PKS introduces MSR IA32_PKRS(0x6e1) to manage the supervisor protection
key rights. Page access and writes can be managed via the MSR update
without TLB flushes when permissions change.
Add the support to save/load IA32_PKRS MSR in guest.
Signed-off-by: Chenyi Qiang <chenyi.qiang@intel.com>
Message-Id: <20210205083325.13880-2-chenyi.qiang@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Protection Keys for Supervisor-mode pages is a simple extension of
the PKU feature that QEMU already implements. For supervisor-mode
pages, protection key restrictions come from a new MSR. The MSR
has no XSAVE state associated to it.
PKS is only respected in long mode. However, in principle it is
possible to set the MSR even outside long mode, and in fact
even the XSAVE state for PKRU could be set outside long mode
using XRSTOR. So do not limit the migration subsections for
PKRU and PKRS to long mode.
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
This patch fixes a translation bug for a subset of x86 BMI instructions
such as the following:
c4 e2 f9 f7 c0 shlxq %rax, %rax, %rax
Currently, these incorrectly generate an undefined instruction exception
when SSE is disabled via CR4, while instructions like "shrxq" work fine.
The problem appears to be related to BMI instructions encoded using VEX
and with a mandatory prefix of "0x66" (data). Instructions with this
data prefix (such as shlxq) are currently rejected. Instructions with
other mandatory prefixes (such as shrxq) translate as expected.
This patch removes the incorrect check in "gen_sse" that causes the
exception to be generated. For the non-BMI cases, the check is
redundant: prefixes are already checked at line 3696.
Buglink: https://bugs.launchpad.net/qemu/+bug/1748296
Signed-off-by: David Greenaway <dgreenaway@google.com>
Message-Id: <20210114063958.1508050-1-dgreenaway@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Newer AMD CPUs will add CPUID_0x8000000A_EDX[28] bit, which indicates
that SVM instructions (VMRUN/VMSAVE/VMLOAD) will trigger #VMEXIT before
CPU checking their EAX against reserved memory regions. This change will
allow the hypervisor to avoid intercepting #GP and emulating SVM
instructions. KVM turns on this CPUID bit for nested VMs. In order to
support it, let us populate this bit, along with other SVM feature bits,
in FEAT_SVM.
Signed-off-by: Wei Huang <wei.huang2@amd.com>
Message-Id: <20210126202456.589932-1-wei.huang2@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
32-bit targets by definition do not support long mode; therefore, the
bit must be masked in the features supported by the accelerator.
As a side effect, this avoids setting up the 0x80000008 CPUID leaf
for
qemu-system-i386 -cpu host
which since commit 5a140b255d ("x86/cpu: Use max host physical address
if -cpu max option is applied") would have printed this error:
qemu-system-i386: phys-bits should be between 32 and 36 (but is 48)
Reported-by: Nathan Chancellor <natechancellor@gmail.com>
Tested-by: Nathan Chancellor <natechancellor@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Some upcoming POWER machines have a system called PEF (Protected
Execution Facility) which uses a small ultravisor to allow guests to
run in a way that they can't be eavesdropped by the hypervisor. The
effect is roughly similar to AMD SEV, although the mechanisms are
quite different.
Most of the work of this is done between the guest, KVM and the
ultravisor, with little need for involvement by qemu. However qemu
does need to tell KVM to allow secure VMs.
Because the availability of secure mode is a guest visible difference
which depends on having the right hardware and firmware, we don't
enable this by default. In order to run a secure guest you need to
create a "pef-guest" object and set the confidential-guest-support
property to point to it.
Note that this just *allows* secure guests, the architecture of PEF is
such that the guest still needs to talk to the ultravisor to enter
secure mode. Qemu has no direct way of knowing if the guest is in
secure mode, and certainly can't know until well after machine
creation time.
To start a PEF-capable guest, use the command line options:
-object pef-guest,id=pef0 -machine confidential-guest-support=pef0
Signed-off-by: David Gibson <david@gibson.dropbear.id.au>
Reviewed-by: Greg Kurz <groug@kaod.org>
While we've abstracted some (potential) differences between mechanisms for
securing guest memory, the initialization is still specific to SEV. Given
that, move it into x86's kvm_arch_init() code, rather than the generic
kvm_init() code.
Signed-off-by: David Gibson <david@gibson.dropbear.id.au>
Reviewed-by: Cornelia Huck <cohuck@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Greg Kurz <groug@kaod.org>
The platform specific details of mechanisms for implementing
confidential guest support may require setup at various points during
initialization. Thus, it's not really feasible to have a single cgs
initialization hook, but instead each mechanism needs its own
initialization calls in arch or machine specific code.
However, to make it harder to have a bug where a mechanism isn't
properly initialized under some circumstances, we want to have a
common place, late in boot, where we verify that cgs has been
initialized if it was requested.
This patch introduces a ready flag to the ConfidentialGuestSupport
base type to accomplish this, which we verify in
qemu_machine_creation_done().
Signed-off-by: David Gibson <david@gibson.dropbear.id.au>
Reviewed-by: Dr. David Alan Gilbert <dgilbert@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Greg Kurz <groug@kaod.org>
This allows failures to be reported richly and idiomatically.
Signed-off-by: David Gibson <david@gibson.dropbear.id.au>
Reviewed-by: Philippe Mathieu-Daudé <philmd@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Richard Henderson <richard.henderson@linaro.org>
Reviewed-by: Cornelia Huck <cohuck@redhat.com>
Currently the "memory-encryption" property is only looked at once we
get to kvm_init(). Although protection of guest memory from the
hypervisor isn't something that could really ever work with TCG, it's
not conceptually tied to the KVM accelerator.
In addition, the way the string property is resolved to an object is
almost identical to how a QOM link property is handled.
So, create a new "confidential-guest-support" link property which sets
this QOM interface link directly in the machine. For compatibility we
keep the "memory-encryption" property, but now implemented in terms of
the new property.
Signed-off-by: David Gibson <david@gibson.dropbear.id.au>
Reviewed-by: Greg Kurz <groug@kaod.org>
Reviewed-by: Cornelia Huck <cohuck@redhat.com>
When AMD's SEV memory encryption is in use, flash memory banks (which are
initialed by pc_system_flash_map()) need to be encrypted with the guest's
key, so that the guest can read them.
That's abstracted via the kvm_memcrypt_encrypt_data() callback in the KVM
state.. except, that it doesn't really abstract much at all.
For starters, the only call site is in code specific to the 'pc'
family of machine types, so it's obviously specific to those and to
x86 to begin with. But it makes a bunch of further assumptions that
need not be true about an arbitrary confidential guest system based on
memory encryption, let alone one based on other mechanisms:
* it assumes that the flash memory is defined to be encrypted with the
guest key, rather than being shared with hypervisor
* it assumes that that hypervisor has some mechanism to encrypt data into
the guest, even though it can't decrypt it out, since that's the whole
point
* the interface assumes that this encrypt can be done in place, which
implies that the hypervisor can write into a confidential guests's
memory, even if what it writes isn't meaningful
So really, this "abstraction" is actually pretty specific to the way SEV
works. So, this patch removes it and instead has the PC flash
initialization code call into a SEV specific callback.
Signed-off-by: David Gibson <david@gibson.dropbear.id.au>
Reviewed-by: Cornelia Huck <cohuck@redhat.com>
Several architectures have mechanisms which are designed to protect
guest memory from interference or eavesdropping by a compromised
hypervisor. AMD SEV does this with in-chip memory encryption and
Intel's TDX can do similar things. POWER's Protected Execution
Framework (PEF) accomplishes a similar goal using an ultravisor and
new memory protection features, instead of encryption.
To (partially) unify handling for these, this introduces a new
ConfidentialGuestSupport QOM base class. "Confidential" is kind of vague,
but "confidential computing" seems to be the buzzword about these schemes,
and "secure" or "protected" are often used in connection to unrelated
things (such as hypervisor-from-guest or guest-from-guest security).
The "support" in the name is significant because in at least some of the
cases it requires the guest to take specific actions in order to protect
itself from hypervisor eavesdropping.
Signed-off-by: David Gibson <david@gibson.dropbear.id.au>
This will allow us to centralize the registration of
the cpus.c module accelerator operations (in accel/accel-softmmu.c),
and trigger it automatically using object hierarchy lookup from the
new accel_init_interfaces() initialization step, depending just on
which accelerators are available in the code.
Rename all tcg-cpus.c, kvm-cpus.c, etc to tcg-accel-ops.c,
kvm-accel-ops.c, etc, matching the object type names.
Signed-off-by: Claudio Fontana <cfontana@suse.de>
Message-Id: <20210204163931.7358-18-cfontana@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Richard Henderson <richard.henderson@linaro.org>
we cannot in principle make the TCG Operations field definitions
conditional on CONFIG_TCG in code that is included by both common_ss
and specific_ss modules.
Therefore, what we can do safely to restrict the TCG fields to TCG-only
builds, is to move all tcg cpu operations into a separate header file,
which is only included by TCG, target-specific code.
This leaves just a NULL pointer in the cpu.h for the non-TCG builds.
This also tidies up the code in all targets a bit, having all TCG cpu
operations neatly contained by a dedicated data struct.
Signed-off-by: Claudio Fontana <cfontana@suse.de>
Message-Id: <20210204163931.7358-16-cfontana@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Richard Henderson <richard.henderson@linaro.org>
commit 568496c0c0 ("cpu: Add callback to check architectural") and
commit 3826121d92 ("target-arm: Implement checking of fired")
introduced an ARM-specific hack for cpu_check_watchpoint.
Make debug_check_watchpoint optional, and move it to tcg_ops.
Signed-off-by: Claudio Fontana <cfontana@suse.de>
Reviewed-by: Alex Bennée <alex.bennee@linaro.org>
Message-Id: <20210204163931.7358-15-cfontana@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Richard Henderson <richard.henderson@linaro.org>
commit 4061200059 ("arm: Correctly handle watchpoints for BE32 CPUs")
introduced this ARM-specific, TCG-specific hack to adjust the address,
before checking it with cpu_check_watchpoint.
Make adjust_watchpoint_address optional and move it to tcg_ops.
Signed-off-by: Claudio Fontana <cfontana@suse.de>
Reviewed-by: Alex Bennée <alex.bennee@linaro.org>
Message-Id: <20210204163931.7358-14-cfontana@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Richard Henderson <richard.henderson@linaro.org>
make it consistently SOFTMMU-only.
Signed-off-by: Claudio Fontana <cfontana@suse.de>
Reviewed-by: Alex Bennée <alex.bennee@linaro.org>
Reviewed-by: Philippe Mathieu-Daudé <philmd@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Richard Henderson <richard.henderson@linaro.org>
[claudio: make the field presence in cpu.h unconditional, removing the ifdefs]
Message-Id: <20210204163931.7358-12-cfontana@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Richard Henderson <richard.henderson@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: Claudio Fontana <cfontana@suse.de>
Reviewed-by: Alex Bennée <alex.bennee@linaro.org>
Reviewed-by: Philippe Mathieu-Daudé <philmd@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Richard Henderson <richard.henderson@linaro.org>
[claudio: wrap target code around CONFIG_TCG and !CONFIG_USER_ONLY]
avoiding its use in headers used by common_ss code (should be poisoned).
Note: need to be careful with the use of CONFIG_USER_ONLY,
Message-Id: <20210204163931.7358-11-cfontana@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Richard Henderson <richard.henderson@linaro.org>
cc->do_interrupt is in theory a TCG callback used in accel/tcg only,
to prepare the emulated architecture to take an interrupt as defined
in the hardware specifications,
but in reality the _do_interrupt style of functions in targets are
also occasionally reused by KVM to prepare the architecture state in a
similar way where userspace code has identified that it needs to
deliver an exception to the guest.
In the case of ARM, that includes:
1) the vcpu thread got a SIGBUS indicating a memory error,
and we need to deliver a Synchronous External Abort to the guest to
let it know about the error.
2) the kernel told us about a debug exception (breakpoint, watchpoint)
but it is not for one of QEMU's own gdbstub breakpoints/watchpoints
so it must be a breakpoint the guest itself has set up, therefore
we need to deliver it to the guest.
So in order to reuse code, the same arm_do_interrupt function is used.
This is all fine, but we need to avoid calling it using the callback
registered in CPUClass, since that one is now TCG-only.
Fortunately this is easily solved by replacing calls to
CPUClass::do_interrupt() with explicit calls to arm_do_interrupt().
Signed-off-by: Claudio Fontana <cfontana@suse.de>
Reviewed-by: Alex Bennée <alex.bennee@linaro.org>
Reviewed-by: Philippe Mathieu-Daudé <philmd@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Richard Henderson <richard.henderson@linaro.org>
Cc: Peter Maydell <peter.maydell@linaro.org>
Message-Id: <20210204163931.7358-9-cfontana@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Richard Henderson <richard.henderson@linaro.org>
for now only TCG is allowed as an accelerator for riscv,
so remove the CONFIG_TCG use.
Signed-off-by: Claudio Fontana <cfontana@suse.de>
Reviewed-by: Alistair Francis <alistair.francis@wdc.com>
Reviewed-by: Alex Bennée <alex.bennee@linaro.org>
Message-Id: <20210204163931.7358-3-cfontana@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Richard Henderson <richard.henderson@linaro.org>
The TCG-specific CPU methods will be moved to a separate struct,
to make it easier to move accel-specific code outside generic CPU
code in the future. Start by moving tcg_initialize().
The new CPUClass.tcg_opts field may eventually become a pointer,
but keep it an embedded struct for now, to make code conversion
easier.
Signed-off-by: Eduardo Habkost <ehabkost@redhat.com>
[claudio: move TCGCpuOperations inside include/hw/core/cpu.h]
Reviewed-by: Alex Bennée <alex.bennee@linaro.org>
Message-Id: <20210204163931.7358-2-cfontana@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Richard Henderson <richard.henderson@linaro.org>
Only define the register if it exists for the cpu.
Signed-off-by: Richard Henderson <richard.henderson@linaro.org>
Message-id: 20210120031656.737646-1-richard.henderson@linaro.org
Reviewed-by: Peter Maydell <peter.maydell@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: Peter Maydell <peter.maydell@linaro.org>
This was defined at some point before ARMv8.4, and will
shortly be used by new processor descriptions.
Reviewed-by: Peter Maydell <peter.maydell@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: Richard Henderson <richard.henderson@linaro.org>
Message-id: 20210120204400.1056582-1-richard.henderson@linaro.org
Signed-off-by: Peter Maydell <peter.maydell@linaro.org>
gcc (Debian 10.2.1-6) 10.2.1 20210110 aborts builds with enabled sanitizers:
../../../target/rx/op_helper.c: In function ‘helper_scmpu’:
../../../target/rx/op_helper.c:213:24: error: ‘tmp1’ may be used uninitialized in this function [-Werror=maybe-uninitialized]
213 | env->psw_c = (tmp0 >= tmp1);
| ~~~~~~^~~~~~~~
../../../target/rx/op_helper.c:213:24: error: ‘tmp0’ may be used uninitialized in this function [-Werror=maybe-uninitialized]
../../../target/rx/op_helper.c: In function ‘helper_suntil’:
../../../target/rx/op_helper.c:299:23: error: ‘tmp’ may be used uninitialized in this function [-Werror=maybe-uninitialized]
299 | env->psw_c = (tmp <= env->regs[2]);
| ~~~~~^~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
../../../target/rx/op_helper.c: In function ‘helper_swhile’:
../../../target/rx/op_helper.c:318:23: error: ‘tmp’ may be used uninitialized in this function [-Werror=maybe-uninitialized]
318 | env->psw_c = (tmp <= env->regs[2]);
| ~~~~~^~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
Rewriting the code fixes those errors.
Signed-off-by: Stefan Weil <sw@weilnetz.de>
Reviewed-by: Philippe Mathieu-Daudé <f4bug@amsat.org>
Reviewed-by: Thomas Huth <thuth@redhat.com>
Message-Id: <20210128172127.46041-1-sw@weilnetz.de>
Signed-off-by: Laurent Vivier <laurent@vivier.eu>
The easiest spots to use QAPI_LIST_APPEND are where we already have an
obvious pointer to the tail of a list. While at it, consistently use
the variable name 'tail' for that purpose.
Signed-off-by: Eric Blake <eblake@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Vladimir Sementsov-Ogievskiy <vsementsov@virtuozzo.com>
Reviewed-by: Markus Armbruster <armbru@redhat.com>
Message-Id: <20210113221013.390592-5-eblake@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Markus Armbruster <armbru@redhat.com>
Using the cfg.use_non_secure bitfield and the MMU access type, we can determine
if the access should be secure or not.
Signed-off-by: Joe Komlodi <komlodi@xilinx.com>
Reviewed-by: Edgar E. Iglesias <edgar.iglesias@xilinx.com>
Tested-by: Edgar E. Iglesias <edgar.iglesias@xilinx.com>
Message-Id: <1611274735-303873-4-git-send-email-komlodi@xilinx.com>
Signed-off-by: Edgar E. Iglesias <edgar.iglesias@xilinx.com>
Using MMUAccessType makes it more clear what the variable's use is.
No functional change.
Signed-off-by: Joe Komlodi <komlodi@xilinx.com>
Reviewed-by: Richard Henderson <richard.henderson@linaro.org>
Reviewed-by: Edgar E. Iglesias <edgar.iglesias@xilinx.com>
Tested-by: Edgar E. Iglesias <edgar.iglesias@xilinx.com>
Message-Id: <1611274735-303873-3-git-send-email-komlodi@xilinx.com>
Signed-off-by: Edgar E. Iglesias <edgar.iglesias@xilinx.com>
This property is used to control the security of the following interfaces
on MicroBlaze:
M_AXI_DP - data interface
M_AXI_IP - instruction interface
M_AXI_DC - dcache interface
M_AXI_IC - icache interface
It works by enabling or disabling the use of the non_secure[3:0] signals.
Interfaces and their corresponding values are taken from:
https://www.xilinx.com/support/documentation/sw_manuals/xilinx2020_2/ug984-vivado-microblaze-ref.pdf
page 153.
Signed-off-by: Joe Komlodi <komlodi@xilinx.com>
Reviewed-by: Edgar E. Iglesias <edgar.iglesias@xilinx.com>
Tested-by: Edgar E. Iglesias <edgar.iglesias@xilinx.com>
Message-Id: <1611274735-303873-2-git-send-email-komlodi@xilinx.com>
Signed-off-by: Edgar E. Iglesias <edgar.iglesias@xilinx.com>
QEMU option -cpu max(max_features) means "Enables all features supported by
the accelerator in the current host", this looks true for all the features
except guest max physical address width, so add this patch to enable it.
Signed-off-by: Yang Weijiang <weijiang.yang@intel.com>
Message-Id: <20210113090430.26394-1-weijiang.yang@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Using strncpy with length equal to the size of target array, GCC 11
reports following warning:
warning: '__builtin_strncpy' specified bound 256 equals destination size [-Wstringop-truncation]
We can prevent this warning by using strpadcpy that copies string
up to specified length, zeroes target array after copied string
and does not raise warning when length is equal to target array
size (and ending '\0' is discarded).
Signed-off-by: Miroslav Rezanina <mrezanin@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Thomas Huth <thuth@redhat.com>
Message-Id: <6f86915755219cf6a671788075da4809b57f7d7b.1610607906.git.mrezanin@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Cornelia Huck <cohuck@redhat.com>
In our EXECUTE fast path, we have to ignore the content of r0, if
specified by b1 or b2.
Fixes: d376f123c7 ("target/s390x: Re-implement a few EXECUTE target insns directly")
Reviewed-by: Richard Henderson <richard.henderson@linaro.org>
Reviewed-by: Thomas Huth <thuth@redhat.com>
Tested-by: Nick Desaulniers <ndesaulniers@google.com>
Tested-by: Guenter Roeck <linux@roeck-us.net>
Signed-off-by: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com>
Message-Id: <20210111163845.18148-6-david@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Cornelia Huck <cohuck@redhat.com>
Using get_address() with register identifiers comming from an "r" field
is wrong: if the "r" field designates "r0", we don't read the content
and instead assume 0 - which should only be applied when the register
was specified via "b" or "x".
PoP 5-11 "Operand-Address Generation":
"A zero in any of the B1, B2, X2, B3, or B4 fields indicates the absence
of the corresponding address component. For the absent component, a zero
is used in forming the intermediate sum, regardless of the contents of
general register 0. A displacement of zero has no special significance."
This BUG became visible for CSPG as generated by LLVM-12 in the upstream
Linux kernel (v5.11-rc2), used while creating the linear mapping in
vmem_map_init(): Trying to store to address 0 results in a Low Address
Protection exception.
Debugging this was more complicated than it could have been: The program
interrupt handler in the kernel will try to crash the kernel: doing so, it
will enable DAT. As the linear mapping is not created yet (asce=0), we run
into an addressing exception while tring to walk non-existant DAT tables,
resulting in a program exception loop.
This allows for booting upstream Linux kernels compiled by clang-12. Most
of these cases seem to be broken forever.
Reported-by: Nick Desaulniers <ndesaulniers@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Richard Henderson <richard.henderson@linaro.org>
Tested-by: Nick Desaulniers <ndesaulniers@google.com>
Tested-by: Guenter Roeck <linux@roeck-us.net>
Cc: Guenter Roeck <linux@roeck-us.net>
Cc: Christian Borntraeger <borntraeger@de.ibm.com>
Cc: Heiko Carstens <hca@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com>
Message-Id: <20210111163845.18148-4-david@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Cornelia Huck <cohuck@redhat.com>
RISBHG is broken and currently hinders clang-11 builds of upstream kernels
from booting: the kernel crashes early, while decompressing the image.
[...]
Kernel fault: interruption code 0005 ilc:2
Kernel random base: 0000000000000000
PSW : 0000200180000000 0000000000017a1e
R:0 T:0 IO:0 EX:0 Key:0 M:0 W:0 P:0 AS:0 CC:2 PM:0 RI:0 EA:3
GPRS: 0000000000000001 0000000c00000000 00000003fffffff4 00000000fffffff0
0000000000000000 00000000fffffff4 000000000000000c 00000000fffffff0
00000000fffffffc 0000000000000000 00000000fffffff8 00000000008e25a8
0000000000000009 0000000000000002 0000000000000008 000000000000bce0
One example of a buggy instruction is:
17dde: ec 1e 00 9f 20 5d risbhg %r1,%r14,0,159,32
With %r14 = 0x9 and %r1 = 0x7 should result in %r1 = 0x900000007, however,
results in %r1 = 0.
Let's interpret values of i3/i4 as documented in the PoP and make
computation of "mask" only based on i3 and i4 and use "pmask" only at the
very end to make sure wrapping is only applied to the high/low doubleword.
With this patch, I can successfully boot a v5.11-rc2 kernel built with
clang-11, and gcc builds keep on working.
Fixes: 2d6a869833 ("target-s390: Implement RISBG")
Reported-by: Nick Desaulniers <ndesaulniers@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Richard Henderson <richard.henderson@linaro.org>
Tested-by: Guenter Roeck <linux@roeck-us.net>
Tested-by: Nick Desaulniers <ndesaulniers@google.com>
Cc: Guenter Roeck <linux@roeck-us.net>
Cc: Christian Borntraeger <borntraeger@de.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com>
Message-Id: <20210111163845.18148-3-david@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Cornelia Huck <cohuck@redhat.com>
Looks like something went wrong whiel touching that line. Instead of "r1"
we need a new temporary. Also, we have to pass MO_TEQ, to indicate that
we are working with 64-bit values. Let's revert these changes.
Fixes: ff26d287bd ("target/s390x: Improve cc computation for ADD LOGICAL")
Reviewed-by: Richard Henderson <richard.henderson@linaro.org>
Tested-by: Nick Desaulniers <ndesaulniers@google.com>
Tested-by: Guenter Roeck <linux@roeck-us.net>
Signed-off-by: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com>
Message-Id: <20210111163845.18148-2-david@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Cornelia Huck <cohuck@redhat.com>
When building with GCC 10.2 configured with --extra-cflags=-Os, we get:
target/arm/m_helper.c: In function ‘arm_v7m_cpu_do_interrupt’:
target/arm/m_helper.c:1811:16: error: ‘restore_s16_s31’ may be used uninitialized in this function [-Werror=maybe-uninitialized]
1811 | if (restore_s16_s31) {
| ^
target/arm/m_helper.c:1350:10: note: ‘restore_s16_s31’ was declared here
1350 | bool restore_s16_s31;
| ^~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
cc1: all warnings being treated as errors
Initialize the 'restore_s16_s31' variable to silence the warning.
Signed-off-by: Philippe Mathieu-Daudé <f4bug@amsat.org>
Message-id: 20210119062739.589049-1-f4bug@amsat.org
Reviewed-by: Peter Maydell <peter.maydell@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: Peter Maydell <peter.maydell@linaro.org>
Update all users of do_perm_pred3 for the new
predicate descriptor field definitions.
Cc: qemu-stable@nongnu.org
Signed-off-by: Richard Henderson <richard.henderson@linaro.org>
Message-id: 20210113062650.593824-4-richard.henderson@linaro.org
Reviewed-by: Peter Maydell <peter.maydell@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: Peter Maydell <peter.maydell@linaro.org>
These two were odd, in that do_pfirst_pnext passed the
count of 64-bit words rather than bytes. Change to pass
the standard pred_full_reg_size to avoid confusion.
Cc: qemu-stable@nongnu.org
Signed-off-by: Richard Henderson <richard.henderson@linaro.org>
Message-id: 20210113062650.593824-3-richard.henderson@linaro.org
Reviewed-by: Peter Maydell <peter.maydell@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: Peter Maydell <peter.maydell@linaro.org>
SVE predicate operations cannot use the "usual" simd_desc
encoding, because the lengths are not a multiple of 8.
But we were abusing the SIMD_* fields to store values anyway.
This abuse broke when SIMD_OPRSZ_BITS was modified in e2e7168a21.
Introduce a new set of field definitions for exclusive use
of predicates, so that it is obvious what kind of predicate
we are manipulating. To be used in future patches.
Cc: qemu-stable@nongnu.org
Signed-off-by: Richard Henderson <richard.henderson@linaro.org>
Message-id: 20210113062650.593824-2-richard.henderson@linaro.org
Reviewed-by: Peter Maydell <peter.maydell@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: Peter Maydell <peter.maydell@linaro.org>
