net: add checks to validate ring buffer pointers(CVE-2015-5279)
Ne2000 NIC uses ring buffer of NE2000_MEM_SIZE(49152) bytes to process network packets. While receiving packets via ne2000_receive() routine, a local 'index' variable could exceed the ring buffer size, which could lead to a memory buffer overflow. Added other checks at initialisation. Reported-by: Qinghao Tang <luodalongde@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: P J P <pjp@fedoraproject.org> Signed-off-by: Stefan Hajnoczi <stefanha@redhat.com>
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@ -221,6 +221,9 @@ ssize_t ne2000_receive(NetClientState *nc, const uint8_t *buf, size_t size_)
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}
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index = s->curpag << 8;
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if (index >= NE2000_PMEM_END) {
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index = s->start;
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}
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/* 4 bytes for header */
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total_len = size + 4;
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/* address for next packet (4 bytes for CRC) */
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@ -306,13 +309,19 @@ static void ne2000_ioport_write(void *opaque, uint32_t addr, uint32_t val)
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offset = addr | (page << 4);
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switch(offset) {
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case EN0_STARTPG:
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s->start = val << 8;
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if (val << 8 <= NE2000_PMEM_END) {
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s->start = val << 8;
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}
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break;
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case EN0_STOPPG:
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s->stop = val << 8;
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if (val << 8 <= NE2000_PMEM_END) {
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s->stop = val << 8;
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}
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break;
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case EN0_BOUNDARY:
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s->boundary = val;
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if (val << 8 < NE2000_PMEM_END) {
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s->boundary = val;
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}
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break;
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case EN0_IMR:
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s->imr = val;
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@ -353,7 +362,9 @@ static void ne2000_ioport_write(void *opaque, uint32_t addr, uint32_t val)
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s->phys[offset - EN1_PHYS] = val;
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break;
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case EN1_CURPAG:
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s->curpag = val;
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if (val << 8 < NE2000_PMEM_END) {
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s->curpag = val;
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}
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break;
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case EN1_MULT ... EN1_MULT + 7:
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s->mult[offset - EN1_MULT] = val;
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