No need to roll our own (with slightly incorrect handling of errno),
when we can use the common version.
Change signed parsing to unsigned, because what it read are values in
PCI config space, which are non-negative.
Signed-off-by: Cao jin <caoj.fnst@cn.fujitsu.com>
Reviewed-by: Stefano Stabellini <stefano.stabellini@eu.citrix.com>
Reviewed-by: Eric Blake <eblake@redhat.com>
And assert the snprintf() error, because user can do nothing in case of
snprintf() fail.
Signed-off-by: Cao jin <caoj.fnst@cn.fujitsu.com>
Reviewed-by: Stefano Stabellini <stefano.stabellini@eu.citrix.com>
Reviewed-by: Eric Blake <eblake@redhat.com>
merge last two lines, keep alphabetic order.
Signed-off-by: Cao jin <caoj.fnst@cn.fujitsu.com>
Reviewed-by: Stefan Weil <sw@weilnetz.de>
Reviewed-by: Stefano Stabellini <stefano.stabellini@eu.citrix.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael Tokarev <mjt@tls.msk.ru>
Introduce yet another mask for them, so that the generic routine can
handle them, at once rendering xen_pt_pmcsr_reg_write() superfluous.
Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Stefano Stabellini <stefano.stabellini@eu.citrix.com>
Reviewed-by: Stefano Stabellini <stefano.stabellini@eu.citrix.com>
The way the generic infrastructure works the intention of not allowing
unaligned accesses can't be achieved by simply setting .unaligned to
false. The benefit is that we can now replace the conditionals in
{get,set}_entry_value() by assert()-s.
Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Stefano Stabellini <stefano.stabellini@eu.citrix.com>
Reviewed-by: Stefano Stabellini <stefano.stabellini@eu.citrix.com>
The remaining log message in pci_msix_write() is wrong, as there guest
behavior may only appear to be wrong: For one, the old logic didn't
take the mask-all bit into account. And then this shouldn't depend on
host device state (i.e. the host may have masked the entry without the
guest having done so). Plus these writes shouldn't be dropped even when
an entry gets unmasked. Instead, if they can't be made take effect
right away, they should take effect on the next unmasking or enabling
operation - the specification explicitly describes such caching
behavior.
Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Stefano Stabellini <stefano.stabellini@eu.citrix.com>
Reviewed-by: Stefano Stabellini <stefano.stabellini@eu.citrix.com>
Asserting "true" is not that useful.
Reported by Coverity.
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Stefano Stabellini <stefano.stabellini@eu.citrix.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael Tokarev <mjt@tls.msk.ru>
msix->mmio is added to XenPCIPassthroughState's object as property.
object_finalize_child_property is called for XenPCIPassthroughState's
object, which calls object_property_del_all, which is going to try to
delete msix->mmio. object_finalize_child_property() will access
msix->mmio's obj. But the whole msix struct has already been freed
by xen_pt_msix_delete. This will cause segment fault when msix->mmio
has been overwritten.
This patch is to fix the issue.
Signed-off-by: Lan Tianyu <tianyu.lan@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Stefano Stabellini <stefano.stabellini@eu.citrix.com>
Signed-off-by: Stefano Stabellini <stefano.stabellini@eu.citrix.com>
The free() and g_free() functions both happily accept
NULL on any platform QEMU builds on. As such putting a
conditional 'if (foo)' check before calls to 'free(foo)'
merely serves to bloat the lines of code.
Signed-off-by: Daniel P. Berrange <berrange@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Markus Armbruster <armbru@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Eric Blake <eblake@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael Tokarev <mjt@tls.msk.ru>
Instead we have the emulation registers ->init functions which
consult the host values to see what the initial value should be
and they are responsible for populating the dev.config.
Reviewed-by: Stefano Stabellini <stefano.stabellini@eu.citrix.com>
Signed-off-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Stefano Stabellini <stefano.stabellini@eu.citrix.com>
and if we have failures we call xen_pt_destroy introduced in
'xen/pt: Move bulk of xen_pt_unregister_device in its own routine.'
and free all of the allocated structures.
Acked-by: Stefano Stabellini <stefano.stabellini@eu.citrix.com>
Signed-off-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Stefano Stabellini <stefano.stabellini@eu.citrix.com>
This way we can call it if we fail during init.
This code movement introduces no changes.
Acked-by: Stefano Stabellini <stefano.stabellini@eu.citrix.com>
Signed-off-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Stefano Stabellini <stefano.stabellini@eu.citrix.com>
To deal with xen_host_pci_[set|get]_ functions returning error values
and clearing ourselves in the init function we should make the
.exit (xen_pt_unregister_device) function be idempotent in case
the generic code starts calling .exit (or for fun does it before
calling .init!).
Reviewed-by: Stefano Stabellini <stefano.stabellini@eu.citrix.com>
Signed-off-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Stefano Stabellini <stefano.stabellini@eu.citrix.com>
We seem to only use these functions when de-activating the
MSI - so just log errors.
Reviewed-by: Stefano Stabellini <stefano.stabellini@eu.citrix.com>
Signed-off-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Stefano Stabellini <stefano.stabellini@eu.citrix.com>
To help with troubleshooting in the field.
Acked-by: Stefano Stabellini <stefano.stabellini@eu.citrix.com>
Signed-off-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Stefano Stabellini <stefano.stabellini@eu.citrix.com>
We do not want to have two entries to cache the guest configuration
registers: XenPTReg->data and dev.config. Instead we want to use
only the dev.config.
To do without much complications we rip out the ->data field
and replace it with an pointer to the dev.config. This way we
have the type-checking (uint8_t, uint16_t, etc) and as well
and pre-computed location.
Alternatively we could compute the offset in dev.config by
using the XenPTRRegInfo and XenPTRegGroup every time but
this way we have the pre-computed values.
This change also exposes some mis-use:
- In 'xen_pt_status_reg_init' we used u32 for the Capabilities Pointer
register, but said register is an an u16.
- In 'xen_pt_msgdata_reg_write' we used u32 but should have only use u16.
Signed-off-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Stefano Stabellini <stefano.stabellini@eu.citrix.com>
It should never happen, but in case it does (an developer adds
a new register and the 'init_val' expands past the register
size) we want to report. The code will only write up to
reg->size so there is no runtime danger of the register spilling
across other ones - however to catch this sort of thing
we still return an error.
Signed-off-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Stefano Stabellini <stefano.stabellini@eu.citrix.com>
For a passthrough device we maintain a state of emulated
registers value contained within d->config. We also consult
the host registers (and apply ro and write masks) whenever
the guest access the registers. This is done in xen_pt_pci_write_config
and xen_pt_pci_read_config.
Also in this picture we call pci_default_write_config which
updates the d->config and if the d->config[PCI_COMMAND] register
has PCI_COMMAND_MEMORY (or PCI_COMMAND_IO) acts on those changes.
On startup the d->config[PCI_COMMAND] are the host values, not
what the guest initial values should be, which is exactly what
we do _not_ want to do for 64-bit BARs when the guest just wants
to read the size of the BAR. Huh you say?
To get the size of 64-bit memory space BARs, the guest has
to calculate ((BAR[x] & 0xFFFFFFF0) + ((BAR[x+1] & 0xFFFFFFFF) << 32))
which means it has to do two writes of ~0 to BARx and BARx+1.
prior to this patch and with XSA120-addendum patch (Linux kernel)
the PCI_COMMAND register is copied from the host it can have
PCI_COMMAND_MEMORY bit set which means that QEMU will try to
update the hypervisor's P2M with BARx+1 value to ~0 (0xffffffff)
(to sync the guest state to host) instead of just having
xen_pt_pci_write_config and xen_pt_bar_reg_write apply the
proper masks and return the size to the guest.
To thwart this, this patch syncs up the host values with the
guest values taking into account the emu_mask (bit set means
we emulate, PCI_COMMAND_MEMORY and PCI_COMMAND_IO are set).
That is we copy the host values - masking out any bits which
we will emulate. Then merge it with the initial emulation register
values. Lastly this value is then copied both in
dev.config _and_ XenPTReg->data field.
There is also reg->size accounting taken into consideration
that ends up being used in patch.
xen/pt: Check if reg->init function sets the 'data' past the reg->size
This fixes errors such as these:
(XEN) memory_map:add: dom2 gfn=fffe0 mfn=fbce0 nr=20
(DEBUG) 189 pci dev 04:0 BAR16 wrote ~0.
(DEBUG) 200 pci dev 04:0 BAR16 read 0x0fffe0004.
(XEN) memory_map:remove: dom2 gfn=fffe0 mfn=fbce0 nr=20
(DEBUG) 204 pci dev 04:0 BAR16 wrote 0x0fffe0004.
(DEBUG) 217 pci dev 04:0 BAR16 read upper 0x000000000.
(XEN) memory_map:add: dom2 gfn=ffffffff00000 mfn=fbce0 nr=20
(XEN) p2m.c:883:d0v0 p2m_set_entry failed! mfn=ffffffffffffffff rc:-22
(XEN) memory_map:fail: dom2 gfn=ffffffff00000 mfn=fbce0 nr=20 ret:-22
(XEN) memory_map:remove: dom2 gfn=ffffffff00000 mfn=fbce0 nr=20
(XEN) p2m.c:920:d0v0 gfn_to_mfn failed! gfn=ffffffff00000 type:4
(XEN) p2m.c:920:d0v0 gfn_to_mfn failed! gfn=ffffffff00001 type:4
..
(XEN) memory_map: error -22 removing dom2 access to [fbce0,fbcff]
(DEBUG) 222 pci dev 04:0 BAR16 read upper 0x0ffffffff.
(XEN) memory_map:remove: dom2 gfn=ffffffff00000 mfn=fbce0 nr=20
(XEN) memory_map: error -22 removing dom2 access to [fbce0,fbcff]
[The DEBUG is to illustate what the hvmloader was doing]
Also we swap from xen_host_pci_long to using xen_host_pci_get_[byte,word,long].
Otherwise we get:
xen_pt_config_reg_init: Offset 0x0004 mismatch! Emulated=0x0000, host=0x2300017, syncing to 0x2300014.
xen_pt_config_reg_init: Error: Offset 0x0004:0x2300014 expands past register size(2)!
which is not surprising. We read the value as an 32-bit (from host),
then operate it as a 16-bit - and the remainder is left unchanged.
We end up writing the value as 16-bit (so 0014) to dev.config
(as we use proper xen_set_host_[byte,word,long] so we don't spill
to other registers) but in XenPTReg->data it is as 32-bit (0x2300014)!
It is harmless as the read/write functions end up using an size mask
and never modify the bits past 16-bit (reg->size is 2).
This patch fixes the warnings by reading the value using the
proper size.
Note that the check for size is still left in-case the developer
sets bits past the reg->size in the ->init routines. The author
tried to fiddle with QEMU_BUILD_BUG to make this work but failed.
Reviewed-by: Stefano Stabellini <stefano.stabellini@eu.citrix.com>
Reported-by: Sander Eikelenboom <linux@eikelenboom.it>
Signed-off-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Stefano Stabellini <stefano.stabellini@eu.citrix.com>
During init time we treat the dev.config area as a cache
of the host view. However during execution time we treat it
as guest view (by the generic PCI API). We need to sync Xen's
code to the generic PCI API view. This is the first step
by replacing all of the code that uses dev.config or
pci_get_[byte|word] to get host value to actually use the
xen_host_pci_get_[byte|word] functions.
Interestingly in 'xen_pt_ptr_reg_init' we also needed to swap
reg_field from uint32_t to uint8_t - since the access is only
for one byte not four bytes. We can split this as a seperate
patch however we would have to use a cast to thwart compiler
warnings in the meantime.
We also truncated 'flags' to 'flag' to make the code fit within
the 80 characters.
Reviewed-by: Stefano Stabellini <stefano.stabellini@eu.citrix.com>
Signed-off-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Stefano Stabellini <stefano.stabellini@eu.citrix.com>
If XEN_PT_LOGGING_ENABLED is enabled the XEN_PT_LOG macros start
using the first argument. Which means if within the function there
is only one user of the argument ('d') and XEN_PT_LOGGING_ENABLED
is not set, we get compiler warnings. This is not the case now
but with the "xen/pt: Use xen_host_pci_get_[byte|word] instead of dev.config"
we will hit - so this sync up the function to the rest of them.
Reviewed-by: Stefano Stabellini <stefano.stabellini@eu.citrix.com>
Signed-off-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Stefano Stabellini <stefano.stabellini@eu.citrix.com>
We would like to know what the MSI register value is to help
in troubleshooting in the field. As such modify the logging
logic to include such details in xen_pt_msgctrl_reg_write.
Reviewed-by: Stefano Stabellini <stefano.stabellini@eu.citrix.com>
Signed-off-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Stefano Stabellini <stefano.stabellini@eu.citrix.com>
However the init routines assume that on errors the return
code is -1 (as the libxc API is) - while those xen_host_* routines follow
another paradigm - negative errno on return, 0 on success.
Reviewed-by: Stefano Stabellini <stefano.stabellini@eu.citrix.com>
Signed-off-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Stefano Stabellini <stefano.stabellini@eu.citrix.com>
As we do not use it outside our code.
Reviewed-by: Stefano Stabellini <stefano.stabellini@eu.citrix.com>
Signed-off-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Stefano Stabellini <stefano.stabellini@eu.citrix.com>
It has changed but the comments still refer to the old names.
Reviewed-by: Stefano Stabellini <stefano.stabellini@eu.citrix.com>
Signed-off-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Stefano Stabellini <stefano.stabellini@eu.citrix.com>
The OpRegion shouldn't be mapped 1:1 because the address in the host
can't be used in the guest directly.
This patch traps read and write access to the opregion of the Intel
GPU config space (offset 0xfc).
The original patch is from Jean Guyader <jean.guyader@eu.citrix.com>
Signed-off-by: Tiejun Chen <tiejun.chen@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Yang Zhang <yang.z.zhang@Intel.com>
Acked-by: Stefano Stabellini <stefano.stabellini@eu.citrix.com>
Signed-off-by: Stefano Stabellini <stefano.stabellini@eu.citrix.com>
Currently we just register this isa bridge when we use IGD
passthrough in Xen side.
Signed-off-by: Tiejun Chen <tiejun.chen@intel.com>
Acked-by: Stefano Stabellini <stefano.stabellini@eu.citrix.com>
Signed-off-by: Stefano Stabellini <stefano.stabellini@eu.citrix.com>
Now we retrieve VGA bios like kvm stuff in qemu but we need to
fix Device Identification in case if its not matched with the
real IGD device since Seabios is always trying to compare this
ID to work out VGA BIOS.
Signed-off-by: Tiejun Chen <tiejun.chen@intel.com>
Acked-by: Stefano Stabellini <stefano.stabellini@eu.citrix.com>
Signed-off-by: Stefano Stabellini <stefano.stabellini@eu.citrix.com>
This is done indirectly by adjusting two typedefs and helps emphasizing
that the respective tables aren't supposed to be modified at runtime
(as they may be shared between devices).
Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: Stefano Stabellini <stefano.stabellini@eu.citrix.com>
Functions setting errno commonly return just -1, which is of no
particular use in the log file.
Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: Stefano Stabellini <stefano.stabellini@eu.citrix.com>
Expecting the ROM BAR to be written with an all ones value when sizing
the region is wrong - the low bit has another meaning (enable/disable)
and bits 1..10 are reserved. The PCI spec also mandates writing all
ones to just the address portion of the register.
Use suitable constants also for initializing the ROM BAR register field
description.
Signed-off-by: Stefano Stabellini <stefano.stabellini@eu.citrix.com>
Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
The code introduced to address XSA-126 allows simplification of other
code in xen_pt_initfn(): All we need to do is update "cmd" suitably,
as it'll be written back to the host register near the end of the
function anyway.
Signed-off-by: Stefano Stabellini <stefano.stabellini@eu.citrix.com>
Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
The function cannot fail, so the check is superfluous.
Signed-off-by: Fam Zheng <famz@redhat.com>
Message-id: 1433400324-7358-12-git-send-email-famz@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: Stefan Hajnoczi <stefanha@redhat.com>
... by default. Add a per-device "permissive" mode similar to pciback's
to allow restoring previous behavior (and hence break security again,
i.e. should be used only for trusted guests).
This is part of XSA-131.
Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Acked-by: Stefano Stabellini <stefano.stabellini@eu.citrix.com>
Reviewed-by: Anthony PERARD <anthony.perard@citrix.com>)
Since the next patch will turn all not explicitly described fields
read-only by default, those fields that have guest writable bits need
to be given explicit descriptors.
This is a preparatory patch for XSA-131.
Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
The adjustments are solely to make the subsequent patches work right
(and hence make the patch set consistent), namely if permissive mode
(introduced by the last patch) gets used (as both reserved registers
and reserved fields must be similarly protected from guest access in
default mode, but the guest should be allowed access to them in
permissive mode).
This is a preparatory patch for XSA-131.
Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
xen_pt_emu_reg_pcie[]'s PCI_EXP_DEVCAP needs to cover all bits as read-
only to avoid unintended write-back (just a precaution, the field ought
to be read-only in hardware).
This is a preparatory patch for XSA-131.
Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: Stefano Stabellini <stefano.stabellini@eu.citrix.com>
This is just to avoid having to adjust that calculation later in
multiple places.
Note that including ->ro_mask in get_throughable_mask()'s calculation
is only an apparent (i.e. benign) behavioral change: For r/o fields it
doesn't matter > whether they get passed through - either the same flag
is also set in emu_mask (then there's no change at all) or the field is
r/o in hardware (and hence a write won't change it anyway).
This is a preparatory patch for XSA-131.
Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Acked-by: Stefano Stabellini <stefano.stabellini@eu.citrix.com>
Reviewed-by: Anthony PERARD <anthony.perard@citrix.com>
xen_pt_pmcsr_reg_write() needs an adjustment to deal with the RW1C
nature of the not passed through bit 15 (PCI_PM_CTRL_PME_STATUS).
This is a preparatory patch for XSA-131.
Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: Stefano Stabellini <stefano.stabellini@eu.citrix.com>
There's no point in xen_pt_pmcsr_reg_{read,write}() each ORing
PCI_PM_CTRL_STATE_MASK and PCI_PM_CTRL_NO_SOFT_RESET into a local
emu_mask variable - we can have the same effect by setting the field
descriptor's emu_mask member suitably right away. Note that
xen_pt_pmcsr_reg_write() is being retained in order to allow later
patches to be less intrusive.
This is a preparatory patch for XSA-131.
Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Acked-by: Stefano Stabellini <stefano.stabellini@eu.citrix.com>
Acked-by: Ian Campbell <ian.campbell@citrix.com>
Without this the actual XSA-131 fix would cause the enable bit to not
get set anymore (due to the write back getting suppressed there based
on the OR of emu_mask, ro_mask, and res_mask).
Note that the fiddling with the enable bit shouldn't really be done by
qemu, but making this work right (via libxc and the hypervisor) will
require more extensive changes, which can be postponed until after the
security issue got addressed.
This is a preparatory patch for XSA-131.
Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Acked-by: Stefano Stabellini <stefano.stabellini@eu.citrix.com>
Limit error messages resulting from bad guest behavior to avoid allowing
the guest to cause the control domain's disk to fill.
The first message in pci_msix_write() can simply be deleted, as this
is indeed bad guest behavior, but such out of bounds writes don't
really need to be logged.
The second one is more problematic, as there guest behavior may only
appear to be wrong: For one, the old logic didn't take the mask-all bit
into account. And then this shouldn't depend on host device state (i.e.
the host may have masked the entry without the guest having done so).
Plus these writes shouldn't be dropped even when an entry is unmasked.
Instead, if they can't be made take effect right away, they should take
effect on the next unmasking or enabling operation - the specification
explicitly describes such caching behavior. Until we can validly drop
the message (implementing such caching/latching behavior), issue the
message just once per MSI-X table entry.
Note that the log message in pci_msix_read() similar to the one being
removed here is not an issue: "addr" being of unsigned type, and the
maximum size of the MSI-X table being 32k, entry_nr simply can't be
negative and hence the conditonal guarding issuing of the message will
never be true.
This is XSA-130.
Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: Stefano Stabellini <stefano.stabellini@eu.citrix.com>
It's being used by the hypervisor. For now simply mimic a device not
capable of masking, and fully emulate any accesses a guest may issue
nevertheless as simple reads/writes without side effects.
This is XSA-129.
Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: Stefano Stabellini <stefano.stabellini@eu.citrix.com>
The old logic didn't work as intended when an access spanned multiple
fields (for example a 32-bit access to the location of the MSI Message
Data field with the high 16 bits not being covered by any known field).
Remove it and derive which fields not to write to from the accessed
fields' emulation masks: When they're all ones, there's no point in
doing any host write.
This fixes a secondary issue at once: We obviously shouldn't make any
host write attempt when already the host read failed.
This is XSA-128.
Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: Stefano Stabellini <stefano.stabellini@eu.citrix.com>
Otherwise the guest can abuse that control to cause e.g. PCIe
Unsupported Request responses (by disabling memory and/or I/O decoding
and subsequently causing [CPU side] accesses to the respective address
ranges), which (depending on system configuration) may be fatal to the
host.
This is CVE-2015-2756 / XSA-126.
Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: Stefano Stabellini <stefano.stabellini@eu.citrix.com>
Acked-by: Ian Campbell <ian.campbell@citrix.com>
Message-id: alpine.DEB.2.02.1503311510300.7690@kaball.uk.xensource.com
Signed-off-by: Peter Maydell <peter.maydell@linaro.org>
The array length of s->real_device.io_regions[] is
"PCI_NUM_REGIONS - 1".
Signed-off-by: Gonglei <arei.gonglei@huawei.com>
Acked-by: Stefano Stabellini <stefano.stabellini@eu.citrix.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael Tokarev <mjt@tls.msk.ru>
