Commit Graph

935 Commits

Author SHA1 Message Date
Keqian Zhu
ac701a4f98 vmstate: Constify some VMStateDescriptions
Constify vmstate_ecc_state and vmstate_x86_cpu.

Signed-off-by: Keqian Zhu <zhukeqian1@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: Philippe Mathieu-Daudé <philmd@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Richard Henderson <richard.henderson@linaro.org>
Message-Id: <20210408140706.23412-1-zhukeqian1@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Laurent Vivier <laurent@vivier.eu>
2021-05-02 17:24:50 +02:00
Babu Moger
cdeaed2778 i386: Add missing cpu feature bits in EPYC-Rome model
Found the following cpu feature bits missing from EPYC-Rome model.
ibrs    : Indirect Branch Restricted Speculation
ssbd    : Speculative Store Bypass Disable

These new features will be added in EPYC-Rome-v2. The -cpu help output
after the change.

x86 EPYC-Rome             (alias configured by machine type)
x86 EPYC-Rome-v1          AMD EPYC-Rome Processor
x86 EPYC-Rome-v2          AMD EPYC-Rome Processor

Reported-by: Pankaj Gupta <pankaj.gupta@cloud.ionos.com>
Signed-off-by: Babu Moger <babu.moger@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Pankaj Gupta <pankaj.gupta@cloud.ionos.com>
Signed-off-by: Eduardo Habkost <ehabkost@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: David Edmondson <david.edmondson@oracle.com>
Message-Id: <161478622280.16275.6399866734509127420.stgit@bmoger-ubuntu>
Signed-off-by: Eduardo Habkost <ehabkost@redhat.com>
2021-04-09 16:02:18 -04:00
Richard Henderson
10b8eb94c0 target/i386: Verify memory operand for lcall and ljmp
These two opcodes only allow a memory operand.

Lacking the check for a register operand, we used the A0 temp
without initialization, which led to a tcg abort.

Buglink: https://bugs.launchpad.net/qemu/+bug/1921138
Signed-off-by: Richard Henderson <richard.henderson@linaro.org>
Message-Id: <20210324164650.128608-1-richard.henderson@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
2021-04-01 09:40:45 +02:00
Vitaly Kuznetsov
561dbb41b1 i386: Make migration fail when Hyper-V reenlightenment was enabled but 'user_tsc_khz' is unset
KVM doesn't fully support Hyper-V reenlightenment notifications on
migration. In particular, it doesn't support emulating TSC frequency
of the source host by trapping all TSC accesses so unless TSC scaling
is supported on the destination host and KVM_SET_TSC_KHZ succeeds, it
is unsafe to proceed with migration.

KVM_SET_TSC_KHZ is called from two sites: kvm_arch_init_vcpu() and
kvm_arch_put_registers(). The later (intentionally) doesn't propagate
errors allowing migrations to succeed even when TSC scaling is not
supported on the destination. This doesn't suit 're-enlightenment'
use-case as we have to guarantee that TSC frequency stays constant.

Require 'tsc-frequency=' command line option to be specified for successful
migration when re-enlightenment was enabled by the guest.

Signed-off-by: Vitaly Kuznetsov <vkuznets@redhat.com>
Message-Id: <20210319123801.1111090-1-vkuznets@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
2021-03-19 08:48:18 -04:00
Vitaly Kuznetsov
816d20c927 i386: Fix 'hypercall_hypercall' typo
Even the name of this section is 'cpu/msr_hyperv_hypercall',
'hypercall_hypercall' is clearly a typo.

Signed-off-by: Vitaly Kuznetsov <vkuznets@redhat.com>
Message-Id: <20210318160249.1084178-3-vkuznets@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
2021-03-19 08:48:18 -04:00
Paolo Bonzini
687758565a target/i386: svm: do not discard high 32 bits of EXITINFO1
env->error_code is only 32-bits wide, so the high 32 bits of EXITINFO1
are being lost.  However, even though saving guest state and restoring
host state must be delayed to do_vmexit, because they might take tb_lock,
it is always possible to write to the VMCB.  So do this for the exit
code and EXITINFO1, just like it is already being done for EXITINFO2.

Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
2021-03-19 08:48:18 -04:00
Paolo Bonzini
da3f3b020f target/i386: fail if toggling LA57 in 64-bit mode
This fixes kvm-unit-tests access.flat with -cpu qemu64,la57.

Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
2021-03-19 08:48:18 -04:00
Paolo Bonzini
b818413583 target/i386: allow modifying TCG phys-addr-bits
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
2021-03-19 08:48:18 -04:00
Philippe Mathieu-Daudé
538f049704 sysemu: Let VMChangeStateHandler take boolean 'running' argument
The 'running' argument from VMChangeStateHandler does not require
other value than 0 / 1. Make it a plain boolean.

Signed-off-by: Philippe Mathieu-Daudé <philmd@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Alex Bennée <alex.bennee@linaro.org>
Acked-by: David Gibson <david@gibson.dropbear.id.au>
Message-Id: <20210111152020.1422021-3-philmd@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Laurent Vivier <laurent@vivier.eu>
2021-03-09 23:13:57 +01:00
Michael Tokarev
cba42d61a3 Various spelling fixes
An assorted set of spelling fixes in various places.

Signed-off-by: Michael Tokarev <mjt@tls.msk.ru>
Reviewed-by: Stefan Weil <sw@weilnetz.de>
Reviewed-by: Philippe Mathieu-Daudé <philmd@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Peter Maydell <peter.maydell@linaro.org>
Message-Id: <20210309111510.79495-1-mjt@msgid.tls.msk.ru>
Signed-off-by: Laurent Vivier <laurent@vivier.eu>
2021-03-09 21:19:10 +01:00
Paolo Bonzini
c6986f16a7 KVM: x86: do not fail if software breakpoint has already been removed
If kvm_arch_remove_sw_breakpoint finds that a software breakpoint does not
have an INT3 instruction, it fails.  This can happen if one sets a
software breakpoint in a kernel module and then reloads it.  gdb then
thinks the breakpoint cannot be deleted and there is no way to add it
back.

Suggested-by: Maxim Levitsky <mlevitsk@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Maxim Levitsky <mlevitsk@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
2021-03-06 11:41:54 +01:00
Zheng Zhan Liang
c45b426acd tcg/i386: rdpmc: fix the the condtions
Signed-off-by: Zheng Zhan Liang <linuxmaker@163.com>
Message-Id: <20210225054756.35962-1-linuxmaker@163.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
2021-02-25 15:41:53 +01:00
Chenyi Qiang
06e878b413 target/i386: Add bus lock debug exception support
Bus lock debug exception is a feature that can notify the kernel by
generate an #DB trap after the instruction acquires a bus lock when
CPL>0. This allows the kernel to enforce user application throttling or
mitigations.

This feature is enumerated via CPUID.(EAX=7,ECX=0).ECX[bit 24].

Signed-off-by: Chenyi Qiang <chenyi.qiang@intel.com>
Message-Id: <20210202090224.13274-1-chenyi.qiang@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
2021-02-25 14:14:33 +01:00
Daniel P. Berrangé
b7d77f5a8e target/i386: update to show preferred boolean syntax for -cpu
The preferred syntax is to use "foo=on|off", rather than a bare
"+foo" or "-foo"

Signed-off-by: Daniel P. Berrangé <berrange@redhat.com>
Message-Id: <20210216191027.595031-11-berrange@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
2021-02-25 14:14:33 +01:00
Babu Moger
623972ceae i386: Add the support for AMD EPYC 3rd generation processors
Adds the support for AMD 3rd generation processors. The model
display for the new processor will be EPYC-Milan.

Adds the following new feature bits on top of the feature bits from
the first and second generation EPYC models.

pcid          : Process context identifiers support
ibrs          : Indirect Branch Restricted Speculation
ssbd          : Speculative Store Bypass Disable
erms          : Enhanced REP MOVSB/STOSB support
fsrm          : Fast Short REP MOVSB support
invpcid       : Invalidate processor context ID
pku           : Protection keys support
svme-addr-chk : SVM instructions address check for #GP handling

Depends on the following kernel commits:
14c2bf81fcd2 ("KVM: SVM: Fix #GP handling for doubly-nested virtualization")
3b9c723ed7cf ("KVM: SVM: Add support for SVM instruction address check change")
4aa2691dcbd3 ("8ce1c461188799d863398dd2865d KVM: x86: Factor out x86 instruction emulation with decoding")
4407a797e941 ("KVM: SVM: Enable INVPCID feature on AMD")
9715092f8d7e ("KVM: X86: Move handling of INVPCID types to x86")
3f3393b3ce38 ("KVM: X86: Rename and move the function vmx_handle_memory_failure to x86.c")
830bd71f2c06 ("KVM: SVM: Remove set_cr_intercept, clr_cr_intercept and is_cr_intercept")
4c44e8d6c193 ("KVM: SVM: Add new intercept word in vmcb_control_area")
c62e2e94b9d4 ("KVM: SVM: Modify 64 bit intercept field to two 32 bit vectors")
9780d51dc2af ("KVM: SVM: Modify intercept_exceptions to generic intercepts")
30abaa88382c ("KVM: SVM: Change intercept_dr to generic intercepts")
03bfeeb988a9 ("KVM: SVM: Change intercept_cr to generic intercepts")
c45ad7229d13 ("KVM: SVM: Introduce vmcb_(set_intercept/clr_intercept/_is_intercept)")
a90c1ed9f11d ("(pcid) KVM: nSVM: Remove unused field")
fa44b82eb831 ("KVM: x86: Move MPK feature detection to common code")
38f3e775e9c2 ("x86/Kconfig: Update config and kernel doc for MPK feature on AMD")
37486135d3a7 ("KVM: x86: Fix pkru save/restore when guest CR4.PKE=0, move it to x86.c")

Signed-off-by: Babu Moger <babu.moger@amd.com>
Message-Id: <161290460478.11352.8933244555799318236.stgit@bmoger-ubuntu>
Signed-off-by: Eduardo Habkost <ehabkost@redhat.com>
2021-02-18 18:34:45 -05:00
Peter Maydell
f0f75dc174 * HVF fixes
* Extra qos-test debugging output (Christian)
 * SEV secret address autodetection (James)
 * SEV-ES support (Thomas)
 * Relocatable paths bugfix (Stefan)
 * RR fix (Pavel)
 * EventNotifier fix (Greg)
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Merge remote-tracking branch 'remotes/bonzini-gitlab/tags/for-upstream' into staging

* HVF fixes
* Extra qos-test debugging output (Christian)
* SEV secret address autodetection (James)
* SEV-ES support (Thomas)
* Relocatable paths bugfix (Stefan)
* RR fix (Pavel)
* EventNotifier fix (Greg)

# gpg: Signature made Tue 16 Feb 2021 16:15:59 GMT
# gpg:                using RSA key F13338574B662389866C7682BFFBD25F78C7AE83
# gpg:                issuer "pbonzini@redhat.com"
# gpg: Good signature from "Paolo Bonzini <bonzini@gnu.org>" [full]
# gpg:                 aka "Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>" [full]
# Primary key fingerprint: 46F5 9FBD 57D6 12E7 BFD4  E2F7 7E15 100C CD36 69B1
#      Subkey fingerprint: F133 3857 4B66 2389 866C  7682 BFFB D25F 78C7 AE83

* remotes/bonzini-gitlab/tags/for-upstream: (21 commits)
  replay: fix icount request when replaying clock access
  event_notifier: Set ->initialized earlier in event_notifier_init()
  hvf: Fetch cr4 before evaluating CPUID(1)
  target/i386/hvf: add rdmsr 35H MSR_CORE_THREAD_COUNT
  hvf: x86: Remove unused definitions
  target/i386/hvf: add vmware-cpuid-freq cpu feature
  hvf: Guard xgetbv call
  util/cutils: Skip "." when looking for next directory component
  tests/qtest/qos-test: dump QEMU command if verbose
  tests/qtest/qos-test: dump environment variables if verbose
  tests/qtest/qos-test: dump qos graph if verbose
  libqos/qgraph_internal: add qos_printf() and qos_printf_literal()
  libqos/qgraph: add qos_node_create_driver_named()
  sev/i386: Enable an SEV-ES guest based on SEV policy
  kvm/i386: Use a per-VM check for SMM capability
  sev/i386: Don't allow a system reset under an SEV-ES guest
  sev/i386: Allow AP booting under SEV-ES
  sev/i386: Require in-kernel irqchip support for SEV-ES guests
  sev/i386: Add initial support for SEV-ES
  sev: update sev-inject-launch-secret to make gpa optional
  ...

Signed-off-by: Peter Maydell <peter.maydell@linaro.org>
2021-02-17 13:04:48 +00:00
Alexander Graf
106f91d59c hvf: Fetch cr4 before evaluating CPUID(1)
The CPUID function 1 has a bit called OSXSAVE which tells user space the
status of the CR4.OSXSAVE bit. Our generic CPUID function injects that bit
based on the status of CR4.

With Hypervisor.framework, we do not synchronize full CPU state often enough
for this function to see the CR4 update before guest user space asks for it.

To be on the save side, let's just always synchronize it when we receive a
CPUID(1) request. That way we can set the bit with real confidence.

Reported-by: Asad Ali <asad@osaro.com>
Signed-off-by: Alexander Graf <agraf@csgraf.de>
Message-Id: <20210123004129.6364-1-agraf@csgraf.de>
[RB: resolved conflict with another CPUID change]
Signed-off-by: Roman Bolshakov <r.bolshakov@yadro.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
2021-02-16 17:15:39 +01:00
Vladislav Yaroshchuk
027ac0cb51 target/i386/hvf: add rdmsr 35H MSR_CORE_THREAD_COUNT
Some guests (ex. Darwin-XNU) can attemp to read this MSR to retrieve and
validate CPU topology comparing it to ACPI MADT content

MSR description from Intel Manual:
35H: MSR_CORE_THREAD_COUNT: Configured State of Enabled Processor Core
  Count and Logical Processor Count

Bits 15:0 THREAD_COUNT The number of logical processors that are
  currently enabled in the physical package

Bits 31:16 Core_COUNT The number of processor cores that are currently
  enabled in the physical package

Bits 63:32 Reserved

Signed-off-by: Vladislav Yaroshchuk <yaroshchuk2000@gmail.com>
Message-Id: <20210113205323.33310-1-yaroshchuk2000@gmail.com>
[RB: reordered MSR definition and dropped u suffix from shift offset]
Signed-off-by: Roman Bolshakov <r.bolshakov@yadro.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
2021-02-16 17:15:39 +01:00
Alexander Graf
45f918ccf6 hvf: x86: Remove unused definitions
The hvf i386 has a few struct and cpp definitions that are never
used. Remove them.

Suggested-by: Roman Bolshakov <r.bolshakov@yadro.com>
Reviewed-by: Philippe Mathieu-Daudé <philmd@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Alexander Graf <agraf@csgraf.de>
Message-Id: <20210120224444.71840-3-agraf@csgraf.de>
Signed-off-by: Roman Bolshakov <r.bolshakov@yadro.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
2021-02-16 17:15:39 +01:00
Vladislav Yaroshchuk
3b502b0e47 target/i386/hvf: add vmware-cpuid-freq cpu feature
For `-accel hvf` cpu_x86_cpuid() is wrapped with hvf_cpu_x86_cpuid() to
add paravirtualization cpuid leaf 0x40000010
https://lkml.org/lkml/2008/10/1/246

Leaf 0x40000010, Timing Information:
EAX: (Virtual) TSC frequency in kHz.
EBX: (Virtual) Bus (local apic timer) frequency in kHz.
ECX, EDX: RESERVED (Per above, reserved fields are set to zero).

On macOS TSC and APIC Bus frequencies can be readed by sysctl call with
names `machdep.tsc.frequency` and `hw.busfrequency`

This options is required for Darwin-XNU guest to be synchronized with
host

Leaf 0x40000000 not exposes HVF leaving hypervisor signature empty

Signed-off-by: Vladislav Yaroshchuk <yaroshchuk2000@gmail.com>
Message-Id: <20210122150518.3551-1-yaroshchuk2000@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Roman Bolshakov <r.bolshakov@yadro.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
2021-02-16 17:15:39 +01:00
Hill Ma
118f2aadbc hvf: Guard xgetbv call
This prevents illegal instruction on cpus that do not support xgetbv.

Buglink: https://bugs.launchpad.net/qemu/+bug/1758819
Reviewed-by: Cameron Esfahani <dirty@apple.com>
Signed-off-by: Hill Ma <maahiuzeon@gmail.com>
Message-Id: <X/6OJ7qk0W6bHkHQ@Hills-Mac-Pro.local>
Signed-off-by: Roman Bolshakov <r.bolshakov@yadro.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
2021-02-16 17:15:39 +01:00
Tom Lendacky
027b524d6a sev/i386: Enable an SEV-ES guest based on SEV policy
Update the sev_es_enabled() function return value to be based on the SEV
policy that has been specified. SEV-ES is enabled if SEV is enabled and
the SEV-ES policy bit is set in the policy object.

Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Cc: Richard Henderson <richard.henderson@linaro.org>
Cc: Eduardo Habkost <ehabkost@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Dr. David Alan Gilbert <dgilbert@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Reviewed-by: Venu Busireddy <venu.busireddy@oracle.com>
Message-Id: <c69f81c6029f31fc4c52a9f35f1bd704362476a5.1611682609.git.thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
2021-02-16 17:15:39 +01:00
Tom Lendacky
23edf8b549 kvm/i386: Use a per-VM check for SMM capability
SMM is not currently supported for an SEV-ES guest by KVM. Change the SMM
capability check from a KVM-wide check to a per-VM check in order to have
a finer-grained SMM capability check.

Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Cc: Richard Henderson <richard.henderson@linaro.org>
Cc: Eduardo Habkost <ehabkost@redhat.com>
Suggested-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Reviewed-by: Venu Busireddy <venu.busireddy@oracle.com>
Message-Id: <f851903809e9d4e6a22d5dfd738dac8da991e28d.1611682609.git.thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
2021-02-16 17:15:39 +01:00
Tom Lendacky
92a5199b29 sev/i386: Don't allow a system reset under an SEV-ES guest
An SEV-ES guest does not allow register state to be altered once it has
been measured. When an SEV-ES guest issues a reboot command, Qemu will
reset the vCPU state and resume the guest. This will cause failures under
SEV-ES. Prevent that from occuring by introducing an arch-specific
callback that returns a boolean indicating whether vCPUs are resettable.

Cc: Peter Maydell <peter.maydell@linaro.org>
Cc: Aurelien Jarno <aurelien@aurel32.net>
Cc: Jiaxun Yang <jiaxun.yang@flygoat.com>
Cc: Aleksandar Rikalo <aleksandar.rikalo@syrmia.com>
Cc: David Gibson <david@gibson.dropbear.id.au>
Cc: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Dr. David Alan Gilbert <dgilbert@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Reviewed-by: Venu Busireddy <venu.busireddy@oracle.com>
Message-Id: <1ac39c441b9a3e970e9556e1cc29d0a0814de6fd.1611682609.git.thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
2021-02-16 17:15:39 +01:00
Paolo Bonzini
b2f73a0784 sev/i386: Allow AP booting under SEV-ES
When SEV-ES is enabled, it is not possible modify the guests register
state after it has been initially created, encrypted and measured.

Normally, an INIT-SIPI-SIPI request is used to boot the AP. However, the
hypervisor cannot emulate this because it cannot update the AP register
state. For the very first boot by an AP, the reset vector CS segment
value and the EIP value must be programmed before the register has been
encrypted and measured. Search the guest firmware for the guest for a
specific GUID that tells Qemu the value of the reset vector to use.

Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Cc: "Michael S. Tsirkin" <mst@redhat.com>
Cc: Marcel Apfelbaum <marcel.apfelbaum@gmail.com>
Cc: Richard Henderson <richard.henderson@linaro.org>
Cc: Eduardo Habkost <ehabkost@redhat.com>
Cc: Marcelo Tosatti <mtosatti@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Message-Id: <22db2bfb4d6551aed661a9ae95b4fdbef613ca21.1611682609.git.thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
2021-02-16 17:15:39 +01:00
Tom Lendacky
9681f8677f sev/i386: Require in-kernel irqchip support for SEV-ES guests
In prep for AP booting, require the use of in-kernel irqchip support. This
lessens the Qemu support burden required to boot APs.

Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Cc: Richard Henderson <richard.henderson@linaro.org>
Cc: Eduardo Habkost <ehabkost@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Dr. David Alan Gilbert <dgilbert@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Reviewed-by: Venu Busireddy <venu.busireddy@oracle.com>
Message-Id: <e9aec5941e613456f0757f5a73869cdc5deea105.1611682609.git.thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
2021-02-16 17:15:39 +01:00
Tom Lendacky
6b98e96f18 sev/i386: Add initial support for SEV-ES
Provide initial support for SEV-ES. This includes creating a function to
indicate the guest is an SEV-ES guest (which will return false until all
support is in place), performing the proper SEV initialization and
ensuring that the guest CPU state is measured as part of the launch.

Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Cc: Richard Henderson <richard.henderson@linaro.org>
Cc: Eduardo Habkost <ehabkost@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Dr. David Alan Gilbert <dgilbert@redhat.com>
Co-developed-by: Jiri Slaby <jslaby@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: Jiri Slaby <jslaby@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Reviewed-by: Venu Busireddy <venu.busireddy@oracle.com>
Message-Id: <2e6386cbc1ddeaf701547dd5677adf5ddab2b6bd.1611682609.git.thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
2021-02-16 17:15:39 +01:00
James Bottomley
f522cef9b3 sev: update sev-inject-launch-secret to make gpa optional
If the gpa isn't specified, it's value is extracted from the OVMF
properties table located below the reset vector (and if this doesn't
exist, an error is returned).  OVMF has defined the GUID for the SEV
secret area as 4c2eb361-7d9b-4cc3-8081-127c90d3d294 and the format of
the <data> is: <base>|<size> where both are uint32_t.  We extract
<base> and use it as the gpa for the injection.

Note: it is expected that the injected secret will also be GUID
described but since qemu can't interpret it, the format is left
undefined here.

Signed-off-by: James Bottomley <jejb@linux.ibm.com>

Reviewed-by: Dr. David Alan Gilbert <dgilbert@redhat.com>
Message-Id: <20210204193939.16617-3-jejb@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
2021-02-16 17:15:39 +01:00
James Bottomley
9617cddb72 pc: add parser for OVMF reset block
OVMF is developing a mechanism for depositing a GUIDed table just
below the known location of the reset vector.  The table goes
backwards in memory so all entries are of the form

<data>|len|<GUID>

Where <data> is arbtrary size and type, <len> is a uint16_t and
describes the entire length of the entry from the beginning of the
data to the end of the guid.

The foot of the table is of this form and <len> for this case
describes the entire size of the table.  The table foot GUID is
defined by OVMF as 96b582de-1fb2-45f7-baea-a366c55a082d and if the
table is present this GUID is just below the reset vector, 48 bytes
before the end of the firmware file.

Add a parser for the ovmf reset block which takes a copy of the block,
if the table foot guid is found, minus the footer and a function for
later traversal to return the data area of any specified GUIDs.

Signed-off-by: James Bottomley <jejb@linux.ibm.com>

Reviewed-by: Dr. David Alan Gilbert <dgilbert@redhat.com>
Message-Id: <20210204193939.16617-2-jejb@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
2021-02-16 17:15:39 +01:00
Richard Henderson
3e8f1628e8 exec: Use cpu_untagged_addr in g2h; split out g2h_untagged
Use g2h_untagged in contexts that have no cpu, e.g. the binary
loaders that operate before the primary cpu is created.  As a
colollary, target_mmap and friends must use untagged addresses,
since they are used by the loaders.

Use g2h_untagged on values returned from target_mmap, as the
kernel never applies a tag itself.

Use g2h_untagged on all pc values.  The only current user of
tags, aarch64, removes tags from code addresses upon branch,
so "pc" is always untagged.

Use g2h with the cpu context on hand wherever possible.

Use g2h_untagged in lock_user, which will be updated soon.

Reviewed-by: Peter Maydell <peter.maydell@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: Richard Henderson <richard.henderson@linaro.org>
Message-id: 20210212184902.1251044-13-richard.henderson@linaro.org
Signed-off-by: Peter Maydell <peter.maydell@linaro.org>
2021-02-16 11:04:53 +00:00
Chenyi Qiang
52a44ad2b9 target/i386: Expose VMX entry/exit load pkrs control bits
Expose the VMX exit/entry load pkrs control bits in
VMX_TRUE_EXIT_CTLS/VMX_TRUE_ENTRY_CTLS MSRs to guest, which supports the
PKS in nested VM.

Signed-off-by: Chenyi Qiang <chenyi.qiang@intel.com>
Message-Id: <20210205083325.13880-3-chenyi.qiang@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
2021-02-08 15:15:32 +01:00
Chenyi Qiang
6aa4228bd6 target/i386: Add support for save/load IA32_PKRS MSR
PKS introduces MSR IA32_PKRS(0x6e1) to manage the supervisor protection
key rights. Page access and writes can be managed via the MSR update
without TLB flushes when permissions change.

Add the support to save/load IA32_PKRS MSR in guest.

Signed-off-by: Chenyi Qiang <chenyi.qiang@intel.com>
Message-Id: <20210205083325.13880-2-chenyi.qiang@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
2021-02-08 15:15:32 +01:00
Paolo Bonzini
e7e7bdabab target/i86: implement PKS
Protection Keys for Supervisor-mode pages is a simple extension of
the PKU feature that QEMU already implements.  For supervisor-mode
pages, protection key restrictions come from a new MSR.  The MSR
has no XSAVE state associated to it.

PKS is only respected in long mode.  However, in principle it is
possible to set the MSR even outside long mode, and in fact
even the XSAVE state for PKRU could be set outside long mode
using XRSTOR.  So do not limit the migration subsections for
PKRU and PKRS to long mode.

Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
2021-02-08 14:43:55 +01:00
David Greenaway
51909241d2 target/i386: Fix decoding of certain BMI instructions
This patch fixes a translation bug for a subset of x86 BMI instructions
such as the following:

   c4 e2 f9 f7 c0                shlxq   %rax, %rax, %rax

Currently, these incorrectly generate an undefined instruction exception
when SSE is disabled via CR4, while instructions like "shrxq" work fine.

The problem appears to be related to BMI instructions encoded using VEX
and with a mandatory prefix of "0x66" (data). Instructions with this
data prefix (such as shlxq) are currently rejected. Instructions with
other mandatory prefixes (such as shrxq) translate as expected.

This patch removes the incorrect check in "gen_sse" that causes the
exception to be generated. For the non-BMI cases, the check is
redundant: prefixes are already checked at line 3696.

Buglink: https://bugs.launchpad.net/qemu/+bug/1748296

Signed-off-by: David Greenaway <dgreenaway@google.com>
Message-Id: <20210114063958.1508050-1-dgreenaway@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
2021-02-08 14:43:55 +01:00
Wei Huang
5447089c2b x86/cpu: Populate SVM CPUID feature bits
Newer AMD CPUs will add CPUID_0x8000000A_EDX[28] bit, which indicates
that SVM instructions (VMRUN/VMSAVE/VMLOAD) will trigger #VMEXIT before
CPU checking their EAX against reserved memory regions. This change will
allow the hypervisor to avoid intercepting #GP and emulating SVM
instructions. KVM turns on this CPUID bit for nested VMs. In order to
support it, let us populate this bit, along with other SVM feature bits,
in FEAT_SVM.

Signed-off-by: Wei Huang <wei.huang2@amd.com>
Message-Id: <20210126202456.589932-1-wei.huang2@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
2021-02-08 14:43:54 +01:00
Paolo Bonzini
5ea9e9e239 target/i386: do not set LM for 32-bit emulation "-cpu host/max"
32-bit targets by definition do not support long mode; therefore, the
bit must be masked in the features supported by the accelerator.

As a side effect, this avoids setting up the 0x80000008 CPUID leaf
for

   qemu-system-i386 -cpu host

which since commit 5a140b255d ("x86/cpu: Use max host physical address
if -cpu max option is applied") would have printed this error:

  qemu-system-i386: phys-bits should be between 32 and 36  (but is 48)

Reported-by: Nathan Chancellor <natechancellor@gmail.com>
Tested-by: Nathan Chancellor <natechancellor@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
2021-02-08 14:43:54 +01:00
David Gibson
ec78e2cda3 confidential guest support: Move SEV initialization into arch specific code
While we've abstracted some (potential) differences between mechanisms for
securing guest memory, the initialization is still specific to SEV.  Given
that, move it into x86's kvm_arch_init() code, rather than the generic
kvm_init() code.

Signed-off-by: David Gibson <david@gibson.dropbear.id.au>
Reviewed-by: Cornelia Huck <cohuck@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Greg Kurz <groug@kaod.org>
2021-02-08 16:57:38 +11:00
David Gibson
abc27d4241 confidential guest support: Introduce cgs "ready" flag
The platform specific details of mechanisms for implementing
confidential guest support may require setup at various points during
initialization.  Thus, it's not really feasible to have a single cgs
initialization hook, but instead each mechanism needs its own
initialization calls in arch or machine specific code.

However, to make it harder to have a bug where a mechanism isn't
properly initialized under some circumstances, we want to have a
common place, late in boot, where we verify that cgs has been
initialized if it was requested.

This patch introduces a ready flag to the ConfidentialGuestSupport
base type to accomplish this, which we verify in
qemu_machine_creation_done().

Signed-off-by: David Gibson <david@gibson.dropbear.id.au>
Reviewed-by: Dr. David Alan Gilbert <dgilbert@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Greg Kurz <groug@kaod.org>
2021-02-08 16:57:38 +11:00
David Gibson
c9f5aaa6bc sev: Add Error ** to sev_kvm_init()
This allows failures to be reported richly and idiomatically.

Signed-off-by: David Gibson <david@gibson.dropbear.id.au>
Reviewed-by: Philippe Mathieu-Daudé <philmd@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Richard Henderson <richard.henderson@linaro.org>
Reviewed-by: Cornelia Huck <cohuck@redhat.com>
2021-02-08 16:57:38 +11:00
David Gibson
e0292d7c62 confidential guest support: Rework the "memory-encryption" property
Currently the "memory-encryption" property is only looked at once we
get to kvm_init().  Although protection of guest memory from the
hypervisor isn't something that could really ever work with TCG, it's
not conceptually tied to the KVM accelerator.

In addition, the way the string property is resolved to an object is
almost identical to how a QOM link property is handled.

So, create a new "confidential-guest-support" link property which sets
this QOM interface link directly in the machine.  For compatibility we
keep the "memory-encryption" property, but now implemented in terms of
the new property.

Signed-off-by: David Gibson <david@gibson.dropbear.id.au>
Reviewed-by: Greg Kurz <groug@kaod.org>
Reviewed-by: Cornelia Huck <cohuck@redhat.com>
2021-02-08 16:57:38 +11:00
David Gibson
aacdb84413 sev: Remove false abstraction of flash encryption
When AMD's SEV memory encryption is in use, flash memory banks (which are
initialed by pc_system_flash_map()) need to be encrypted with the guest's
key, so that the guest can read them.

That's abstracted via the kvm_memcrypt_encrypt_data() callback in the KVM
state.. except, that it doesn't really abstract much at all.

For starters, the only call site is in code specific to the 'pc'
family of machine types, so it's obviously specific to those and to
x86 to begin with.  But it makes a bunch of further assumptions that
need not be true about an arbitrary confidential guest system based on
memory encryption, let alone one based on other mechanisms:

 * it assumes that the flash memory is defined to be encrypted with the
   guest key, rather than being shared with hypervisor
 * it assumes that that hypervisor has some mechanism to encrypt data into
   the guest, even though it can't decrypt it out, since that's the whole
   point
 * the interface assumes that this encrypt can be done in place, which
   implies that the hypervisor can write into a confidential guests's
   memory, even if what it writes isn't meaningful

So really, this "abstraction" is actually pretty specific to the way SEV
works.  So, this patch removes it and instead has the PC flash
initialization code call into a SEV specific callback.

Signed-off-by: David Gibson <david@gibson.dropbear.id.au>
Reviewed-by: Cornelia Huck <cohuck@redhat.com>
2021-02-08 16:57:38 +11:00
David Gibson
f91f9f254b confidential guest support: Introduce new confidential guest support class
Several architectures have mechanisms which are designed to protect
guest memory from interference or eavesdropping by a compromised
hypervisor.  AMD SEV does this with in-chip memory encryption and
Intel's TDX can do similar things.  POWER's Protected Execution
Framework (PEF) accomplishes a similar goal using an ultravisor and
new memory protection features, instead of encryption.

To (partially) unify handling for these, this introduces a new
ConfidentialGuestSupport QOM base class.  "Confidential" is kind of vague,
but "confidential computing" seems to be the buzzword about these schemes,
and "secure" or "protected" are often used in connection to unrelated
things (such as hypervisor-from-guest or guest-from-guest security).

The "support" in the name is significant because in at least some of the
cases it requires the guest to take specific actions in order to protect
itself from hypervisor eavesdropping.

Signed-off-by: David Gibson <david@gibson.dropbear.id.au>
2021-02-08 16:57:37 +11:00
Claudio Fontana
b86f59c715 accel: replace struct CpusAccel with AccelOpsClass
This will allow us to centralize the registration of
the cpus.c module accelerator operations (in accel/accel-softmmu.c),
and trigger it automatically using object hierarchy lookup from the
new accel_init_interfaces() initialization step, depending just on
which accelerators are available in the code.

Rename all tcg-cpus.c, kvm-cpus.c, etc to tcg-accel-ops.c,
kvm-accel-ops.c, etc, matching the object type names.

Signed-off-by: Claudio Fontana <cfontana@suse.de>
Message-Id: <20210204163931.7358-18-cfontana@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Richard Henderson <richard.henderson@linaro.org>
2021-02-05 10:24:15 -10:00
Claudio Fontana
940e43aa30 accel: extend AccelState and AccelClass to user-mode
Signed-off-by: Claudio Fontana <cfontana@suse.de>
Reviewed-by: Alex Bennée <alex.bennee@linaro.org>

[claudio: rebased on Richard's splitwx work]

Signed-off-by: Claudio Fontana <cfontana@suse.de>
Message-Id: <20210204163931.7358-17-cfontana@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Richard Henderson <richard.henderson@linaro.org>
2021-02-05 10:24:15 -10:00
Claudio Fontana
7827168471 cpu: tcg_ops: move to tcg-cpu-ops.h, keep a pointer in CPUClass
we cannot in principle make the TCG Operations field definitions
conditional on CONFIG_TCG in code that is included by both common_ss
and specific_ss modules.

Therefore, what we can do safely to restrict the TCG fields to TCG-only
builds, is to move all tcg cpu operations into a separate header file,
which is only included by TCG, target-specific code.

This leaves just a NULL pointer in the cpu.h for the non-TCG builds.

This also tidies up the code in all targets a bit, having all TCG cpu
operations neatly contained by a dedicated data struct.

Signed-off-by: Claudio Fontana <cfontana@suse.de>
Message-Id: <20210204163931.7358-16-cfontana@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Richard Henderson <richard.henderson@linaro.org>
2021-02-05 10:24:15 -10:00
Claudio Fontana
0545608056 cpu: move cc->do_interrupt to tcg_ops
Signed-off-by: Claudio Fontana <cfontana@suse.de>
Reviewed-by: Alex Bennée <alex.bennee@linaro.org>
Reviewed-by: Richard Henderson <richard.henderson@linaro.org>
Message-Id: <20210204163931.7358-10-cfontana@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Richard Henderson <richard.henderson@linaro.org>
2021-02-05 10:24:14 -10:00
Eduardo Habkost
e9ce43e97a cpu: Move debug_excp_handler to tcg_ops
Signed-off-by: Eduardo Habkost <ehabkost@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Claudio Fontana <cfontana@suse.de>
Reviewed-by: Alex Bennée <alex.bennee@linaro.org>
Reviewed-by: Richard Henderson <richard.henderson@linaro.org>
Message-Id: <20210204163931.7358-8-cfontana@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Richard Henderson <richard.henderson@linaro.org>
2021-02-05 10:24:14 -10:00
Eduardo Habkost
e124536f37 cpu: Move tlb_fill to tcg_ops
[claudio: wrapped target code in CONFIG_TCG]

Signed-off-by: Eduardo Habkost <ehabkost@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Claudio Fontana <cfontana@suse.de>
Reviewed-by: Philippe Mathieu-Daudé <philmd@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Alex Bennée <alex.bennee@linaro.org>
Reviewed-by: Richard Henderson <richard.henderson@linaro.org>
Message-Id: <20210204163931.7358-7-cfontana@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Richard Henderson <richard.henderson@linaro.org>
2021-02-05 10:24:14 -10:00
Eduardo Habkost
48c1a3e303 cpu: Move cpu_exec_* to tcg_ops
Signed-off-by: Eduardo Habkost <ehabkost@redhat.com>
[claudio: wrapped target code in CONFIG_TCG]
Signed-off-by: Claudio Fontana <cfontana@suse.de>
Reviewed-by: Philippe Mathieu-Daudé <philmd@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Alex Bennée <alex.bennee@linaro.org>
Reviewed-by: Richard Henderson <richard.henderson@linaro.org>
Message-Id: <20210204163931.7358-6-cfontana@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Richard Henderson <richard.henderson@linaro.org>
2021-02-05 10:24:14 -10:00
Eduardo Habkost
ec62595bab cpu: Move synchronize_from_tb() to tcg_ops
Signed-off-by: Eduardo Habkost <ehabkost@redhat.com>
[claudio: wrapped target code in CONFIG_TCG, reworded comments]
Signed-off-by: Claudio Fontana <cfontana@suse.de>
Reviewed-by: Alex Bennée <alex.bennee@linaro.org>
Message-Id: <20210204163931.7358-5-cfontana@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Richard Henderson <richard.henderson@linaro.org>
2021-02-05 10:24:14 -10:00