A new acme process is created that communicates with the acme servers.
This process does not hold any of your private keys (no account keys,
no domain keys etc).
Whenever the acme process requires a signed payload it will ask the keymgr
process to do the signing with the relevant keys.
This process is also sandboxed with pledge+unveil on OpenBSD and seccomp
syscall filtering on Linux.
The implementation only supports the tls-alpn-01 challenge. This means that
you do not need to open additional ports on your machine.
http-01 and dns-01 are currently not supported (no wildcard support).
A new configuration option "acme_provider" is available and can be set
to the acme server its directory. By default this will point to the
live letsencrypt environment:
https://acme-v02.api.letsencrypt.org/directory
The acme process can be controlled via the following config options:
- acme_root (where the acme process will chroot/chdir into).
- acme_runas (the user the acme process will run as).
If none are set, the values from 'root' and 'runas' are taken.
If you want to turn on acme for domains you do it as follows:
domain kore.io {
acme yes
}
You do not need to specify certkey/certfile anymore, if they are present
still
they will be overwritten by the acme system.
The keymgr will store all certificates and keys under its root
(keymgr_root), the account key is stored as "/account-key.pem" and all
obtained certificates go under "certificates/<domain>/fullchain.pem" while
keys go under "certificates/<domain>/key.pem".
Kore will automatically renew certificates if they will expire in 7 days
or less.
If set to "yes" then Kore will trace its child processes and properly
notify you of seccomp violations while still allowing the syscalls.
This can be very useful when running Kore on new platforms that have
not been properly tested with seccomp, allowing me to adjust the default
policies as we move further.
If the kodev tool is built with MINIMAL=1 it will not compile in
support for creating application skeletons, only to build apps, etc.
Building with MINIMAL=1 drops the openssl linkage.
We actually woke up the coroutine that originally spawned the process
when we reap it, but another coroutine may have taken over the object.
This mimics how we do things for the pysock_op things.
Now everything that has the "newer" OpenSSL API (1.1.x) is hidden
behind a KORE_OPENSSL_NEWER_API define. Tone down minimum libressl
version again to 2.7.5.
Allow JSON to be constructed via kore_json_create_item and its
handy macro family:
- kore_json_create_object()
- kore_json_create_array()
- kore_json_create_string()
- kore_json_create_number()
- kore_json_create_literal().
Adds kore_json_item_tobuf() to convert a JSON item into a string
representation in a kore_buf data structure.
Renames the kore_json_get* family to kore_json_find* instead.
Allows for quite clean code:
struct kore_buf buf;
struct kore_json_item *root;
root = kore_json_create_object(NULL, NULL);
kore_json_create_string(root, "hello", "world");
kore_json_create_number(root, "value", 2.241);
kore_buf_init(&buf, 128);
kore_json_item_tobuf(root, &buf);
kore_json_item_free(root);
kore_buf_cleanup(&buf);
In cases where a request is immediately completed in libcurl its multi
handle and no additional i/o is happening a coro can get stuck waiting
to be run.
Prevent this by lowering netwait from KORE_WAIT_INFINITE if there
are pending python coroutines.
Changes kore_curl_init() to take a flag parameter, much like pgsql api
in which you specify KORE_CURL_ASYNC or KORE_CURL_SYNC.
If KORE_CURL_ASYNC is specified, Kore will behave as before.
If Kore_CURL_SYNC is specified, Kore will execute the libcurl immediately
and return once it has been completed.
This allows you to send Python objects that can be run through pickle
to other worker processes.
If your application implements koreapp.onmsg() you will be able to receive
these objects.
A new hook in the koreapp class is called right before seccomp
is enabled. This hook receives a Kore seccomp object which has
the following methods:
seccomp.allow("syscall")
seccomp.allow_arg("syscall", arg, value)
seccomp.allow_flag("syscall", arg, flag)
seccomp.allow_mask("syscall", arg, mask)
seccomp.deny("syscall")
seccomp.deny_arg("syscall", arg, value, errno=EACCES)
seccomp.deny_flag("syscall", arg, flag, errno=EACCES)
seccomp.deny_mask("syscall", arg, mask, errno=EACCES)
This allows you to finetune the seccomp filters for your application
from inside your koreapp.
Joris Vink
Raymond Pasco