This reverts the following commits due to their basis on a bogus
linux kernel header update:
c93a656f7b ("tests/acceptance: Add virtiofs_submounts.py")
45ced7ca2f ("tests/acceptance/boot_linux: Accept SSH pubkey")
08dce386e7 ("virtiofsd: Announce sub-mount points")
eba8b096c1 ("virtiofsd: Store every lo_inode's parent_dev")
ede24b6be7 ("virtiofsd: Add fuse_reply_attr_with_flags()")
e2577435d3 ("virtiofsd: Add attr_flags to fuse_entry_param")
2f10415abf ("virtiofsd: Announce FUSE_ATTR_FLAGS")
97d741cc96 ("linux/fuse.h: Pull in from Linux")
Cc: Max Reitz <mreitz@redhat.com>
Cc: Stefan Hajnoczi <stefanha@redhat.com>
Cc: Dr. David Alan Gilbert <dgilbert@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Alex Williamson <alex.williamson@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Dr. David Alan Gilbert <dgilbert@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Max Reitz <mreitz@redhat.com>
Message-id: 160385090886.20017.13382256442750027666.stgit@gimli.home
Signed-off-by: Peter Maydell <peter.maydell@linaro.org>
Whenever we encounter a directory with an st_dev that differs from that
of its parent, we set the FUSE_ATTR_SUBMOUNT flag so the guest can
create a submount for it.
Make this behavior optional, so submounts are only announced to the
guest with the announce_submounts option. Some users may prefer the
current behavior, so that the guest learns nothing about the host mount
structure.
Signed-off-by: Max Reitz <mreitz@redhat.com>
Message-Id: <20200909184028.262297-7-mreitz@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Stefan Hajnoczi <stefanha@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Dr. David Alan Gilbert <dgilbert@redhat.com>
Manual merge
We want to detect mount points in the shared tree. We report them to
the guest by setting the FUSE_ATTR_SUBMOUNT flag in fuse_attr.flags, but
because the FUSE client will create a submount for every directory that
has this flag set, we must do this only for the actual mount points.
We can detect mount points by comparing a directory's st_dev with its
parent's st_dev. To be able to do so, we need to store the parent's
st_dev in the lo_inode object.
Note that mount points need not necessarily be directories; a single
file can be a mount point as well. However, for the sake of simplicity
let us ignore any non-directory mount points for now.
Signed-off-by: Max Reitz <mreitz@redhat.com>
Message-Id: <20200909184028.262297-6-mreitz@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Dr. David Alan Gilbert <dgilbert@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Dr. David Alan Gilbert <dgilbert@redhat.com>
The plain fuse_reply_attr() function does not allow setting
fuse_attr.flags, so add this new function that does.
Make fuse_reply_attr() a wrapper around it.
Signed-off-by: Max Reitz <mreitz@redhat.com>
Message-Id: <20200909184028.262297-5-mreitz@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Stefan Hajnoczi <stefanha@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Dr. David Alan Gilbert <dgilbert@redhat.com>
fuse_entry_param is converted to fuse_attr on the line (by
fill_entry()), so it should have a member that mirrors fuse_attr.flags.
fill_entry() should then copy this fuse_entry_param.attr_flags to
fuse_attr.flags.
Signed-off-by: Max Reitz <mreitz@redhat.com>
Message-Id: <20200909184028.262297-4-mreitz@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Stefan Hajnoczi <stefanha@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Dr. David Alan Gilbert <dgilbert@redhat.com>
The fuse_attr.flags field is currently just initialized to 0, which is
valid. Thus, there is no reason not to always announce FUSE_ATTR_FLAGS
(when the kernel supports it).
Signed-off-by: Max Reitz <mreitz@redhat.com>
Message-Id: <20200909184028.262297-3-mreitz@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Stefan Hajnoczi <stefanha@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Dr. David Alan Gilbert <dgilbert@redhat.com>
The mapping rule system implemented in the last few patches is
extremely flexible, but not easy to use. Add a simple
'map' type as a sprinkling of sugar to make it easy.
e.g.
-o xattrmap=":map::user.virtiofs.:"
would be sufficient to prefix all xattr's
or
-o xattrmap=":map:trusted.:user.virtiofs.:"
would just prefix 'trusted.' xattr's and leave
everything else alone.
Signed-off-by: Dr. David Alan Gilbert <dgilbert@redhat.com>
Message-Id: <20201023165812.36028-6-dgilbert@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Stefan Hajnoczi <stefanha@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Dr. David Alan Gilbert <dgilbert@redhat.com>
Map xattr names coming from the server, i.e. the host filesystem;
currently this is only from listxattr.
Signed-off-by: Dr. David Alan Gilbert <dgilbert@redhat.com>
Message-Id: <20201023165812.36028-4-dgilbert@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Stefan Hajnoczi <stefanha@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Dr. David Alan Gilbert <dgilbert@redhat.com>
Map xattr names originating at the client; from get/set/remove xattr.
Signed-off-by: Dr. David Alan Gilbert <dgilbert@redhat.com>
Message-Id: <20201023165812.36028-3-dgilbert@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Stefan Hajnoczi <stefanha@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Dr. David Alan Gilbert <dgilbert@redhat.com>
Add an option to define mappings of xattr names so that
the client and server filesystems see different views.
This can be used to have different SELinux mappings as
seen by the guest, to run the virtiofsd with less privileges
(e.g. in a case where it can't set trusted/system/security
xattrs but you want the guest to be able to), or to isolate
multiple users of the same name; e.g. trusted attributes
used by stacking overlayfs.
A mapping engine is used with 3 simple rules; the rules can
be combined to allow most useful mapping scenarios.
The ruleset is defined by -o xattrmap='rules...'.
This patch doesn't use the rule maps yet.
Signed-off-by: Dr. David Alan Gilbert <dgilbert@redhat.com>
Message-Id: <20201023165812.36028-2-dgilbert@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Stefan Hajnoczi <stefanha@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Dr. David Alan Gilbert <dgilbert@redhat.com>
virtiofsd cannot run in a container because CAP_SYS_ADMIN is required to
create namespaces.
Introduce a weaker sandbox mode that is sufficient in container
environments because the container runtime already sets up namespaces.
Use chroot to restrict path traversal to the shared directory.
virtiofsd loses the following:
1. Mount namespace. The process chroots to the shared directory but
leaves the mounts in place. Seccomp rejects mount(2)/umount(2)
syscalls.
2. Pid namespace. This should be fine because virtiofsd is the only
process running in the container.
3. Network namespace. This should be fine because seccomp already
rejects the connect(2) syscall, but an additional layer of security
is lost. Container runtime-specific network security policies can be
used drop network traffic (except for the vhost-user UNIX domain
socket).
Signed-off-by: Stefan Hajnoczi <stefanha@redhat.com>
Message-Id: <20201008085534.16070-1-stefanha@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Dr. David Alan Gilbert <dgilbert@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Dr. David Alan Gilbert <dgilbert@redhat.com>
Just noticed that although help message says default log level is INFO,
it is actually 0 (EMRGE) and no mesage will be shown when error occurs.
It's better to follow help message.
Signed-off-by: Misono Tomohiro <misono.tomohiro@jp.fujitsu.com>
Message-Id: <20201008110148.2757734-1-misono.tomohiro@jp.fujitsu.com>
Reviewed-by: Stefan Hajnoczi <stefanha@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Dr. David Alan Gilbert <dgilbert@redhat.com>
Currently it is unknown whether virtiofsd will be built at
configuration time. It will be automatically built when dependency
is met. Also, required libraries are not clear.
To make this clear, add configure option --{enable,disable}-virtiofsd.
The default is the same as current (enabled if available) like many
other options. When --enable-virtiofsd is given and dependency is not
met, we get:
ERROR: Problem encountered: virtiofsd requires libcap-ng-devel and seccomp-devel
or
ERROR: Problem encountered: virtiofsd needs tools and vhost-user support
In addition, configuration summary now includes virtiofsd entry:
build virtiofs daemon: YES/NO
Signed-off-by: Misono Tomohiro <misono.tomohiro@jp.fujitsu.com>
Message-Id: <20201008103133.2722903-1-misono.tomohiro@jp.fujitsu.com>
Reviewed-by: Dr. David Alan Gilbert <dgilbert@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Dr. David Alan Gilbert <dgilbert@redhat.com>
Manual merge
Since installation is not part of Makefiles anymore, Make need not
know the directories anymore. Meson already knows them through
built-in options, do everything using them instead of the config_host
dictionary.
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Allow vu_message_read to be replaced by one which will make use of the
QIOChannel functions. Thus reading vhost-user message won't stall the
guest. For slave channel, we still use the default vu_message_read.
Reviewed-by: Marc-André Lureau <marcandre.lureau@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Coiby Xu <coiby.xu@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Stefan Hajnoczi <stefanha@redhat.com>
Message-id: 20200918080912.321299-2-coiby.xu@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Stefan Hajnoczi <stefanha@redhat.com>
In order to prevent /proc/self/fd escapes a temporary directory is
created where /proc/self/fd is bind-mounted. This doesn't work on
read-only file systems.
Avoid the temporary directory by bind-mounting /proc/self/fd over /proc.
This does not affect other processes since we remounted / with MS_REC |
MS_SLAVE. /proc must exist and virtiofsd does not use it so it's safe to
do this.
Path traversal can be tested with the following function:
static void test_proc_fd_escape(struct lo_data *lo)
{
int fd;
int level = 0;
ino_t last_ino = 0;
fd = lo->proc_self_fd;
for (;;) {
struct stat st;
if (fstat(fd, &st) != 0) {
perror("fstat");
return;
}
if (last_ino && st.st_ino == last_ino) {
fprintf(stderr, "inode number unchanged, stopping\n");
return;
}
last_ino = st.st_ino;
fprintf(stderr, "Level %d dev %lu ino %lu\n", level,
(unsigned long)st.st_dev,
(unsigned long)last_ino);
fd = openat(fd, "..", O_PATH | O_DIRECTORY | O_NOFOLLOW);
level++;
}
}
Before and after this patch only Level 0 is displayed. Without
/proc/self/fd bind-mount protection it is possible to traverse parent
directories.
Fixes: 397ae982f4 ("virtiofsd: jail lo->proc_self_fd")
Cc: Miklos Szeredi <mszeredi@redhat.com>
Cc: Jens Freimann <jfreimann@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Stefan Hajnoczi <stefanha@redhat.com>
Message-Id: <20201006095826.59813-1-stefanha@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Dr. David Alan Gilbert <dgilbert@redhat.com>
Tested-by: Jens Freimann <jfreimann@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Jens Freimann <jfreimann@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Dr. David Alan Gilbert <dgilbert@redhat.com>
Since fcb4f59c87 qemu_get_local_state_pathname relies on the
init_exec_dir, and virtiofsd asserts because we never set it.
Set it.
Reported-by: Alex Bennée <alex.bennee@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: Dr. David Alan Gilbert <dgilbert@redhat.com>
Message-Id: <20201002124015.44820-1-dgilbert@redhat.com>
Tested-by: Alex Bennée <alex.bennee@linaro.org>
Reviewed-by: Alex Bennée <alex.bennee@linaro.org>
Reviewed-by: Stefan Hajnoczi <stefanha@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Dr. David Alan Gilbert <dgilbert@redhat.com>
If you like running QEMU as a normal user (very common for TCG runs)
but you have to run virtiofsd as a root user you run into connection
problems. Adding support for an optional --socket-group allows the
users to keep using the command line.
Signed-off-by: Alex Bennée <alex.bennee@linaro.org>
Reviewed-by: Stefan Hajnoczi <stefanha@redhat.com>
Message-Id: <20200925125147.26943-2-alex.bennee@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: Dr. David Alan Gilbert <dgilbert@redhat.com>
dgilbert: Split long line
Gcc worries fd might be used unset, in reality it's always set if
fi is set, and only used if fi is set so it's safe. Initialise it to -1
just to keep gcc happy for now.
Signed-off-by: Dr. David Alan Gilbert <dgilbert@redhat.com>
Message-Id: <20200827153657.111098-2-dgilbert@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Ján Tomko <jtomko@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Dr. David Alan Gilbert <dgilbert@redhat.com>
Due to the commit 65da453980, the O_DIRECT
open flag of guest applications will be discarded by virtiofsd. While
this behavior makes it consistent with the virtio-9p scheme when guest
applications use direct I/O, we no longer have any chance to bypass the
host page cache.
Therefore, we add a flag 'allow_direct_io' to lo_data. If '-o
no_allow_direct_io' option is added, or none of '-o allow_direct_io' or
'-o no_allow_direct_io' is added, the 'allow_direct_io' will be set to
0, and virtiofsd discards O_DIRECT as before. If '-o allow_direct_io'
is added to the starting command-line, 'allow_direct_io' will be set to
1, so that the O_DIRECT flags will be retained and host page cache can
be bypassed.
Signed-off-by: Jiachen Zhang <zhangjiachen.jaycee@bytedance.com>
Reviewed-by: Stefan Hajnoczi <stefanha@redhat.com>
Message-Id: <20200824105957.61265-1-zhangjiachen.jaycee@bytedance.com>
Signed-off-by: Dr. David Alan Gilbert <dgilbert@redhat.com>
glib offers thread pools and it seems to support "exclusive" and "shared"
thread pools.
https://developer.gnome.org/glib/stable/glib-Thread-Pools.html#g-thread-pool-new
Currently we use "exlusive" thread pools but its performance seems to be
poor. I tried using "shared" thread pools and performance seems much
better. I posted performance results here.
https://www.redhat.com/archives/virtio-fs/2020-September/msg00080.html
So lets switch to shared thread pools. We can think of making it optional
once somebody can show in what cases exclusive thread pools offer better
results. For now, my simple performance tests across the board see
better results with shared thread pools.
Signed-off-by: Vivek Goyal <vgoyal@redhat.com>
Message-Id: <20200921213216.GE13362@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Stefan Hajnoczi <stefanha@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Dr. David Alan Gilbert <dgilbert@redhat.com>
With seccomp fix from Miklos
When cross-compiling, by default qemu_datadir is 'c:\Program
Files\QEMU', which is not recognized as being an absolute path, and
meson will end up adding the prefix again.
Signed-off-by: Marc-André Lureau <marcandre.lureau@redhat.com>
Message-Id: <20200826110419.528931-6-marcandre.lureau@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
An assertion failure is raised during request processing if
unshare(CLONE_FS) fails. Implement a probe at startup so the problem can
be detected right away.
Unfortunately Docker/Moby does not include unshare in the seccomp.json
list unless CAP_SYS_ADMIN is given. Other seccomp.json lists always
include unshare (e.g. podman is unaffected):
https://raw.githubusercontent.com/seccomp/containers-golang/master/seccomp.json
Use "docker run --security-opt seccomp=path/to/seccomp.json ..." if the
default seccomp.json is missing unshare.
Cc: Misono Tomohiro <misono.tomohiro@jp.fujitsu.com>
Signed-off-by: Stefan Hajnoczi <stefanha@redhat.com>
Message-Id: <20200727190223.422280-4-stefanha@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Misono Tomohiro <misono.tomohiro@jp.fujitsu.com>
Signed-off-by: Dr. David Alan Gilbert <dgilbert@redhat.com>
virtiofsd does not need CAP_DAC_READ_SEARCH because it already has
the more powerful CAP_DAC_OVERRIDE. Drop it from the list of
capabilities.
This is important because container runtimes may not include
CAP_DAC_READ_SEARCH by default. This patch allows virtiofsd to reduce
its capabilities when running inside a Docker container.
Note that CAP_DAC_READ_SEARCH may be necessary again in the future if
virtiofsd starts using open_by_handle_at(2).
Signed-off-by: Stefan Hajnoczi <stefanha@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Dr. David Alan Gilbert <dgilbert@redhat.com>
Message-Id: <20200727190223.422280-2-stefanha@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Dr. David Alan Gilbert <dgilbert@redhat.com>
Commit 93bb3d8d4c ("virtiofsd: remove symlink fallbacks") removed
the implementation of the "norace" option, so remove it from the
cmdline help and the documentation too.
Signed-off-by: Sergio Lopez <slp@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Philippe Mathieu-Daudé <philmd@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Stefano Garzarella <sgarzare@redhat.com>
Message-Id: <20200717121110.50580-1-slp@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Dr. David Alan Gilbert <dgilbert@redhat.com>
Right now we enable remote posix locks by default. That means when guest
does a posix lock it sends request to server (virtiofsd). But currently
we only support non-blocking posix lock and return -EOPNOTSUPP for
blocking version.
This means that existing applications which are doing blocking posix
locks get -EOPNOTSUPP and fail. To avoid this, people have been
running virtiosd with option "-o no_posix_lock". For new users it
is still a surprise and trial and error takes them to this option.
Given posix lock implementation is not complete in virtiofsd, disable
it by default. This means that posix locks will work with-in applications
in a guest but not across guests. Anyway we don't support sharing
filesystem among different guests yet in virtiofs so this should
not lead to any kind of surprise or regression and will make life
little easier for virtiofs users.
Reported-by: Aa Aa <jimbothom@yandex.com>
Suggested-by: Miklos Szeredi <mszeredi@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Vivek Goyal <vgoyal@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Stefan Hajnoczi <stefanha@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Misono Tomohiro <misono.tomohiro@jp.fujitsu.com>
Signed-off-by: Dr. David Alan Gilbert <dgilbert@redhat.com>
Allow capabilities to be added or removed from the allowed set for the
daemon; e.g.
default:
CapPrm: 00000000880000df
CapEff: 00000000880000df
-o modcaps=+sys_admin
CapPrm: 00000000882000df
CapEff: 00000000882000df
-o modcaps=+sys_admin:-chown
CapPrm: 00000000882000de
CapEff: 00000000882000de
Signed-off-by: Dr. David Alan Gilbert <dgilbert@redhat.com>
Message-Id: <20200629115420.98443-4-dgilbert@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Vivek Goyal <vgoyal@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Stefan Hajnoczi <stefanha@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Dr. David Alan Gilbert <dgilbert@redhat.com>
Check the capability calls worked.
Signed-off-by: Dr. David Alan Gilbert <dgilbert@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Stefan Hajnoczi <stefanha@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Vivek Goyal <vgoyal@redhat.com>
Message-Id: <20200629115420.98443-3-dgilbert@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Dr. David Alan Gilbert <dgilbert@redhat.com>
capng_updatev is a varargs function that needs a -1 to terminate it,
but it was missing.
In practice what seems to have been happening is that it's added the
capabilities we asked for, then runs into junk on the stack, so if
we're unlucky it might be adding some more, but in reality it's
failing - but after adding the capabilities we asked for.
Fixes: a59feb483b ("virtiofsd: only retain file system capabilities")
Signed-off-by: Dr. David Alan Gilbert <dgilbert@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Stefan Hajnoczi <stefanha@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Vivek Goyal <vgoyal@redhat.com>
Message-Id: <20200629115420.98443-2-dgilbert@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Dr. David Alan Gilbert <dgilbert@redhat.com>
lo_setattr() invokes fchmod() in a rarely used code path, so it should
be whitelisted or virtiofsd will crash with EBADSYS.
Said code path can be triggered for example as follows:
On the host, in the shared directory, create a file with the sticky bit
set and a security.capability xattr:
(1) # touch foo
(2) # chmod u+s foo
(3) # setcap '' foo
Then in the guest let some process truncate that file after it has
dropped all of its capabilities (at least CAP_FSETID):
int main(int argc, char *argv[])
{
capng_setpid(getpid());
capng_clear(CAPNG_SELECT_BOTH);
capng_updatev(CAPNG_ADD, CAPNG_PERMITTED | CAPNG_EFFECTIVE, 0);
capng_apply(CAPNG_SELECT_BOTH);
ftruncate(open(argv[1], O_RDWR), 0);
}
This will cause the guest kernel to drop the sticky bit (i.e. perform a
mode change) as part of the truncate (where FATTR_FH is set), and that
will cause virtiofsd to invoke fchmod() instead of fchmodat().
(A similar configuration exists further below with futimens() vs.
utimensat(), but the former is not a syscall but just a wrapper for the
latter, so no further whitelisting is required.)
Buglink: https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1842667
Reported-by: Qian Cai <caiqian@redhat.com>
Cc: qemu-stable@nongnu.org
Signed-off-by: Max Reitz <mreitz@redhat.com>
Message-Id: <20200608093111.14942-1-mreitz@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Dr. David Alan Gilbert <dgilbert@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Vivek Goyal <vgoyal@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Dr. David Alan Gilbert <dgilbert@redhat.com>
Path lookup in the kernel has special rules for looking up magic symlinks
under /proc. If a filesystem operation is instructed to follow symlinks
(e.g. via AT_SYMLINK_FOLLOW or lack of AT_SYMLINK_NOFOLLOW), and the final
component is such a proc symlink, then the target of the magic symlink is
used for the operation, even if the target itself is a symlink. I.e. path
lookup is always terminated after following a final magic symlink.
I was erronously assuming that in the above case the target symlink would
also be followed, and so workarounds were added for a couple of operations
to handle the symlink case. Since the symlink can be handled simply by
following the proc symlink, these workardouds are not needed.
Also remove the "norace" option, which disabled the workarounds.
Commit bdfd667883 ("virtiofsd: Fix xattr operations") already dealt with
the same issue for xattr operations.
Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <mszeredi@redhat.com>
Message-Id: <20200514140736.20561-1-mszeredi@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Vivek Goyal <vgoyal@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Dr. David Alan Gilbert <dgilbert@redhat.com>
All this process does is wait for its child. No capabilities are
needed.
Signed-off-by: Stefan Hajnoczi <stefanha@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Philippe Mathieu-Daudé <philmd@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Dr. David Alan Gilbert <dgilbert@redhat.com>
virtiofsd runs as root but only needs a subset of root's Linux
capabilities(7). As a file server its purpose is to create and access
files on behalf of a client. It needs to be able to access files with
arbitrary uid/gid owners. It also needs to be create device nodes.
Introduce a Linux capabilities(7) whitelist and drop all capabilities
that we don't need, making the virtiofsd process less powerful than a
regular uid root process.
# cat /proc/PID/status
...
Before After
CapInh: 0000000000000000 0000000000000000
CapPrm: 0000003fffffffff 00000000880000df
CapEff: 0000003fffffffff 00000000880000df
CapBnd: 0000003fffffffff 0000000000000000
CapAmb: 0000000000000000 0000000000000000
Note that file capabilities cannot be used to achieve the same effect on
the virtiofsd executable because mount is used during sandbox setup.
Therefore we drop capabilities programmatically at the right point
during startup.
This patch only affects the sandboxed child process. The parent process
that sits in waitpid(2) still has full root capabilities and will be
addressed in the next patch.
Signed-off-by: Stefan Hajnoczi <stefanha@redhat.com>
Message-Id: <20200416164907.244868-2-stefanha@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Dr. David Alan Gilbert <dgilbert@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Dr. David Alan Gilbert <dgilbert@redhat.com>
Currently, setup_mounts() bind-mounts the shared directory without
MS_REC. This makes all submounts disappear.
Pass MS_REC so that the guest can see submounts again.
Fixes: 5baa3b8e95
Signed-off-by: Max Reitz <mreitz@redhat.com>
Message-Id: <20200424133516.73077-1-mreitz@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Dr. David Alan Gilbert <dgilbert@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Dr. David Alan Gilbert <dgilbert@redhat.com>
Changed Fixes to point to the commit with the problem rather than
the commit that turned it on
While it's not possible to escape the proc filesystem through
lo->proc_self_fd, it is possible to escape to the root of the proc
filesystem itself through "../..".
Use a temporary mount for opening lo->proc_self_fd, that has it's root at
/proc/self/fd/, preventing access to the ancestor directories.
Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <mszeredi@redhat.com>
Message-Id: <20200429124733.22488-1-mszeredi@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Stefan Hajnoczi <stefanha@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Dr. David Alan Gilbert <dgilbert@redhat.com>
The system-wide fs.file-max sysctl value determines how many files can
be open. It defaults to a value calculated based on the machine's RAM
size. Previously virtiofsd would try to set RLIMIT_NOFILE to 1,000,000
and this allowed the FUSE client to exhaust the number of open files
system-wide on Linux hosts with less than 10 GB of RAM!
Take fs.file-max into account when choosing the default RLIMIT_NOFILE
value.
Fixes: CVE-2020-10717
Reported-by: Yuval Avrahami <yavrahami@paloaltonetworks.com>
Signed-off-by: Stefan Hajnoczi <stefanha@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Dr. David Alan Gilbert <dgilbert@redhat.com>
Message-Id: <20200501140644.220940-3-stefanha@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Dr. David Alan Gilbert <dgilbert@redhat.com>
Make it possible to specify the RLIMIT_NOFILE on the command-line.
Users running multiple virtiofsd processes should allocate a certain
number to each process so that the system-wide limit can never be
exhausted.
When this option is set to 0 the rlimit is left at its current value.
This is useful when a management tool wants to configure the rlimit
itself.
The default behavior remains unchanged: try to set the limit to
1,000,000 file descriptors if the current rlimit is lower.
Signed-off-by: Stefan Hajnoczi <stefanha@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Dr. David Alan Gilbert <dgilbert@redhat.com>
Message-Id: <20200501140644.220940-2-stefanha@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Dr. David Alan Gilbert <dgilbert@redhat.com>
On success, the fdopendir() call closes fd. Later on the error
path we try to close an already-closed fd. This can lead to
use-after-free. Fix by only closing the fd if the fdopendir()
call failed.
Cc: qemu-stable@nongnu.org
Fixes: b39bce121b (add dirp_map to hide lo_dirp pointers)
Reported-by: Coverity (CID 1421933 USE_AFTER_FREE)
Suggested-by: Peter Maydell <peter.maydell@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: Philippe Mathieu-Daudé <philmd@redhat.com>
Message-Id: <20200321120654.7985-1-philmd@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Stefan Hajnoczi <stefanha@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Dr. David Alan Gilbert <dgilbert@redhat.com>
Current virtiofsd has problems about xattr operations and
they does not work properly for directory/symlink/special file.
The fundamental cause is that virtiofsd uses openat() + f...xattr()
systemcalls for xattr operation but we should not open symlink/special
file in the daemon. Therefore the function is restricted.
Fix this problem by:
1. during setup of each thread, call unshare(CLONE_FS)
2. in xattr operations (i.e. lo_getxattr), if inode is not a regular
file or directory, use fchdir(proc_loot_fd) + ...xattr() +
fchdir(root.fd) instead of openat() + f...xattr()
(Note: for a regular file/directory openat() + f...xattr()
is still used for performance reason)
With this patch, xfstests generic/062 passes on virtiofs.
This fix is suggested by Miklos Szeredi and Stefan Hajnoczi.
The original discussion can be found here:
https://www.redhat.com/archives/virtio-fs/2019-October/msg00046.html
Signed-off-by: Misono Tomohiro <misono.tomohiro@jp.fujitsu.com>
Message-Id: <20200227055927.24566-3-misono.tomohiro@jp.fujitsu.com>
Acked-by: Vivek Goyal <vgoyal@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Dr. David Alan Gilbert <dgilbert@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Dr. David Alan Gilbert <dgilbert@redhat.com>
This is a cleanup patch to simplify the following xattr fix and
there is no functional changes.
- Move memory allocation to head of the function
- Unify fgetxattr/flistxattr call for both size == 0 and
size != 0 case
- Remove redundant lo_inode_put call in error path
(Note: second call is ignored now since @inode is already NULL)
Signed-off-by: Misono Tomohiro <misono.tomohiro@jp.fujitsu.com>
Message-Id: <20200227055927.24566-2-misono.tomohiro@jp.fujitsu.com>
Acked-by: Vivek Goyal <vgoyal@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Dr. David Alan Gilbert <dgilbert@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Dr. David Alan Gilbert <dgilbert@redhat.com>
All code in fuse.h and struct fuse_module are not used by virtiofsd
so removing them is safe.
Signed-off-by: Xiao Yang <yangx.jy@cn.fujitsu.com>
Reviewed-by: Stefan Hajnoczi <stefanha@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Philippe Mathieu-Daudé <philmd@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Dr. David Alan Gilbert <dgilbert@redhat.com>
Fix warning reported by Clang static code analyzer:
CC tools/virtiofsd/fuse_lowlevel.o
tools/virtiofsd/fuse_lowlevel.c:195:9: warning: Value stored to 'error' is never read
error = -ERANGE;
^ ~~~~~~~
Fixes: 3db2876
Reported-by: Clang Static Analyzer
Reviewed-by: Ján Tomko <jtomko@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Dr. David Alan Gilbert <dgilbert@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Philippe Mathieu-Daudé <philmd@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Dr. David Alan Gilbert <dgilbert@redhat.com>
Fix warning reported by Clang static code analyzer:
CC tools/virtiofsd/passthrough_ll.o
tools/virtiofsd/passthrough_ll.c:925:9: warning: Value stored to 'newfd' is never read
newfd = -1;
^ ~~
tools/virtiofsd/passthrough_ll.c:942:9: warning: Value stored to 'newfd' is never read
newfd = -1;
^ ~~
Fixes: 7c6b66027
Reported-by: Clang Static Analyzer
Signed-off-by: Philippe Mathieu-Daudé <philmd@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Ján Tomko <jtomko@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Dr. David Alan Gilbert <dgilbert@redhat.com>
Fix warning reported by Clang static code analyzer:
CC tools/virtiofsd/passthrough_ll.o
tools/virtiofsd/passthrough_ll.c:1083:5: warning: Value stored to 'saverr' is never read
saverr = ENOMEM;
^ ~~~~~~
Fixes: 7c6b66027
Reported-by: Clang Static Analyzer
Reviewed-by: Ján Tomko <jtomko@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Dr. David Alan Gilbert <dgilbert@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Philippe Mathieu-Daudé <philmd@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Dr. David Alan Gilbert <dgilbert@redhat.com>
Missing a NULL check if the argument fetch fails.
Fixes: Coverity CID 1413119
Signed-off-by: Dr. David Alan Gilbert <dgilbert@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Philippe Mathieu-Daudé <philmd@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Stefan Hajnoczi <stefanha@redhat.com>
Missing unlock in error path.
Fixes: Covertiy CID 1413123
Signed-off-by: Dr. David Alan Gilbert <dgilbert@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Philippe Mathieu-Daudé <philmd@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Stefan Hajnoczi <stefanha@redhat.com>
If we fail when bringing up the socket we can leak the listen_fd;
in practice the daemon will exit so it's not really a problem.
Fixes: Coverity CID 1413121
Signed-off-by: Dr. David Alan Gilbert <dgilbert@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Philippe Mathieu-Daudé <philmd@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Stefan Hajnoczi <stefanha@redhat.com>
Alex Williamson
Max Reitz
Dr. David Alan Gilbert
Stefan Hajnoczi
Misono Tomohiro
Peter Maydell
Paolo Bonzini
Coiby Xu
Alex Bennée
Jiachen Zhang
Vivek Goyal
Marc-André Lureau
Sergio Lopez
Miklos Szeredi
Philippe Mathieu-Daudé
Xiao Yang