small black bar on the right of the screen.
If the surface is too big to fit the limits only the upper left area is shown.
On top of that this fixes 2 memory corruption issues:
The first was actually discovered during playing
around with a Windows 7 vServer. During resolution
change in Windows 7 it happens sometimes that Windows
changes to an intermediate resolution where
server_stride % cmp_bytes != 0 (in vnc_refresh_server_surface).
This happens only if width % VNC_DIRTY_PIXELS_PER_BIT != 0.
The second is a theoretical issue, but is maybe exploitable
by the guest. If for some reason the guest surface size is bigger
than VNC_MAX_WIDTH x VNC_MAX_HEIGHT we end up in severe corruption since
this limit is nowhere enforced.
Signed-off-by: Peter Lieven <pl@kamp.de>
Signed-off-by: Gerd Hoffmann <kraxel@redhat.com>
Since VNC_CONNECTED, VNC_DISCONNECTED, VNC_INITIALIZED share some
common functions, convert them in one patch.
Signed-off-by: Wenchao Xia <wenchaoqemu@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Eric Blake <eblake@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Luiz Capitulino <lcapitulino@redhat.com>
vnc_update_client currently scans the dirty bitmap of each client
bitwise which is a very costly operation if only few bits are dirty.
vnc_refresh_server_surface does almost the same.
this patch optimizes both by utilizing the heavily optimized
function find_next_bit to find the offset of the next dirty
bit in the dirty bitmaps.
The following artifical test (just the bitmap operation part) running
vnc_update_client 65536 times on a 2560x2048 surface illustrates the
performance difference:
All bits clean - vnc_update_client_new: 0.07 secs
vnc_update_client_old: 10.98 secs
All bits dirty - vnc_update_client_new: 11.26 secs
vnc_update_client_old: 20.19 secs
Few bits dirty - vnc_update_client_new: 0.08 secs
vnc_update_client_old: 10.98 secs
The case for all bits dirty is still rather slow, this
is due to the implementation of find_and_clear_dirty_height.
This will be addresses in a separate patch.
Signed-off-by: Peter Lieven <pl@kamp.de>
Reviewed-by: Wenchao Xia <xiawenc@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Gerd Hoffmann <kraxel@redhat.com>
Added TLS support to the VNC QEMU Websockets implementation.
VNC-TLS needs to be enabled for this feature to be used.
The required certificates are specified as in case of VNC-TLS
with the VNC parameter "x509=<path>".
If the server certificate isn't signed by a rooth authority it needs to
be manually imported in the browser because at least in case of Firefox
and Chrome there is no user dialog, the connection just gets canceled.
As a side note VEncrypt over Websocket doesn't work atm because TLS can't
be stacked in the current implementation. (It also didn't work before)
Nevertheless to my knowledge there is no HTML 5 VNC client which supports
it and the Websocket connection can be encrypted with regular TLS now so
it should be fine for most use cases.
Signed-off-by: Tim Hardeck <thardeck@suse.de>
Reviewed-by: Anthony Liguori <aliguori@us.ibm.com>
Message-id: 1366727581-5772-1-git-send-email-thardeck@suse.de
Signed-off-by: Anthony Liguori <aliguori@us.ibm.com>
Make gui update rate adaption code in gui_update() actually work.
Sprinkle in a tracepoint so you can see the code at work. Remove
the update rate adaption code in vnc and make vnc simply use the
generic bits instead.
Signed-off-by: Gerd Hoffmann <kraxel@redhat.com>
It's broken by design. There can be multiple DisplayChangeListener
instances, so they simply can't store state in the (single) DisplayState
struct. Try 'qemu -display gtk -vnc :0', watch it crash & burn.
With DisplayChangeListenerOps having a more sane interface now we can
simply use the DisplayChangeListener pointer to get access to our
private data instead.
Signed-off-by: Gerd Hoffmann <kraxel@redhat.com>
Some VncState values are not initialized before the Websocket handshake.
If it fails QEMU segfaults during the cleanup. To prevent this behavior
intialization checks are added.
Signed-off-by: Tim Hardeck <thardeck@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Anthony Liguori <aliguori@us.ibm.com>
This patch adds basic Websocket Protocol version 13 - RFC 6455 - support
to QEMU VNC. Binary encoding support on the client side is mandatory.
Because of the GnuTLS requirement the Websockets implementation is
optional (--enable-vnc-ws).
To activate Websocket support the VNC option "websocket"is used, for
example "-vnc :0,websocket".
The listen port for Websocket connections is (5700 + display) so if
QEMU VNC is started with :0 the Websocket port would be 5700.
As an alternative the Websocket port could be manually specified by
using ",websocket=<port>" instead.
Parts of the implementation base on Anthony Liguori's QEMU Websocket
patch from 2010 and on Joel Martin's LibVNC Websocket implementation.
Signed-off-by: Tim Hardeck <thardeck@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Anthony Liguori <aliguori@us.ibm.com>
Following Anthony Liguori's Websocket implementation I have added the
buffer_advance function to VNC and replaced all related buffer memmove
operations with it.
Signed-off-by: Tim Hardeck <thardeck@suse.de>
Reviewed-by: Anthony Liguori <aliguori@us.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Anthony Liguori <aliguori@us.ibm.com>
* 'trivial-patches' of git://github.com/stefanha/qemu:
pc: Drop redundant test for ROM memory region
exec: make some functions static
target-ppc: make some functions static
ppc: add missing static
vnc: add missing static
vl.c: add missing static
target-sparc: make do_unaligned_access static
m68k: Return semihosting errno values correctly
cadence_uart: More debug information
Conflicts:
target-m68k/m68k-semi.c
The vnc code uses *three* DisplaySurfaces:
First is the surface of the actual QemuConsole, usually the guest
screen, but could also be a text console (monitor/serial reachable via
Ctrl-Alt-<nr> keys). This is left as-is.
Second is the current server's view of the screen content. The vnc code
uses this to figure which parts of the guest screen did _really_ change
to reduce the amount of updates sent to the vnc clients. It is also
used as data source when sending out the updates to the clients. This
surface gets replaced by a pixman image. The format changes too,
instead of using the guest screen format we'll use fixed 32bit rgb
framebuffer and convert the pixels on the fly when comparing and
updating the server framebuffer.
Third surface carries the format expected by the vnc client. That isn't
used to store image data. This surface is switched to PixelFormat and a
boolean for bigendian byte order.
Signed-off-by: Gerd Hoffmann <kraxel@redhat.com>
QEMU now has a fundamental requirement for pthreads, so there
is no compelling reason to retain support for the non-threaded
VNC server. Remove the --{enable,disable}-vnc-thread configure
arguments, and all CONFIG_VNC_THREAD conditionals
Signed-off-by: Daniel P. Berrange <berrange@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Anthony Liguori <aliguori@us.ibm.com>
The threaded VNC servers messed up with QEMU fd handlers without
any kind of locking, and that can cause some nasty race conditions.
Using qemu_mutex_lock_iothread() won't work because vnc_dpy_cpy(),
which will wait for the current job queue to finish, can be called with
the iothread lock held.
Instead, we now store the data in a temporary buffer, and use a bottom
half to notify the main thread that new data is available.
vnc_[un]lock_ouput() is still needed to access VncState members like
abort, csock or jobs_buffer.
Signed-off-by: Corentin Chary <corentin.chary@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Anthony Liguori <aliguori@us.ibm.com>
VNC clients send a shared flag in the client init message. Up to now
qemu completely ignores this. This patch implements shared flag
handling. It comes with three policies: By default qemu behaves as one
would expect: Asking for a exclusive access grants exclusive access to
the client connecting. There is also a desktop sharing mode which
disallows exclusive connects (so one forgetting -shared wouldn't drop
everybody else) and a compatibility mode which mimics the traditional
(but non-conforming) qemu behavior.
Signed-off-by: Gerd Hoffmann <kraxel@redhat.com>
A future patch will introduce a situation where different
clients may have different authentication schemes set.
When a new client arrives, copy the 'auth' and 'subauth'
fields from VncDisplay into the client's VncState, and
use the latter in all authentication functions.
* ui/vnc.h: Add 'auth' and 'subauth' to VncState
* ui/vnc-auth-sasl.c, ui/vnc-auth-vencrypt.c,
ui/vnc.c: Make auth functions pull auth scheme
from VncState instead of VncDisplay
Signed-off-by: Anthony Liguori <aliguori@us.ibm.com>
Commit bc2429b917 introduced
a severe bug (stack corruption).
bitmap_clear was called with a wrong argument
which caused out-of-bound writes to the local variable width_mask.
This bug was detected with QEMU running on windows.
It also occurs with wine:
*** stack smashing detected ***: terminated
wine: Unhandled illegal instruction at address 0x6115c7 (thread 0009), starting debugger...
The bug is not windows specific!
Instead of fixing the wrong parameter value, bitmap_clear(), bitmap_set
and width_mask were removed, and bitmap_intersect() was replaced by
!bitmap_empty(). The new operation is much shorter and equivalent to
the old operations.
The declarations of the dirty bitmaps in vnc.h were also wrong for 64 bit
hosts because of a rounding effect: for these hosts, VNC_MAX_WIDTH is no
longer a multiple of (16 * BITS_PER_LONG), so the rounded value of
VNC_DIRTY_WORDS was too small.
Fix both declarations by using the macro which is designed for this
purpose.
Cc: Corentin Chary <corentincj@iksaif.net>
Cc: Wen Congyang <wency@cn.fujitsu.com>
Cc: Gerhard Wiesinger <lists@wiesinger.com>
Cc: Anthony Liguori <aliguori@us.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Stefan Weil <weil@mail.berlios.de>
Signed-off-by: Anthony Liguori <aliguori@us.ibm.com>
This option allow to disable adaptive behaviors in some encodings.
Signed-off-by: Corentin Chary <corentincj@iksaif.net>
Signed-off-by: Anthony Liguori <aliguori@us.ibm.com>
Switch to bitmap.h and bitops.h instead of redefining our own bitmap
helpers.
Signed-off-by: Corentin Chary <corentincj@iksaif.net>
Signed-off-by: Anthony Liguori <aliguori@us.ibm.com>
If an adaptive encoding has choosen to send a lossy update
based on the result of vnc_update_freq(), then it should advertise
it with vnc_sent_lossy_rect(). This will allow to automatically refresh
this rect once it's static again.
Signed-off-by: Corentin Chary <corentincj@iksaif.net>
Signed-off-by: Anthony Liguori <aliguori@us.ibm.com>
This patch compute the update frequency (in Hz) for each 64x64 rects.
Any adaptive encoding can get this value using vnc_update_freq(), and
switch to a lossy encoding if the value is too high.
The frequency is pre-calculated every 500ms, based on the last 10
updates per 64x64 rect.
If a 64x64 rect was not updated in the last 2 second, then the frequency
became 0, and all the stored timestamp are reseted.
Signed-off-by: Corentin Chary <corentincj@iksaif.net>
Signed-off-by: Anthony Liguori <aliguori@us.ibm.com>
This patch adds support for expiring passwords to vnc. It adds a new
vnc_display_pw_expire() function which specifies the time when the
password will expire.
Signed-off-by: Gerd Hoffmann <kraxel@redhat.com>
Implement a threaded VNC server using the producer-consumer model.
The main thread will push encoding jobs (a list a rectangles to update)
in a queue, and the VNC worker thread will consume that queue and send
framebuffer updates to the output buffer.
The threaded VNC server can be enabled with ./configure --enable-vnc-thread.
If you don't want it, just use ./configure --disable-vnc-thread and a syncrhonous
queue of job will be used (which as exactly the same behavior as the old queue).
If you disable the VNC thread, all thread related code will not be built and there will
be no overhead.
Signed-off-by: Corentin Chary <corentincj@iksaif.net>
Signed-off-by: Anthony Liguori <aliguori@us.ibm.com>
This will allow to implement the threaded VNC server in a
more cleaner way.
Signed-off-by: Corentin Chary <corentincj@iksaif.net>
Signed-off-by: Anthony Liguori <aliguori@us.ibm.com>
Introduce a new encoding: VNC_ENCODING_TIGHT_PNG [1] (-269) with a new
tight filter VNC_TIGHT_PNG (0x0A). When the client tells it supports the Tight PNG
encoding, the server will use tight, but will always send encoding pixels using
PNG instead of zlib. If the client also told it support JPEG, then the server can
send JPEG, because PNG will only be used in the cases zlib was used in normal tight.
This encoding was introduced to speed up HTML5 based VNC clients like noVNC [2], but
can also be used on devices like iPhone where PNG can be rendered in hardware.
[1] http://wiki.qemu.org/VNC_Tight_PNG
[2] http://github.com/kanaka/noVNC/
Signed-off-by: Corentin Chary <corentincj@iksaif.net>
Signed-off-by: Anthony Liguori <aliguori@us.ibm.com>
