Add support for the Dataset Management command and the Deallocate
attribute. Deallocation results in discards being sent to the underlying
block device. Whether of not the blocks are actually deallocated is
affected by the same factors as Write Zeroes (see previous commit).
format | discard | dsm (512B) dsm (4KiB) dsm (64KiB)
--------------------------------------------------------
qcow2 ignore n n n
qcow2 unmap n n y
raw ignore n n n
raw unmap n y y
Again, a raw format and 4KiB LBAs are preferable.
In order to set the Namespace Preferred Deallocate Granularity and
Alignment fields (NPDG and NPDA), choose a sane minimum discard
granularity of 4KiB. If we are using a passthru device supporting
discard at a 512B granularity, user should set the discard_granularity
property explicitly. NPDG and NPDA will also account for the
cluster_size of the block driver if required (i.e. for QCOW2).
See NVM Express 1.3d, Section 6.7 ("Dataset Management command").
Signed-off-by: Klaus Jensen <k.jensen@samsung.com>
Reviewed-by: Keith Busch <kbusch@kernel.org>
This adds the NPWG, NPWA, NPDG, NPDA and NOWS family of fields to the
shared nvme.h header for use by later patches.
Signed-off-by: Klaus Jensen <k.jensen@samsung.com>
Cc: Stefan Hajnoczi <stefanha@redhat.com>
Cc: Fam Zheng <fam@euphon.net>
Reviewed-by: Stefan Hajnoczi <stefanha@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Minwoo Im <minwoo.im.dev@gmail.com>
Add support for reporting the Deallocated or Unwritten Logical Block
Error (DULBE).
Rely on the block status flags reported by the block layer and consider
any block with the BDRV_BLOCK_ZERO flag to be deallocated.
Multiple factors affect when a Write Zeroes command result in
deallocation of blocks.
* the underlying file system block size
* the blockdev format
* the 'discard' and 'logical_block_size' parameters
format | discard | wz (512B) wz (4KiB) wz (64KiB)
-----------------------------------------------------
qcow2 ignore n n y
qcow2 unmap n n y
raw ignore n y y
raw unmap n y y
So, this works best with an image in raw format and 4KiB LBAs, since
holes can then be punched on a per-block basis (this assumes a file
system with a 4kb block size, YMMV). A qcow2 image, uses a cluster size
of 64KiB by default and blocks will only be marked deallocated if a full
cluster is zeroed or discarded. However, this *is* consistent with the
spec since Write Zeroes "should" deallocate the block if the Deallocate
attribute is set and "may" deallocate if the Deallocate attribute is not
set. Thus, we always try to deallocate (the BDRV_REQ_MAY_UNMAP flag is
always set).
Signed-off-by: Klaus Jensen <k.jensen@samsung.com>
Reviewed-by: Keith Busch <kbusch@kernel.org>
Add a new function, nvme_aio_err, to handle errors resulting from AIOs
and use this from the callbacks.
Signed-off-by: Klaus Jensen <k.jensen@samsung.com>
nvme_check_bounds has no use of the NvmeCtrl parameter; remove it.
Signed-off-by: Klaus Jensen <k.jensen@samsung.com>
Reviewed-by: Minwoo Im <minwoo.im.dev@gmail.com>
In the modules that we are checking so far, we can be stricter about the
difference between Optional[T] and T types. Enable that check.
Enabling it now will assist review on further typing and cleanup work.
Signed-off-by: John Snow <jsnow@redhat.com>
Message-Id: <20210201193747.2169670-17-jsnow@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Markus Armbruster <armbru@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Markus Armbruster <armbru@redhat.com>
For everything typed so far, type this parameter as
Optional[QAPISourceInfo].
In the most generic case, QAPISchemaEntity's info field may be None to
represent types that come from built-in definitions. Although some
Entity types may not currently have any built-in definitions, it is not
easily possible to constrain the type except on an ad-hoc basis using
assertions.
It's easier and simpler, then, to just say it's always an Optional type.
Signed-off-by: John Snow <jsnow@redhat.com>
Message-Id: <20210201193747.2169670-16-jsnow@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Markus Armbruster <armbru@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Markus Armbruster <armbru@redhat.com>
The previous commit removed the only user of QAPIGen(None). Tighten
the type hint.
Signed-off-by: Markus Armbruster <armbru@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: John Snow <jsnow@redhat.com>
Message-Id: <20210201193747.2169670-15-jsnow@redhat.com>
QAPISchemaGenCommandVisitor.visit_command() needs to generate the
marshalling function into the current module, and also generate its
registration into the ./init system module. The latter is done
somewhat awkwardly: .__init__() creates a QAPIGenCCode that will not
be written out, each .visit_command() adds its registration to it, and
.visit_end() copies its contents into the ./init module it creates.
Instead provide the means to temporarily switch to another module.
Create the ./init module in .visit_begin(), and generate its initial
part. Add registrations to it in .visit_command(). Finish it in
.visit_end().
Signed-off-by: Markus Armbruster <armbru@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: John Snow <jsnow@redhat.com>
Message-Id: <20210201193747.2169670-14-jsnow@redhat.com>
Many places assume they can access these fields without checking them
first to ensure they are defined. Eliminating the _genc and _genh fields
and replacing them with functional properties that check for correct
state can ease the typing overhead by eliminating the Optional[T] return
type.
Signed-off-by: John Snow <jsnow@redhat.com>
Message-Id: <20210201193747.2169670-12-jsnow@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Markus Armbruster <armbru@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Markus Armbruster <armbru@redhat.com>
Use a constant to make it obvious we're referring to a very specific thing.
Signed-off-by: John Snow <jsnow@redhat.com>
Message-Id: <20210201193747.2169670-11-jsnow@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Markus Armbruster <armbru@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Markus Armbruster <armbru@redhat.com>
With callers to _add_system_module now explicitly using the './' prefix
to indicate a system module, there is no longer any reason to have
separate interfaces for adding system vs user modules; use a unified
interface that differentiates based on the name.
Signed-off-by: Markus Armbruster <armbru@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: John Snow <jsnow@redhat.com>
Message-Id: <20210201193747.2169670-10-jsnow@redhat.com>
Use './builtin' as the built-in module name instead of
None. Clarify the typing that this is now always a string.
Signed-off-by: John Snow <jsnow@redhat.com>
Message-Id: <20210201193747.2169670-9-jsnow@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Markus Armbruster <armbru@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Markus Armbruster <armbru@redhat.com>
QAPISchemaModularCVisitor._add_system_module() prefixes './' to its name
argument to make it a module name. Pass the module name instead. This
will allow us to coalesce the methods to add modules later on.
Signed-off-by: John Snow <jsnow@redhat.com>
Message-Id: <20210201193747.2169670-8-jsnow@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Markus Armbruster <armbru@redhat.com>
[Commit message reworded]
Signed-off-by: Markus Armbruster <armbru@redhat.com>
QAPISchemaModularCVisitor._begin_system_module() is actually just for
the builtin module. Rename it to ._begin_builtin_module() and drop
its useless @name parameter.
Clarify conditionals in visit_module to make this clear.
Signed-off-by: Markus Armbruster <armbru@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: John Snow <jsnow@redhat.com>
Message-Id: <20210201193747.2169670-7-jsnow@redhat.com>
Define what a module is and define what kind of a module it is once and
for all, in one place.
Signed-off-by: John Snow <jsnow@redhat.com>
Message-Id: <20210201193747.2169670-6-jsnow@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Markus Armbruster <armbru@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Markus Armbruster <armbru@redhat.com>
We assert _start_if is not None in end_if, but that's opaque to mypy.
By inlining _wrap_ifcond, that constraint becomes provable to mypy.
Signed-off-by: John Snow <jsnow@redhat.com>
Message-Id: <20210201193747.2169670-5-jsnow@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Markus Armbruster <armbru@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Markus Armbruster <armbru@redhat.com>
Mypy cannot understand that this match can never be None, so help it
along.
Signed-off-by: John Snow <jsnow@redhat.com>
Message-Id: <20210201193747.2169670-4-jsnow@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Markus Armbruster <armbru@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Markus Armbruster <armbru@redhat.com>
Actually, the arg_type can indeed be Optional.
Signed-off-by: John Snow <jsnow@redhat.com>
Message-Id: <20210201193747.2169670-3-jsnow@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Markus Armbruster <armbru@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Markus Armbruster <armbru@redhat.com>
When boxed is True, expr.py asserts that we must have
arguments. Ultimately, this should mean that if boxed is True that
arg_type should be defined. Mypy cannot infer this, and does not support
'stateful' type inference, e.g.:
```
if x:
assert y is not None
...
if x:
y.etc()
```
does not work, because mypy does not statefully remember the conditional
assertion in the second block. Help mypy out by creating a new local
that it can track more easily.
Signed-off-by: John Snow <jsnow@redhat.com>
Message-Id: <20210201193747.2169670-2-jsnow@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Markus Armbruster <armbru@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Markus Armbruster <armbru@redhat.com>
- increase timeout on replay kernel acceptance test
- fixes for binfmt_misc docker images
- better gdb version detection
- don't silently skip gdb tests
- fix for gdbstub auxv handling
- cleaner handling of check-tcg on tcg disabled builds
- expand vexpress/versitile docs with examples
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Merge remote-tracking branch 'remotes/stsquad/tags/pull-testing-gdbstub-docs-080221-1' into staging
Testing, gdbstub and doc tweaks:
- increase timeout on replay kernel acceptance test
- fixes for binfmt_misc docker images
- better gdb version detection
- don't silently skip gdb tests
- fix for gdbstub auxv handling
- cleaner handling of check-tcg on tcg disabled builds
- expand vexpress/versitile docs with examples
# gpg: Signature made Mon 08 Feb 2021 11:12:03 GMT
# gpg: using RSA key 6685AE99E75167BCAFC8DF35FBD0DB095A9E2A44
# gpg: Good signature from "Alex Bennée (Master Work Key) <alex.bennee@linaro.org>" [full]
# Primary key fingerprint: 6685 AE99 E751 67BC AFC8 DF35 FBD0 DB09 5A9E 2A44
* remotes/stsquad/tags/pull-testing-gdbstub-docs-080221-1:
docs/system: document an example booting the versatilepb machine
docs/system: document an example vexpress-a15 invocation
tests/Makefile.include: don't use TARGET_DIRS for check-tcg
scripts/mtest2make.py: export all-%s-targets variable and use it
tests/tcg: Replace /bin/true by true (required on macOS)
gdbstub: Fix handle_query_xfer_auxv
tests/tcg: don't silently skip the gdb tests
configure: bump the minimum gdb version for check-tcg to 9.1
configure: make version_ge more tolerant of shady version input
tests/docker: add a docker-exec-copy-test
tests/docker: alias docker-help target for consistency
tests/docker: preserve original name when copying libs
tests/docker: make _copy_with_mkdir accept missing files
tests/docker: Fix typo in help message
tests/docker: Fix _get_so_libs() for docker-binfmt-image
tests/acceptance: Increase the timeout in the replay tests
Signed-off-by: Peter Maydell <peter.maydell@linaro.org>
A number of hardware platforms are implementing mechanisms whereby the
hypervisor does not have unfettered access to guest memory, in order
to mitigate the security impact of a compromised hypervisor.
AMD's SEV implements this with in-cpu memory encryption, and Intel has
its own memory encryption mechanism. POWER has an upcoming mechanism
to accomplish this in a different way, using a new memory protection
level plus a small trusted ultravisor. s390 also has a protected
execution environment.
The current code (committed or draft) for these features has each
platform's version configured entirely differently. That doesn't seem
ideal for users, or particularly for management layers.
AMD SEV introduces a notionally generic machine option
"machine-encryption", but it doesn't actually cover any cases other
than SEV.
This series is a proposal to at least partially unify configuration
for these mechanisms, by renaming and generalizing AMD's
"memory-encryption" property. It is replaced by a
"confidential-guest-support" property pointing to a platform specific
object which configures and manages the specific details.
Note to Ram Pai: the documentation I've included for PEF is very
minimal. If you could send a patch expanding on that, it would be
very helpful.
Changes since v8:
* Rebase
* Fixed some cosmetic typos
Changes since v7:
* Tweaked and clarified meaning of the 'ready' flag
* Polished the interface to the PEF internals
* Shifted initialization for s390 PV later (I hope I've finally got
this after apply_cpu_model() where it needs to be)
Changes since v6:
* Moved to using OBJECT_DECLARE_TYPE and OBJECT_DEFINE_TYPE macros
* Assorted minor fixes
Changes since v5:
* Renamed from "securable guest memory" to "confidential guest
support"
* Simpler reworking of x86 boot time flash encryption
* Added a bunch of documentation
* Fixed some compile errors on POWER
Changes since v4:
* Renamed from "host trust limitation" to "securable guest memory",
which I think is marginally more descriptive
* Re-organized initialization, because the previous model called at
kvm_init didn't work for s390
* Assorted fixes to the s390 implementation; rudimentary testing
(gitlab CI) only
Changes since v3:
* Rebased
* Added first cut at handling of s390 protected virtualization
Changes since RFCv2:
* Rebased
* Removed preliminary SEV cleanups (they've been merged)
* Changed name to "host trust limitation"
* Added migration blocker to the PEF code (based on SEV's version)
Changes since RFCv1:
* Rebased
* Fixed some errors pointed out by Dave Gilbert
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Merge remote-tracking branch 'remotes/dg-gitlab/tags/cgs-pull-request' into staging
Generalize memory encryption models
A number of hardware platforms are implementing mechanisms whereby the
hypervisor does not have unfettered access to guest memory, in order
to mitigate the security impact of a compromised hypervisor.
AMD's SEV implements this with in-cpu memory encryption, and Intel has
its own memory encryption mechanism. POWER has an upcoming mechanism
to accomplish this in a different way, using a new memory protection
level plus a small trusted ultravisor. s390 also has a protected
execution environment.
The current code (committed or draft) for these features has each
platform's version configured entirely differently. That doesn't seem
ideal for users, or particularly for management layers.
AMD SEV introduces a notionally generic machine option
"machine-encryption", but it doesn't actually cover any cases other
than SEV.
This series is a proposal to at least partially unify configuration
for these mechanisms, by renaming and generalizing AMD's
"memory-encryption" property. It is replaced by a
"confidential-guest-support" property pointing to a platform specific
object which configures and manages the specific details.
Note to Ram Pai: the documentation I've included for PEF is very
minimal. If you could send a patch expanding on that, it would be
very helpful.
Changes since v8:
* Rebase
* Fixed some cosmetic typos
Changes since v7:
* Tweaked and clarified meaning of the 'ready' flag
* Polished the interface to the PEF internals
* Shifted initialization for s390 PV later (I hope I've finally got
this after apply_cpu_model() where it needs to be)
Changes since v6:
* Moved to using OBJECT_DECLARE_TYPE and OBJECT_DEFINE_TYPE macros
* Assorted minor fixes
Changes since v5:
* Renamed from "securable guest memory" to "confidential guest
support"
* Simpler reworking of x86 boot time flash encryption
* Added a bunch of documentation
* Fixed some compile errors on POWER
Changes since v4:
* Renamed from "host trust limitation" to "securable guest memory",
which I think is marginally more descriptive
* Re-organized initialization, because the previous model called at
kvm_init didn't work for s390
* Assorted fixes to the s390 implementation; rudimentary testing
(gitlab CI) only
Changes since v3:
* Rebased
* Added first cut at handling of s390 protected virtualization
Changes since RFCv2:
* Rebased
* Removed preliminary SEV cleanups (they've been merged)
* Changed name to "host trust limitation"
* Added migration blocker to the PEF code (based on SEV's version)
Changes since RFCv1:
* Rebased
* Fixed some errors pointed out by Dave Gilbert
# gpg: Signature made Mon 08 Feb 2021 06:07:27 GMT
# gpg: using RSA key 75F46586AE61A66CC44E87DC6C38CACA20D9B392
# gpg: Good signature from "David Gibson <david@gibson.dropbear.id.au>" [full]
# gpg: aka "David Gibson (Red Hat) <dgibson@redhat.com>" [full]
# gpg: aka "David Gibson (ozlabs.org) <dgibson@ozlabs.org>" [full]
# gpg: aka "David Gibson (kernel.org) <dwg@kernel.org>" [unknown]
# Primary key fingerprint: 75F4 6586 AE61 A66C C44E 87DC 6C38 CACA 20D9 B392
* remotes/dg-gitlab/tags/cgs-pull-request:
s390: Recognize confidential-guest-support option
confidential guest support: Alter virtio default properties for protected guests
spapr: PEF: prevent migration
spapr: Add PEF based confidential guest support
confidential guest support: Update documentation
confidential guest support: Move SEV initialization into arch specific code
confidential guest support: Introduce cgs "ready" flag
sev: Add Error ** to sev_kvm_init()
confidential guest support: Rework the "memory-encryption" property
confidential guest support: Move side effect out of machine_set_memory_encryption()
sev: Remove false abstraction of flash encryption
confidential guest support: Introduce new confidential guest support class
qom: Allow optional sugar props
Signed-off-by: Peter Maydell <peter.maydell@linaro.org>
There is a bit more out there including Aurelien's excellent write up
and older Debian images here:
https://www.aurel32.net/info/debian_arm_qemu.phphttps://people.debian.org/~aurel32/qemu/armel/
However the web is transitory and git is forever so lets add something
to the fine manual.
Signed-off-by: Alex Bennée <alex.bennee@linaro.org>
Cc: Anders Roxell <anders.roxell@linaro.org>
Cc: Aurelien Jarno <aurelien@aurel32.net>
Message-Id: <20210202134001.25738-16-alex.bennee@linaro.org>
The wiki and the web are curiously absent of the right runes to boot a
vexpress model so I had to work from first principles to work it out.
Use the more modern -drive notation so alternative backends can be
used (unlike the hardwired -sd mode).
Signed-off-by: Alex Bennée <alex.bennee@linaro.org>
Cc: Anders Roxell <anders.roxell@linaro.org>
Message-Id: <20210202134001.25738-15-alex.bennee@linaro.org>
TARGET_DIRS reflects what we wanted to configure which in the normal
case is all our targets. However once meson has pared-down our target
list due to missing features we need to check the final list of
ninja-targets. This prevents check-tcg barfing on a --disable-tcg
build.
Suggested-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Alex Bennée <alex.bennee@linaro.org>
Acked-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Message-Id: <20210202134001.25738-14-alex.bennee@linaro.org>
There are some places where the conditional makefile support is the
simplest solution. Now we don't expose CONFIG_TCG as a variable create
a new one that can be checked for the check-help output.
As check-tcg is a PHONY target we re-use check-softfloat to gate that
as well.
Signed-off-by: Alex Bennée <alex.bennee@linaro.org>
Acked-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Message-Id: <20210202134001.25738-13-alex.bennee@linaro.org>
/bin/true is missing on macOS, but simply "true" is available as a shell builtin.
Signed-off-by: Stefan Weil <sw@weilnetz.de>
Signed-off-by: Alex Bennée <alex.bennee@linaro.org>
Reviewed-by: Peter Maydell <peter.maydell@linaro.org>
Reviewed-by: Philippe Mathieu-Daudé <f4bug@amsat.org>
Message-Id: <20210128135627.2067003-1-sw@weilnetz.de>
Message-Id: <20210202134001.25738-12-alex.bennee@linaro.org>
The main problem was that we were treating a guest address
as a host address with a mere cast.
Use the correct interface for accessing guest memory. Do not
allow offset == auxv_len, which would result in an empty packet.
Fixes: 51c623b0de ("gdbstub: add support to Xfer:auxv:read: packet")
Signed-off-by: Richard Henderson <richard.henderson@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: Alex Bennée <alex.bennee@linaro.org>
Message-Id: <20210128201831.534033-1-richard.henderson@linaro.org>
Message-Id: <20210202134001.25738-11-alex.bennee@linaro.org>
Otherwise people won't know what they are missing.
Signed-off-by: Alex Bennée <alex.bennee@linaro.org>
Message-Id: <20210202134001.25738-10-alex.bennee@linaro.org>
For SVE, currently the bulk of the GDB TCG tests, we need at least GDB
9.1 to support the "ieee_half" data type we report. This only affects
when GDB tests are run; users can still use lower versions of gdb as
long as they aren't talking to an SVE enabled model. The work around
is to either get a newer gdb or disable SVE for their CPU model.
Reported-by: Claudio Fontana <cfontana@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Alex Bennée <alex.bennee@linaro.org>
Cc: Luis Machado <luis.machado@linaro.org>
Message-Id: <20210202134001.25738-9-alex.bennee@linaro.org>
When checking GDB versions we have to tolerate all sorts of random
distro extensions to the version string. While we already attempt to
do some of that before we call version_ge is makes sense to try and
regularise the first input by stripping extraneous -'s. While we at it
convert the old-style shell quoting into a cleaner form t shut up my
editors linter lest it confuse me by underlining the whole line.
Suggested-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Alex Bennée <alex.bennee@linaro.org>
Tested-by: Thomas Huth <thuth@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Eric Blake <eblake@redhat.com>
Message-Id: <20210202134001.25738-8-alex.bennee@linaro.org>
This provides test machinery for checking the QEMU copying logic works
properly. It takes considerably less time to run than starting a
debootstrap only for it to fail later. I considered adding a remove
command to docker.py but figured that might be gold plating given the
relative size of the containers compared to the ones with actual stuff
in them.
Signed-off-by: Alex Bennée <alex.bennee@linaro.org>
Message-Id: <20210202134001.25738-7-alex.bennee@linaro.org>
We have a bunch of -help targets so this will save some cognitive
dissonance. Keep the original for those with muscle memory.
Signed-off-by: Alex Bennée <alex.bennee@linaro.org>
Reviewed-by: Thomas Huth <thuth@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Philippe Mathieu-Daudé <f4bug@amsat.org>
Message-Id: <20210202134001.25738-6-alex.bennee@linaro.org>
While it is important we chase down the symlinks to copy the correct
data we can confuse the kernel by renaming the interpreter to what is
in the binary. Extend _copy_with_mkdir to preserve the original name
of the file when asked.
Fixes: 5e33f7fead ("tests/docker: better handle symlinked libs")
Signed-off-by: Alex Bennée <alex.bennee@linaro.org>
Message-Id: <20210202134001.25738-5-alex.bennee@linaro.org>
Depending on the linker/ldd setup we might get a file with no path.
Typically this is the psuedo library linux-vdso.so which doesn't
actually exist on the disk. Rather than try and catch these distro
specific edge cases just shout about it and try and continue.
Signed-off-by: Alex Bennée <alex.bennee@linaro.org>
Tested-by: Philippe Mathieu-Daudé <f4bug@amsat.org>
Reviewed-by: Philippe Mathieu-Daudé <f4bug@amsat.org>
Message-Id: <20210202134001.25738-4-alex.bennee@linaro.org>
To have the variable properly passed, we need to set it,
ie. NOUSER=1. Fix the message displayed by 'make docker'.
Signed-off-by: Philippe Mathieu-Daudé <f4bug@amsat.org>
Signed-off-by: Alex Bennée <alex.bennee@linaro.org>
Message-Id: <20210119052120.522069-1-f4bug@amsat.org>
Message-Id: <20210202134001.25738-3-alex.bennee@linaro.org>
Fix a variable rename mistake from commit 5e33f7fead:
Traceback (most recent call last):
File "./tests/docker/docker.py", line 710, in <module>
sys.exit(main())
File "./tests/docker/docker.py", line 706, in main
return args.cmdobj.run(args, argv)
File "./tests/docker/docker.py", line 489, in run
_copy_binary_with_libs(args.include_executable,
File "./tests/docker/docker.py", line 149, in _copy_binary_with_libs
libs = _get_so_libs(src)
File "./tests/docker/docker.py", line 123, in _get_so_libs
libs.append(s.group(1))
NameError: name 's' is not defined
Fixes: 5e33f7fead ("tests/docker: better handle symlinked libs")
Signed-off-by: Philippe Mathieu-Daudé <f4bug@amsat.org>
Signed-off-by: Alex Bennée <alex.bennee@linaro.org>
Message-Id: <20210119050149.516910-1-f4bug@amsat.org>
Message-Id: <20210202134001.25738-2-alex.bennee@linaro.org>
Our gitlab-CI just showed a failed test_ppc_mac99 since it was apparently
killed some few seconds before the test finished. Allow it some more
time to complete.
Signed-off-by: Thomas Huth <thuth@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Wainer dos Santos Moschetta <wainersm@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Pavel Dovgalyuk <pavel.dovgalyuk@ispras.ru>
Signed-off-by: Alex Bennée <alex.bennee@linaro.org>
Message-Id: <20210127065222.48650-1-thuth@redhat.com>
At least some s390 cpu models support "Protected Virtualization" (PV),
a mechanism to protect guests from eavesdropping by a compromised
hypervisor.
This is similar in function to other mechanisms like AMD's SEV and
POWER's PEF, which are controlled by the "confidential-guest-support"
machine option. s390 is a slightly special case, because we already
supported PV, simply by using a CPU model with the required feature
(S390_FEAT_UNPACK).
To integrate this with the option used by other platforms, we
implement the following compromise:
- When the confidential-guest-support option is set, s390 will
recognize it, verify that the CPU can support PV (failing if not)
and set virtio default options necessary for encrypted or protected
guests, as on other platforms. i.e. if confidential-guest-support
is set, we will either create a guest capable of entering PV mode,
or fail outright.
- If confidential-guest-support is not set, guests might still be
able to enter PV mode, if the CPU has the right model. This may be
a little surprising, but shouldn't actually be harmful.
To start a guest supporting Protected Virtualization using the new
option use the command line arguments:
-object s390-pv-guest,id=pv0 -machine confidential-guest-support=pv0
Signed-off-by: David Gibson <david@gibson.dropbear.id.au>
Tested-by: Christian Borntraeger <borntraeger@de.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Christian Borntraeger <borntraeger@de.ibm.com>
The default behaviour for virtio devices is not to use the platforms normal
DMA paths, but instead to use the fact that it's running in a hypervisor
to directly access guest memory. That doesn't work if the guest's memory
is protected from hypervisor access, such as with AMD's SEV or POWER's PEF.
So, if a confidential guest mechanism is enabled, then apply the
iommu_platform=on option so it will go through normal DMA mechanisms.
Those will presumably have some way of marking memory as shared with
the hypervisor or hardware so that DMA will work.
Signed-off-by: David Gibson <david@gibson.dropbear.id.au>
Reviewed-by: Dr. David Alan Gilbert <dgilbert@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Cornelia Huck <cohuck@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Greg Kurz <groug@kaod.org>
We haven't yet implemented the fairly involved handshaking that will be
needed to migrate PEF protected guests. For now, just use a migration
blocker so we get a meaningful error if someone attempts this (this is the
same approach used by AMD SEV).
Signed-off-by: David Gibson <david@gibson.dropbear.id.au>
Reviewed-by: Dr. David Alan Gilbert <dgilbert@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Greg Kurz <groug@kaod.org>
Some upcoming POWER machines have a system called PEF (Protected
Execution Facility) which uses a small ultravisor to allow guests to
run in a way that they can't be eavesdropped by the hypervisor. The
effect is roughly similar to AMD SEV, although the mechanisms are
quite different.
Most of the work of this is done between the guest, KVM and the
ultravisor, with little need for involvement by qemu. However qemu
does need to tell KVM to allow secure VMs.
Because the availability of secure mode is a guest visible difference
which depends on having the right hardware and firmware, we don't
enable this by default. In order to run a secure guest you need to
create a "pef-guest" object and set the confidential-guest-support
property to point to it.
Note that this just *allows* secure guests, the architecture of PEF is
such that the guest still needs to talk to the ultravisor to enter
secure mode. Qemu has no direct way of knowing if the guest is in
secure mode, and certainly can't know until well after machine
creation time.
To start a PEF-capable guest, use the command line options:
-object pef-guest,id=pef0 -machine confidential-guest-support=pef0
Signed-off-by: David Gibson <david@gibson.dropbear.id.au>
Reviewed-by: Greg Kurz <groug@kaod.org>
Now that we've implemented a generic machine option for configuring various
confidential guest support mechanisms:
1. Update docs/amd-memory-encryption.txt to reference this rather than
the earlier SEV specific option
2. Add a docs/confidential-guest-support.txt to cover the generalities of
the confidential guest support scheme
Signed-off-by: David Gibson <david@gibson.dropbear.id.au>
Reviewed-by: Greg Kurz <groug@kaod.org>
While we've abstracted some (potential) differences between mechanisms for
securing guest memory, the initialization is still specific to SEV. Given
that, move it into x86's kvm_arch_init() code, rather than the generic
kvm_init() code.
Signed-off-by: David Gibson <david@gibson.dropbear.id.au>
Reviewed-by: Cornelia Huck <cohuck@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Greg Kurz <groug@kaod.org>
The platform specific details of mechanisms for implementing
confidential guest support may require setup at various points during
initialization. Thus, it's not really feasible to have a single cgs
initialization hook, but instead each mechanism needs its own
initialization calls in arch or machine specific code.
However, to make it harder to have a bug where a mechanism isn't
properly initialized under some circumstances, we want to have a
common place, late in boot, where we verify that cgs has been
initialized if it was requested.
This patch introduces a ready flag to the ConfidentialGuestSupport
base type to accomplish this, which we verify in
qemu_machine_creation_done().
Signed-off-by: David Gibson <david@gibson.dropbear.id.au>
Reviewed-by: Dr. David Alan Gilbert <dgilbert@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Greg Kurz <groug@kaod.org>
This allows failures to be reported richly and idiomatically.
Signed-off-by: David Gibson <david@gibson.dropbear.id.au>
Reviewed-by: Philippe Mathieu-Daudé <philmd@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Richard Henderson <richard.henderson@linaro.org>
Reviewed-by: Cornelia Huck <cohuck@redhat.com>
Currently the "memory-encryption" property is only looked at once we
get to kvm_init(). Although protection of guest memory from the
hypervisor isn't something that could really ever work with TCG, it's
not conceptually tied to the KVM accelerator.
In addition, the way the string property is resolved to an object is
almost identical to how a QOM link property is handled.
So, create a new "confidential-guest-support" link property which sets
this QOM interface link directly in the machine. For compatibility we
keep the "memory-encryption" property, but now implemented in terms of
the new property.
Signed-off-by: David Gibson <david@gibson.dropbear.id.au>
Reviewed-by: Greg Kurz <groug@kaod.org>
Reviewed-by: Cornelia Huck <cohuck@redhat.com>
