use generic cpu_model parsing introduced by
(6063d4c0f vl.c: convert cpu_model to cpu type and set of global properties before machine_init())
it allows to:
* replace sPAPRMachineClass::tcg_default_cpu with
MachineClass::default_cpu_type
* drop cpu_parse_cpu_model() from hw/ppc/spapr.c and reuse
one in vl.c
* simplify spapr_get_cpu_core_type() by removing
not needed anymore recurrsion since alias look up
happens earlier at vl.c and spapr_get_cpu_core_type()
works only with resulted from that cpu type.
* spapr no more needs to parse/depend on being phased out
MachineState::cpu_model, all tha parsing done by generic
code and target specific callback.
Signed-off-by: Igor Mammedov <imammedo@redhat.com>
[dwg: Correct minor compile error]
Signed-off-by: David Gibson <david@gibson.dropbear.id.au>
next commit will drop ppc_cpu_lookup_alias() declaration from header
and make it static which will break its last user ppc_cpu_class_by_name()
since ppc_cpu_class_by_name() defined before ppc_cpu_lookup_alias().
To avoid this move ppc_cpu_lookup_alias() right before
ppc_cpu_class_by_name().
Signed-off-by: Igor Mammedov <imammedo@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Philippe Mathieu-Daudé <f4bug@amsat.org>
Signed-off-by: David Gibson <david@gibson.dropbear.id.au>
consolidate 'host' core type registration by moving it from
KVM specific code into spapr_cpu_core.c, similar like it's
done in x86 target.
Signed-off-by: Igor Mammedov <imammedo@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Greg Kurz <groug@kaod.org>
Acked-by: David Gibson <david@gibson.dropbear.id.au>
Signed-off-by: David Gibson <david@gibson.dropbear.id.au>
replace sPAPRCPUCoreClass::cpu_class with cpu type name
since it were needed just to get that at points it were
accessed.
Signed-off-by: Igor Mammedov <imammedo@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Greg Kurz <groug@kaod.org>
Acked-by: David Gibson <david@gibson.dropbear.id.au>
Signed-off-by: David Gibson <david@gibson.dropbear.id.au>
there is a dedicated callback CPUClass::parse_features
which purpose is to convert -cpu features into a set of
global properties AND deal with compat/legacy features
that couldn't be directly translated into CPU's properties.
Create ppc variant of it (ppc_cpu_parse_featurestr) and
move 'compat=val' handling from spapr_cpu_core.c into it.
That removes a dependency of board/core code on cpu_model
parsing and would let to reuse common -cpu parsing
introduced by 6063d4c0
Set "max-cpu-compat" property only if it exists, in practice
it should limit 'compat' hack to spapr machine and allow
to avoid including machine/spapr headers in target/ppc/cpu.c
Signed-off-by: Igor Mammedov <imammedo@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: David Gibson <david@gibson.dropbear.id.au>
For POWER ISA v3.0, the XER bit CA32 needs to be set by the shift
right algebraic instructions whenever the CA bit is to be set. This
change affects the following instructions:
* Shift Right Algebraic Word (sraw[.])
* Shift Right Algebraic Word Immediate (srawi[.])
* Shift Right Algebraic Doubleword (srad[.])
* Shift Right Algebraic Doubleword Immediate (sradi[.])
Signed-off-by: Sandipan Das <sandipan@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Richard Henderson <richard.henderson@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: David Gibson <david@gibson.dropbear.id.au>
At the moment the only POWER9 model which is listed in qemu is v1.0 (aka
"DD1"). This is a very early (read, buggy) version which will never be
released to the public - it was included in qemu only for the convenience
of those doing bringup on the early silicon. For bonus points, we actually
had its PVR incorrect in the table (0x004e0000 instead of 0x004e0100). We
also never actually implemented the differences in behaviour (read, bugs)
that marked DD1 in qemu.
Now that we know the PVR for the substantially better v2.0 (DD2) chip,
include it and make it the default POWER9 in qemu. For the time being we
leave the DD1 definition in place for the poor souls (read, me) who still
need to work with DD1 hardware.
Signed-off-by: David Gibson <david@gibson.dropbear.id.au>
We don't have any 460 or 460F CPUs in QEMU, so the init functions
are just dead code. Let's simply remove them (translate_init.c
is already big enough without them).
Signed-off-by: Thomas Huth <thuth@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: David Gibson <david@gibson.dropbear.id.au>
Besides being more correct, arbitrarily long instruction allow the
generation of a translation block that spans three pages. This
confuses the generator and even allows ring 3 code to poison the
translation block cache and inject code into other processes that are
in guest ring 3.
This is an improved (and more invasive) fix for commit 30663fd ("tcg/i386:
Check the size of instruction being translated", 2017-03-24). In addition
to being more precise (and generating the right exception, which is #GP
rather than #UD), it distinguishes better between page faults and too long
instructions, as shown by this test case:
#include <sys/mman.h>
#include <string.h>
#include <stdio.h>
int main()
{
char *x = mmap(NULL, 8192, PROT_READ|PROT_WRITE|PROT_EXEC,
MAP_PRIVATE|MAP_ANON, -1, 0);
memset(x, 0x66, 4096);
x[4096] = 0x90;
x[4097] = 0xc3;
char *i = x + 4096 - 15;
mprotect(x + 4096, 4096, PROT_READ|PROT_WRITE);
((void(*)(void)) i) ();
}
... which produces a #GP without the mprotect, and a #PF with it.
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
These take care of advancing s->pc, and will provide a unified point
where to check for the 15-byte instruction length limit.
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
This should be done by all target and, since commit 53f6672bcf
("gen-icount: use tcg_ctx.tcg_env instead of cpu_env", 2017-06-30),
is causing the NIOS2 target to hang.
This is because the test for "should I exit to the main loop"
was being done with the correct offset to the icount decrementer,
but using TCG temporary 0 (the frame pointer) rather than the
env pointer.
Cc: qemu-stable@nongnu.org
Cc: Marek Vasut <marex@denx.de>
Reported-by: Thomas Huth <thuth@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
It is used by all PPC targets; we can give the directory its own
Makefile.objs file, and include it directly from target/ppc.
target/s390 can do the same when it starts using it.
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
The real kernel has TASK_SIZE as 0x7c000000, due to quirks with
a couple of SH parts. But nominally user-space is limited to 2GB.
Signed-off-by: Richard Henderson <rth@twiddle.net>
Reviewed-by: Philippe Mathieu-Daudé <f4bug@amsat.org>
Message-Id: <20170708025030.15845-4-rth@twiddle.net>
Signed-off-by: Riku Voipio <riku.voipio@linaro.org>
We had a check using TARGET_VIRT_ADDR_SPACE_BITS to make sure
that the allocation coming in from the command-line option was
not too large, but that didn't include target-specific knowledge
about other restrictions on user-space.
Remove several target-specific hacks in linux-user/main.c.
For MIPS and Nios, we can replace them with proper adjustments
to the respective target's TARGET_VIRT_ADDR_SPACE_BITS definition.
For ARM, we had no existing ifdef but I suspect that the current
default value of 0xf7000000 was chosen with this in mind. Define
a workable value in linux-user/arm/, and also document why the
special case is required.
Signed-off-by: Richard Henderson <rth@twiddle.net>
Reviewed-by: Peter Maydell <peter.maydell@linaro.org>
Message-Id: <20170708025030.15845-3-rth@twiddle.net>
Signed-off-by: Riku Voipio <riku.voipio@linaro.org>
The common situation of the SG instruction is that it is
executed from S&NSC memory by a CPU in NS state. That case
is handled by v7m_handle_execute_nsc(). However the instruction
also has defined behaviour in a couple of other cases:
* SG instruction in NS memory (behaves as a NOP)
* SG in S memory but CPU already secure (clears IT bits and
does nothing else)
* SG instruction in v8M without Security Extension (NOP)
These can be implemented in translate.c.
Signed-off-by: Peter Maydell <peter.maydell@linaro.org>
Reviewed-by: Richard Henderson <richard.henderson@linaro.org>
Message-id: 1507556919-24992-10-git-send-email-peter.maydell@linaro.org
A few Thumb instructions are always unconditional even inside an
IT block (as opposed to being UNPREDICTABLE if used inside an
IT block): BKPT, the v8M SG instruction, and the A profile
HLT (debug halt) instruction.
This means we need to suppress the jump-over-instruction-on-condfail
code generation (though the IT state still advances as usual and
subsequent insns in the IT block may be conditional).
Signed-off-by: Peter Maydell <peter.maydell@linaro.org>
Reviewed-by: Richard Henderson <richard.henderson@linaro.org>
Message-id: 1507556919-24992-9-git-send-email-peter.maydell@linaro.org
Recent changes have left insn_crosses_page() more complicated
than it needed to be:
* it's only called from thumb_tr_translate_insn() so we know
for certain that we're looking at a Thumb insn
* the caller's check for dc->pc >= dc->next_page_start - 3
means that dc->pc can't possibly be 4 aligned, so there's
no need to check that (the check was partly there to ensure
that we didn't treat an ARM insn as Thumb, I think)
* we now have thumb_insn_is_16bit() which lets us do a precise
check of the length of the next insn, rather than opencoding
an inaccurate check
Simplify it down to just loading the first half of the insn
and calling thumb_insn_is_16bit() on it.
Signed-off-by: Peter Maydell <peter.maydell@linaro.org>
Reviewed-by: Richard Henderson <richard.henderson@linaro.org>
Message-id: 1507556919-24992-8-git-send-email-peter.maydell@linaro.org
Refactor the Thumb decode to do the loads of the instruction words at
the top level rather than only loading the second half of a 32-bit
Thumb insn in the middle of the decode.
This is simple apart from the awkward case of Thumb1, where the
BL/BLX prefix and suffix instructions live in what in Thumb2 is the
32-bit insn space. To handle these we decode enough to identify
whether we're looking at a prefix/suffix that we handle as a 16 bit
insn, or a prefix that we're going to merge with the following suffix
to consider as a 32 bit insn. The translation of the 16 bit cases
then moves from disas_thumb2_insn() to disas_thumb_insn().
The refactoring has the benefit that we don't need to pass the
CPUARMState* down into the decoder code any more, but the major
reason for doing this is that some Thumb instructions must be always
unconditional regardless of the IT state bits, so we need to know the
whole insn before we emit the "skip this insn if the IT bits and cond
state tell us to" code. (The always unconditional insns are BKPT,
HLT and SG; the last of these is 32 bits.)
Signed-off-by: Peter Maydell <peter.maydell@linaro.org>
Reviewed-by: Richard Henderson <richard.henderson@linaro.org>
Message-id: 1507556919-24992-7-git-send-email-peter.maydell@linaro.org
The code which implements the Thumb1 split BL/BLX instructions
is guarded by a check on "not M or THUMB2". All we really need
to check here is "not THUMB2" (and we assume that elsewhere too,
eg in the ARCH(6T2) test that UNDEFs the Thumb2 insns).
This doesn't change behaviour because all M profile cores
have Thumb2 and so ARM_FEATURE_M implies ARM_FEATURE_THUMB2.
(v6M implements a very restricted subset of Thumb2, but we
can cross that bridge when we get to it with appropriate
feature bits.)
Signed-off-by: Peter Maydell <peter.maydell@linaro.org>
Reviewed-by: Richard Henderson <richard.henderson@linaro.org>
Message-id: 1507556919-24992-6-git-send-email-peter.maydell@linaro.org
Secure function return happens when a non-secure function has been
called using BLXNS and so has a particular magic LR value (either
0xfefffffe or 0xfeffffff). The function return via BX behaves
specially when the new PC value is this magic value, in the same
way that exception returns are handled.
Adjust our BX excret guards so that they recognize the function
return magic number as well, and perform the function-return
unstacking in do_v7m_exception_exit().
Signed-off-by: Peter Maydell <peter.maydell@linaro.org>
Acked-by: Philippe Mathieu-Daudé <f4bug@amsat.org>
Reviewed-by: Richard Henderson <richard.henderson@linaro.org>
Message-id: 1507556919-24992-5-git-send-email-peter.maydell@linaro.org
Implement the BLXNS instruction, which allows secure code to
call non-secure code.
Signed-off-by: Peter Maydell <peter.maydell@linaro.org>
Reviewed-by: Richard Henderson <richard.henderson@linaro.org>
Message-id: 1507556919-24992-4-git-send-email-peter.maydell@linaro.org
Implement the SG instruction, which we emulate 'by hand' in the
exception handling code path.
Signed-off-by: Peter Maydell <peter.maydell@linaro.org>
Reviewed-by: Richard Henderson <richard.henderson@linaro.org>
Message-id: 1507556919-24992-3-git-send-email-peter.maydell@linaro.org
Add the M profile secure MMU index values to the switch in
get_a32_user_mem_index() so that LDRT/STRT work correctly
rather than asserting at translate time.
Signed-off-by: Peter Maydell <peter.maydell@linaro.org>
Reviewed-by: Richard Henderson <richard.henderson@linaro.org>
Message-id: 1507556919-24992-2-git-send-email-peter.maydell@linaro.org
It is unlikely that we will ever want to call this helper passing
an argument other than the current PC. So just remove the argument,
and use the pc we already get from cpu_get_tb_cpu_state.
This change paves the way to having a common "tb_lookup" function.
Reviewed-by: Richard Henderson <rth@twiddle.net>
Signed-off-by: Emilio G. Cota <cota@braap.org>
Signed-off-by: Richard Henderson <richard.henderson@linaro.org>
It looks like there was a transcription error when writing this code
initially. The code previously only decoded src or dst of rax. This
resolves
https://bugs.launchpad.net/qemu/+bug/1719984.
Signed-off-by: Todd Eisenberger <teisenbe@google.com>
Message-Id: <CAP26EVRNVb=Mq=O3s51w7fDhGVmf-e3XFFA73MRzc5b4qKBA4g@mail.gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Richard Henderson <richard.henderson@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: Eduardo Habkost <ehabkost@redhat.com>
For the SG instruction and secure function return we are going
to want to do memory accesses using the MMU index of the CPU
in secure state, even though the CPU is currently in non-secure
state. Write arm_v7m_mmu_idx_for_secstate() to do this job,
and use it in cpu_mmu_index().
Signed-off-by: Peter Maydell <peter.maydell@linaro.org>
Reviewed-by: Philippe Mathieu-Daudé <f4bug@amsat.org>
Reviewed-by: Richard Henderson <richard.henderson@linaro.org>
Message-id: 1506092407-26985-17-git-send-email-peter.maydell@linaro.org
In cpu_mmu_index() we try to do this:
if (env->v7m.secure) {
mmu_idx += ARMMMUIdx_MSUser;
}
but it will give the wrong answer, because ARMMMUIdx_MSUser
includes the 0x40 ARM_MMU_IDX_M field, and so does the
mmu_idx we're adding to, and we'll end up with 0x8n rather
than 0x4n. This error is then nullified by the call to
arm_to_core_mmu_idx() which masks out the high part, but
we're about to factor out the code that calculates the
ARMMMUIdx values so it can be used without passing it through
arm_to_core_mmu_idx(), so fix this bug first.
Signed-off-by: Peter Maydell <peter.maydell@linaro.org>
Reviewed-by: Philippe Mathieu-Daudé <f4bug@amsat.org>
Reviewed-by: Richard Henderson <richard.henderson@linaro.org>
Message-id: 1506092407-26985-16-git-send-email-peter.maydell@linaro.org
Implement the security attribute lookups for memory accesses
in the get_phys_addr() functions, causing these to generate
various kinds of SecureFault for bad accesses.
The major subtlety in this code relates to handling of the
case when the security attributes the SAU assigns to the
address don't match the current security state of the CPU.
In the ARM ARM pseudocode for validating instruction
accesses, the security attributes of the address determine
whether the Secure or NonSecure MPU state is used. At face
value, handling this would require us to encode the relevant
bits of state into mmu_idx for both S and NS at once, which
would result in our needing 16 mmu indexes. Fortunately we
don't actually need to do this because a mismatch between
address attributes and CPU state means either:
* some kind of fault (usually a SecureFault, but in theory
perhaps a UserFault for unaligned access to Device memory)
* execution of the SG instruction in NS state from a
Secure & NonSecure code region
The purpose of SG is simply to flip the CPU into Secure
state, so we can handle it by emulating execution of that
instruction directly in arm_v7m_cpu_do_interrupt(), which
means we can treat all the mismatch cases as "throw an
exception" and we don't need to encode the state of the
other MPU bank into our mmu_idx values.
This commit doesn't include the actual emulation of SG;
it also doesn't include implementation of the IDAU, which
is a per-board way to specify hard-coded memory attributes
for addresses, which override the CPU-internal SAU if they
specify a more secure setting than the SAU is programmed to.
Signed-off-by: Peter Maydell <peter.maydell@linaro.org>
Reviewed-by: Richard Henderson <richard.henderson@linaro.org>
Message-id: 1506092407-26985-15-git-send-email-peter.maydell@linaro.org
Implement the register interface for the SAU: SAU_CTRL,
SAU_TYPE, SAU_RNR, SAU_RBAR and SAU_RLAR. None of the
actual behaviour is implemented here; registers just
read back as written.
When the CPU definition for Cortex-M33 is eventually
added, its initfn will set cpu->sau_sregion, in the same
way that we currently set cpu->pmsav7_dregion for the
M3 and M4.
Number of SAU regions is typically a configurable
CPU parameter, but this patch doesn't provide a
QEMU CPU property for it. We can easily add one when
we have a board that requires it.
Signed-off-by: Peter Maydell <peter.maydell@linaro.org>
Reviewed-by: Richard Henderson <richard.henderson@linaro.org>
Message-id: 1506092407-26985-14-git-send-email-peter.maydell@linaro.org
Add support for v8M and in particular the security extension
to the exception entry code. This requires changes to:
* calculation of the exception-return magic LR value
* push the callee-saves registers in certain cases
* clear registers when taking non-secure exceptions to avoid
leaking information from the interrupted secure code
* switch to the correct security state on entry
* use the vector table for the security state we're targeting
Signed-off-by: Peter Maydell <peter.maydell@linaro.org>
Reviewed-by: Richard Henderson <richard.henderson@linaro.org>
Message-id: 1506092407-26985-13-git-send-email-peter.maydell@linaro.org
For v8M, exceptions from Secure to Non-Secure state will save
callee-saved registers to the exception frame as well as the
caller-saved registers. Add support for unstacking these
registers in exception exit when necessary.
Signed-off-by: Peter Maydell <peter.maydell@linaro.org>
Reviewed-by: Richard Henderson <richard.henderson@linaro.org>
Message-id: 1506092407-26985-12-git-send-email-peter.maydell@linaro.org
In v8M, more bits are defined in the exception-return magic
values; update the code that checks these so we accept
the v8M values when the CPU permits them.
Signed-off-by: Peter Maydell <peter.maydell@linaro.org>
Reviewed-by: Richard Henderson <richard.henderson@linaro.org>
Message-id: 1506092407-26985-11-git-send-email-peter.maydell@linaro.org
Add the new M profile Secure Fault Status Register
and Secure Fault Address Register.
Signed-off-by: Peter Maydell <peter.maydell@linaro.org>
Reviewed-by: Richard Henderson <richard.henderson@linaro.org>
Message-id: 1506092407-26985-10-git-send-email-peter.maydell@linaro.org
In the v8M architecture, return from an exception to a PC which
has bit 0 set is not UNPREDICTABLE; it is defined that bit 0
is discarded [R_HRJH]. Restrict our complaint about this to v7M.
Signed-off-by: Peter Maydell <peter.maydell@linaro.org>
Reviewed-by: Philippe Mathieu-Daudé <f4bug@amsat.org>
Reviewed-by: Richard Henderson <richard.henderson@linaro.org>
Message-id: 1506092407-26985-9-git-send-email-peter.maydell@linaro.org
Attempting to do an exception return with an exception frame that
is not 8-aligned is UNPREDICTABLE in v8M; warn about this.
(It is not UNPREDICTABLE in v7M, and our implementation can
handle the merely-4-aligned case fine, so we don't need to
do anything except warn.)
Signed-off-by: Peter Maydell <peter.maydell@linaro.org>
Reviewed-by: Philippe Mathieu-Daudé <f4bug@amsat.org>
Reviewed-by: Richard Henderson <richard.henderson@linaro.org>
Message-id: 1506092407-26985-8-git-send-email-peter.maydell@linaro.org
ARM v8M specifies that the INVPC usage fault for mismatched
xPSR exception field and handler mode bit should be checked
before updating the PSR and SP, so that the fault is taken
with the existing stack frame rather than by pushing a new one.
Perform this check in the right place for v8M.
Since v7M specifies in its pseudocode that this usage fault
check should happen later, we have to retain the original
code for that check rather than being able to merge the two.
(The distinction is architecturally visible but only in
very obscure corner cases like attempting an invalid exception
return with an exception frame in read only memory.)
Signed-off-by: Peter Maydell <peter.maydell@linaro.org>
Reviewed-by: Richard Henderson <richard.henderson@linaro.org>
Message-id: 1506092407-26985-7-git-send-email-peter.maydell@linaro.org
On exception return for v8M, the SPSEL bit in the EXC_RETURN magic
value should be restored to the SPSEL bit in the CONTROL register
banked specified by the EXC_RETURN.ES bit.
Add write_v7m_control_spsel_for_secstate() which behaves like
write_v7m_control_spsel() but allows the caller to specify which
CONTROL bank to use, reimplement write_v7m_control_spsel() in
terms of it, and use it in exception return.
Signed-off-by: Peter Maydell <peter.maydell@linaro.org>
Reviewed-by: Richard Henderson <richard.henderson@linaro.org>
Message-id: 1506092407-26985-6-git-send-email-peter.maydell@linaro.org
Now that we can handle the CONTROL.SPSEL bit not necessarily being
in sync with the current stack pointer, we can restore the correct
security state on exception return. This happens before we start
to read registers off the stack frame, but after we have taken
possible usage faults for bad exception return magic values and
updated CONTROL.SPSEL.
Signed-off-by: Peter Maydell <peter.maydell@linaro.org>
Reviewed-by: Richard Henderson <richard.henderson@linaro.org>
Message-id: 1506092407-26985-5-git-send-email-peter.maydell@linaro.org
In the v7M architecture, there is an invariant that if the CPU is
in Handler mode then the CONTROL.SPSEL bit cannot be nonzero.
This in turn means that the current stack pointer is always
indicated by CONTROL.SPSEL, even though Handler mode always uses
the Main stack pointer.
In v8M, this invariant is removed, and CONTROL.SPSEL may now
be nonzero in Handler mode (though Handler mode still always
uses the Main stack pointer). In preparation for this change,
change how we handle this bit: rename switch_v7m_sp() to
the now more accurate write_v7m_control_spsel(), and make it
check both the handler mode state and the SPSEL bit.
Note that this implicitly changes the point at which we switch
active SP on exception exit from before we pop the exception
frame to after it.
Signed-off-by: Peter Maydell <peter.maydell@linaro.org>
Reviewed-by: Philippe Mathieu-Daudé <f4bug@amsat.org>
Reviewed-by: Richard Henderson <richard.henderson@linaro.org>
Message-id: 1506092407-26985-4-git-send-email-peter.maydell@linaro.org
Currently our M profile exception return code switches to the
target stack pointer relatively early in the process, before
it tries to pop the exception frame off the stack. This is
awkward for v8M for two reasons:
* in v8M the process vs main stack pointer is not selected
purely by the value of CONTROL.SPSEL, so updating SPSEL
and relying on that to switch to the right stack pointer
won't work
* the stack we should be reading the stack frame from and
the stack we will eventually switch to might not be the
same if the guest is doing strange things
Change our exception return code to use a 'frame pointer'
to read the exception frame rather than assuming that we
can switch the live stack pointer this early.
Signed-off-by: Peter Maydell <peter.maydell@linaro.org>
Reviewed-by: Philippe Mathieu-Daudé <f4bug@amsat.org>
Reviewed-by: Richard Henderson <richard.henderson@linaro.org>
Message-id: 1506092407-26985-3-git-send-email-peter.maydell@linaro.org
This properly forwards SMC events to EL2 when PSCI is provided by QEMU
itself and, thus, ARM_FEATURE_EL3 is off.
Found and tested with the Jailhouse hypervisor. Solution based on
suggestions by Peter Maydell.
Signed-off-by: Jan Kiszka <jan.kiszka@siemens.com>
Message-id: 4f243068-aaea-776f-d18f-f9e05e7be9cd@siemens.com
Reviewed-by: Peter Maydell <peter.maydell@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: Peter Maydell <peter.maydell@linaro.org>
Just as for external interrupts and I/O interrupts, we need to
initialize mchk_index during cpu reset.
Reviewed-by: Richard Henderson <rth@twiddle.net>
Reviewed-by: Thomas Huth <thuth@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Cornelia Huck <cohuck@redhat.com>
Provides an interface for getting and setting the guest's extended
TOD-Clock via a single ioctl to kvm. If the ioctl fails because it
is not support by kvm, then we fall back to the old style of
retrieving the clock via two ioctls.
Signed-off-by: Collin L. Walling <walling@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Eric Farman <farman@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Claudio Imbrenda <imbrenda@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Christian Borntraeger <borntraeger@de.ibm.com>
[split failure change from epoch index change]
Message-Id: <20171004105751.24655-2-borntraeger@de.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Thomas Huth <thuth@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Cornelia Huck <cohuck@redhat.com>
[some cosmetic fixes]
Using virtual memory access is wrong and will soon include low-address
protection checks, which is to be bypassed for STFL.
STFL is a privileged instruction and using LowCore requires
!CONFIG_USER_ONLY, so add the ifdef and move the declaration to the
right place.
This was originally part of a bigger STFL(E) refactoring.
Signed-off-by: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com>
Message-Id: <20170927170027.8539-4-david@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Richard Henderson <richard.henderson@linaro.org>
Reviewed-by: Thomas Huth <thuth@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Cornelia Huck <cohuck@redhat.com>
Will be handy in the future.
Reviewed-by: Thomas Huth <thuth@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Richard Henderson <richard.henderson@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com>
Message-Id: <20170928134609.16985-6-david@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Cornelia Huck <cohuck@redhat.com>
core_id is not needed by linux-user, as the core_id a.k.a. CPU address
is only accessible from kernel space.
Therefore, drop next_core_id and make cpu_index get autoassigned again
for linux-user.
While at it, shield core_id and cpuid completely from linux-user. cpuid
can also only be queried from kernel space.
Suggested-by: Igor Mammedov <imammedo@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Igor Mammedov <imammedo@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com>
Message-Id: <20170928134609.16985-5-david@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Cornelia Huck <cohuck@redhat.com>
